著者

大森 弘喜

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.4, pp.54-56, 2012-07-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

著者

林 采成

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.46-62, 2010-10-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

参考文献数

62

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the personnel management of Japanese National Railways (JNR) during the wartime period and clarify the postwar implications of that policy. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out, JNR faced great instability of railroad labor and a concomitant attenuation of skills. In response, JNR reinforced its internal training system and adjusted the disposition of its limited human resources. Through the expansion of incentives including allowances, bonuses and fringe benefits, the decline of real wages was halted. Programs for the ideological reinforcement of laborers' spirit and lifestyle were implemented as well. However, as the war escalated to become the Pacific War, labor supply was further restricted, finally running short, and the quality of labor consequently deteriorated. As a countermeasure, JNR implemented administrative streamlining and established a personnel maintenance committee, focusing human resources allocation within the organization according to importance. Female workers and students were employed as a new source of labor. In particular, to compensate for a marked decline in living standards, chances of promotion were expanded. Railroad operational efficiency was achieved through this personnel management style and in 1943 JNR reached the highest level of productivity since its foundation. Nonetheless, in the face of a transportation crisis and with a mainland battle seeming imminent, JNR could not avoid conversion to a military organization. For this conversion, a new rank of Vice Associate Railroad Officer was established as a temporary measure and more than 100,000 personnel were promoted to this rank and the existing Associate Railroad Officer. At the same time, the lowest rank of employee was abolished. These wartime measures and the military organization of JNR were reformed during the radical postwar reorganization of Japanese National Railways under the Allied occupation of Japan.

著者

金 慧昇

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.2, pp.1-16, 2018-01-30 (Released:2020-01-30)

参考文献数

34

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The primary aim of this paper is to re‒evaluate female labourers' participation in the Preston strike of 1853. This paper also explores how and why those female labourers came to demand the withdrawal of married women from the labour market, despite the fact that they had been obvious participants in labour movements. Much of the research on the Preston strike of 1853 has not give sufficient attention to women’s roles in the strike, so this study seeks to compensate for that neglect through an examination of local newspapers such as the Preston Chronicle and contemporary pamphlets. The investigation shows that women were important supporters of the strike through their attendance at operatives’ meetings, subscription to strike funds, and criticism of blacklegs.This paper discusses the fact that the demand by females that married women leave the factories was the result of the influence of the Chartist and factory reform movements of the 1830s. Female labourers actively participated in the 1853 strike having already forged their identity as wage labourers, but they were affected by the shared perspective of the two movements regarding female wage labour, and especially the view that married women’s wage labor constituted a social problem and that women’s duty as wives and mothers should be emphaslzed. The evidence suggests that by expressing sympathy with the resolution calling on all married women to withdraw from the labour market, female labourers expected the following results : first, an increase in wages(especially for males) due to the restricted supply of labour ; second, the alleviation of the double burden on married women who were responsible for both wage labour and housework ; and finally, maintenance of the economic independence of single women labourers.The agreement with the prohibition of married women's wage labour shows that married and unmarried women had different identities, and that they differed not only in social status but also in their own awareness of themselves. This paper concludes that this divergence in identities was a product of the gap between the working‒class ideal of family‒wage/male breadwinner ideology and the reality of English society, which relied on a female labour force. Nevertheless, though confronted with opposition to women’s wage labour, female labourers maintained their position as wage‒earners and did not cease to support labour movements in the nineteenth century. And their experiences as important actors in labour agitations can be understood as a pard of the prehistory of the female labour movements that flourished after the 1870s.

著者

金井 雄一

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.1, pp.16-29, 2017-10-30 (Released:2019-10-30)

参考文献数

66

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Expansionary monetary policies (policies for increasing the money supply) are often adopted when the economy is in a slump. However, a fundamental issue in monetary policy is whether a central bank can control the money supply by manipulating the monetary base. As is well known, this question has effectively divided the field of economics into two schools. The exogenous and endogenous money theories have offered conflicting views on money supply since the mid‒18th century, and even today’s application of econometric methods to the question has ended in fruitless debate. This perhaps means that we should look beyond econometric approaches to settle the dispute. This paper argues that an examination of banknotes from a historical perspective might bring about the resolution of the longstanding debate.From its foundation in 1694, the Bank of England issued pieces of paper (running cash notes) as receipts in exchange for deposits, and these pieces of paper gradually began to circulate. This is how the Bank of England’s notes came into being. Originally they acted simply as notes that the Bank of England promised to repay to the depositors or bearers; they were entered as debts in the book of outstanding banknotes, known as the “Clearer.” The Bank of England also issued its notes in other banking activities such as discount drafts and loans. The notes with their varying written amounts ultimately evolved into notes with printed denominations.As suggested above, banknotes came into existence only when a credit relationship was established, and they expired with the expiry of that credit relationship. Since a banknote went from the bank of issue into the real economy only when a credit transaction was conducted, the bank of issue could not control quantity of banknotes in circulation. As previous studies have shown, goldsmith bankers had by the end of the 17th century constructed a payment and settlement system that used transfers of deposit monies. Banknotes became a means for adding or withdrawing money from one’s balance.In summary, it was not banknotes that enabled the settlement of payments by allowing the transfer of deposits, but rather that the settlement of payments through the transfer of deposits gave rise to banknotes. Banknotes were a product of the credit system. In other words, a bank of issue can not increase or reduce deposits or banknotes arbitrarily. Should we therefore recognize that both deposits and banknotes are born endogenously?

著者

平井 廣一

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.73-75, 2004

著者

嶋 理人

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.28-42, 2012-10-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

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This article examines a case in which an electricity service district in Chiba Prefecture was transferred from Tokyo Electric Light (Co.) to Keisei Electric Railway (Co.) (hereafter referred to as the "Chiba Case"). It focuses on two points: first, the principal features of the 1931 Revised Electricity Business Act (hereafter referred to as "The Revised Act"); and second, changes in the relationship between the Revised Act and State management of electric power. The research is based mainly on the diary of OOWADA Teiji, who was a Ministry of Communications (MOC) bureaucrat. The agreement to transfer the electricity service district from Tokyo Electric Light to Keisei Electric Railway was concluded in 1934, but in 1936, the Ministry of Communications decided not to approve it. The 1931 Revised Act had originally established electricity service district monopolies, as well as systems for approving electric bills, granting permission for mergers and transfers, and so on. Under the Revised Act, public regulation over the monopolies was strengthened. Five major electric power companies imposed self-regulation by organizing the Electric Power League (cartel). The driving force behind the Revised Act was HIRASAWA Kaname, an MOC bureaucrat who was specialized in electricity administration. The evolving regime reflected his ideas. He insisted on electricity service district monopolies and on the system for approving the electric bill (the introduction of the fully distributed cost method). He also respected the spirit of enterprise, however. His supervision of the electric power industry was therefore not oppressive but rather encouraged self-regulation by the companies. Meanwhile, OOWADA, who had opposed HIRASAWA, played an important role in establishing State management of electric power (1938). OOWADA insisted that the electric power industry should not be managed by private enterprise but should be controlled directly by the state, to correspond with the move to total war and to revive farming areas. Similar views gained influence in the Ministry of Communications in the reforming climate of the times. Finally, TANOMOGI Keikichi, who had long sought state management of electric power, was appointed Minister of Communications. He removed HIRASAWA as chief of the electricity bureau and appointed OOWADA in his place. OOWADA and others dismissed HIRASAWA's policy as antireform: as a result, the Chiba transfer agreement was rejected. The Revised Act regime had aimed to balance an enterprising spirit with the public interest, but bureaucrats like OOWADA criticized it as insufficient for establishing state control of electricity. Some previous studies have argued that the Revised Act regime paved the way for State management by tightening public regulations. However, the above case reveals the discontinuity between electricity management under the Revised Act and State management. The rejection of the Chiba Case was a sign of the changes taking place in electricity administration at that time, and thus suggests a universal problem in the relationship between the spirit of enterprise and the public interest.

著者

張 暁紅

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, no.2, pp.18-28, 2017-01-30 (Released:2019-01-30)

参考文献数

10

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This paper examines movements in local capital in order to elucidate the impact of economic controls on the wartime economy (1937‒45) of Manchuguo. The focus is on local capital and cotton industry controls, because the controls had a strong impact on the wartime cotton industry's development; and also because local capital played a leading role in the local economy, and its study is therefore essential to any investigation of the local impact of control policies. Two conclusions emerge from this study.First, when cotton industry control began in 1939, local textile factories were not included in the Production Control Association, centered on the Cotton Industry Federation. As members of the Textile Manufacturing Trade Association, local factories, though subject to supply regulations, obtained raw materials (cotton yarn) from the Cotton Industry Federation. They also had a certain degree of freedom, because direct transactions with local merchants were permitted in practice. With tightened controls from the summer of 1941, however, local textile operators were formed into a Control Union and became subject to consolidation. Combined with the difficulty of procuring yarn and other factors, local capital's market share in cotton cloth production dropped by over half, and a string of businesses left the Union. Toward the end of the control period, many local textile businesses were either idle or had closed. Control Union member factories were subject to control and forced to operate at a fraction of capacity. Factories outside the Control Union operated with shadow-market materials to generate income.Second, the controls on supply resulted in streamlined distribution channels. Policies were implemented to eliminate wholesalers (chiefly local merchants), and a number of local traders went out of business. Many factories shifted to capital sources outside the control regime by becoming small- or micro-scale enterprises, in order to stay in business. Local traders also slipped through the cracks of the controls by hanging “closed for business” signs while continuing to operate; their shadow transactions engendered a boom in the shadow market. Thus, the measures for eliminating wholesalers were not wholly effective, and actually caused considerable market turmoil. The Manchuguo government eventually aimed to rectify the situation with new plans to make use of local capital and rely again on the old framework, but the war ended three months later and the plans were never implemented.

著者

本田 由紀 堤 孝晃

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, no.3, pp.23-33, 2014-04-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

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Since the 1970s, Japan's high-school system has been characterized by a lack of institutional diversity, or in other words by an oversupply of general studies programs and undersupply of vocational programs. This paper reexamines the social context of the 1970s policy shift and proposes an alternative to the dominant view that the striking decline of high-school vocational courses in the 1970s and '80s was the inevitable result of their dysfunctions. In the 1960s, Japan's educational policy-makers pursued the institutional diversification of high schools in response both to the high demand for trained manpower in developing industries and to the increase in the proportion of students advancing to high school. Around 1970, however, educational policy made an about-face, depreciating vocational programs and promoting the flexible and individualized approach of general coursework. One possible explanation for this abrupt change in policy is that just when the Japanese government was facing serious financial challenges following the oil shock in 1973, it was also confronted with the need to establish more and more high schools, especially in metropolitan areas which had seen significant population increases during the high-growth years of the '60s. The only way to reconcile these conflicting circumstances was to establish general studies programs, the construction and operation of which were far cheaper than those of vocational courses. Another possible factor was the demand for general-studies high schools by members of the upper and middle classes, including government officials, teachers and academics, who most highly valued the path to university and white-collar careers. These factors together served to counteract and overwhelm the demand for vocational education that persisted from small and medium-size enterprises and from families that expected their children to take stable jobs after graduating high school. The result was the establishment of vertical diversification among schools and among students within general courses and the steady decline of the relevance of high-school education to occupational training. This study suggests the need for a thorough reconsideration of Japan's high-school policies, both past and present.

著者

木庭 俊彦

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.4, pp.35-45, 2009-07-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

参考文献数

60

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Prior to the Second World War, much of the coal mined in Kyushu and Yamaguchi was transported through the Seto Inland Sea by motorized sailboat. This motorized sailboat transportation system was taken under government control during the Pacific War and could have proved of some utility. This paper clarifies how and why the system failed, through an analysis of the transport management organization's problem recognition and ability to implement countermeasures, and also aims to create a more concrete understanding of the decline of marine transportation power, of such crucial importance during WWII, in the wartime Japanese economy. In order to increase coal supply, full-scale control of the motorized sailboat system was started in 1942 and most of the motorized sailing traders were taken under government management. From 1943 mobilization of traders was strengthened and a variety of measures were taken for the reinforcement of transport capacity. Nevertheless, far from increasing, coal traffic from Kyushu and Yamaguchi decreased. Within the transportation plan for Kyushu and Yamaguchi coal, a bottleneck was created by the exclusive use of some vessels by the army and a number of factories. On the other hand, contradictions surfaced during the process of development of the control system and as the acceleration of mobilization of motorized sailboats proceeded. These can be classified in the following three forms. First, because of the peculiar nature of the motorized sailboat business and in spite of repeated investigations, the control organization was not able to develop an overall picture of the tonnage and status of the vessels and consequently there were problems in drawing up and implementing policies. Second, mobilization for national purposes did not proceed smoothly and some traders refused to join the control system. Third, problems remained in making full use to plan of those vessels that were employed for national use. Lack of replacement staff due to conscription, shortage of staff, supplies and fuel, and low wages in a context of ever increasing prices, motorized sailboat owners evaded the planned transportation system or chose to sell their vessels on the secondhand ship market. These complex restrictions brought about the failure of the controlled transportation system.

著者

大門 正克

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.3, pp.18-28, 2020-04-30 (Released:2022-04-30)

参考文献数

20

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The purpose of this study is to perform dynamic analyses of the relationship between corporate society during the high‒growth period of the Japanese economy and modern family (homemakers) in order to identify the connection between labor‒force reproduction and lifestyle. This paper analyzes “Nittsu Dayori”, the internal newsletters published by Nippon Express Co., Ltd. and “Nittsu Rodo”, its labor’s press. “Nittsu Dayori” describes the ideal images of its employees and their wives. It also demands that wives should manage family life, paying attention to such areas as the safety of husband, their health, and hygiene, understanding the company business, and taking care of children’s education, family health, hygiene, and housework. One of the messages posted in “Nittsu Dayori” by a homemaker pictures her efforts to please her husband who is tired from work and in a bad mood.The asymmetric image of husband and wife is also shown in “Nittsu Rodo”. Housewife norms and her daily practice in life played an important role in labor‒force reproduction during the high‒growth period of the Japanese economy, and remains to a great extent in current Japanese society.

著者

平井 廣一

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.73-75, 2004-01-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

著者

鎮目 雅人

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.2, pp.61-64, 2020-01-30 (Released:2022-01-30)

著者

土地制度史学会 政治経済学・経済史学会史編纂委員会

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.Suppl, pp.8-97, 2008-03-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

著者

深澤 敦

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.4, pp.27-36, 2021-07-30 (Released:2023-07-30)

参考文献数

41

著者

新井田 智幸

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.1, pp.29-37, 2019-10-30 (Released:2021-10-30)

参考文献数

10

著者

林 采成

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.3, pp.28-36, 2016-04-30 (Released:2018-04-30)

参考文献数

20

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This paper focuses on the Korea-U.S. Combined Economic Board (CEB), which developed comprehensive policies for the Korean economy after the Korean War, and reconsiders presuppositions about the “development period” by examining economic recovery and stabilization under the American aid program.Rehabilitation and stabilization in the Korean economy were achieved through cooperation and opposition between Korea and the U.S. The CEB played a central role in this process. Although it is true that significant differences of opinion occurred over the amount and composition of economic aid, the accumulation and use of counterpart funds, and exchange rates, the MSA programs that integrated economic aid and military assistance ultimately caused more friction than did the philosophies of CEB participants. The result was issues over how Korea and the U.S. would share the economic expenses for post-war rehabilitation.Once the exchange rate was adjusted to meet the increase in prices, a system of cooperation between Korea and the U.S. was formulated, including exchanges in manpower, and management of the Korean economy became highly sophisticated. In particular, the Korean government implemented plans that succeeded in stabilizing the economy, enabling long-term maintenance of the exchange rate. In other words, from the mid-1950s on, Korea and the U.S. were able to avoid excessive friction. The introduction of large volumes of aid supplies enabled Korea to implement an array of projects and thereby to return to its prewar production levels, and long-term economic development plans were drawn up with U.S. support with the aim of enhancing Korea’s capacity for economic independence. The Korean government, however, seeking to stay in power, failed to rein in the sharp increase in prices, and was therefore unable to extend exchange-rate adjustments with the U.S. Ultimately, it faced an economic crisis that resulted in the early demise of its long-term economic development plans.The above shows that, contrary to the premise of “collapse” and “delay” presented in existing research, the Korean economy of the 1950s did achieve rehabilitation after the war, as well as economic stabilization, and was able to lay the groundwork for the “development period.” Fluctuations in economic aid are not enough to explain the process. That is, the rehabilitation and stabilization of the Korean economy would be impossible without the accumulation of experience and the resulting maturity of administrative capacity.

著者

平山 勉

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.1-17, 2009-01-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

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The purpose of this article is to clarify the actions of the South Manchuria Railways Company (SMR) and its shareholders during the period of the 1933 SMR stock issue, using documents from the closed institutional records of its Tokyo branch. My interest in this issue is to establish how the SMR achieved this capital increase from private sector shareholders and investors in general, given the turbulent business environment resulting from the Manchurian Incident and the resulting increased scrutiny of the SMR itself. At the same time, I consider the significance of changes in the shareholder body during the take-up period by examining the reorganization of the SMR. In summary, this article establishes the following four points. First, bids for the newly-issued common stock were distributed approximately into two groups, the majority of bids clustering around the 53 yen mark, below the lower price of the offering. The record of the public offering shows that while some general investors were enthusiastic during the "Manchuria boom," others demonstrated a rather more cool attitude. Second, after the new stock came into circulation, it was rural shareholders who took up new and outstanding stock sold off by urban shareholders in areas such as Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa and Hyogo prefectures. The proportion of stock held by rural shareholders increased, and the number of shareholders also showed a greater rate of increase in rural areas than in urban. Throughout the take-up period, the relative importance of rural shareholders increased within the SMR shareholder body. Third, the sale of SMR stock by urban shareholders was triggered by political intervention in the SMR from the period of the Manchurian Incident to the time of the stock issue and the resulting management uncertainty and poor outlook. On the other hand, the reason that rural shareholders bought up the stock was that within the context of a widening loss of confidence in regional banks, an improved "environment for investment" brought about the stable circulation of reliable SMR stock which was seen as a haven for investment Finally, the transformed shareholder body successfully demanded the restructuring of the SMR to ensure the recovery of the share price and the payment of dividends Within the context of an increase of issued stock and diversification of the body of shareholders, the SMR could not ignore the specific demands of a large body of shareholders, numbering some tens of thousands of registered individuals, and as such it may be said that the shareholder body was able to exert a form of "governance" over the SMR.

著者

満薗 勇

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, no.3, pp.11-20, 2015-04-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

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The theme of this symposium (What Is the Middle Class?) emphasizes the importance of lifestyle and values rather than occupation and income level as the defining components of the middle class. As is well known, the increase in the number of people who regarded themselves as middle class during the period of rapid economic growth after World War II gave birth to the so-called 'all-middle class society' in Japan. It has been shown that their middle-class consciousness derived from a lifestyle and values focused on consumption. This paper therefore focuses on the history of consumption and elucidates the following points. It was in the 1920s-30s that a middle-class model was formed based on consumption levels and patterns rather than on the social prestige or culture associated with occupation and type of employment. Although this model was certainly influenced by that of the USA, its consumption patterns revealed certain Japanese characteristics. For example, Japanese consumers preferred small-scale mom-and-pop retail stores rather than large-scale stores such as GMS. As a result, the commercial sector was able to sustain many self-employed households and to expand business opportunities during rapid growth and thereby to allow the acquisition of sufficient income to meet middle-class consumption levels. Moreover, this model was inextricably linked to the norm of the 'modern family' as a consumption unit. Traditional families changed drastically in these years, for example in the reduced number of children in a household. They willingly accepted birth control and family planning in order to build an affuluent life. At the same time, many married females engaged not only in reproductive activity but in productive activity as well to acquire money sufficient for the middle-class levels of consumption, so that the male-breadwinner family did not in fact become the majority. These women were not entirely happy because they could not take time for housework, child-rearing and leisure. The 'all-middle class society' focused on consumption entailed various conflicts between time and money. From the comparative perspective of this symposium, this type of 'all-middle class society' based on consumption was not formed in contemporary China or India because of differences in historical conditions. Income inequality and family structures give rise to large variations in the consumption levels and patterns in these countries. It is important to take the historical particularity of Japan's 'all-middle class society' into account when considering the Comparison between Developed and Emerging Countries.

著者

高柳 友彦

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.3, pp.41-58, 2006-04-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

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Although hot spring usage was restricted by community regulations in the Edo period, with the relaxation of restrictions in modern times, the exploitation of hot springs rapidly progressed. The increased usage of hot springs has brought problems involving adjustment to the development and conservation of hot springs in hot springs regions. This paper clarifies the process through which local communities balanced development with conservation of hot springs after the social class-based restrictions were dismantled, using the region of Atami, Shizuoka prefecture, as an example. During the Edo period, one inn, the Yuko, maintained power in Atami with the backing of the Tokugawa shogunate. The Yuko monopolized the usage of the largest geyser (the "oyu") and ruled Atami socially and economically. After the Meiji Restoration, rule by the Yuko collapsed, and the privatization and exploitation of hot springs progressed. The balance of development and conservation changed with the regulations of 1884 to a policy of self-adjustment between hot spring users, based on one control center. After the 1900's, with the development of the railroad, and the Russo-Japanese War, the situation of the spas of Atami changed. The exploitation of hot springs by outsiders, as well as by inn masters who ignored the regulations, increased, and the policy of self-adjustment by hot spring users which had existed until then ceased to function. As a result of this dysfunction, the policy of self-adjustment was replaced with new rules regarding usage of the hot-springs, which were to be enforced by the police. However, the police were ineffective, and new disputes arose. Thereafter, Shizuoka prefecture gave Atami ward the exclusive right to develop and exploit its hot springs. Atami ward established an administrative organization and stabilized the usage of hot springs in the ward. This organization successfully managed and stabilized hot spring use in Atami.

著者

小島 庸平

出版者

政治経済学・経済史学会

雑誌

歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.3, pp.26-37, 2019-04-30 (Released:2021-04-30)

参考文献数

25

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This paper investigates how and why consumer-financing firms became highly developed during the post-war era in Japan. Although previous studies have emphasized the inadequacy of consumer finance regulation, this paper focuses on the strategy of lenders and the characteristics of borrowers from the 1960s to the 1980s.It is said that the number of “amateur usurers” increased among white-collar workers during the Great Depression. Even in the 1950s, there was still room for ‘amateur usury’ businesses, some of which were founded in the new public housing complexes of the time. The biggest benefit of “housing-complex finance” was that it saved the cost of credit checks. Because public housing complexes strictly investigated the incomes and assets of their applicants before allowing them to become residents, moneylenders in the housing complexes could substitute those inquiries for the usual credit checks.Other consumer financing firms founded in the 1960s also saved the cost of credit checks by using information from the borrower’s place of employment. White-collar workers in listed firms were evaluated on the basis of their overall character and therefore faced a certain dilemma. While they had to be sociable to maintain their reputations as good colleagues or superiors, the wining and dining expenses imposed a burden on their family budgets. They had to borrow secretly in order to make ends meet, but fearful that they’d be found out, they were avoided to an extreme degree any chance of defaulting on their debt. This made them very advantageous for consumer financing firms. During the rapid growth period, lenders used information about workplaces and residences as their standards for evaluating creditworthiness.After the 1973 oil crisis, however, there was a drastic change in how people used the money they borrowed from consumer financing firms. Unlike the 1960s, when male workers were the main customers, many housewives struggling from he recession started to use consumer finance to cover deficits in the family budget. This meant a greater risk of default than before and a need for more sophisticated approaches to lending. Consumer-financing firms introduced new statistical methods for analyzing creditworthiness and shared information with each other regarding defaulters, effectively instituting black lists. The corporate effort to introduce these innovations was essential to the development of consumer finance in the post-war era.