著者

池上 萬奈

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.177, pp.177_142-177_155, 2014-10-30 (Released:2015-11-13)

参考文献数

67

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The First Oil Crisis started as a result of the six Persian Gulf members of OPEC announcing a raise in the posted price of crude oil on October 16, 1973 and OAPEC deciding to reduce oil production by 5% per month on the following day, touched off by the breakout of the Yom Kippur War. Japan was faced with an unprecedented dilemma between the Arab countries, who strongly demanded Japan to condemn Israel, and the United States who pressed Japan to align with their Middle East policy based on diplomatic relations with Israel. When the Arabs announced a 25% cut of oil supply on November 4, the European countries, similarly to Japan, who were scarce on resources, immediately criticized Israel, and declared support for the Arabs. However, the Japanese government was hesitant to criticize Israel. And the Arab countries pressed to intensify oil supply reduction unless Japan announced to break off diplomatic relations with Israel in the case Israel would not obey the UN Security Council Resolution 242. On the other hand, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger restrained Japan by stating that condemning Israel would hinder Middle East peace talks with the United States and that cooperative relations with the U.S. would be profitable for Japan from a long-term view. On November 18, the Arab countries announced that they would release the European countries, excluding Holland, from the weighted oil supply reduction measure of 5% from the benchmark set on December, because the European countries had criticized Israel. As a result, the criticism of the weakness of the Japanese diplomacy in attaining resources made the headlines of the Japanese newspapers. How was the Japanese government to escape such dilemma? The Japanese government finally criticized Israel by name and made its pro-Arab positioning clear in the statement made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido on November 22. Further on December 10, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki, as special envoy, left for eight Middle Eastern countries to offer economic and technical aid. At first glance, the Japanese government took a pro-Arab policy without accepting the warning of the Unites States. This document, however, will empirically clarify that the U.S.-Japan friction related to Japanese Middle East policy was resolved before November 22 in the midst of the development of multilateral diplomacy for the “Kissinger Plan”, a unified framework among Japan, the U.S. and the European countries, and that the Japanese diplomacy during the First Oil Crisis achieved to broaden the permissible scope of the United States.

著者

平井 友義

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1966, no.31, pp.99-113, 1966

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_62-154_78, 2008

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The purpose of this research is to explore political dynamics of the ways of Japan's defense capability, asking why the &ldquo;Concept of Basic Defense Capability&rdquo; (<i>kibanteki boeiryoku koso</i>), which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Planning Outline (<i>boei taiko</i>), has been maintained for over 30 years and how this concept has affected defense capability construction.<br>The ways of defense capability can be typified as four genres. Type I recognizes the threat level as low and emphasizes the autonomy of Japan's defense capability. Type II also admits the importance of autonomy but does not consider the threat level as low. Type III and IV emphasize operability with forces of Japan's ally, the United States. Type III is distinguished from type IV based on the level threat recognition. In the preceding studies, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was understood as a type I defense concept.<br>In fact, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has consisted of a number of diverse interpretations, so it can be explained by any of the above ways of defense capability. Around the period that the 1976 NDPO was developed, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had type I-III interpretations. The vice minister of defense, Kubo Takuya, understood the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was a type I defense concept, but other defense bureaucrats interpreted the Concept of Basic Defense Capability as type II. Some Self-Defense Force officials downplayed low threat recognition and the autonomy of defense capability. In the new cold war era, some defense officials and politicians insisted on restoring the Concept of Necessary Defense Capability (<i>shoyo boeiryoku koso</i>) or modifying the schedule form (<i>beppyo</i>) in the NDPO. However, these counter-concepts against the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had been co-opted in these interpretations of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability, because it included two interpretations other than Kubo's opinion. When the 1995 NDPO was formulated after the cold war period, the interpretation of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was expanded to type IV.<br>In conclusion, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has continued for over 30 years, co-opting its counter-concepts in itself, restoring the cracks among domestic groups, and permitting a consensus to be made over the ways of defense capability through its diverse interpretations.

著者

松浦 正伸

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_80-187_96, 2017

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<p>How do we apply history in politics? The purpose of this paper is to analyze how recognition in civil society, such as perception of history, plays a role in public opinion and parliamentary government. To clarify this research question, incorporating a political concept into the analysis, this paper focused on roles of the General Association of Korean Residents (Chongryon) and the North Korean Lobby and looked into the backgrounds in the repatriation massively expanded between 1959 and 1961.</p><p>Before repatriation movements started, changes of organization structures were observed in the Chongryon and they began to speak in favor of North Korea. Simultaneously, the nature of the Niccho-Kyokai (日朝協会), which had been taking a politically neutral position, also began to change. They began to be a lobbying group in order to support the North Korean foreign diplomacy against Japan.</p><p>Applying a concept of "Pseudo Environment" defined by Walter Lippmann as a subjective, biased, and abridged mental image of the world, this section reflected on influences of the two key players over North Korean residents in Japan and Japanese public opinion. The analysis found a social trend with regards to repatriation issues being manipulated by a correlation of three components in the Pseudo Environment: (1) unified perception of history, (2) motherland-oriented nationalism, and (3) economic rationality.</p><p>Based on a data-mining method, the influences of the Pseudo Environment in the Diet were analyzed. The penetration of such an environment into civil society assisted the Diet members with the repatriation project being recognized ethically and humanitarianly. Therefore, intentions of the North Korean strategies against South Korea were insufficiently discussed.</p><p>The Pseudo Environment lost its effect as (1) demand of mobilization was weakened, (2) activities were diversified among the North Korean Lobby, and (3) information about North Korea was brought by returnees, and gaps were gradually closed between the Pseudo Environment and reality.</p><p>As a result of the Pseudo Environment effectively created by the two players among the North Korean residents in Japan and in the Japanese public opinion, one-sided recognition of North Korean strategies influenced civil society and parliamentary government to bring the mass repatriation out. This analysis also concludes that a nation is capable of controlling a social trend in other countries via intermediaries from outside of its country taking advantage of certain recognition. When we see international relations in East Asia, perception of history is an ongoing issue and has been more complex. This indicates that more case studies will be expected on how history has been utilized in politics.</p>

著者

宮田 律

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.92, pp.158-170,L16, 1989

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The coup backed by the CIA which toppled the Mussadiq's government in 1953 and the failure of the popular uprising led by Khumeini initiated and developed the anti-US feeling in Iran. This fact can be proved because Khumeini's &ldquo;struggle&rdquo; against &ldquo;American imperialism&rdquo; led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the successive US hostage incident in Iran (November 1979-January 1981).<br>After the uprising in 1963, the U. S. government gradually got on closer terms with the Shah's regime. Such U. S. support for the corrupt and repressive government of the Shah had close connections with important American industries, such as munitions production, electric power generation and communication industry. In addition, the clash of interests and competition of these industries in Iran were carried out by bribes and a huge commission system. Furthermore, in 1977, about 70% of the national budget was spent on military affairs, so it was evident to many Iranians that the Iranian policies were determined by the interest of these American enterprises.<br>After the 1963 uprising was quelled, Khumeini formed strong attachments with the purpose of overthrowing the Shah's regime. He believed that the Shah was selling the spirit of Iran to the U. S. and propagating corruption, immorality and repression. In addition, Khumeini blamed the U. S. for making the Shah carry out the &ldquo;White Revolution&rdquo;, so it was responsible for the tragedy that occurred in that uprising. Khumeini also declared that the U. S. government compelled the &ldquo;Puppet Shah&rdquo; to give Americans extraterritorial rights. Up until the revolution in 1979, he had condemned the Shah and admired the people who were engaged in the anti-establishment movement, and he denounced the U. S. government for supporting the corrupt and repressive Shah's government. Thus, Khumeini and his followers became the background of anti-US ideology of the Iran-Islam government which has endured till the present.<br>This paper traces the formation and development of anti-American feeling in Iran. This anti-US feeling has formed the basis of diplomatic policies of the Iranian government since the revolution. Needless to say, Iranians have various feelings about the U. S. In fact, while freedom and democracy have been questioned in Iran since the revolution, some Iranians have discovered the merits of American democracy. This influence of democracy had penetrated the public as well as the private sector, because it is known that some Iranian government officials secretly negotiated with the U. S. government in the Iran-Contra incident. Furthermore, Rafsanjani's more realistic government might change its policies against the U. S.; however, it is certain that the Iranian government will follow Khumeini's line for the present. Needless to say, the U. S. learned a great lesson about its relations with the Third World from Iran-a lesson that should be remembered when dealing with these countries in the future.

著者

前田 幸男

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_147-187_158, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

参考文献数

51

著者

鈴木 均

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_98-173_111, 2013-06-25 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

100

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Due to Japan’s flood of export during the 1970s and 80s, Japan and the EC (European Community) member states faced trade conflict. Because the common foreign trade policy was launched in January 1970, member states were to abolish bilateral safe-guard measures and agree with Japan on a common foreign tariff. Negotiation between MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan) and the European Commission, however, faced a deadlock. The Federal Republic claimed free trade and condemned France and Italy for keeping protectionist measures against Japan. Britain, however, took a unique position by both criticising Japan’s aggressive export as “abuse of free (trade) rules” on one hand, but also inviting Japanese companies, especially Nissan, to build a factory in Britain on the other. Margaret Thatcher decided to invite Nissan from the first day of her office. The British automobile industry, which had been heavily penetrated by car imports from Germany, France and Italy after Britain had entered into the EC in 1973, could export to the EC market vigorously and therefore reduce Britain’s trade deficit. A new Nissan factory would also reduce unemployment and boost economy in developing areas: Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. Due to its ambition to overtake its impeccable rival Toyota, Nissan agreed to Thatcher’s invitation, regardless of the costs and risks: the overall investment cost of 200 million Pounds, required high local contents of cars produced in the new factory, reliability of Britishmade parts, and frequent labour disputes. Nissan’s advance into Britain made Thatcher’s administration into a fore-runner of EC common policies of welcoming foreign investment into the EC, acquiring Japanese management techniques, and furthering free trade. For such sudden and drastic change of Britain’s EC diplomacy, Thatcher and her office was condemned not only by France and Italy but also by Germany as a “Trojan horse of Japan.”

著者

湯澤(下谷内) 奈緒

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_58-171_71, 2013-01-30 (Released:2014-12-13)

参考文献数

37

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Building on a growing body of literature in international and comparative politics on transitional justice, this article examines the debate as to whether international criminal justice contributes to peace. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has often been hailed as the culmination of international human rights standards that have been developed and advanced as norms following World War II. Yet the ICC’s prosecution activities have been criticized by those who argue that the threat of punishment causes dictators to cling to power, resulting in delaying the end of conflicts or a smooth transition to democracy. This article demonstrates how the “peace vs. justice” debate is rooted in opposing ideas for fostering international peace, both premised on the decentralized nature of international society, and how the tenets for their arguments are being shaken when faced with the reality of international human rights protection. Advocates for international criminal prosecution believe that strengthening centralized law enforcement authority beyond sovereign states will deter future atrocities. Given that a victor’s justice is no longer tolerated on one hand and that there is no world government in sight on the other, however, efforts to make credible the threat of prosecution would remain incomplete. Meanwhile those who criticize the ICC as an idealistic endeavor find the basis of international order in bargaining that occurs within sovereign states, but their logic is difficult to sustain because the ICC is making the promise of amnesty, considered crucial to strike a compromise, less credible. The article argues that international criminal prosecution should be understood as part of the international community’s efforts to intervene in and improve internal governance of weak, failing or collapsed states. The limits of the ICC lie not just in weak enforcement but in the very act of questioning the legitimacy of leaders who are caught in conflict. International human rights norms encourage democratized states to address past human rights violations committed under previous regimes; however, they do not solve the problem of how to deal with perpetrators who are currently engaged in violence during times of democratization and peace negotiations. To make international criminal prosecution a viable force for the prevention of future atrocities, it must be coupled with assistance to domestic civil society, which has to bear the consequences of these ultimate decisions.

著者

山崎 眞

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_145-154_160, 2008

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Recently, it has been closed-up again that Japan relies on the import mostly of the energy source, food, and the raw material because the sudden rise of the oil price and the price hike of food and various raw materials, etc. occurred in early 2008. A serious discussion about the food security is happening, too. Japan imports most 99 percent of oil, 87 percent of wheat, 95 percent of the soybean, and 100 percent of other iron ore and rare metals, etc. and 98 percent of those materials are transported through Sea Lane. Japan has developed economically for 60 years after the war because such a raw material etc. were able to be imported without trouble by can the free use of the sea, and to export the product.<br>A two great sea power of U. S. -Soviet was rivaled, and the stability of the ocean was kept because two great military power of U. S. -Soviet faced it at the cold war era. The balance of such a sea power collapses when the cold war is concluded, and the element of instability in the ocean has increased. Therefore, the confrontation by the race and the religion, etc. came to light, and the pirate and the outrage, etc. for the capital work of these group and organization came to be generated. Moreover, maritime terrorism came frequently to occur chiefly when becoming after 2000 years. Safety and the stability of the ocean are deteriorating than the cold war era because of such a situation, and it has come not to be able to disregard the influence given to the economy of the world. For instance, the Strait of Malacca passes by 50 percent of the amount of the oil transportation in the world and 30 percent of the amount of the world trade, and if here would be blockaded by the terrorism such as mines, it is said that the economy of the world will become a situation that nears panic.<br>And furthermore, recent Chinese naval modernization and reinforcement and North Korean nuclear armament under opaque situation will bring insecurity in this region. 90 percent of the trade of the world depends on marine transport now. Moreover, 75 percent of the world's population and 80 percent of the capital are in the coastal frontier. Safety in the ocean therefore can be called a base for the world economy as well as the human race living. Especially, this is extremely important for Japan that is the maritime country.<br>The ocean policy of Japan was something like a inconsistent stripe passes existed in the situation in which the national interest in the ocean was being lost for this by the government office organizations of lack of coordination so far. The former political administration of Prime Minister Abe enforced &ldquo;The Basic Law of the Sea&rdquo; to demonstrate a strong statesmanship considering such a situation and to straighten the situation as the country in July, 2007. The Cabinet Council was continuously decided to &ldquo;Oceanic basic plan&rdquo; based on this law in April 2008.<br>On the other hand, the United States that valued safety and the stability of the ocean made &ldquo;New Maritime Strategy&rdquo; public after an interval of about 20 years in October 2007. This is a new idea of acquiring safety and the stability of the ocean in the world by cooperate about the ally and the friendly country strong. It is the one that the Maritime Self-Defense Force's being sending the fleet to the multinational fleet in the Indian Ocean coincident with such an idea. Now, there is no country that can defend safety in the ocean in the world by one country. Peace in the sea can be acquired only by concentrating the imperative power such as naval forces and coast guards in the world.<br>It is necessary that Japan cooperate positively in such the world strategy.

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.117, pp.121-139,L12, 1998

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This essay intends to analyse the formative process of discourses on international politics in post-war Japan, and by doing so shed light on the hitherto neglected aspects of Japanese political thought. Most of previous studies have understood discourses on international politics in post-war Japan as a simple dichotomy, realism/idealism, and paid little attention to the intellectual contexts in which these discourses had their own roots; While &ldquo;idealists&rdquo; have searched for their identity in that Japan was reborn as a &ldquo;peace-loving&rdquo; nation after the end of the Pacific War, &ldquo;realists&rdquo; have acused the &ldquo;idealists&rdquo; of being naive. Both of them, however, seem to have overlooked or possibly masked from what kind of historical background discourses on international politics in post-war Japan had emerged and to what extent post-war discourses had been influenced by pre-war ones. Therefore, this essay will uncover the complicated relationship of political thought between post-war and pre-war Japan.<br>Chapter I &ldquo;Morality, Power and Peace&rdquo; treats how relationship between morality and power in international politics was argued during the early post-war era. Dogi-Kokka-Ron (Nation Based on Morality), the dominant discourse on peace immediately after Japan's surrender, insisted that Japan search for morality rather than power and by doing so exceed the principle of sovereignty, characterestic of modern states. In spite of its appearance, however, Dogi-Kokka-Ron contained echoes of philosophical argument of the Kyoto School which had advocated morality of Japan's wartime foreign policies vis-&agrave;-vis Western imperialism. Thus Maruyama Masao and other leading intellectuals, who belonged to the school known as Shimin-Shakai-Ha (Civil Society School), tried to differentiate their arguments from Dogi-Kokka-Ron and create another discourse on morality, power and peace. Since the Kyoto School had criticised harshly the modernity and nationalism during the Pacific War, Shimin-Shakai-Ha's undertakings resulted in reestimation of the modern nation-state. This chapter further elucidates Shimin-Shakai-Ha's ambivalent attitudes toward power and norm in international politics with special reference to its understandings of the concept of the equality of states.<br>Chapter II &ldquo;Regionalism and Nationalism&rdquo; focuses on Royama Masamichi's argument on regionalism. Regionalism was a difficult topic to handle during the early post-war era because it could bring to mind the idea of the Great East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Pacific War. Royama, founder of the study on International Politics in Japan, was one of the rare figures who continued to advocate the significance of regionalism. This chapter surveys Royama's argument on regionalism from the mid-1920's to the mid-1950's and investigates how his concern about development and nationalism of Asian countries appeared within the framework of regionalism. Royama's argument is also suggestive for better understanding of the context in which the &ldquo;Rostow-Reischauer line&rdquo; surfaced in the early 1960's.<br>Chapter III &ldquo;Collective Security and Neutralism&rdquo; elucidates several aspects of this issue which have not been hitherto fully investigated. Whether positively or negatively, neutralism in post-war Japan has been understood as a typically &ldquo;idealistic&rdquo; attitude toward international politics. However, the context in which the concept of neutrality was understood and argued in the early post-war Japan was more complicated. Discourses on neutralism at that time had still echoes of the controversies over collective security during the inter-war years. The Yokota-Taoka Controversy which took place in the late-1940's witnessed the continuity of pre-war and post-war arguments on this issue. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the Yokota-Taoka Controversy and analyses its impact on the following arguments of

著者

千知岩 正継

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_114-171_128, 2013-01-30 (Released:2014-12-13)

参考文献数

40

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In recent years, some IR theorists have begun to depart from the assumption of anarchy and to shed light on certain forms of inter-state hierarchy. Stimulated by those new studies, this article engages in a discussion on the legitimacy of a global authority which is expected to preside over ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ norms. The first part of this paper clarifies the global authority governing R2P norms, and explains its critical importance. Drawing upon the concept of “right authority” in just war traditions, it is argued that a global authority in relation to R2P is supposed to decide whether certain states fail to fulfil their responsibility to protect, and if necessary, to take responsibility for authorizing military interventions for human protection. This will inevitably determine the nature of global order. The following two sections examine both the United Nations Security Council and a proposed concept of “Concert of Democracies” as possible candidates to be the global authority. As a universally agreed legal authority, the Council is entrusted with the fulfilling of R2P principles, and in fact many commentators saw the Council decision in the case of Libyan civil war as its first successful implementation of R2P. However, the Council has critical legitimacy deficits in terms of its selective function to the intractable question of “for whom should the Council be ultimately accountable and responsible?” As for the idea of “Concert of Democracies” it is a reflection of “liberal hierarchy” based on the solidarity of liberal democracies, and presented as a preferred alternative to the illegitimate and ineffective Council. On the contrary to optimistic expectations, it is demonstrated that its exclusive membership and misguided assessment of liberal democratic states behaviour will undermine this institution’s legitimacy. In conclusion I suggest two daunting challenges that the Security Council should overcome as the global authority responsible for putting R2P norms into practice. The first is to translate a plurality of values and interests of the Council members into the unity and effective decision making in times of humanitarian tragedies. The other challenge concerns the need for the Council to seek legitimation not only from member states but also from those people severely affected by the Council action or inaction. This might involve a transformation of the Council from globally acting authority into a kind of cosmopolitan authority based on the approval of “we the people” If this is the case, a new form of the Council authority will need further consideration.

著者

白鳥 潤一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_164-175_167, 2014

著者

鬼丸 武士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.191, pp.191_64-191_79, 2018-03-28 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

48

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From mid-19th century onwards, the world was increasingly connected by modern modes of transportation and technologies of communication, such as railways, steamships, modern banking systems, the telegraph, and so on. In East and Southeast Asia, the highest degrees of connectivity were found in and between the capitals or maritime port cities, including Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki, Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, Batavia, and Rangoon. These cities were linked by steamship, rail, and telegraph services, and covered with networks extending the flows of people, commodities, money, and information. That era of deepening regional connectivity and flows in East and Southeast Asia corresponded with the peak of political revolutionary movements grounded in nationalism, communism, religion, or anti-colonialism. Colonial and national governments regarded these movements as threats, and closely monitored and severely suppressed political activists. Under such circumstances, many revolutionaries were forced into exile by arrest and deportation or in order to escape detention. Exiled activists regularly moved between different cities connected by modern transportation and communication technologies. The cities served as their bases from which they partook of many itineraries of revolutionary activity abroad. This paper focuses on the itineraries of three famous Asian revolutionaries, namely, Sun Yat-sen, Nguyen Ai Quoc, and Tan Malaka, who lived in exile from 1895 to 1916, from 1911 to 1941, and from 1922 to 1942 respectively. The paper offers a comparative study of the particular cities in which these exiled revolutionaries based or pursued their political movements, and explains why these cities were chosen for their arenas of revolutionary activity. Between them, the exiles lived and operated in Tokyo/Yokohama, Shanghai, Manila, Amoy, Canton, Hong Kong, Hanoi, Bangkok, Singapore, and Penang. These were the major maritime cities of Asia, serving as national or colonial state capitals or the leading trading centers in the region. Besides the advantage of having regular services of steamships and communication technologies at hand, the revolutionaries had differing reasons for selecting cities for their revolutionary headquarters. For example, Sun Yat-sen frequently visited and stayed in Tokyo/Yokohama because of his links with Japanese politicians, entrepreneurs, and supporters. On the other hand, Shanghai was the preferred city of underground revolutionaries, such as Tan Malaka, because Shanghai was divided into three municipalities. In short, a close understanding of the relations between cities and revolutionary movements requires a careful analysis of the political, economic, social, and historical background and character of the cities themselves.

著者

千葉 大奈

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_89-181_102, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

39

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Although there are theoretical reasons to expect that stronger agreements promote durable peace,the extant empirical research provides mixed support for this expectation. This paper reexamines this argument empirically, addressing two inferential problems overlooked in the past studies. First, since the strength of cease-fire agreements is endogenous to the baseline prospect for peace, I employ a copula-based estimation that explains agreement strength and peace duration jointly. Second, I allow the effect of agreement strength to vary over time. This is important because agreement strength matters little right after the war, for there exists a rough consensus among the ex-belligerents about the likely outcome of a next war. As time passes, however, the effect of agreement strength will start to show because there will be a greater chance that some exogenous shocks distort this consensus. Analyzing the duration of postwar peace from 1914 to 2001, I demonstrate that stronger cease-fire agreements indeed stabilize peace after war.

著者

光辻 克馬 山影 進

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_119-200_134, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

39

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In fields ranging from physics to biology, there has been an increasing realization that the exploration into the self-organizing process of the interactive agents will give us a new understanding of the world. Adopting a new Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, we can shed light upon the patterns and processes of international relations which has been considered to be incomprehensible and unpredictable, or overlooked and undervalued.In this article, we propose two simple models using agent-based methodologies that focus on alliance formation and conflict generation in international politics. The interactions among the virtual states in the models result in the skewed distribution of the sizes of alliances and conflicts which contain both exceptionally large ones and unusually large amounts of small ones. Such distributions with long tails of alliance and conflict are empirically observable in the real world. The results show that the models have the possibility to give a new explanation of the pattern and processes of state behavior in the international system.The performance of the models presented in this article, which is formalized with the simplest rules, shows us that the research program from the CAS perspective with agent-based methodology is a useful and promising strategy for the exploration in explanation and understanding of international politics.

著者

江﨑 智絵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_108-195_122, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

71

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The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has gained much support from its sponsor states including Iran and Syria, which has been a cause of deep concern for Israel. The biggest problem for Israel is that Hamas has been launching missiles from the Gaza Strip, which it has controlled since June 2007. Some of these missiles are said to have been supplied by Iran. In response, Israel imposed a land and air blockade on Gaza and attacked Hamas military base in Gaza three times between December 2008 and August 2014. However, in October 2011, Hamas and Israel held a prisoner exchange deal, mediated by Egypt. Why did Hamas climb down to a prisoner exchange deal with hostile Israel? What was Hamas’s logic behind managing its foreign relations in this manner?Previous studies on Hamas’s foreign relations indicate that the organization behaves according to political expediency rather than ideology and religious solidarity. This means that Hamas acts flexibly in response to the context it finds itself situated in. These foreign strategies need to be verified further, with a focus on a case that changed the relations between Hamas and the involved countries. Therefore, this paper examines the background of prisoner exchange deal between Hamas and Israel in the context of deteriorating relations between Hamas and its sponsor states.The results of this study are summarized as follows. First, Hamas agreed to a prisoner exchange with Israel to minimize the damage resulting from Iran’s suspension of financial support. When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, Hamas did not accept Iran’s request to support the Syrian regime and thus weakened its relations with Iran. Harking back to Hamas’s historical background would bear out that they were inclined to support the Syrian people’s aspiration. Thus, Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip who were most effected by the waning financial assistance from Iran needed Egypt to ease the blockade imposed on the area. For them, an indirect negotiation with Israel on a prisoner exchange presented a good opportunity to reach out to Egypt, which played a mediator role in the negotiation.Second, Hamas’s rational for entering a prisoner exchange deal with Israel indicates that Hamas exercises flexibility in fostering relations with foreign countries. It is inevitable for a non-state actor such as Hamas to need the support of other countries as much as possible. Factors such as ideology and religious solidarity would not go well with this aim because they limit the number of countries to which Hamas can appeal for support.

著者

吉田 徹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.177, pp.177_57-177_69, 2014-10-30 (Released:2015-11-13)

参考文献数

60

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François Mitterrand was elected as the President of French Republic in 1981. The article asks if this change of government in France had a substantial and direct effect to the foreign policy of the country, especially when one compares it with the previous administration. It starts with an examination of the existing literature of the relationship between national politics and foreign policy. The author states that there is no direct and mechanical effect between the change in national politics and in the diplomacy; however, the latter is activated by the former when some conditions are met. When analyzing the case of “Euro-missile Crisis” in the early 1980’s, we clearly see that the Mitterrand Presidency has changed its policy stance as compared to the opposition period and also to its predecessor. The Mitterrand Presidency showed a clear preference to the “Atlantist” policy, and supported the deployment of the U.S Pershing Missile in West Europe. At least this case leads to the fact that there is an obvious shift in policy that has been made by the change of government, and that the literature stressing on the continuity in French diplomacy doomed to be false. In fact, the reasons of the decision made by the new presidency were multi-faced: 1) to give assurance to the U.S. that the new presidency, even there are Communists inside the government and to be recognized as the legitimate Left government, 2) to show its electorates the difference compared to the former government, 3) to exclude the possibility that the West Germany possess a nuclear weapon, and finally 4) to keep French strategic independence. But the decision was not clearly taken from the beginning; the above-mentioned policies were consequence of a strategic consideration after failure of the Socialist diplomatic agenda which intended to change the U.S monetary policy and to strengthen North-South cooperation. The French diplomatic historian Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle pointed out that in the age of democratic governance, political leaders had to be careful about the “mood” generated by the direct and indirect demand from the internal politics. If they are only adaptive to the international environment, it can be contrary an obstacle to the diplomacy. In other words, a skilful diplomacy means to conciliate the state as an actor and as an arena. After a close examination of the Mitterrand diplomacy in the early 1980’s, we can conclude, despite many miscalculations, that at least the maneuver on missile deployment has been a success as a result of the change of government, and has restore the equilibrium between France and conditions of the New Cold war.

著者

大庭 三枝

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.196, pp.196_97-196_115, 2019-03-30 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

30

著者

木戸 蓊

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1959, no.7, pp.125-127, 1959-01-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

浅香 幸枝

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.207, pp.207_113-207_129, 2022-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

40

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The year 2019 was the 151st anniversary of Japanese overseas migration: mainly in the Americas but also worldwide, including Japan. According to the Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad, the total number of Nikkei is roughly 3,800,000: some 2,240,000 in LAC. Firstly Brazil (some 1,190,000), then the U.S.A. (some 1,330,000 including Hawaii (240,000)), thirdly Japan (some 250,000), fourthly Canada (some 120,000), fifthly Peru (some 100,000). The Revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1990, extended domestic employment privileges to second and third generation Japanese descendants who travel between Japan and LAC and contribute to exchange and interaction.Japanese overseas migration was one of the ways to resolve domestic overpopulation and poverty but national high economic growth stopped this. Later third and forth generations took their place in Nikkei societies. The “Report of the Panel of Experts on Collaborating with Communities of Japanese Immigrants and Descendants (“Nikkei”) in Latin America and the Caribbean” May 9, 2017 was presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus the Japanese Government has been achieving a partnership with Nikkei communities in LAC in an “All-Japan” style.This article focuses on this diplomatic policy with Nikkei communities, and will consider the impact on Japanese diplomatic negotiations through Nikkei networks in LAC and other regions, as bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy. To consider such multilateral diplomatic negotiations, we have collected documents on participant observations and have analyzed three international conventions: the 19th Pan American Nikkei Convention 2017 (Lima), the 59th Convention of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad (Honolulu) and the 20th Pan American Nikkei Convention (San Francisco).Analysis results: over 3 days in each convention, participants shared the same history of host Nikkei societies and formed a Nikkei consciousness by staying and eating in the same hotels, etc. On this common foundation, the network between the Americas and Japan fosters Nikkei bonding. At these conventions participants discuss what “Nikkei” means. Proof that Nikkei people reflect on their own position in changing international affairs. Therefore, when we consider a partnership with Nikkei, collaboration with them helps us find universal solutions to achieve the 2030 Agenda’s global goals, in which they can flourish and become a bridge between Japan and other countries.Specifically, how to collaborate with Nikkei people depends on each country’s situation. Considering individual differences, we can extract a type of success by Nikkei people in the Americas. They are good at technological advancement, and especially agricultural technology, development and production. Nikkei people had to improve themselves and are appreciated for their success in surviving in their host country. Their Nikkei legacy thus underlines the importance of “Gaman (patience)” and “Okagesama (gratitude)”.