著者

ヴォロビエフ エヌ.エヌ

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.175-223, 1970-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

7

著者

太田 紘史

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.143-162, 2019

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In his recent book, Takayuki Suzuki proposes a novel physicalist solution toward the hard problem of consciousness, wherein the representationalist analysis of qualia is advanced via incorporating the intrinsic notion of representation. In this review, I critically examine the metaphysical character of his resultant position and present some questions on to what extent it satisfies the core theses of physicalism. The moral to be drawn is the significant tension between physicalism and the phenomenal principle, whose endorsement could misdirect us into troublesome positions in an unexpected manner.</p>

著者

伊勢田 哲治

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.45-57, 2001

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This paper discusses how evolutionary biology can contribute to sociological theory. I maintain that a biological understanding of human being can function as a common language among various competing trends in sociological theory. Sociologists do not use biological insights much, but one of the reasons for this is that simply they are not sure how such insights relate to their own research interests. My main purpose in this paper is to give an example of an enhancement of social theory (a conflict analysis of stratification) from an evolutionary point of view, hoping to remedy the 'biophobic' attitude of some sociological theorists.

著者

野矢 茂樹

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.47-58, 2004

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Fatalism or logical determinism says that the future is determined on a very logical ground. In this paper, examining the fatalist argument critically, I am going to show how we can avoid the fatalist thesis. Aristotle discussed this problem and came to the conclusion that some statements about the future are neither true nor false. Following his suggestion, I farther claim that the future does not exist. That is the reason why any proper name included in a statement about the future has no referent. Therefore, as Aristotle said, statements about the future have no truth value. In the latter half of this paper, I will consider some problems with my claim what does a statement about the future mean and how is the past related to the present?

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.27-47, 2016

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A normative reason is a consideration that counts in favor of doing something. According to Internalism about reasons, a consideration is a normative reason for an agent to do something only if that consideration is capable of motivating the agent to do that action. Externalism about reasons denies this claim. After surveying the debate between Internalism and Externalism, I defend the oldest version of Internalism, that is, Bernard Williamsʼ deliberative Internalism. My argument is twofold: first I argue that there is a specific motivation for adopting deliberative Internalism, and then try to address the most serious objection against Internalism, <i>i.e.</i>, the undergeneration problem.</p>

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.104-106, 2006

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_115-2_134, 2011

被引用文献数

3

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&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;According to the &ldquo;truthmaker maximalism&rdquo;, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its <I>truthmaker</I>. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense.

著者

竹内 啓

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, pp.35-48, 1980

著者

川野 洋

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.15-30, 1982

著者

川野 洋

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.1-16, 1991

著者

前田 高弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.67-81, 1999

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注意されたいのは,私はスワンプマンがある種の生物学的機能や心的特性(ないしそれに似た何か)をもつことを否定してはいないということだ.スワンプマンが通常の照明の下で赤いリンゴを目の前にしたとき,彼はあなたが同様の条件下でもつ経験と同じ経験をもつという直観は,内在主義というより,物理的スーパーヴィニエンスに基づく自然主義に由来するものであるように思われる.だが他方で,心的特性を進化論的な観点によって捉えようとする外在主義も同様の自然主義によって動機づけられており,本稿は,この自然主義の内部における対立を調停する試みであると言える.この試みによって,外在主義者たちがスワンプマンに悩まされなくなれば幸いである.だが,たとえそうならなくても,スワンプマンを自然法則に関する形而上学的問題の中に位置づけることによって,志向性や感覚質に関する哲学的議論の場そのものからはスワンプマンに別れを告げることができれば私は満足である.そこではドッペルゲンガーだけで十分だろう.

著者

内井 惣七

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

no.6, pp.7-17, 1973

著者

岡田 光弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.1, pp.82-84, 2012 (Released:2016-01-13)

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.2, pp.143-143, 1998 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

石黒 ひで

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.139-141, 1992-11-14 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

谷川 卓

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.102-106, 2010

著者

金杉 武司他

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.97-106, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

被引用文献数

1

著者

井頭 昌彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.2_59-2_73, 2009

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&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Although physicalism is usually understood as an ontological thesis, it is not clear that what implications this position has on the matter of ontology expressed by the question &ldquo;What there is?&rdquo; In this paper, I begin with Quine's &ldquo;indispensability argument,&rdquo; and abstract from it a framework for sorting ontological positions. Then, I try to locate supervenience thesis, which is an important part of physicalism, within the framework above. One conclusion of this paper is that supervenience thesis works, neither as a direct assertion on what there is nor as an assertion on the criterion of ontological commitment we should adopt, but as an assertion on the class of the sentences from which we should extract ontology.

著者

前田 高弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.89-93, 2001-05-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

岡本 賢吾

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.7-19, 2001

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Frege's well-known thesis that arithmetic is reducible to logic leaves unexplained what is the gain of the reduction and what he means by logic in principle. First, the author contends that the real interest of the reduction consists in a form of conceptual reduction: it frees us from the ordinary naive conception of numbers as forming extremely peculiar genus and replaces it with a very general and basic conception of them. Second, it is pointed out that Frege's concept of logic involves two elements. One is based on the iteratability of the operation of abstraction and naturally leads him to accept a sort of denumerably higher order logical language. The other is based on the so-called comprehension principle. Each of the two elements could be said to be logical in some sense but they are inconsistent with each other. Still, we can learn much from his attempt to search for as extensive and global a conception of logic as possible.