著者
髙村 武幸
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.99, no.3, pp.1-34, 2017-12

This article examines the kinds of people who passed through Jianshui Jinguan 肩水金關, a Han period garrisoned checkpoint in the northwestern frontier region, in order to clarify the mobility of commoners and the actual relationship between frontier and interior commanderies (jun 郡), utilizing mainly the Han period bamboo slips unearthed at Jianshui Jinguan.Although carrying a passport (chuan 傳) was required when travelling during the Han Period, there were no strict institutional restrictions on long-distance travel, even in the case of commoners on the road for personal reasons. The author’s examination of the Han bamboo slips from Jianshui Jinguan reveals that not a few people from the interior commanderies passed through this checkpoint, a considerable number of whom had obtained passports for the purpose of “private commerce for family business,” and shows that many people were transporting goods from the interior to the frontier commanderies to sell and then returning with cash that had been originally sent as taxes from the interior commanderies. Thus, not only did frontier commanderies obtain from the interior goods that the state alone could not distribute in sufficient quantities, but they were also sending back money to the interior. Such transactions reveal one more link between the interior and frontier commanderies separate from the state-controlled distribution of goods between the two regions.That being said, the majority of the people of the interior commanderies did not directly traded their products with the frontier commanderies of Hexi 河西 and elsewhere, but chose either to stay at home to sell their wares locally, or to commission agents to carry and peddle them in the frontier commanderies. Therefore, most of the private-sector interaction between interior and frontier commanderies was in fact conducted by professional merchants and transport agents acting on behalf of commoners of the interior, passing through Jianshui Jinguan with passports obtained on the pretext of “private commerce for family business.” In the case of Hexi, the overwhelming majority of these agents were from the nearby commanderies of Henan 河南, where commerce had traditionally flourished. In other words, the actual interaction that occurred between the northwestern frontier commanderies, starting with the four commanderies of Hexi, and the interior commanderies was characterized by formal state-operated commodity distribution and military service, on the one hand, and by merchants and transport agents from the commanderies of Henan travelling to and from the interior and the frontier on behalf of clients.

1 0 0 0 鑲紅旗檔

著者
東洋文庫清代史研究室編
出版者
東洋文庫
巻号頁・発行日
1972
著者
小山 皓一郎
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.3, pp.265-306, 1967-12

Details of the life of Osman who gave his name to the Ottoman Dynasty are yet to be clarified. The author of this article attempts to make them clear through the re-examination of early Ottoman chronicles (mainly ‘Aşïkpaşazade Tarihi’ written in the second half of 15th century) with reference to the present researches on the subject. The author discusses and concludes as follows:Osman succeeded his father Ertuğrul as the head of a small band of nomads belonging to Kayï, a branch of Türkmen tribes. Osman was therefore first of all a nomad chief and there is no reason to regard his Kayï genealogy false.Soon after his succession towards the end of 13th century, Osman began to extend his territories around Söğüt at the expense of the Byzantine dominion in the north-western Anatolia. The expansion was not accomplished all at once but was proceeded by steps. Osman’s military movement against the Byzantine Empire might be largely divided in two stages. At first, his operations on the Byzantine frontiers remained within the scope of small conflicts or skirmishes with the neighbouring Christian Princes (‘tekfur-lar’ in Aşïkpaşazade Tarihi). At this stage, Osman’s followers consisted for the most part of Kayï tribesmen. But in the second stage, when the siege of Bursa and İznik (Nicaea) was undertaken, Osman’s operations against the Byzantine dominion grew in character into a systematic invasion and Osman began to appear more and more as a leader of a ghâzî organization which had almost constantly existed on the frontiers of the Moslem World. The ghâzîs (‘gazi-ler’ in Aşïkpaşazade Tarihi) under Osman’s leadership were marked by their nomadic elements (the elements of ‘Alp’ in Aşïkpaşazade Tarihi) and their passion for loot rather than for the faith.Osman died a chief of nomad tribesmen as well as a head of the ghâzî organization. At the time of his death, his dominion was still limited to the north-western corner of Anatolia. Osman was neither a sultan nor a great conqueror as he was described by most Ottoman historiographers. The importance of Osman in Ottoman history lies in the fact that he organized the earliest core of the Ottoman Turks.
著者
佐々木 正哉
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.3, pp.370-399, 1963-12
著者
石川 寛
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.84, no.2, pp.255-276, 2002-09

It is well known fact that the regime of the Rāshṭrakūṭas who extended their power throughout the Deccan and beyond between the 8th and 10th centuries was characterised by dynamic temple-building, including the Kailāsanātha temple of Ellora, and the promotion of Kannaḍa literature. However, a debate still exists over the original homeland and the capital・of the Rāshṭrakūṭas in their early days. A. S. Altekar holds the idea in his reputed “Rāshṭrakūṭas and their Times” (1967) that Dantidurga, the founder of the dynasty, originally hailed from Laṭṭalūra, (modern day Laāṭūr in the Osmānābād district, Mahārāshṭra state) and was a local chieftain under the overlordship of the Chālukyas of Bādāmi. By the time of independence he had migrated to the northern region of Mahārāshṭra where Elichpur, a proposed earlier capital by Altaka, was located.Judging from related records, including a new Kandhār inscription,it is clear that the Rāshṭrakūṭas had never migrated, and that they came from south-eastern and central Mahārāshṭra, the so called “Marāṭhavāḍā” regions, that they comprise the modern day districts of Osmānābād, Nānḍed, Parbhanī, Bīr and Auragabād, and that they used the Kannaḍa language as their mother tongue.Some inscriptions dearly show that Mānyakhēṭa in Gulbarga district, Karnātaka state was the capital city from the days of Amōghsvarsha I, the dynasty’s 6th king. Many scholars have expressed their opinions about an earlier capital. Altekar opines that Achalapura, (modern day Elichpur in Amarāvatī district, Mahārāshṭra state) was the earlier capital. Ellora was regarded as the capital by H. Cousens. But the present state of our knowledge, makes it impossible to identify the earlier capital of the Rāshṭrakūṭas as before establishing Mānyakhēṭa as the permanent capital, even though such locations as Ellora and Mayūrakhaṇḍī seem to have been temporary capitals. The author is of the opinion that Ellora was the capital during the reigns of Dantidurga and Kṛehṇe I, the 1st and 2nd kings, and that Mayūrakhaṇḍī occupied the same position during the time of the 5th king Gōvinda III.

1 0 0 0 OA 元朝駅伝雑考

著者
羽田亨 著
出版者
東洋文庫
巻号頁・発行日
1930
著者
藤田 豊八
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, no.3, pp.443-448, 1913-11
著者
藤田 豊八
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, no.3, pp.443-448, 1913-11
著者
戸川 貴行
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.96, no.3, pp.1-26, 2014-12

The research to date on Shishuo Xinyu 世説新語 compiled by Yiqing, Prince of Linchuan, has relied on the interpretation that it was a work extolling the reign of Liu-Song (Southern Song) Dynasty Emperor Wen (407-553) as the last great achievement of the Han aristocracy and decrying the present decay of the aristocracy through comparisons with the golden ages of the past.On the other hand, a question should be raised as to why all the sequels of Shishuo Xlnyu ending in Liao Dynasty Emperor Yuan's Jinlouzi 金楼子, compiled by members of generations from whom even the last flourish lay far into the past and thus had no personal experience of what a golden age was really like.In an attempt to reply to such an inquiry, the author of this article points to the necessity of focusing on the historical background of the Sahishuo Xlnyu genre and offers the hypothesis that the compilation of the original work was deeply affected by cultural changes caused by the indigenization of non-Han people fleeing from the northeast (qiaomin 僑民), which also influenced the tone of all its sequels.In more concrete terms, the article begins with the comment that there is no research to date that seriously engages the question of why Shishuo Xinyu contains both positive and negative evaluations of the qingtan 清談 style of intellectual discourse.Secondly, since the main political objective of the Eastern Jin Dynasty's Jiangnan Regime was the recovery of the Chinese heartland, the decision was made that cultural policy, beginning with state protocol and also including qingtan institutions, should not be given priority.Next, the term shenzhou 神州, which indicated the center of the universe, and during the early Eastern Jin Period was geographically identified with the Chinese heartland, gradually moved to the Yangzhou region centered upon Jiankang 建康, which had become prosperous due in part to the successful indigenization of foreign refugees.This change in universal nucleus required cultural adjustments that brought about such phenomenon as the revival in popularity of qingfan as far as the Liao through reforms in state protocol implemented during the reign of Emperor Wen. Therefore the writing of Shishuo Xinyu reflects the decision to abandon recovery in the Chinese heartland and a period of cultural transformation made possible by that decision.Finally, in the background to the parts of Shishuo Xinyu critical of qingtan from the standpoint of Chinese heartland's recovery and those not critical, lurks the two views concerning where the center of the universe actually lies.
著者
津田 左右吉
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, no.2, pp.198-249, 1924-09
著者
津田 左右吉
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, no.3, pp.295-356, 1924-12
著者
津田 左右吉
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, no.3, pp.356, 1924-12
著者
三王 昌代
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.91, no.1, pp.130-104, 2009-06

According to such Chinese sources as Da Ming Shi Lu and Da Qing Li Chao Shi Lu, several diplomatic missions were sent from Sulu to China during the years 1417-24 and 1726-63, during the Ming and the Qing Periods respectively. The present article deals with a Malay document written in Arabic script, called Jawi, which consists of a diplomatic message dispatched by Sultan Muhammad Azim al-Din of the Sulu Sultanate to China in the ninth month of the hijra year 1198 (1784 AD), some twenty years after the aforementioned missions. This diplomatic message was submitted to Emperor Qianlong through the hands of many officials, including the tongzhi 同知 of Xiamen (Amoy), the xunfu 巡撫 of Fujian, and the zongdu 総督 of Fujian and Zhejiang.After describing the circumstances that led to an exchange of documents between Sulu and China, the author deciphers this Jawi document and conducts a detailed analysis of its contents, including a comparison with a public letter addressed to Sulu in 1782 and with the Chinese translation of the document, which was included in a Qing official's memorial to Emperor Qianlong in 1784.The results of the comparison show that both countries shared a common view of a villain who, engaged in foreign trade, and embezzled the takings, and of the quantity of silver and other merchandise that must be returned to Sulu. On the other hand, there are differences in expression or in recognition as to whether the Emperor's instructions had been widely transmitted throughout the Sulu Sultanate. Moreover, the honorific expression for the Sultan himself in the opening sentence of the original was replaced in the corresponding part of the translation by some words that express deference to the Chinese Emperor. Also added is a tribute of respect and gratitude to the Emperor, which was nonexistent in the original. It may be reasonably concluded that the translation was not so much a literal rendering of the original as something close to the expressions in the 1782 public letter addressed to Sulu.Although Jawi documents in general have rarely been used in historical study, this particular source seems to be of great value in understanding diplomatic as well as economic relations between the two countries.
著者
北川 香子
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.101, no.1, pp.01-029, 2019-06

This article is an attempt to clarify the way in which Princess Malika (1872-1951), the daughter of Cambodia King Norodom (r.1860-1904), managed the household of the “Yukanthor Family” and brought up her children, based on the documents related to the Princess. Prince Yukanthor (1860-1934) is a Cambodian historical hero, known for his resistance to the French colonial regime, resulting in his exile, with such honors as a high school and a street named after him in the city of Phnom Penh, while Princess Malika is well-known for such achievements as the establishment of the first school for young women (École Malika) and the compilation and publication of works of Cambodian classical literature (the story of Kaki) and history textbooks. Moreover, their daughter, Princess Pengpas (1893-1969), served as the minister of education under the post-independence monarchy. However, despite such activity and fame, these two women have yet to be the subjects of any serious research; and not for any lack of source materials, for the National Archives in Phnom Penh presently holds at least 13 folders, containing several hundred individual documents, related to the “Yukanthor Family,” which consisted solely of the Princess Malika and her children, who lived in Cambodia after the exile of Prince Yukanthor and his death. The collection records over forty years of the family’s struggle to improve its living conditions through continual petitions to the authorities and replies issued by both the Cambodian and French colonial powers that be.In the process we find, for example, the Princess’ ideas about educating her children, providing them with the highest levels of education possible, including French lessons, regardless of their gender. In more general terms, the Princess, perceiving that the Khmer including herself were powerless than the French, set out to remedy the situation through the introduction of modern education into Cambodia. For her, the barrier between innately privileged royalty and its commoner subjects was even more unsurmountable. From a debate involving a comparison between “Khmer law” and “the laws of other countries,” we discover her perception of Cambodian traditions being equal in worth to those of any other nation, including France. It seems to be these kinds of ideas that greatly influence the process of administering education in post-independence Cambodia.
著者
森 巧
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.101, no.1, pp.1-30, 2019-06

The present article examines how the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo 中華民國; ROC) attempted to reform its foreign affairs sector under its plan to counterattack the mainland during the 1950s, in order to discover the background against which the ROC regime became internationally isolated from the 1970s on. One important factor cited by the research to date as to why the ROC government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek was able to represent China on the world scene was the political acumen of the ROC diplomatic corps which continued to serve the regime since its mainland days. Then, as the ROC’s foreign policy tended more and more to stress the One China principle (hanzei buliangli 漢賊不兩立), the influence of those diplomats in policy-making waned, leading to the ROC’s international isolation.Here, the author challenges such an argument by the tracing the process in which the intervention of the Kuomintang Party and the military expanded in foreign affairs within reforms conducted throughout the foreign policy establishment during the 1950s under the implementation of the “Recover Mainland China Plan,” surmising that those reforms were part of a bolstering of what had been loosely termed the area of “oversea struggle affairs” (haiwai gongzuo 海外工作). Given such a state of affairs, the author takes up the specific case of the setting up of the Liaison Committee for Overseas Struggle Affairs (Haiwaiduifei Douzhenggongzuo Tongyizhidao Weiyuanhui 海外對匪闘争工作統一指導委員會) under the reforms.Based the idea of a “united front,” which predated the first Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-55, oversea struggle affairs were continuously expanded during the post-crisis years aiming at counterattacking the mainland. The Overseas Struggle Operations Team (Haiwai Gongzuo Zhidao Xiaozu 海外工作指導小組) set up around the Kuomintang in 1953 and the Liaison Committee set up in 1957 by military intelligence both formed the leadership in oversea struggle affairs, through which the Kuomintang and the military continued to intervene in diplomatic affairs during the post-crisis era, even after the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. The author’s analysis shows that such intervention, which resulted in two phases of institutional reforms, expanded under the guise of conducting oversea struggle affairs aiming at counterattacking the mainland. Then from the 1960s on, similar intervention by other agencies caused a weakening of the position of professional diplomats in international affairs, leading to the ROC’s political isolation from the world scene during the 1970s.
著者
松田 孝一
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.3・4, pp.219-247, 1987-03

The Ho-nan Huai-pei Mongol army 河南淮北蒙古軍 was one of the main Yüan armies. According to chüan 86 of the Yüan-shi 元史, which contains details pertaining to all of the Yüan armies, it consisted of four units of 10,000 soldiers and two additional units of 1,000 soldiers. Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing 蕭啓慶 has already pointed out that the army was one of the Mongol armies concentrated in the Yellow River valley to separate the capital ta-tu 大都 from the southern region. My concern in this article is with the formation of the Ho-nan Huai-pei Mongol army and its activities under Mongol rule.There were two groups of army commanders. One group belonged to a family of Ta’achar from the Hü'üshin tribe, the other belonged to a family of Temütei from the Jalair tribe. Ta’achar and Temütei commanded armies at the campaign against the Chin 金 from 1231 to 1234 in the reign of Ögetei Qa’an. After the conquest Ta’achar built his base at Wen-hsi circuit 聞喜縣 to guard the region along the Yellow River between P’u Tsao 濮曹 and T’ung-kuan 潼關. The army of Ta’achar became one of the so-called Tammachi armies which was stationed in the frontier regions.The earliest record that lists the organization of the army into four units of 10,000 soldiers is dated at 1252. Two of the units were almost entirely made up of Han chinese soldiers 漢軍. The organization seems to have been formed after the conquest of the Chin, incorporating Han chinese.After the conquest of the Southern Sung, the new headquarters of the army was constructed south of Lung-men 龍門. Soldiers of the army were regularity stationed in the Chiang-nan 江南 and Kan-su 甘粛 regions. The army was also often temporarily dispatched to areas far from the bases along the Yellow River (For examples: Annam 安南 and north-western Mongolia). Although soldiers of the army gradually became impoverished due to such excessive military operations, the organization of the army remained in existence till 1350’s.