著者
平山 勉
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.2, pp.1-17, 2009

The purpose of this article is to clarify the actions of the South Manchuria Railways Company (SMR) and its shareholders during the period of the 1933 SMR stock issue, using documents from the closed institutional records of its Tokyo branch. My interest in this issue is to establish how the SMR achieved this capital increase from private sector shareholders and investors in general, given the turbulent business environment resulting from the Manchurian Incident and the resulting increased scrutiny of the SMR itself. At the same time, I consider the significance of changes in the shareholder body during the take-up period by examining the reorganization of the SMR. In summary, this article establishes the following four points. First, bids for the newly-issued common stock were distributed approximately into two groups, the majority of bids clustering around the 53 yen mark, below the lower price of the offering. The record of the public offering shows that while some general investors were enthusiastic during the "Manchuria boom," others demonstrated a rather more cool attitude. Second, after the new stock came into circulation, it was rural shareholders who took up new and outstanding stock sold off by urban shareholders in areas such as Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa and Hyogo prefectures. The proportion of stock held by rural shareholders increased, and the number of shareholders also showed a greater rate of increase in rural areas than in urban. Throughout the take-up period, the relative importance of rural shareholders increased within the SMR shareholder body. Third, the sale of SMR stock by urban shareholders was triggered by political intervention in the SMR from the period of the Manchurian Incident to the time of the stock issue and the resulting management uncertainty and poor outlook. On the other hand, the reason that rural shareholders bought up the stock was that within the context of a widening loss of confidence in regional banks, an improved "environment for investment" brought about the stable circulation of reliable SMR stock which was seen as a haven for investment Finally, the transformed shareholder body successfully demanded the restructuring of the SMR to ensure the recovery of the share price and the payment of dividends Within the context of an increase of issued stock and diversification of the body of shareholders, the SMR could not ignore the specific demands of a large body of shareholders, numbering some tens of thousands of registered individuals, and as such it may be said that the shareholder body was able to exert a form of "governance" over the SMR.
著者
村松 怜
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.2, pp.35-51, 2019

<p>This article studies the Ministry of Finance's philosophy on income taxes in Meiji and Taisho Japan. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it reexamines "tax reform as social policy" in Taisho Japan. Second, it reveals aspects of the Ministry's taxation philosophy that lasted until the postwar period. Previous research on Taisho‒era tax reforms has focused on the relationship between the tax reforms and "social policy." The tax reform of 1920, considered a major example of "tax reform as social policy," has received particular attention: its inclusion of dividends in taxable income in particular is attributed to the taxation and social policy theories of the Japan Association for Social Policy Studies.</p><p>In contrast with the previous studies, this work reveals other factors leading to the 1920 tax reform by following MOF discussions of income tax going back to the Meiji period. First, the general principle of taxing dividend income did not arise out of a "social policy" context but was consistent with the income tax system envisioned by the MOF since Meiji. The MOF consistently supported a general income tax levied on aggregate income as well as differentiation of the income tax such that earned income would be taxed more lightly than unearned (capital) income. Second, for the MOF, the emergence of the "social policy" debate simply represented a "good opportunity" to bring about the general taxation of dividend income. The chief of the MOF's National Tax Section of the Tax Bureau, KATSU Masanori, who played an important role in the 1920 income tax reform, regarded general taxation of dividend income as essential for a fair tax system. He took advantage of the "social policy" debate to propose the income tax reform. In the 1930s the MOF proposed the so‒called Baba Tax Reform Plan, which attempted a comprehensive general income taxation. The Tax Bureau, moreover, regarded the comprehensive system of income tax recommended by the Shoup Mission during the postwar US occupation of Japan as the "ideal" tax system. MOF consistently embraced this tax philosophy from Meiji into the postwar period.</p>
著者
竹田 泉
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.2, pp.18-33, 2006-01-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

Why did the Irish linen industry, which had spread throughout the country by the latter half of the 18th century, experience a rapid decline at the end of that century? The purpose of this paper is to present a colonial image of the 18th-century Irish linen industry, by investigating the policies England forced on the Irish linen industry, and how Ireland reacted to them. England's late 17th-century measure to promote the manufacture of linens in Ireland was a typical mercantile policy that was carefully designed to pursue the national interests of England, which was, at that point, the development of the English woollen industry. However, when linen manufacturing began to develop in Lancashire in the mid 18th-century, it became unfavourable for England to encourage the linen manufacture in Ireland, because it was an obstacle to the development of the Lancashire linen industry. The persons concerned in the linen trade in Ireland rarely felt that they were dependent upon the economic conditions of England as long as they were given enough encouragement. However, once the English Parliament passed a bill that gave the Lancashire linen industry priority over that of Ireland in 1770 (the 1771 Act), they came to recognise that their industry was a colonial type. After the 1771 Act, the Irish linen industry was depressed sharply while that of Lancashire continued to expand. Furthermore, the outbreak of the War of Independence in colonial America decreased the exports of Irish linens. To overcome these difficulties, the Irish linen industry pressured the English government, and finally got the freedom to trade with the British colonies. It was ironic, however, that by acquiring this freedom, Ireland became aware that there existed many other oppressive British policies over Ireland. In Irish political history, the 1770s and 1780s, when Ireland fought for liberty from England, have been understood positively, but through this movement for freedom, the Irish linen industry realised that there existed the limits of their development, and that they were incorporated into the growth process of the Lancashire linen industry as a yarn supplier. Furthermore, at the time they clarified this recognition, the Lancashire linen industry was ending its dependence upon Ireland for linen yarns, and taking a lean forward to the manufacture of pure cottons-calicoes.
著者
竹田 泉
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.2, pp.18-33, 2006

Why did the Irish linen industry, which had spread throughout the country by the latter half of the 18th century, experience a rapid decline at the end of that century? The purpose of this paper is to present a colonial image of the 18th-century Irish linen industry, by investigating the policies England forced on the Irish linen industry, and how Ireland reacted to them. England's late 17th-century measure to promote the manufacture of linens in Ireland was a typical mercantile policy that was carefully designed to pursue the national interests of England, which was, at that point, the development of the English woollen industry. However, when linen manufacturing began to develop in Lancashire in the mid 18th-century, it became unfavourable for England to encourage the linen manufacture in Ireland, because it was an obstacle to the development of the Lancashire linen industry. The persons concerned in the linen trade in Ireland rarely felt that they were dependent upon the economic conditions of England as long as they were given enough encouragement. However, once the English Parliament passed a bill that gave the Lancashire linen industry priority over that of Ireland in 1770 (the 1771 Act), they came to recognise that their industry was a colonial type. After the 1771 Act, the Irish linen industry was depressed sharply while that of Lancashire continued to expand. Furthermore, the outbreak of the War of Independence in colonial America decreased the exports of Irish linens. To overcome these difficulties, the Irish linen industry pressured the English government, and finally got the freedom to trade with the British colonies. It was ironic, however, that by acquiring this freedom, Ireland became aware that there existed many other oppressive British policies over Ireland. In Irish political history, the 1770s and 1780s, when Ireland fought for liberty from England, have been understood positively, but through this movement for freedom, the Irish linen industry realised that there existed the limits of their development, and that they were incorporated into the growth process of the Lancashire linen industry as a yarn supplier. Furthermore, at the time they clarified this recognition, the Lancashire linen industry was ending its dependence upon Ireland for linen yarns, and taking a lean forward to the manufacture of pure cottons-calicoes.
著者
シュペーラー マルク シュトレープ ヨッヘン 雨宮 昭彦 三ツ石 郁夫
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.4, pp.46-58, 2008-07-30

More than half a century after the collapse of the Third Reich, satisfactory economic explanations for the most important economic processes of the Nazi period are still lacking. That is why these economic processes are often christened "miracles" by historians. Recently, however, a group of German economic historians started the attempt to demystify these "miracles" with the help of modern economic theory and econometrics. In this review article, we present both the new methods and the new results of this research programme to Japanese scholars. In section 2, under the headline "Deformed economic miracle" we analyse the distorted macroeconomic development of the Third Reich until the outbreak of the Second World War. In section 3, headed "The 'miracle' of the armament industry", we show that the Nazis directed the German economy generally not by compulsion and the threat of violence but by setting adequate economic incentives which secured the voluntary cooperation of profit-oriented entrepreneurs.
著者
川越 修
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.3, pp.20-27, 2004-04-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

本論文の課題は,19世紀末から20世紀前半にかけてのドイツにおける乳児死亡問題と母子保健制度の展開過程という限定された事例の検討を通じて,現在大きな転換点に立っている先進工業社会(=都市型社会)の制度的基盤(=制度としての社会国家)と,それが内包する問題点を歴史的に考察することにある.こうした課題設定に従って,以下,(1)19世紀から20世紀への世紀転換点に西ヨーロッパ社会がほぼ共時的に経験した社会変動,(2)世紀転換期から第一次世界大戦を経てヴァイマル共和国時代へと至る時期のドイツにおける,乳児死亡問題と母子保健問題の展開,(3)ヴァイマル期からナチ期にかけての母子保健制度の展開過程の分析から浮かび上がるナチ社会像,(4)20世紀前半のドイツ社会の歴史的経験の意味,という4点を中心に考察を進めて行くことにしよう.
著者
白木沢 旭児
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.3, pp.31-39, 2010-04-30 (Released:2017-08-30)
参考文献数
43

This paper first considers whether the controlled economy in the first half of the 1930s was directly connected with the controlled economy of wartime Japan, and second, aims to clarify the meaning of the terms "modification of capitalism" and "reorganization of capitalism". Regarding the first point, in the first half of the 1930s it was thought that a controlled economy and market monopolization were almost the same thing. However, the evils of monopolization were well recognized after economic recovery from the Great Depression, such that the view of the controlled economy as monopolization came to be criticized. Moreover, confrontation between vocational organizations intensified in the first half of the 1930s. Although control regulation for small and medium-sized enterprises existed, for example, in the form of industrial guilds, this was not available to major companies. This problem was solved at last by the 1940 Key-Industries Association Act. Concerning the second point, in the first half of the 1930s, correction of capitalism meant the abolition of laissez-faire capitalism. On the other hand, profit control at companies aiming at low prices was asserted late in the 1930s, and companies were expected not just to pursue profit, but also to work for the improvement of the public good. However, profit controls were not instituted, and bureaucrats who tried to do so in earnest were arrested. As such, controlled economy theory came to have no meaning. In contrast, I term the theory of controlled economy which prospered in 1940s Japan the Japanese-principle controlled economy theory. Controlled economy theory and profit control was not inherited in the postwar period. Consequently, it is suggested that the theory of the controlled economy was different in each of the prewar, wartime and postwar periods. Future research will focus on postwar vocational organizations and control organizations, such as industrial guilds, which continued in existence from the prewar into the postwar period.
著者
原 朗
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 : the journal of political economy and economic history (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.2, pp.1-18, 2016-01

Moritaro Yamada's "Nihon Shihonshugi Bunseki (Analysis of Japanese Capitalism)" (1934), hereafter "Bunseki," is a classic that has had an great impact on Japan's social science since the 1930s. It is difficult to understand the author's true intent, however, because he used obscure language, in order to avoid censorship by the authoritarian government. The book is principally composed of three volumes that were originally part of "Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsushi Koza (Lectures on the Development of Japanese Capitalism)" (1932-1933), hereafter "Koza." We are now able to compare the "Bunseki" and "Koza" manuscripts because they were recently donated to the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo. The other Moritaro Yamada's collections are at the Archive for the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tokyo, the Institute of Social Science at Senshu University and the Library of Ryukoku University, with both of which Yamada was affiliated. It is important to compare the various manuscripts of "Bunseki" and "Koza", and particularly the "Koza" manuscripts with the published version, in order to establish an evidentiary basis for the retrospective examination of Yamada's theory and analysis. This article collates the differences between the manuscript and published versions of "Koza" where they are most divergent in content, as shown in Table 1 and 2. These Tables enable us to understand the author's intention regarding a substantial portion of the complicated terminology used in "Koza" and "Bunseki." Some results of collation are as follows. First, the original title of "Bunseki" was "Nihon Shihonshugi (tokuni Kogyo) Bunseki (Analysis of Japanese Capitalism [Especially Industry])." Secondly, the third section, 'Kitei (The Basis),' which has received particular recognition, was initially titled 'Yohen (Appendix)'. Thridly, in 'Jogen (Introduction),' which compared the characteristics of Japanese capitalism with that of other countries, the author defined by 'revolution' and 'capitalism' at the beginning, and then went on to clarify by 'absolutism' and 'land ownership.' Lastly, the author changed his wording, especially in relation to 'Military', 'Police', 'Imperial Court', and 'Labor Struggle', to other unique complicated terminologies.
著者
千田 稔
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
土地制度史学 (ISSN:04933567)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, no.4, pp.p40-59, 1987-07

The purpose of this study is to make clear what characteristics Marquis Hosokawa had before World War II, from the point of each stage of capitalistic development, in order to encourage the study of peerage capital which has been so far almost neglected. The historical documents used in this paper consist of the materials concerning both human affairs and family budgets of the Hosokawas. The conclusions of this study are as follows. 1. Marquis Hosokawa grew to be a big land owner of 1000 cho (about 1000 ha) in Kumamoto in the thirties of Meiji era and of 2000 cho in Korea, but the amount of farm-rent was smaller than the amount of stock dividends or almost equal to it. 2. Under the direction of Keigo Kiyoura, counselor of the Hosokawas, and Nagaaki Takahashi, semi-servant of the Hosokawas, Marquis Hosokawa tried to contribute the colonization of Korea and made Kumamoto the base of capital accumulation by the help of Zaibatu Yasuda mainly through the field of the banking and the electric power industry. And it became a man of property amounting to ten million yen in the Taisho period. 3. Though Marquis Hosokawa had priority to the national position of peerage as the guard of the Emperor, thus it obtained farm-rent as the main revenue by becoming a big land owner in Kumamoto and Korea, and established the base of capitalistic accumulation in Kumamoto, which brought the Hosokawas somewhat social influence over Kumamoto at least. We can point it out that Marquis Hosokawa was one of the typical existences standing for almost main features peculiar to prewar Japan.
著者
川上 正道
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
土地制度史学 (ISSN:04933567)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, no.1, pp.29-39, 1963-10-20

われわれは当面,日本資本主義の再生産構造を解明することを課題としている.これに応えるためには,マルクスの再生産論を正しく把握しておくことが,理論的な基礎として必要であるが,その実証的な資料という点では,政府推計の国民所得および産業連関表を重視すべきであろう.ところで,これらの政府の統計は,主観的な効用価値説にもとづいて作成されているから,客観的な労働価値説の立場からこれを正しく再編成したうえで利用しなければならない.つまり,マルクスの再生産論に立脚して,国民所得と産業連関表を正しく位置づけ,それを基準として政府推計の国民所得および産業連関表の歪曲された性格をとらえておく必要がある.われわれは,以下に,マルクスの拡大再生産表式を手がかりとして,この点を明確にしようとするものである.
著者
福澤 直樹
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
土地制度史学 (ISSN:04933567)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, no.4, pp.1-17, 1994-07-20

The purpose of this paper is to examine the development of the state assistance-system for unemployed from the period of Wilhelmine Germany to the Weimar Republic and to make its background clear. In Germany no assistance-system for unemployed was taken by the state before World War I. This was not caused by the absence of the unemployment problem, but by the absence of agreement to that the state organize the redistribution as seen in the social insurance or in the state subsidy, due to the dominance of the classical Liberal way of thinking. It was after the war, in the political and economic confusion, with enormous unemployment, that the first state assistance-system for unemployed was introduced. However, it was not the unemployment insurance planned earlier, but rather a special unemployment assistance which was financed solely from the public (mainly state) expenditure, the so-called "Erwerbslosenfiirsorge", because there was no prospect of keeping the finance of insurance just after the end of the war. After that, several attempts were made to realize the unemployment insurance more adequate for a market economy, in which the propotion of benefit to burden is clear. But the attempts were not successful till 1927. In the meantime the Erwerbslosenfiirsorge went on, as the only state assistance-system for unemployed, in spite of problems of administration, conflict between proportional contributions and standardized benefits which appeared after the hyper-inflation, and insufficient right to assistance due to means-testing. The Erwerbslosenfiirsorge kept the assistance just sufficient to sustain the essentials of life, even in the financial pressure in the recession in 1925/26. The Erwerbslosenfiirsorge functioned as the actual system for effective maintenance of the livelihood of the unemployed. The right to social security for unemployed was essentially established, de facto, with the Erwerbslosenfiirsorge. But the Erwerbslosenfiirsorge lacks the financial stability, and the confusion of bases of burden and benefit brought social frictions. Therefore, the unemployment-assistance system had to be changed into a state insurance system. Because of this change, a wide range of people would not be covered by the new system. Therefore, a main point of discussion about introduction of unemployment insurance was, how a security system with benefits corresponding to former income could be established without hindering the function of insurance as a comprehensive social security system. As a result, the elements of planned redistribution were included in the insurance, contrary to the original intent. For the persons excluded from this social security system, a parallel system like "Flirsorge" was introduced. The establishment of the insurance law in 1927 can be understood as a systematization of both functions of social security, i.e. the insurance, which is adequate for a market economy, and the Fiirsorge, which had been combined with the right to assistance in the Erwerbslosenfiirsorge. We can see that the origin of the complementary relationship between unemployment insurance and unemployment aid in the contemporary Employment Law in Germany had already been established at this time.
著者
崔 在東
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.2, pp.15-31, 2011-01-30

From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, there was a ten-fold increase in fire incidents in rural Russia. In particular, from the beginning of the 20th century until right before WWI there was a two- to three-fold increase in fire incidents in comparison to the end of the 19th century. Arson was the cause of some 30 percent of these fires, but in some regions and provinces over 50 percent were caused by arson. Fires did not necessarily lead to bankruptcy for Russian peasants, but were an opportunity to receive a significant payment of insurance money that enabled them to reset their economic situation. Peasants in Moscow province actively purchased coverage in the higher zemstvo additional insurance program, the zemstvo voluntary insurance program and from fire insurance companies. As a result in 1904, more than 40 percent of those who purchased zemstvo compulsory insurance coverage received 70 to 80 percent of the registered value of the insured asset, the value of which was frequently overestimated two or three times. 50 percent of policy holders of zemstvo compulsory insurance received payouts in 1909, while more than 60 percent did so in 1914. Farmers in Russia did not consider it a shame or a crime to cause arson, if it was not harmful to others. They saw arson as a quicker and more secure way to resolve the economic difficulties of rural management than bringing issues to the courts, which took into consideration various interests, or by bringing issues forward for an administrative procedure. It was not only quicker and easier to receive a large insurance payout for fire and arson, but insurance payouts also resolved the problems more quickly. In addition, there were very few cases where a suspect of arson was tried and punished as a criminal. During WWI and the Russian Revolution in 1917, there was a sharp decrease in the number of fire incidents. The primary reason for this was that the economic gain from insurance payouts decreased remarkably due to the sudden rise of prices for building materials and of worker pay. For this reason, in contrast to the 1905 Revolution, farmers seeking to restart their businesses during the revolutionary period beginning in 1917 were extremely careful about fire and arson.