著者

小島 真智子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_17-204_32, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

85

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This paper deals with the continuities and changes in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy by asking the following question: has the basic notion of French strategy switched to the so-called “deterrence by denial” as opposed to “deterrence by punishment”? Some raised such question, by observing that France no longer insists on her nuclear weapons’ retaliatory capabilities, but underlines its arms’ precision as if they were to be used in counter-force operations. Such critiques do not make sense to others, because all deterrence capabilities should be or should at least look operational in order to be effective. And in a world where many countries are increasing their military invulnerabilities, the search for operational capabilities is a condition sine qua non to strengthen the deterrence.In order to answer the above question, this article first traces the French nuclear strategy thinking from 1945 on, with a focus on the strategic quarrels, in 1960s, between Pierre Gallois and Raymond Aron. Aron was against Gallois’ nuclear weapons’ “equalizer” concept which made French nuclear deterrence oriented not only against Russians but also against Americans. These quarrels were more political than strategic. In fact, the Vth republic under De Gaulle promoted the notion of national independence based on Gallois’ concept on nuclear deterrence and rejected Aron’s preferences on France-US cooperative relations. The article then analyses how France’s independent nuclear policy found its righteousness as US-USSR condominium emerged during the Cold war. France was against US coexistence with the Soviets which would undermine its Ally’s national interest. The US-USSR condominium was sacred through Arms Control measures. Even Aron criticized the condominium by calling the SALT I agreement a US-USSR “Alliance”.The second part of the article is devoted to the revision of France’s nuclear deterrence strategy in the post-Cold war era. It was especially under Jacques Chirac’s administration that France’s nuclear doctrine went through an important revision. The article uses presidential discourses, parliamentary discussions as well as ministerial internal documents such as “Horizon stratégique” in order to analyze how and why France had to review its nuclear deterrence strategy. The focus here is put on the notion of “counter-deterrence”. This notion is based on France’s recognition that France can no longer be on the side to deter but will be deterred by an emerging country in the post Cold war era. And it happens that these emerging countries are non-democratic countries marking the decline of the Occident.This article concludes that continuities in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy remains essential whereas the changes are only apparent. The changes are nonetheless important because they confirm that today’s nuclear world order as two-folds (or disconnected between): global order between Russians and Americans; regional order among emerging nuclear countries including nuclear-capable Iran.

著者

シナン レヴェント

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_33-204_48, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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This manuscript analyzes the nationalism seen in Japan’s Middle East diplomacy after the World War II, focusing on Takeyo Nakatani, the president of Japan Arab Society. Nakatani’s activities, thoughts about the Middle East, and his network with Japanese politicians will be investigated. Specifically, it examines Nakatani’s relationship with conservative politicians such as Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Takeo Miki etc. in his approach to the Arabian countries, as well as how Nakatani’s Pan-Asiatic notion left over from the pre-war period effected his ‘public diplomacy’ to the Middle East.Concretely, the manuscript first examines Nakatani’s role in Japan’s involvement of the Egyptian Aswan High Dam construction project. Then, it inquires the process of establishing the Japan Arab Society in Tokyo and Nakatani’s ‘public diplomacy’ with Egypt and other Arab countries. Finally, Nakatani’s postwar Asianism is discussed in the example of the Middle East issues, especially the Palestinian Question.Consequently, Nakatani was a Japanese nationalist, keenly advocating that the Japanese Imperial regime and so the institution of Tennō should be preserved in post-war time. Tennō, Japanese Emperor was a holy existence which took his roots from a two-thousand year history and was placed at the center of Japanese nation and people. His ideological background deeply related to the Greater Asianism, Pan-Asianism in other word, did not leave him in post-war period either.Since Japan’s technological and economical superiority to other Asian countries, he consistently advocated that Japan was still the leader nation of all Asia even in post-war time. He believed that most of Arabian countries in the Middle East obtained their independence via Japanese defeat in the World War II, that Nakatani explained it as ‘Japanese sacrifice for Asian nations’ in the war.‘Asia’, which was Tōyō in Nakatani’s word, was centered on Japan and Japanese Emperor was the core of this concept. Nakatani’s way of thinking is none other than ‘the post-war Asianism’. He thought that Japan’s diplomacy towards the Middle East as a demilitarized country should be based on peaceful system, and the economic and technical aspects should be mainstream of the politics to countries in the region.Briefly, Nakatani as a non-state actor played crucial roles in Japan’s Middle East diplomacy in post-war period. And Asianism, nationalist ideology in Japan before and during the war was still effective in his actions, remarks on the Middle East issues and even network in the relations with both Japanese politicians and leaders of Arab countries.

著者

藤田 将史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_49-204_65, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

58

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Since the liberalization of capital accounts, huge international financial crises have resulted repeatedly and caused serious damage. This experience clearly demonstrates that the international lender of last resort is essential for the stable development of the global economy.Intriguingly, the U.S. that bore the responsibility of the international lender of last resort after World War II ceased bilateral balance of payment (BOP) support recently and commenced its delegation to the IMF (International Monetary Fund). Prior to the second half of the 1990s, the U.S. gave huge amounts of bilateral BOP support to economically or politically important countries because it is easier to reflect U.S. national interests in bilateral support than multilateral ones. However, since the second half of the 1990s, the U.S. has provided limited bilateral support however important a crisis country is, and increased contribution to the IMF instead. Why has the U.S. ceased to provide support by itself and delegated the role of the international lender of last resort to the IMF?Previous studies explained the U.S. utilization of the IMF mainly by two international factors: change in the nature of BOP support from economic stabilization to structural adjustment and a decline in the U.S. financial capacity. However, these international factors dissipated post the second half of the 1990s with no precise explanations for the U.S. delegation to the IMF during that period.Therefore, this paper focuses on the U.S. domestic decision-making process that previous studies almost ignored and presents a hypothesis that the Congress has delegated the BOP support to the IMF for the purpose of blame avoidance. That is, while integration of the U.S. economy into the global financial system increased the necessity of BOP support for the American political elites, enlarging inequality also increased discontent in the U.S. voters with the support. Consequently, members of Congress that faced a serious dilemma have delegated the support to the IMF for reconciliation between implementation of necessary BOP support and maintenance of political support from voters. This paper verifies that hypothesis both by statistical analysis and by supplementary case analysis.This paper has three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it demonstrates that the IMF has a politically important function to the U.S. that enables implementation of large BOP support through domestic blame avoidance. Second, it confirms the significant role and preferences of the Congress in deciding the means of the U.S. BOP support. Third, it hints at the general theory of international institutions that multilateral organizations can be utilized for blame avoidance because they can lower the visibility of operations controversial in domestic politics.

著者

山口 航

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_105-202_108, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

一政 祐行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_17-203_32, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

77

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It has been a long time since the international security dealing with nuclear weapons started to be called the “second nuclear age.” The second nuclear age has lasted more than 30 years since the end of the Cold War. There is considerable diversity in established studies on this era, which need to be assessed and analyzed. Based on those studies, this paper examines how international security related to nuclear weapons in the second nuclear age have changed since the “first nuclear age.” It also discusses whether the international community in the second nuclear age is safer or more in danger than it was in the first nuclear age.The international environment of nuclear weapons has changed dramatically during the second nuclear age, and the horizontal nuclear proliferation has resulted in the birth of three regional substantial nuclear powers. There are other concerns about proliferation, especially among Asian countries. India and Pakistan, which have possessed nuclear weapons during the second nuclear age, have yet to dispel the risk of nuclear warfare. Although two countries are working to establish hotlines and implement measures to improve their relations, India has set a nuclear triad to improve its second-strike ability, and Pakistan is rushing to develop tactical nuclear forces to realize an immediate reactive nuclear posture. As for the “third nuclear crisis of the Korean Peninsula,” North Korea has repeatedly done provocative acts, which have been increasingly alarming its neighboring countries and the United States and destabilizing the region’s security. The blitz summit meetings between the U.S. and North Korea seemed to open the way to denuclearization talks. Still, no concrete results have yet been achieved. While the number of nuclear weapons in the world is reducing, nuclear-weapon states and substantial nuclear powers strive to modernize their nuclear forces. Among nuclear weapon states, the number of countries adopting the no first use (NFU) policy does not increase. The norm of “the sole purpose of nuclear weapons” has not been adopted, and counties seek more advanced transporting means of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, nuclear arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts still significantly influence international security and its strategic stability.In conclusion, security policies related to nuclear weapons has been changing, depending on whether the object of safety is a state or the entire human race. Therefore, multilateral nuclear non-proliferation will be more required in international politics in the future.

著者

秋山 信将

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_33-203_46, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

46

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Arms control policy is aimed at achieving objectives such as (1) disarmament, (2) stability, and (3) the pursuit of superiority. These objectives can be understood as three aspects of arms control policy that are simultaneously in place, rather than mutually exclusive. Under stability, there was at the same time a technological and political competition between the great powers for superiority within a framework set by the arms control regime. Which of these aspects is emphasized in the negotiation and policy pursuits of arms control and which of these aspects comes into play in reaching an agreement between the parties will depend on (1) the international political environment, particularly the distribution of power, (2) domestic political dynamics, and (3) innovations in weapons technology.This paper discusses how the multi-polarization of the international political structure due to the rise of China and changes in military strategy due to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic gliding and precision warheads, missile defense, and cyber offense will affect the designing of deterrence architecture and the modality of nuclear arms control regime that defines the framework for strategic competition between the major powers.The nuclear arms control regime encompasses the conflicting objectives of ensuring stability and pursuing superiority. As the United States, Russia, and China have different strategic visions and different prospects for power distribution in the future, which increase uncertainty in the prospect nature and modality of mutual relationships among them, as emerging technologies assign a strategic role to conventional and cyber technologies, and as non-strategic uses of nuclear weapons are incorporated into national nuclear policies, a concept of strategic stability will require extensive work to re-define. Institutionalizing nuclear deterrence at the strategic level based on mutual vulnerability is not enough to ensure stability among states, and the potential for intense security competition to unfold across the borders of nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional domains is increasing. As a result, different nuclear weapons employment policies make it difficult to find a point of equilibrium in the institutional design of an arms control regime that ensures the establishment of stability among the three countries, including the United States, Russia and China. In addition, as a result of the convergence of competition at the global level of the great powers and regional security that includes non-nuclear allies, a new challenge has also arisen: how can arms control bridge the stability at the strategic level between the great powers and security at the regional level?

著者

戸﨑 洋史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_47-203_62, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

40

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The basic structure of nuclear arms control during and after the Cold War was shaped mainly by the structure of the international system and its balance of power. Particularly for the great powers, nuclear arms control was one of the key tools for maintaining the international order they led.Since the U.S.-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed in 2010, nuclear arms control has been at a standstill for a decade. This can be mainly seen as a consequence of power transition in the international system, which has affected the trend of nuclear weapons issues at the unit level as well. The narrowing of the power/nuclear disparity in the post post-Cold War era has brought about dual multipolarity of nuclear arms control among the great powers and between the great and other major countries, suggesting a possibility that the framework as well as regime of nuclear arms control would also be transformed considerably. Especially in multilateral nuclear arms control, difficulties of achieving agreements—through coordination of national and security interests and convergence of objectives among countries involved—increase exponentially.In addition, the implications for nuclear arms control of the modernization of nuclear forces, and the technological development and proliferation of both nuclear and conventional forces have also being becoming apparent. On the one hand, the development of highly capable conventional forces which could compliment nuclear forces could reduce the role of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a country facing a threat of its adversary’s advanced conventional weapons would increase its reliance on nuclear weapons in order to offset its inferiority, and thus increase its reluctance to engage in nuclear arms control by which its nuclear activities are bound. Besides that, since conventional weapons do not have equivalent psychological and strategic impact as nuclear weapons, the incentives for promoting conventional arms control are not as high as those for nuclear arms control, which would also impede a progress of nuclear arms control.The possible transformation of nuclear arms control is complicated due to the dual multiporality of countries involved and diversification of nuclear and conventional forces, making it difficult to predict the future of nuclear arms control. Furthermore, as great power/geopolitical competitions have intensified, countries involved are re-emphasizing the importance of nuclear deterrents in their security policies. However, this is also the moment when nuclear arms control is most needed. It is necessary to renovate framework and discourse on nuclear arms control that takes into account the complexities surrounding nuclear weapons issues.

著者

向 和歌奈

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_63-203_79, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

43

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There seems to be a tendency that nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence have been treated as contradictory concepts. Those who have advocated nuclear disarmament, and ultimately the elimination of nuclear weapons, have claimed that the idea of nuclear deterrence has long been an obstacle for the further progress of nuclear disarmament. Likewise, promoters of nuclear deterrence consider the concept itself as an important mechanism to enhance international peace and security, and thus tend to neglect the idea of nuclear disarmament. In other words, the two concepts are on the opposite ends of the spectrum.At the same time, it is also possible to point out that the concept of deterrence and disarmament have long been inseparable, and that the two have progressed in parallel with each other. In other words, the promotion of nuclear disarmament has, in some cases, reinforced the concept of nuclear deterrence.In the early ages of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union experienced a period in which the two countries were contemplating the idea of a General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) with specific proposals for a treaty to initiate the concept. Both the United States and the Soviet Union craved for international support to let the world know that they were seriously thinking of how to ultimately avoid war. On the other hand, the two countries recognized from an early stage that it was nearly impossible to reach an agreement on GCD, and the two moved in the direction of a search for multilateral arms control agreements, resulting in the creation of the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).Both the PTBT and the NPT contributed in securing the nuclear status of the already-nuclear possessing states at that time. The two treaties were attempts by the already-nuclear possessing states to dominate nuclear weapons, which were considered as signs that nuclear deterrence does matter in international politics. This prompted discontent among the nuclear threshold states, which eventually led them to acquire their own nuclear weapons.The indefinite extension of the NPT, the creation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) were cases in which the importance of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence were more explicitly and implicitly advocated by countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. The TPNW which stigmatizes nuclear weapons made the gap between the so-called “deterrers” and “disarmers” even more solid. Moreover, it reminded the international community that not only countries that possess nuclear weapons but also countries that are under the nuclear umbrella regard nuclear deterrence too important to let go, even being accused of not being faithful to the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

著者

足立 研幾

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_94-203_109, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

61

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The nuclear non-proliferation norm is one of the most important norms in international security to date. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was created to implement this norm and took effect in 1970. Since then, the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states has been curbed to a considerable extent. However, after the end of the Cold War, a couple of countries clearly violated the norm. Sanctions against such misconduct have not been strong enough to enforce compliance. The nuclear non-proliferation norm has been shaken from many angles and severely damaged. Will this lead to the degeneration and disappearance of the nuclear non-proliferation norm and the collapse of nuclear non-proliferation governance?One of the few existing studies on norm disappearance was conducted by Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn. They emphasize the importance of imposing appropriate sanctions on actors who violate an internalized norm. They say that when a lack of appropriate sanctions triggers a cascade of norm violation, the norm will degenerate and disappear or be replaced by another norm. They also argue that a norm will weaken rapidly if it is highly precise, if the environment changes rapidly, and if compliance is not enforced by others. Considering the preciseness of the nuclear non-proliferation norm, the rapidly changing international environment after the end of the Cold War, and the weak sanctions for enforcing compliance when the norm has been violated, will the nuclear non-proliferation norm degenerate?By examining the results of public polls, behaviors and discourses of states which violated the nuclear non-proliferation norm, and the reactions of other states to the norm violations, this paper demonstrates that the norm is still robust. One reason for its robustness is because there is no alternative norm that can supersede it. In addition, this paper shows that the nuclear non-proliferation norm’s high level of institutionalization as well as the high density of the web of norms related to it have increased the norm’s viscosity. This viscosity is the key to understanding why the nuclear non-proliferation norm has so far not regressed and hence why nuclear non-proliferation governance will not likely collapse in the near future despite all the challenges the norm has faced.

著者

山添 博史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_110-203_125, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

52

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Russia, perceiving the U.S. political actions in Eastern Europe as threats to its vital interests there, developed the concept of ‘Strategic Deterrence.’ According to Russia’s ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014, this concept means countering non-military and military threats to Russia’s interests by non-military, conventional, and nuclear means. Nuclear weapons can serve three purposes within this concept: ultimate means, conflict localization means, and narrative offensive means. Russia officially shows its readiness to use strategic nuclear forces as ultimate means to counter conventional threats to the existence of the state, and to develop conventional forces for local conflicts. When Russian officials mention the use of nuclear weapons, it serves as a narrative offensive means, which they expect will incite fear among the adversaries’ populations and weaken their united will to confront Russia, and thus fulfill the role of a non-military means of the ‘Strategic Deterrence’ framework. Russian military might think of what I call ‘conflict localization means’ in this paper, popularly known as an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine, a posture of using nuclear weapons to persuade adversaries to cease further military actions in a local conflict. ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014 and other factors show little evidence of the existence of such a posture, but do not necessarily exclude the possibility. Partly to enhance a nuclear ‘narrative offensive,’ the possibility of use of nuclear weapons as a conflict localization means is made deliberately ambiguous. The Russian military did officially seek to realize the conflict localization means in the 2003 reform document, and debates on this matter continue. The ‘Grom-2019’ military exercise in October 2019 showed a possibility of forming a unified command and control not only of strategic nuclear forces but also of local-level weapons such as Kalibr and Iskander cruise missile systems with nuclear warheads. The issues of the nuclear threshold and strategic stability will depend on further development of forces and doctrines of Russia and the United States.

著者

三牧 聖子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_1-202_14, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

35

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Since the start of his presidency in 2017, Donald Trump has abandoned multiple treaties and agreements such as the Paris climate-change accord, the Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade agreement, asserting that U.S. foreign policy should put the interests and security of American people first. Trump’s “America first” foreign policy doctrine has cast profound doubt on U.S. commitment to the multilateral international system that the United States helped create and nurture after World War II. Pundits have wondered if the world has been sliding back to the chaos of the 1930s - when another war in Europe approached, the United States was reluctant to engage in world peace and tolerated the rise of fascist countries. Despite serious divide over Trump’s statesmanship, Trump’s instinct for non-intervention and his focus on domestic politics are widely shared among Americans. According to opinion polls, a growing number of Americans agree that the United States should reduce its overseas commitments.Nevertheless, it is too early to conclude that America is returning to isolationism like in the 1930s. This paper explores America’s ongoing search for a new way to engage with the world, particularly focusing on the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an action-oriented think tank built as a unique hybrid of left and right-wing anti-militarists in 2019 with the purpose of laying the foundation for a more restraint foreign policy centered on diplomatic engagement. Backed by the growing bipartisan support for ending the “endless wars,” The Quincy Institute fundamentally questions American bipartisan commitment to “primacy,” the notion that world peace ultimately depends on the United States asserting preponderant military power. Military restraint, The Quincy Institute argues, would give America the best chance of building deeper international cooperation against climate change and other global challenges that have afflicted humanity as a whole, as well as of reconstructing U.S. crumbling health care system.The spread of COVID-19 has had profound impacts on American peoples’ perception of national security, and made Quincy’s challenges increasingly relevant. Suffering from the epidemic, many Americans are wondering if their country has been ever more threatened, in return for lavishing taxpayer dollars on the world’s largest national security apparatus. According to recent opinion polls, especially young Americans, who have grown up in the age of unsuccessful military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, and 2008 global financial crisis stemming from the collapse of the U.S. housing market and a rash of bankruptcies of financial institutions, no longer believe that the United States is an “indispensable nation.” Rather, they realize their country’s weakness exposed by COVID-19, and embrace more restraint foreign approaches and multilateral cooperation. Supported by these youth’s preferences, Quincy’s search for a systematically different world role for the United States would be continued and intensified in the future.

著者

高橋 慶吉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_15-202_30, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

60

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In the field of American diplomatic history, the 1930s is depicted as an era of isolationism. It is true that the United States did not actively engage in the international efforts to maintain both the Versailles system in Europe and the Washington system in the Asia-Pacific region. However, American diplomacy in the 1930s was neither dormant nor unproductive. It successfully fulfilled some important achievements in the Western Hemisphere by vigorously developing the so-called Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin American countries.The architect of the Good Neighbor Policy was Sumner Welles, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs from 1933 to 1937 and Under Secretary of State from 1937 to 1943. Welles is also known for the central role he played in formulating the postwar plans of the State Department during the Second World War.By using Welles’ private papers that previous studies rarely consult, this paper examines the kind of international order Welles sought to realize in the Western Hemisphere. Before Welles joined the Roosevelt administration in 1933, the United States had made military interventions in Latin American countries repeatedly and imposed high tariffs on their commodities. Welles observed that the military interventions settled political confusion in Latin American countries only temporarily and the high tariffs prevented them from achieving economic prosperity, which Welles regarded as the fundamental factor for a sustainable stability of the society. In addition, Welles thought that the military interventions and the high tariffs induced Latin American enmity toward the United States, making it difficult for Washington to make the Western Hemisphere the solid foundation supporting American leadership in the world.Based on those observations, this paper argues, Welles tried to modify the American tariff policy and establish an inter-American conference system to manage internal and external threats to the American republics. In other words, Welles sought to create a new hemispheric order characterized by two principles: promotion of trade and joint action to keep peace in the region. Welles’ endeavors were successful and enabled the Western Hemisphere to have, in Welles’ words, “the most advanced, and at the same time the most practical, form of regional system” in the world. This paper concludes that the hemispheric system not only supported the American war efforts during the Second World War but also impacted the postwar visions created by Welles and his group as a model that other regions should follow.

著者

水野 良哉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_31-202_46, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

98

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This paper sheds new light on a British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975) as a prominent scholar in the international relations by focusing on his arguments about European international affairs, particularly in the late 1930s. Through the analysis, this paper also contributes to further understanding of “Liberal Internationalism” in the 1930s and deepening our thought on the contemporary international order.Toynbee is famous for his book A Study of History, where he described the development and decline of the Western Civilization, while previous studies have not addressed the role of Toynbee in international relations. It is primarily because he was criticized by E. H. Carr, who was another leading scholar in the discipline during the same period. In his classic work Twenty Years Crisis, Carr criticized his opponents by describing each of them as a utopian, who failed to grasp the reality of international politics. Among the utopians, Toynbee was included.However, Toynbee was a prominent scholar in the international relations between the 1920s and the early 1950s. I discuss this underestimated aspect of the British historian by examining how he reacted to the rising threat of a totalitarian state, namely Nazi Germany.After the experience of the First World War, Toynbee realized that the war and its related destructions gravely damaged Western Europe. In his view, the enormous power of sovereignty states would cause international anarchy and inter-state conflict. Therefore, Toynbee advanced a new idea of the international order for regulating state sovereignty and facilitating international cooperation of states.In contrast to his earlier belief, the political events which were damaging the European international relations happened in the late 1930s. Among them, the expansion of Nazi Germany appeared as the most serious threat to peace. Faced with the threat, the British government appeased toward Nazi Germany, especially in the Munich Agreement and did not immediately use serious countermeasures against it.Because of the Nazi’s aggressive behaviours, Toynbee needed to reconsider his initial political viewpoint. However, the more significant event for him was the Munich Agreement. Toynbee stood against the Agreement and stated that Nazi Germany would be a potential threat to Europe, due to its power and totalitarian ideology. Under the political circumstances, he thought that Britain had to resist against the totalitarian state. Besides, he called for the US’s diplomatic involvement in the European continent and then strategic cooperation by Britain, France, and the Soviet Union in order to prevent further expansion by Nazi Germany. By making these statements, he aimed to restore the broken balance of power and to defend democracy, and the rule of law in the European Continent.

著者

重松 尚

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_47-202_60, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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After the coup d’état in 1926, Lithuania was ruled by the authoritarian regime led by President Antanas Smetona. In the late 1930s, complaints about the Smetona government was grew, especially among the opposition groups, such as Voldemarininkai, the Populists (liaudininkai) and the Christian Democrats, because they considered that Smetona government’s “neutral” foreign policies led to the ultimatum by Poland in 1938. Thus, they established a unified anti-Smetona movement “Lithuanian Activists Union” (LAS) in 1938 in Klaipėda (Memel) and criticized the authoritarian government as dictatorship. They aimed to establish a Fascism regime in Lithuania instead, as they believed that, under the Fascism regime, the whole Lithuanian nation could be involved in the policy decision making. They, nevertheless, considered the Jews and communists were “anti-national”, thus tried to exclude them. LAS pursued some democratic values, such as freedom of the press and free elections, but they criticized parliamentary democracy since they believed that it led to a split of the nation. They aimed at close relations with Nazi Germany and state-planned economy. They believed that such “Disciplined Authoritarian Democracy” should have replaced the Smetona-led authoritarian regime.

著者

工藤 芽衣

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_61-202_76, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

57

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The purpose of this article is to describe international order designed by French neoliberalism through European integration and Atlanticism and its effects on the French government’s external policies.French neoliberalism was born in the late 1930s in the struggle to retrieve the credibility of liberal economy and fight against fascism and communism by searching for a third way. In most of the literature, the birth of new economic norms and new economic policy in the 1930s is explained by the emergence of Keynesian economics and economic policies, and ‘neo-liberalism’ is often placed as a contrasting concept to Keynesian policies. However, the original neoliberalism was, like Keynesian ideas, more socially oriented. After the Second World war, French neoliberals gradually lost common ground regarding economic principles, dividing between the left (neoliberals seeking a way to reconcile liberalism and socialists) and the right (trying to return to orthodox liberal economics). However, the two groups were still united as long as it concerned European integration and Atlanticism. These two ideas on the international order maintained the unity of the French neoliberalism from its birth to after the Second World War.With regard to the European integration, its support was based on the expectation that European integration become a framework to establish an ‘institutional market’ in which liberal competition was coordinated by the rules and interventions by the international institutions.The institutional market come to reality when the EEC was established in 1957 by the initiatives of the neoliberals. Not only did they develop a campaign for the Rome Treaty, they also desired for the French economy to really participate in the liberalisation processes in Europe with financial reform to contain inflation – which was finally achieved in the Rueff Plan in 1958.The influence of the Atlanticism of the neoliberals to the French external policy was limited. In 1936, when the Popular Front government adopted the devaluation of the franc as suggested by the neoliberals in the Tripatite Agreement between France, United States, and United Kingdom, this situation represented as a French decision to unite with liberal countries, denying fascism. However it was too late and the changing international circumstances made it meaningless.In the 1960s, the neoliberal’s Atlanticism was reflected in their critiques to the international monetary system centered on US dollars. Their critical attitude to the dollar did not mean their support for Atlanticism was lost, rather, they tried to consolidate the economic basis of the Atlantic cooperation by reforming the international monetary system. However, when their call for return to the gold standard was adopted by the General de Gaulle, it was used as a tool to attack Atlanticism.

著者

北村 厚

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_77-202_86, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

19

著者

亀山 康子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_87-202_96, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

11

著者

今野 茂充

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_97-202_100, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

武田 健

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_101-202_104, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

藤本 健太朗

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_66-201_81, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

63

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This study reconsiders the Soviet policy toward Japan before the USSR and USA established diplomatic relations in 1933, especially taking American factors into account, which have been neglected in the previous studies.After the Russian Revolution and military interference by the Allied Powers, Soviet Russia and Japan began negotiations in 1920. During the negotiations, Russia demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Russian territory, while Japan sought some economic benefit in return. In order to counter this Japanese strategy, Soviet Russia signed contracts with American companies in the form of “concessions (investing with the right to develop the designated areas)” in the Far East. Since the US government refused to recognize the Soviet government however, and the negotiations with Japan had progressed, Soviet leaders prioritized the agreement with Japan. Finally, under the Japan-Soviet Basic Convention in January 1925, the USSR promised to give Japanese companies “concessions” in the Far East, and annulled the contracts with the Americans.This provided a basis for Japan to expand its influence into the Russian Far East in the late 1920s. G.V. Chicherin, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, planned to attract American companies to the Far East again, in order to indirectly restrain Japan’s expansion. At the same time, it was also thought that any diplomatic tension with Japan should be avoided, so as not to obstruct Soviet policy toward China; this finally led to the abandonment of the policy to attract American companies.At the end of 1928, it was reported that UK and Japan could ally to war with America. Soviet leaders feared that the USSR would get involved with this war in some way. L.M. Karakhan, the Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed to strengthen border security and affiliate with China, in order to lock the Japanese out from the Far East, and restrict them in Manchuria. He expected the conflict between Japan and America to play a minor role in this plan. The Politburo adopted his plan, and in order to incite this conflict, incorporated in their policy the “concessions” to American companies a third time. This policy, however, did not realize due to the Sino-Soviet Conflict in 1929 and the friendly relationship between Japan and America.The Manchurian Incident was a trigger for the implementation of this policy. The Sino-Soviet Conflict discontinued, allowing the Soviets to strengthen border security in the Far East. Moreover, at the beginning of 1932, I.V. Stalin and Soviet leaders judged that the United States and China opposed Japanese aggression and were inclined to reach some agreement with the Soviet Union. Finally, the USSR established diplomatic relations with these two countries, and laid “siege” to Japan by 1933.