著者
勝守 真
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.53-63, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

Shozo Omori's theory of the past, developed during his later years, is examined critically with a focus on its central thesis that the past is that which is recalled. The analysis shows that Omori's argument designed to support the above thesis contains ideas which run counter to that very thesis. Specifically, it turns out that, when contrasting recall and perception as two heterogeneous modes of experience, he tacitly supposes past perception as something other than the recalled, and that this inconsistency threatens the validity of his basic views.
著者
水本 正晴
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.95-110, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
11

In Mind and World, John McDowell tries to provide a picture in which our experiences give "rational", rather than merely causal, constraints on our thinking. This was to avoid both Myth of the Given, which can give us only exculpation rather than justification, and unconstrained coherentism, which sounds idealistic. This picture can be understood as a form of "internal realism", and I have a great sympathy with this ambitious project. But I find some tension among his several theses, which in turn brings about two interconnected problems. I will give my own solution to them, in terms of the notion of ignorance. Then I will depict some consequences, both positive and negative, of that modification.
著者
中村 正利
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, no.1, pp.31-42, 2000-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

This paper deals with the question: what does Carnap's conventionalism consist in? As Quine points out, logic is needed for inferring logic from conventions. In the same way, in order to show that mathematics is true by convention, or to provide a justification for mathematics by convention, the very mathematics must be presupposed, as Godel puts it. So, the conventionalist claim that logic and mathematics are true or justified by convention must fail. Is this predicament not a problem for Carnap's conventionalism? I shall argue it is not, for his conventionalism does not aim at justification of logic and mathematics. It is what Carnap later called "explication" that he tries to undertake with his conventionalism.
著者
小林 傳司
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.1, pp.15-27, 1999-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
被引用文献数
2

The development of science and technology has posed again the problem of the "legitimacy" of science and technology. Philosophy of science in the nineteenth century had such concern but recently it has lost the sensitivity to such a problematique. This article claims the recovery of this sensitivity in the sense of Social Epistemology advocated by Steve Fuller and argues that scientific research should be analyzed as a collective activity of knowledge production at face value. Then it is argued that justification of scientific knowledge is intrinsically social activity, and the identity of the content of scientific knowledge is not to be presumed but to be explained.
著者
大林 雅之
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.15-23, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
被引用文献数
1

以上の議論から,小論における一応の結論を以下のように示すことができよう.「医学の哲学」は従来から議論されていたが,1960年代から起こったバイオエシックスの議論が,従来の「医学の哲学」を,患者(「非専門家」)の役割を考慮することにより,医療のリアリティーに迫るものに変えた.医療者と患者により成立する「医療」についての哲学こそ「医学の哲学」すなわち「医療の哲学」なのである.
著者
佐藤 純一
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.25-37, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

本稿で論じた論点において,論者のコミットしたい「医療の哲学」は,医学の方法・概念を対象化し,医療が社会的文化的行為(現象)であることを確認し,人々(患者・layman)の視点・realityを包摂するようなものとして構築される「医療の哲学」である.そのような「医療の哲学」の構築には,医学や哲学だけではなく,社会学・人類学などの様々な領域・方法の共同作業が必要であることは,ここまでの議論で明白であろう.とくに「科学哲学」の参加への要望・期待は非常に大きいものである.なぜなら,医療・医学の分析においての科学哲学のもつ方法の可能性と同時に,本稿で論じた「医療の哲学が検討せねばならない諸問題」は,科学哲学が検討して行かねばならない「問題」と通底していると思われるからでもある.感応する議論が出てくるのを期待したい.
著者
坂本 百大
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.2, pp.49-59, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

In this paper, I will propose a new foundation of the possible post-modern "Philosophy of Biology" by introducing the new idea of "Artificial Evolution" revising the meaning of classical Darwinian concepts of "fitness" and "natural selection", replacing by the term of contemporary biotechnology.Then, clarifying essential distinction between "Genetic Identity" and "Personal Identity", I will sketch a newly emerging "Communitarian Bioethics" which is based on the revised interpretation of value-oriented "Personhood" which might destroy the classic idea of "humanism" and therefore, the theory of "fundamental human right".
著者
西脇 与作
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.2, pp.61-74, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
12

We are now living together with the enormous progress of many biological innovations. In this situation, do these innovations change evolutionary biology? Or can evolutionary biology control these various innovations? There is the strong opinion that we have to change present biology to include the new situation where we can make an artificial selection to change organisms genetically in order to satisfy our desires. I defend evolutionary theory, which should not change itself to treat the new situation, even though it needs a minor change. Within the synthetic theory, we can answer negatively to these two questions. Evolutionary biology took a progress recently and this new population biology claims something positive about the new situation. With new evolutionary ideas we can give partially affirmative answers to these questions. We see why the answers are affirmative by considering evolutionary egoism and altruism. And then we will show that at the bottom of these answers there are many philosophically unsolved problems.
著者
伊藤 邦武
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.2, pp.75-87, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
12

As a methodologist of science, John Maynard Keynes scrutinised the classical induction theory of Bernoulli and Laplace and proposed a new set of principles of induction in A Treatise on Probability (1921). He took up the same subject, after the publication of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), in his debate with Jan Tinbergen on econometrics. Keynes's criticism of econometrics is generally considered to be done on the ground of the principles of induction which he formulated in the former book. However, this standard interpretation seems odd, because those principles depended heavily on his theory of probability and he radically changed this analysis of probability in his mature economic theory. If he kept the theory of induction intact in his criticism of econometrics, then he was curiously absent-minded. I do not think that Keynes was such an inconsistent thinker, and I believe that his later theory of induction should be understood from the perspective of a much modern type of theory, i.e., something like a Kuhnian paradigm-bound view of science, or one of its more sophisticated variants. It is founded on the concept of inter-personal probability or 'expectation', and it is also constructed to be amenable to the interplay of 'theory and practice'.
著者
村田 全
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.2, pp.89-104, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

This is a complement of 'Cantor's set theory and his philosophy', compiled in my collected papers, Borderland between Mathematics and Philosophy (1998, in Japanese). Cantor (1845-1918) was a mathematician with a strong tendency to philosophy, which tendency appeared as early as 1867 (Dissertation), and finally exerted latent influences upon the formation of transfinite set theory. For a purely mathematical purpose, this theory as well as its formation process can be explained without any reflection on his philosophical writings. However, in this case, we shall miss the complete figure of his conception. In fact, he expressed an opinion on Time and Space, opposed to Kant, on the basis of his Continuum, and gave an interpretation of-Spinoza's 'Deus' (in Ethica) through his transfinite ordinals (1883). He attempted, too, to establish a sort of Pythagorean Natural Philosophy, but in vain, in which was applied the Continuum Hypothesis (1885). This Natural Philosophy, fantastic as it was, can be traced back via several marks in his papers up to 1867. On the other hand, to speak frankly, Cantor's philosophical reasonings are far from systematic, and sometimes remain casual remarks.

1 0 0 0 OA 意味と意図

著者
川野 洋
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.1, pp.1-14, 1999-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

In what follows, I would like to point out some basic aspects of the message in communication. First, a holistic agency as "the society of mind" (Minsky) emerges from interactions among its individual agents. Second, the messages which are sent out or received by the agents consist of two different constituents: "citation" and "commentaire" (Sperber), where the former is the invariant part of their meaning conditioned by semantic rules, and the latter is the variant one showing the agent's intention to perform the speech act. Third, what is expressed in the message of communication is a speaker's intention, making use of the "quoted" propositional meaning only as Stoff for its performance.
著者
真船 えり
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.1, pp.53-68, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
17

The subject of this paper is Hume's concept of mind, especially the arguments concerning the mind-body problem, in A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 5. I will try to clarify the aspect of Hume's naturalism by showing that it aims to explain the human cognitive processes in terms of human nature. Hume's arguments on the cause of thought show that the relation between mind and body may be regarded as causal one, since the constant conjunction between objects constitutes the essence of their causal relations. It will be found through the examinations of the arguments that Hume's sceptical arguments are to introduce the naturalistic programmes.
著者
西脇 与作
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.2, pp.1-16, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
19

Let's think first the following argument: if (1) classical mechanics implies Laplacian determinism, and (2) biology is reducible in principle to classical mechanics, then Laplacian determinism holds in biology and therefore, probability used in biology is only the result of classical ignorance. This claim seems to represent the so-called classical attitude toward the probability concept, but still there are many advocates of this position. I will show that this position is wrong by investigating the argument of Laplace's demon. It is shown that probability model can't be reduced to mechanical model, because of having different points of view. We will see the concrete differences between two types of models. From the construction of each model, I will claim that the difference between two types of models is due to the point of view of thinking of the world. Models include many points of view and among them the elements of agents are implicitly included in (genetic) probability models, whereas there are fewer elements in mechanical models than probability models.
著者
竹尾 治一郎
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.1, pp.1-15, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
9

The model of language presupposed by the verificationist theory of meaning and the two holistic models of language such as W. V. Quine's are of marked difference. But in theoretical details, they have interesting points of contact. The paper considers the verification condition of meaningas formulated by Prawitz, on the basis of which the verificationist and non-verificationist aspects of Quine's theories are discussed. The contrast is also related to that of classical and intuitionistic logic. And Quine's view on the "obvious" in the translation of logical connectives is criti-cally examined along with the dogmatic presupposition of the grasp of meaning by the intuitionists.

1 0 0 0 OA adjunction小考

著者
清水 義夫
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.1, pp.17-33, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
5

The following relation between operations F and G is called an adjoint situation or adjunction, and such a relation occurs almost everywhere in logic and mathematics; F(C)→B ⇔ C→G(B). The relation between A∧ and A⊃ which are primitive connectives in logic is a well-known example. So to understand the primitiveness of these connectives, it is necessary to clarify the essence of adjointness. For this purpose the author thinks tentatively that two operations G and F in an adjunction ultimately correspond to two mental functions (i.e. projection and reflexion) which are always found in a primitive state of our consciousness.
著者
岡庭 宏之
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.183-193, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

This paper is an examination of Jerry Fodor's internalist position in his controversy with externalists. His internalism is not to be taken as the contention that the whole of mental content is independent of the surrounding world. Rather his point is that the scientific explanation of behavior requires that the relevant mental content should be causally efficacious and therefore supervene on brain states. If we have to give the content of a propositional attitude a semantic value, we can interpret "narrow contents" as functions from both their contexts and mental states to "wide contents".
著者
田村 均
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.29-42, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
24

The aim of this paper is to propound a view that philosophical epistemology has failed to comprehend the essence of experimental natural science ever since the late seven-teenth century. The first indication of the failure is given in Edward Stillingfleet's misunderstanding of John Locke. In his Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke tries to establish the distinction between the particular matters of fact and the universal theories of nature. Stillingfleet mistakenly counts him, however, among cartesians and regards his distinction as that of the objects in the mind and those in the external world. This misreading of Locke, which is common to later historians of philosophy, entails total misunderstanding of the essential trait of experimental science. The Lockean way of ideas is, if correctly un-derstood, a successful vindication of the experiments based on sense perception and has nothing to do with the cartesian skepticism towards the senses.
著者
松王 政浩
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.43-58, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

Scientific methodologies in 17-18th centuries are very important when we think of the relation of philosophy and science in this period. Particularly interesting among them is that of Leibniz's philosophy. His method of finding laws of natural sciences was a so-called hypotheticodeductive method. What is quite remarkable in his methodology is that he not only shows empirically valid criteria for finding laws, in spite of his extreme rationalistic tendencies on one hand, but also delves into the grounds for the hypothetico-deductive method in terms of God's perfection. In this latter point, we can recognize one of the proper roles of philosophy, very clearly distinguished from but united very organistically with those of science.
著者
渡辺 博
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.59-76, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

I attempt in this paper to survey the classical features which lie in the concept and methodology of the Newtonian science. To this end I summarize the concept of science in the Aristotelian philosophy, and utilize several recent results in the Newtonian scholarship.

1 0 0 0 OA Qualiaの不在

著者
入不二 基義
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.77-92, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

In this paper I show an aporia which both a subjectivist view and a functionalist view of qualia have in common, and try to change the view of qualia in order to solve the aporia. The aporia of the qualia problem is this: as long as we take a subjectivist view or a functionalist view, qualia must shift either into something other than qualia, or just into nothing. A solution of the aporia which I try to present is: qualia is neither something nor nothing, but an uncom-pleted absence.