著者

張 雲

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_77-205_93, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

116

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As the second biggest economy in the world and the leading emerging economy, how does China use its huge economic power to realize strategic goals to make influence attempts toward other nations? What implications would be for the international order? China’s economic statecraft has attracted increasing global attention in both academic and policy circles. However, the existing scholarship on China’s economic statecraft has been mainly on economic inducements particularly China’s overseas investment and finance such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The research on China’s coercive economic statecraft remains understudied and most empirical studies have derived from the cases of import restrictions on agricultural products. China’s rare earth resource diplomacy, particularly the imposition of temporary rare earth embargo on Japan, provides us a valuable case to investigate China’s coercive economic statecraft. The existing literature on China’s rare earth resource economic statecraft could be divided into three major categories. First, there is a bulk of research from the perspectives of economics and law, but the studies from international politics remain to be developed. Second, the research from international political lens mainly considers China’s behavior a diplomatic failure as Japan successfully diversified its rare earth sources in a short period. China’s international reputation is also considered to be damaged as the WTO ruled against China and the Japanese public opinion toward China has deteriorated. Third, China’s rare earth economic statecraft has been largely used as a solid supportive evidence for China’s revisionist vision against the current liberal international order. The aforementioned research has provided significant insights to understand China’s coercive economic statecraft. However, they are mainly based on the outsider’s perspective and do not address the diversified internal debate and complex internal-external dynamic linkage. This paper has two major aims. First, it aims to identify the effectiveness and mechanism of China’s rare earth temporary embargo incident toward Japan in 2010. Second, this paper aims to clarify the full logic of China’s coercive economic statecraft by focusing China’s internal debate on rare earth from the global economic crisis in 2008 to now with an internal-external nexus perspective. With this combination of zoom-in and zoom-out approach, this paper is expected to clarify the conditions, effectiveness and legitimacy of China’s coercive economic statecraft and its implications on international order.

著者

小林 周

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_94-205_107, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

38

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The paper analyzes Middle Eastern countries’ foreign aid and military activities in African countries through the lens of Economic Statecraft (ES), the art of employing economic means to exert influence over other countries and thereby pursue geopolitical and strategic goals. Due to changes in the strategic environment, such as the United States’ withdrawal from the Middle East and the escalation of intra-regional conflicts, Middle Eastern countries have pursued foreign and security policies that place greater emphasis on their national interests. Arab states in the Gulf and Turkey are upping their foreign aid to Africa and establishing military bases at geopolitical chokepoints to expand their spheres of influence. The economic and military expansion of Middle Eastern countries into Africa also intensifies competition among various state and non-state actors.There have been studies on foreign aid to African countries and on the establishment of military bases by Middle Eastern countries. By examining these regional dynamics from the perspective of ES, this paper seeks to decipher the complex and multi-dimensional competition, confrontation, and cooperation. Additionally, the paper investigates the effectiveness of the ES as practiced by non-major powers, which is often overlooked, the impact of ES on regional politics and security, and the linkage with international order and international security.ES is frequently discussed in the context of great power politics and strategic competition, such as the US-China rivalry. However, the same is true for regional and middle powers that use economic means to pursue their geopolitical objectives. The distinction is that great powers such as the US, China, and Russia are exceptional in the scale of their military and economic clout in international politics. Therefore, to better understand ES, it is necessary to focus on tactics being employed at the regional level and the geopolitical shifts that arise. This paper outlines the debate on ES in/towards/from the Middle East and examines the trends and background of the pursuit of geopolitical goals linked to foreign aid, which has accelerated in recent years. Then, as a case study, this paper focuses on the Middle Eastern countries’ intervention in Sudan and the Horn of Africa region, as well as the competition among the regional countries. The intervention of Middle Eastern countries in Somalia and Libya is also analyzed to demonstrate that ES involves various actors, including unrecognized states and non-state actors.

著者

久保田 裕次

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_108-205_123, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

83

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This article reconsiders Japanese diplomacy towards China during the period of the initial establishment of the Hara Takashi cabinet, concentrating on the problem of having industrial loans included in the formation of the “New Four-Power Consortium”.Previous research has concentrated on the transition from “Old Diplomacy” to “New Diplomacy”, and has stated that the Hara cabinet altered the policy of the previous Terauchi Masatake cabinet. Compared with the old consortium, the new consortium is characterised by the inclusion of industrial loans in its scope of business. However, this has only been pointed out by a few researchers, who have clarified the relationship between this problem and “New Diplomacy”. My research concentrates on the domestic preparation for participating in the new consortium, and the changes it brought to Anglo-Japanese relations.In October 1918, the Hara cabinet decided not to supply loans that would pose an obstacle to North-South peace in China, such as the “Nishihara Loans”. This decision was certainly ground-breaking, but the Army Ministry demanded certain exceptions.The US government tried to restrain Japanese economic influence on the Chinese government and proposed forming a new consortium. The US State Department insisted that the new consortium should include not only administrative loans, but industrial loans. The British government and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation had been opposed to including industrial loans when the Six-Power Consortium was formed in 1912. The Japanese government expected that the British government and bankers would be opposed to including industrial loans this time as well. However, the British government pledged “exclusive support” to the British syndicate to unify British banks connected to China. Therefore, the Japanese government could not expect the British party to state its opposition.J. J. Abbott, an American banker who had visited Japan, had held talks with Prime Minister Hara and Deputy Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro. Abbott and the State Department were optimistic that Japan would want to include industrial loans. T. W. Lamont, representing the American syndicate, suggested in the inter-group conference in Paris that the new consortium should include not only administrative loans but industrial loans. Yokohama Specie Bank, representing the Japanese syndicate, agreed to his proposal. However, the bank’s stance did not represent all Japanese banks closely related to China. These banks could not fully agree to his proposal because the Hara cabinet had not yet made preparations to organize a syndicate formed of multiple banks. It was only after the Paris conference that the Hara cabinet assembled eighteen banks in Tokyo and Osaka to let them participate in the new consortium.In conclusion, it was not difficult for the Hara cabinet to agree to include industrial loans in the process of forming the new consortium. However, the Hara cabinet had not been able to organize the Japanese syndicate. The argument is also advanced that the Japanese syndicate formed by the Hara cabinet had its origins in the syndicate under the Terauchi cabinet.

著者

久保田 雅則

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_124-205_140, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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The nuclear non-proliferation norm, or the limitation on the number of nuclear weapon states, has been institutionalized in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) centered regime. It is notable that the 25 years term limitation of the treaty was extended indefinitely and the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection system strengthened in spite of the unfairness of the treaty. Why then, was the non-proliferation norm institutionalized in such a strong regime beyond the merely ideological norm?Existing research points to the Great Powers preference and/or civil society movements as the factors behind the norm institutionalization. In contrast, this paper focuses on the norm violations and presents a hypothesis that the norm violations prompted the institutionalization of the nuclear non-proliferation norm. Specifically, the norm violations, that is, possession of nuclear weapons, gave policy makers accurate information about the costs and effects of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, many states who renounced nuclear weapon possession created the strong regime in order to bind other potential norm violators.The theoretical kernel of this argument is the uncertainty of the costs and effects of nuclear weapons. Many policy makers were not well-informed about the effects and costs after the first atomic bomb was introduced. This discouraged policy makers from planning nuclear weapon policies, then dampened their resolve to establish the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Against this background, nuclear non-proliferation norm violations, that is, new nuclear weapon possessors emerged, which reduced the uncertainty around the nuclear weapons and decisively influenced the institutionalization of the nuclear non-proliferation norm.This paper derived the hypothesis from theoretical consideration. Policy makers faced a range of uncertainties regarding nuclear weapons, including deterrent effect, costs, international relations, and normative behavior of other states. These played a role in their decisions regarding compliance with the norm. The uncertainties of nuclear weapons are reduced and the policy makers clearly recognize the costs and effects of nuclear weapons when the nuclear non-proliferation norm violations occurred. Almost all policy makers renounce possession of nuclear weapons because of their relatively high costs. They then want to bind others to abandon the aspiration for nuclear weapons. Hence it follows that a strict institution is created.The sections which follow the theoretical consideration empirically verify the above hypothesis. The third section posits that no violations led a weak institution, that is to say the 1968 NPT. The fourth section shows that the policy makers who became informed about the costs and effects of nuclear weapons by norm violations, renounced possession of nuclear weapons and strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime to bind other states.

著者

増永 真

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_141-205_156, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

47

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In international relations theory, balancing can be defined as provision of protection against a threat to a weaker state (junior partner) by a stronger ally (senior partner). Though there are several related works on this, the following question remains unanswered.If the senior partner suddenly stops engaging balancing, what would the junior partner’s policy choice and its related consequences be?This paper aims to provide an answer to this question by presenting two patterns of behaviors of the North Korea (DPRK) and Taiwan (ROC) as cases.The DPRK found itself in a state of confusion when its two senior partners—the Soviet Union and China—established diplomatic ties with South Korea, while the ROC found itself in a difficult spot when the U.S. officially recognized the Mainland.These changes have led to the following internal balancing strategies having contrasting patterns: the DPRK has chosen nuclear weapons as a means to protect itself from U.S.’ threat, whereas the ROC has decided to continue to depend on the U.S. to balance against China.Asymmetric patterns can also be observed when we compare the two nations’ international economic policies. The DPRK’s level of economic interdependence with other nations, barring senior partners, has been low because of its closed and self-reliant economy. This has resulted high vulnerability to the change in the economic relations with their senior partners and the low sensitivity to the turbulence in the international economy. The situation in the ROC, on the other hand, is completely opposite as it has always been open to the global economy with diversified economic interdependence with other nations.The DPRK’s continued nuclearization has resulted in the international society imposing economic sanctions on it, but effects of consecutive sanctions have been hedged by their closed and self-relied economy with dependence on the economic relations with China. The strategy that the DPRK employed—holding summits with the U.S.—can be described as bandwagon; this has, however, been unsuccessful due to the DPRK’s continued internal balancing strategy armed by nuclear weapons.The ROC, on the other hand, has succeeded in establishing economic relations with its two former Cold War rivals—Russia and Vietnam; the ROC’s domestic market and investments by its private companies have attracted the two nations. The ROC’s approaches to these two were part of its hedging strategy to avoid vulnerability to economic interdependence with a limited number of nations, as well as isolation in the international society.

著者

高橋 力也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_66-204_82, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

67

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This article aims to examine the process by which the project of codifying international law was initiated in the League of Nations in the 1920s, particularly focusing on the contribution made by an American international lawyer, Manley O. Hudson.The codification efforts for international law under the aegis of the League of Nations, including the Hague Codification Conference in 1930, are considered to be crucial in the history of international law. During this period, not only did the number of multilateral treaties increase dramatically, but also non-Western states began to participate in treaty negotiations through the forum of the League, and the international law-making process, which had previously been dominated by the Western powers, was transformed into a more universal one.Nevertheless, the development of international law was not necessarily promised by the establishment of the League Covenant. In the first place, the drafters of the Covenant had little interest in the enhancement of international law in general. This is evidenced by the fact that the Covenant contained only one sentence in the preamble that referred to international law. What is more, at the first Assembly of the League in 1920, a resolution proposing to embark on the project of codification was rejected.How did the League then change its course and decided to undertake the project for assembling the Hague Conference? The League’s efforts for codification were in fact not solely made for the purpose of development of international law. With the United States showing a keen interest in hosting a codification conference at that time, some League officials were concerned that the role as the bearer of the global legal order would shift from Geneva to Washington. Hudson, who was a temporary member of the Secretariat of the League, strongly shared this concern; he submitted a memorandum to the Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, suggesting the League demonstrate its initiative in codification in order to preserve the League’s presence in the making of global law. With the approval of Drummond, Hudson co-drafted a resolution on the project of codification of international law which was adopted at the Fifth Session of the League’s Assembly in 1924.Hudson’s proposal became the catalyst for the League to quickly take up the initiative on the codification of international law; it paved the way for the holding of the first codification conference in The Hague. For the League, the codification was one of the means for maintaining its leadership of world order building in relation to the United States.

著者

青山 瑠妙

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_99-204_108, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

3

著者

武内 進一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_109-204_116, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

2

著者

山尾 大

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_117-204_125, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

4

著者

東野 篤子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_126-204_135, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

12

著者

村上 友章

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_136-204_145, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

18

著者

今井 真士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_146-204_149, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

半澤 朝彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_149-204_152, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

編集委員会

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_153, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

荒井 誉史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_126-203_141, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

58

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This paper explores why the Sato Eisaku administration (from 1964 to 1972) feared the development of nuclear weapons by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The existing literature argues that the Sato administration worried about the possibility of a nuclear attack by the PRC because this administration considered the political leaders of PRC as very aggressive and irrational. In contrast, by using newly declassified documents, this paper shows that the Sato administration feared the possibility of a political disturbance in Japan resulting from a nuclear blackmail by the PRC.During this period, the Japanese government recognized that it was not likely for the PRC and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to invade Japanese soil, including by a nuclear attack, because they realized that the US had military supremacy in Asia in terms of naval, air, and nuclear force. On the other hand, the Japanese government feared nuclear blackmail by the PRC or the USSR because it could lead to a large political movement against the US-Japan Security Treaty. In this period, the Japanese political leaders felt uneasiness about the duration of the US-Japan Security Treaty because this treaty would expire in 1970, and the number of supporters of this treaty was as much as that of the non-alignment policy. Therefore, the Japanese government suspected that if the PRC or the USSR inflamed public anxiety for Japanese security by nuclear blackmail, Japanese people would be attracted by a non-alignment policy in order to inhibit nuclear attacks. To avoid such a situation, the Japanese government asked the US to assure their defense commitment to Japan to eradicate public anxiety that the US government would not fulfill the commitment to defend Japan when the PRC or the USSR attacked Japanese soil by nuclear weapons. Therefore, this paper concludes that the Sato administration feared political disturbance against the US-Japan Security Treaty caused by nuclear blackmail of the PRC or the USSR.This paper may contribute to a rethinking of the role of extended nuclear deterrence. Generally, nuclear weapons are known to be deterrent to a nuclear attack by other states, and few researchers have paid attention to nuclear blackmail and domestic politics. However, this paper illustrates that extended deterrence has also played an important role in preventing domestic disturbance caused by nuclear blackmail. This paper discovers new aspects of extended nuclear deterrence.

著者

太田 昌克

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_142-203_158, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

60

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Since the Crimea crisis in 2014, the international nuclear order bed-rocked on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has become severely distressed due to lack of cooperation among nuclear stakeholders. Especially, stalling disarmament dialogue between the United States and Russia amplifies such a negative atmosphere. To be worse, the competitive nuclear-weapon powers have been beefing up their nuclear capability and sharpening their nuclear doctrines in recent years.The demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 and the expiration of the Intermediate-Range Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 have undermined the “strategic stability” which was established and maintained by the US and the Soviet Union, later Russia, through a series of nuclear arms-control negotiations during the Cold War.Behind these destabilizing scenes played by the former super-powers, China, another nuclear rising power, has steadily increased her strategic capability through deployment of new nuclear missiles and hypersonic weapons for the past decade. North Korea is another big nuclear challenge against regional stakeholders like Japan, South Korea and the U.S. that promises to provide strategic deterrence in East Asia.Giving a rough overview of the recent nuclear landscape shaped by these strategic trends, this paper mainly analyzes evolutions of the U.S.-Japan alliance influenced by U.S. nuclear policy, especially represented by each administrations’ Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and deteriorating security situation in East Asia.For example, the Trump administration announced its own NPR in 2018 and broadened nuclear retaliation option against “non-nuclear strategic attack” which may include adversary’s cyber-attack on the U.S. nuclear command and control system. At almost the same timing of an announcement of Trump NPR, the Japanese Abe administration expressed a high evaluation of the NPR, because Japan strongly desired to strengthen the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against the backdrop of on-going military crisis provoked by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests.Based on exclusive interviews with current and former officials of the U.S. and Japan, the paper focuses on diplomatic process of the two allies for solidifying the nature of “nuclear alliance” through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue that started under the Obama administration in 2010. Differently from NATO, the U.S.-Japan alliance has not ever formalized any mechanism to share and operate U.S. nuclear weapons at the time of contingency. However, the paper sheds a light on how the U.S. and Japan have evolved their nuclear bond particularly for the past decade.

著者

鳥潟 優子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_159-203_162, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

浜中 新吾

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_163-203_166, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

植木(川勝) 千可子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_167, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_1-204_16, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

55

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How do alliance partners treat the problem of credibility of extended deterrence when they understand seriousness of security threats differently? Do they continue negotiations on the measures to confirm credibility? If so, why? To study this problem, this paper examines US policies toward nuclear sharing when France challenged NATO and shook US-European relations since World War II.France withdrew from the military organization of NATO when nuclear sharing and the stationing costs of the US/British troops on the European continent also troubled the alliance. The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson treated them as parts of a large problem. Washington also tried to solve these related problems through closer cooperation of the United States, the British, and the West Germans. This tripartitism (or trilateralism) was the basic framework through which the Johnson administration considered the ways to deal with individual problems in NATO.Nuclear sharing was not only a part of tripartitism but also a means to promote it. At least by the end of 1964, the respective US governments regarded nuclear sharing as the major way to secure credibility of extended deterrence and, as a result, to hold the alliance together. This attitude changed, however, by the beginning of 1966 when the Johnson administration seriously studied the France-NATO problem and the troop stationing costs. By constructing a nuclear consultation mechanism based on US-UK-FRG cooperation, Washington expected to introduce tripartitism into NATO.The problem of the US/British troop stationing costs grew tense in the middle of the same year. The Johnson administration tried to persuade Bonn to bear more costs of these costs, and this burden-sharing was expected to be a part of tripartitism. Washington tried to introduce a burden-sharing mechanism into NATO in face of the French challenge. President Johnson particularly considered a deal with Bonn over nuclear sharing and the troop costs problem, and this became clear in unofficial US-Soviet talks over the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Johnson insisted on sustaining the possibility of a common strategic nuclear force despite Soviet rejection of any common strategic nuclear force with FRG participation. Here Johnson expected to open this option of a common nuclear force to encourage Bonn’s acceptance of larger burden to support US/British forces.This paper shows that a nuclear sharing measure played a role in inter-allies’ negotiations even though its prime purpose, securing credibility of US extended deterrence, grew less relevant. This perspective could enhance our understanding of nuclear issues under a less tense international situation.