著者

三百苅 拓志

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_117-206_132, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

91

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As a part of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) is situated at the top of the hierarchical channel for security talks. The SCC played a major role in the management of the Japan-U.S. Alliance during the post-Cold War era as it was reorganized into a “2+2” meeting structure in which two foreign ministers and two defense ministers participate. However, there have been no studies that have tracked the historical changes in the talks system or the talks process.This paper aims to track the historical transformations in the processes relating to how agreements are reached and to clarify the qualitative changes in these processes until the enactment of the “2+2” system. We will chronologically follow the historical transformations in the Japan-U.S. talks by focusing on the following two points: centered on the “2+2” meetings, how the consulted channels such as the Security Sub-Committee (SSC), the Mini-SSC, and the Sub-Committee on Defense Cooperation (SDC) were utilized in the process of strengthening the alliance; and how actors such as the politicians and the bureaucratic organizations in Japan and the United States spearheaded the agreement. The following became clear as a result of doing this.In the 1990s, the “2+2” meetings became increasingly important as a type of ceremony that demonstrated the strengthening of an alliance. They also transitioned to being a forum in which each of the channels of consultation was converted into a group of processes. The “2+2” meetings then came to play the role of controlling the deadlines for the targets to be met in each of the consultation channels and the channels themselves. In addition, the meetings were positioned as a part of a “comprehensive mechanism” through which Japan and the United States formulated operational plans during emergencies and critical situations in the areas surrounding Japan.In the 2000s, there was a change on the Japanese side, whereby the agreement process changed from being led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to being led by the Prime Minister’s Office. This strengthened the initiative of the cabinet ministers and expanded the role of the Ministry of Defense, in particular the uniformed members of the armed forces. As a result, the negotiations with the United States were held in the form of a joint team for foreign affairs and defense under the Prime Minister’s Office, allowing them to deal with the political issues that were difficult to coordinate. In addition, the uniformed personnel group within the Self-Defense Force (SDF) made use of it expertise to realign the bases as well as the units of the SDF and U.S. forces in Japan, thereby strengthening the military cooperation.In the 2010’s, the Japanese side proposed a revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation along with the consideration and coordination of the expansion of the Japan-U.S. roles, including the partial acceptance of the right to have a collective self-defense.It became clear that the qualitative changes in the “2+2” system as described above had gradually strengthened the framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. While “2+2” did not fully function right from the beginning, nevertheless, through the changes in the situation in East Asia post the end of Cold War and other factors, the two countries accumulated an experience of more than 20 years and qualitatively shifted towards more politically, militarily, and pragmatically important engagements.

著者

佐竹 知彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_133-206_148, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

73

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Since the end of the Cold War, the US allies in Asia such as Japan and Australia have enhanced their bilateral and trilateral security cooperation including the United States. Does it mean that, as some suggest, the US-led “hub and spokes” system—a bilateral alliance network centered on the US “hub” and regional allies as “spokes”—has transformed to a more “networked” alliance structure based on horizontal relations between the United States and regional allies?To answer this question, the paper first focuses on the asymmetric nature of the “hub and spokes” alliance system. Previous studies suggest that an asymmetric structure of the US alliance system in Asia—in a sense that regional allies do not assume defense obligations or burden which are equivalent to those of the United States—has prevented the emergence of the collective defense mechanism such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. In particular, the US regional allies did not wish to establish a collective defense mechanism in Asia, so long as the United States continuously committed to regional allies’ defense bilaterally.This in turn suggests that, should the US security commitment become less credible, regional allies have greater incentives to enhance their mutual defense cooperation in order to prepare for the loss of security provided by the United States. Indeed, Japan and Australia began to enhance their security cooperation immediately after the Cold War, out of fear that the US military presence in the region would become weaken. In order to maintain the strong US military presence in the region, these two allies began to assume greater burden-sharing with the United States.Such cooperation continued after the 2000s, at which the rise of China became more prominent. In order to maintain the US strategic primacy in Asia, Japan and Australia actively contributed to the US-led global “war on terror”. Both countries also increased their roles in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster reliefs activities. As a result, the trilateral security cooperation became institutionalized in the late 2000s. As such, trilateral security cooperation between Japan, the US and Australia have enhanced as Japan and Australia assumed greater burden and responsibilities in both regional and global security.This ostensibly suggests the transformation of the US alliance network from an asymmetrical “hub and spokes” system to a more symmetrical alliance network. In reality, however, these regional allies enhanced their security cooperation in order to maintain the US strategic primacy, so that they can continuously enjoy the US security commitment to them through bilateral alliance relations. This means that, quite ironically, the so-called “spokes to spokes” cooperation could help to endure, rather than transform, the existing hub and spokes system by maintaining its asymmetric alliance structure.

著者

川村 陶子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_149-206_164, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

52

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In today’s world, cross-border movement of people, goods, and information causes instability of sovereign nation-state system and distrust in fundamental values. To attain security and creative development of international society, it is necessary to develop a policy which contributes to co-existence and -creation among people with different cultural backgrounds. Conventional research on cultural and public diplomacy suffers from multiplicity of terminology and difficulty in policy evaluation. A new conceptual framework is necessary, which allows comparative study across time and space, and enables analysis of broader policy process.This paper suggests two new concepts to meet the current needs: (1) management of international cultural relations (ICR-management), and (2) cultural relations policy (CRP). The first concept, ICR-management, refers to cultural resources management for the purpose of constructing better intercultural relations. The second concept, CRP, refers to commitment of a state to ICR-management.The paper consists of three parts. Part One sketches out the theoretical background of ICR-management, drawing on different approaches of IR-scholars (and also of practitioners) to cultural dimension of international relations. There are three main approaches: analytical, administrative, and combined. The combined approach explicitly pursues better cross-cultural relations by exploiting cultural resources. Researchers in other disciplines also take interest in ICR-management; recent works of Cultural Policy Research have especially a lot to offer.Part Two introduces the concept of CRP, i.e., a state’s policy which directly or indirectly promotes ICR-management. CRP consists of cultural policies in a broad sense with four interrelated dimensions: external (traditional cultural or public diplomacy), outward (nation branding and information), inbound (attraction of foreigners), and inland (intercultural education and diversity management). Planning and administration of CRP requires consultation and collaboration among many different actors – both public and private, domestic and foreign. Adopting the concept of CRP would make it possible to consider various “cultural policies,” which have conventionally been handled in different administrative sectors, within a single framework. The concept also enlarges the scope of policymaking in international cultural relations, thus facilitates a broader perspective in the analysis and evaluation of a cultural program.Part Three briefly examines the practices of CRP in Germany and Japan. Scope and content of a country’s CRP vary, according to the nation’s constitution and its history of cultural relations with internal and external “others”. While the CRPs of Germany and Japan contrast in their concepts and structures, the two countries share their historical principle of nation-building and the current issue of accepting migrant workers as a complement to aging society. For Japan, it is instructive that many German organizations with longtime experience in “external” cultural policy currently apply their know-how of ICR-management to new “inbound” and “inland” programs.

著者

毛利 聡子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_165-206_179, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

49

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At the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) in Paris in 2015, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) reached an agreement to combat climate change and set goal of holding temperature rises no more than 2°C. The Paris Agreement entered into force in 2016, and the ratified countries were expected to submit their intended nationally determined contributions. However, climate talks at COP 25 in 2019 ended with limited progress on emissions targets. The long-term climate talks among governments continue to fail to deliver commitment to cut greenhouse gases and to limit dangerous climate impacts.On the other hand, the global financers and investors have accelerated to shift their funds from fossil fuel industry to realize the de-carbonized economy. In practice large institutional investors and companies start to divest from the fossil fuel industry and re-invest renewable energy industry. According to the environmental NGO “Fossil Free”, over 1110 institutions have committed to policies black-listing coal, oil and gas, and assets committed to divestment have leapt from $52 billion in 2014 to more than $11 trillion in 2019. Why do the number of investors express commitment to divest their funds without international legal binding? It can be assumed that institutional investors have re-examined their thoughts through interactions with civil society actors. In order to answer to these questions, this article examines how and to what extent NGOs’proposals and strategies influence on decisions made by institutional investors in three aspects.First, this article explores how the small thinktank called Carbon Tracker’s Report Unburnable Carbon (especially the concept of ‘stranded assets’) could reframe the debate on climate change into financial term. Second, how do strategies taken by fossil fuel divestment movement campaigns impact and effect on finance and public discourse. A closer look is taken at the changing notions of ‘reputation risk’ and ‘fiduciary duty’ which have significant impacts on investors and companies. Third, this article analyzes how the information disclosure system, which is essential for investors to decide investment choice, has been constructed with a particular focus on the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project).In so doing, the article explores the process of non-state actors, particularly NGOs and institutional investors, contributing to create information-based private governance. In addition, the article addresses the conditions and lessons that empower private governance sustainable and democratic.

著者

三船 恵美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_180-206_189, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

16

著者

山下 光

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_190-206_200, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

6

著者

浅野 豊美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_201-206_204, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

前川 一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_157-205_166, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

24

著者

高原 秀介

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_167-205_176, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

5

著者

ロメロ イサミ

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_177-205_180, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

浜 由樹子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_180-205_183, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

安富 淳

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_184-205_187, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

鈴木 一人

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_188, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

青野 利彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_1-206_16, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

44

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This special issue is an attempt to reexamine the dynamics of alliance politics from historical and theoretical perspectives. The subsequent essay serves as an introduction to the current issue and is divided in two parts. The first half provides a short overview of the theoretical and historical literature concerning alliance politics, with special attention to important topics, such as: alliance formation, alliance security dilemma, alliance functions, alliance institutionalization, and the dynamics of asymmetrical alliances.The second half of this piece contends that the scholarly contribution of the eight articles in this volume are significant to the study of alliance politics. With evidence from neglected archival sources, YAGUCHI Hiroaki and TAJIMA Nobuo reinterpret the nature of such well-studied alliances as the Quadruple Alliance in the nineteenth century and the alliance among the Axis powers in the 1930s. FUJII Atsushi’s article on French-Belgian relations and NAKASHIMA Takuma’s article on the US-Japan alliance respectively examine the alliance politics in Europe and Asia with emphasis on the wider historical contexts – decolonization in the 1950s and the development of nuclear weapons technology in the 1960s. International Relations (IR) theorist IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro offers a new “dynamic” theory of alliance politics concerned with the interplay between allied countries and their adversary, while FUKUSHIMA Hiroyuki seeks to reassess the transformation of the post-war US-Japanese alliance by means of his new analytical model. Articles by SANBYAKUGARI Hiroshi and SATAKE Tomohiko shed new light on the post-Cold War US-Japanese alliance. The former meticulously scrutinizes the development of the Two-Plus-Two system between the allies after 1990, while the latter analyzes the implications of the increasing Australian-Japanese security cooperation for the “hub and spoke” alliance system in post-war Asia. All in all, this special issue makes significant contributions to the historical and theoretical literature on alliance politics.

著者

矢口 啓朗

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_17-206_33, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

113

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The Quadruple Alliance, which was signed by Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia on November 20, 1815, established the foundation of the Congress System. However, the main object of this Alliance was the prevention of another instance of French aggression. In the 1830s, the international order was threatened by the French July Monarchy, which wanted to influence neighboring countries through ideas of liberalism. The autocrat of Russia, Tsar Nicholas I, who was afraid of these ideas, tried to prevent the spread of French influence. Many previous studies have emphasized that he strengthened relationships with the Holly Alliance. However, this study focuses on Russia’s relationship with Great Britain and reveals the Russo-British partnerships in the Quadruple Alliance for the defense of the Vienna System when Britain was governed by the liberal Whig Party during most of the 1830s.Although there was a liberal ideological identity, in both Great Britain and France in the 1830s, the two countries had many conflicts of interest in Europe and the Near East. The Whig government never permitted France to expand its influence over Belgium and Syria. For example, when a son of the King of France was recommended as the new Belgian king in January 1831, the British Foreign Secretary Palmerston rejected this idea, because Britain could not agree to the practical annexation of Belgium by France. In addition, since Britain showed negative attitudes to France in 1831, Russia could be sure of Britain’s commitment to the Continent through the Quadruple Alliance. Although in 1832 the ideological differences between Russia and Britain appeared with the passing of the Reform Act in Britain and by means of Belgian independence, Russia relied on Britain to deflect French aggression to neighboring countries. However, after the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which was signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire on July 8, 1833, Britain approached France because they did not agree with the expansion of Russia’s influence in the Near East.Nevertheless, during the Second Syrian Crisis, when the divergent and conflicting of Anglo-French interests in the Near East resurfaced, Russia approached Britain and took the initiative to develop the First Straits Convention, signed without France on July 15, 1840. Since “disgraced” France was threatening its neighboring countries into signing another convention, Russia demanded Britain’s commitment to defend Europe. Britain agreed to deflect the French invasion, although it did not want to sign a formal agreement. Russia used the Quadruple Alliance as a tool for involving liberal Britain in consistent defense against France in the 1830s. This Alliance contributed to the preservation of the Vienna System even after the collapse of the Congress System through the continued solidarity of the Four Powers against France.

著者

田嶋 信雄

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_34-206_50, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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This study will analyze the political realities of the Japanese–German Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and the Japan–Germany–Italy wartime alliance. Particular attention will be paid to the following: (1) introducing a new perspective on Axis relations from the viewpoint of Japan’s policy toward India, Afghanistan, and Iran; (2) providing new historical knowledge on Axis relations while unearthing new materials; (3) demonstrating that the trend of international politics, the development of Axis relations, and the change in the “virtual enemy” of the alliance factored in changing Japan’s Axis Alliance policy. It will also analyze the political transformation of Japan’s Axis policy, which, metaphorically speaking, drastically changed from “a policy to combat Russia and defend against Communism” to “a policy to work with Russia and accommodate Communism.”Conventionally, studies have underscored the continuity in the relationship between Germany, Italy, and Japan, categorized as the “Axis,” from the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 to the collapse of the Japanese–German wartime alliance in 1945. The Axis Pact has been regarded as a “hollow alliance,” as Johanna Menzel Meskill (1966) put it more than half-a-century ago. In addition, the Anti-Comintern Pact has been thought of not as an ideological anti-Soviet alliance but as a power-political anti-British alliance from the beginning, which had a commonality and continuity with the Tripartite Pact, in other words, the anti-British and anti-American alliance. Moreover, scholars have situated the origin of the Tripartite Pact in the “Axis Diplomacy” of the 1930s. They have also emphasized the continuity between the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact.This study will compare the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and the Japan–Germany–Italy wartime alliance, with a focus on the policies toward India, Afghanistan, and Iran, to demonstrate that the Axis relationship was not “hollow” but a real one and that the Tripartite Pact and the wartime alliance were not based on the continuity of the Anti-Comintern Pact but rather on its negation.

著者

鈴木 一人

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_1-205_13, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

18

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Globalization connects the economic activities of the world even though the world is becoming more contested and confrontational. The rivalry between the US and China increases the political frictions while they are deeply connected through global supply chain. Both the US and China are weaponizing trade relations as if they are at war without shooting a single bullet. The concept of “Economic Statecraft” emerged in such circumstances.A quick definition of the “Economic Statecraft (hereafter, ES)” is “achieving diplomatic and strategic goals of the state by using economic means”. Under this definition, the article examines the measures used in ES such as sanctions, export control, trade restrictions and aid. These measures have different effects on delivering political message to the target state, but they are taken in accordance with the aim and objective of the ES exercising state.The aim and objectives of the states are threefold. First, the ES is used to change the behavior and action of target state. For example, ES can be used for improving human rights conditions or halting nuclear programs by adding economic pressure. Second, ES is effective for announcing the malign activities and setting up norms of behavior. It is a message to add not only economic pressure but social pressure as well. Third, ES may have an effect to improve international and national solidarity and claim its legitimacy for implementing market distorting measures. If a state exercise ES, it may have negative effect on the economy of its own by cutting trade and investment or not licensing the export from its territory.The condition for the success of ES does not depend on the size of economy but the monopoly position in the global supply chain. If other countries have no option but to depend on the product from particular state, that state will have the power to use such a product as a leverage. Also the size of the market may create dependence. States in proximity of a large economy tend to fall into this category. Also state which controls the international currency can use such a position as a leverage.The article also examines the difference between the concepts of “economic security” and ES. The difference is that “economic security” focuses on the defense from economic coercion by improving national autonomy, while ES is an offensive tool for imposing political will on other states.

著者

長谷川 将規

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_29-205_44, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

90

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This article examines the practices and studies of economic statecraft (ESC), which refers to economic means for strategic purposes. The aim is to acquire a broad view of ESC to deepen our understanding of ESC and provide useful suggestions for ESC in the 21st century. ESC has been practiced since ancient times, and many states used it in the 20th century. China’s ESC, based on its massive economic power, is now attracting international attention. However, although various countries have used ESC in various times, comprehensive research of ESC is unexpectedly few. Without grasping the whole picture of ESC, it is difficult for us to understand the true value, usefulness, and implications of each ESC practice or study, and to understand the big picture of ESC, we have to explore the history of ESC.This article begins by examining past ESC practices. It surveys the diverse techniques, cases, and objectives of ESC and its changing legitimacy. Next, based on the above research, I focus on how previous studies discussed ESC. Third, the article confirms the problems with the ESC (economic engagement) that the West has used toward China for the past twenty years, discussing more useful and appropriate alternatives toward rising China in the 21st century. Finally, the article confirms the pitfalls of ESC studies, summarizing the theoretical and practical implications of its discussion.Today’s liberal democracies need an alternative and more systematic ESC toward China because the failure of economic engagement is now obvious. It must be the ESC focused on economic order—the gauze curtain, which is different from the iron curtain of the Cold War period and is based on a high-level multilateral free trade agreement, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).In today’s global era, the high cost of military means is widely recognized, ESC techniques are expanding thanks to economic globalization, the two major powers—the United States and China—are both outstanding ESC users, and the West wants a new ESC toward China to replace economic engagement. Therefore, ESC bears significant meaning for both practice and research. Traditionally, both policymakers and researchers have considered national security and geopolitics exclusively from the perspective of military means. In the 21st century, however, without the perspective of ESC, they would not be able to fully understand national security and geopolitics.

著者

杉之原 真子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_45-205_60, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

60

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This study aims to shed light on the reality of economic statecraft under the Trump administration by examining the formation of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018. For effective economic statecraft, the state as a unitary actor need to set a clear goal and pursue it in a concerted manner. Does this assumption hold in economic policymaking, where conflicting interests often collide?FIRRMA is primarily aimed to restrict China’s access to U.S. technology in order to contain the country’s rapid technological development. It is an effort to use American economic power to maintain US hegemony by limiting the operation of Chinese companies on the US soil, especially in the high-tech industries. At first glance, the bill seems to have been passed smoothly with a bipartisan support in Congress and with the full approval of the legislative branch, both of which came to take increasingly hardline stance toward China. They did so without being pushed by the public opinion or economic interests of their constituencies. This can be interpreted as a case in which policymakers came together to exercise economic statecraft in order to protect “national interest” in the face of the rising China threat, as Neorealism predicts.However, a close examination of the preferences and motives of each actor involved in the policymaking process reveals that the U.S. hardline policy toward China on inward investment was based on a combination of various motives and conditions. As there exists no firm consensus within the U.S. authority on detailed goals, it is highly likely that China’s actions or changes in the U.S. economic situation will lead to a loss of policy unity. It also shows the fundamental weakness of the foundation of economic statecraft, as economic policies usually involve a wide range of interests and preferences.In the long run, the strengthening of regulations on foreign investment could weaken the U.S. economic power, which is the base of its hegemony. Therefore, the case of regulations on inward investment also highlights such double-edged nature of economic statecraft: overuse of economic power can undermine the very source of power.

著者

松本 充豊

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_61-205_76, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

74

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This article considers the effects of China’s economic statecraft, conducting a case study of the tourism policy of sending out mainland Chinese tourists to Taiwan in China’s “Favor-Granting policies.” The Favor-Granting policies can be regarded as a particular type of economic statecraft, one which intends to change the behavior and policies of another country by providing economic benefits.Pursuing the strategic end of the “Peaceful Unification” with Taiwan, China is exerting more influence on Taiwan by economic means in recent years, following China’s emergence as an economic great power and Taiwan’s rapid deepening of economic dependence on China. A typical example of such practices is the Favor-Granting policies, which is essentially a pork barrel project. China has intended to exert its influence on the broader Taiwanese people by promoting the policies to reduce anti-China sentiment in Taiwan and to encourage the people to support or vote for the party in Taiwan that is desirable to the Chinese government, in an effort to create advantageous circumstances for future reunification. The tourism policy of sending out mainland Chinese tourists is a diplomatic means which China has been employing toward other countries also. However, in the case of Taiwan, its precise effect was limited and not successful in achieving the political ends.The literature on this topic has not completely grasped the reality of China’s influence exerted by the Favor-Granting policies. While the economic statecraft perspective elucidates the conditions with which China could exercise its influence effectively, it is not clear how the influence would exhibit its effect in Taiwan. Though political sociologists in Taiwan empirically explore the mechanisms of how China’s influence would penetrate Taiwanese society, as well as the importance of the native collaborators in Taiwan, they do not investigate the possibilities that its influence would ultimately be limited. Therefore, we need a comprehensive framework which enable us to analyze the interaction among actors involved with the Favor Granting policies.This article adopts a clientelism approach to examine the effect of the tourism policy towards Taiwan. This is because China’s influence as seen in ‘Favor Granting’ is viewed as pork barrel politics, which appears in a quasi-nation’s territory called “Liang’an” including the mainland China and Taiwan. We can know the effect of China’s influence by considering whether the clientelism across the Taiwan Strait will operate effectively.This article argues that the effective operation of the clientelism was constrained not only by a lack of the unity in the Chinese state, the market mechanism, and the existence of the de facto national border between China and Taiwan, but also by Taiwan’s democratic system. A principal-agent problem caused in the pork barrel politics undermined the effect of China’s tourism policy towards Taiwan. We argue that China’s economic statecraft is less lilely to be effective when it is applied to democratic countries.