著者
細田 晴子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.157, pp.157_115-128, 2009-09-30 (Released:2011-11-30)
参考文献数
48

Using newly available diplomatic sources from Spain and the United States dating from the 1970s to the 1990s, this article examines both the transformation of the relationship between the two countries as the Cold War came to an end in Europe and Spain's effort to conduct an “independent foreign policy” in the Mediterranean under the old bipolar system.Franco's dictatorial regime, initially isolated after World War II, had attempted to draw closer to the West through a bilateral agreement with the United States based on an anti-communism platform as Cold War tensions grew. The article thus first considers how this bilateral relationship was affected by the process of the winding down of the Cold War.We conclude that during this period Spain changed the manner and focus of its participation in international politics from passive to active and from bilateral to multilateral, especially with regard to Europe. Specifically, Spain, which had been drawn into the Cold War through an anti-communist bilateral partnership with the United States, gradually aimed to increase its international influence by continuously confronting its sense of rivalry and distrust towards the United States as well as its feelings of inadequacy vis- ` a-vis Europe. After democratization, Spain resolved this internal inconsistency between its foreign and domestic policies and transformed itself from an economic, military, and political dependency of the United States to a country pursuing a multilateral foreign policy.Secondly, the article considers how the democratizing Spain, which had long hoped for a “return to Europe,” utilized the opportunities provided by the process of the Cold War' s close and how it later balanced its actions on the international stage with its bilateral relationship with the United States.This period proved a felicitous one for the new Spain as it tried not only to return to Europe but also to expand its activities in the international arena. We conclude that Spain effectively utilized this period to achieve a reduction in the number of American troops stationed within its borders while consolidating its democracy and playing a bridging role between theWest and other Mediterranean countries. Specifically, steadily gaining the support of the public after joining the NATO and the EC, the Spanish government exhibited a flexibility that transcended bipolar divisions as the progressive PSOE (The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) moved to the right, allowing Spain to reduce its American troop burdens while maintaining balance in its relations with Europe, domestic politics, and the Spanish-American bilateral relationship.
著者
野口 和彦
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2003, no.133, pp.124-140,L13, 2003-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
61

The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of power shifts on war. Realists have argued that the change of the distribution of power among states is a major cause of war. Yet, they failed to explain how and why it affects state's incentive to attack another country. I propose a window theory for clarifying the causal relationship between them. I argue that the rapid change of relative power affects state's motivation to initiate a war in two ways. First, war is more likely when the window of vulnerability opens. When a state is the declining power, it tends to begin a preventive war for stopping its weakening. Second, war is more likely when the window of opportunity opens. Under the condition that the costs of an offensive war are low, a state in the rising process may want more secure position by the use of forces.I examine the cases of the opening of the Korean War and the Entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers in 1950 for testing the above hypotheses. North Korea decided to invade South Korea with the approval of the Soviet Union because it expected that the United States would not militarily intervene in the war. The Acheson's announcement of the defensive perimeter indirectly excluding South Korea gave Stalin an opportunity to permit the North's war plan against the South. Kim Il Sung also estimated that North Korea would win the war without US intervention in the short period of time because South Korea was quite weak. Chinese decision makers almost agreed to send the Chinese People's Volunteers to Korean peninsula immediately after that the US-led UN forces advanced across the 38 parallel. China expected better outcomes from the preventive war than a war started later because time would make its security worse. In short, the empirical tests confirm this window theory.
著者
大石 一男
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, no.139, pp.45-59,L8, 2004-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
62

Were they harmonious with each other, treaty revisions by Munemitu Mutsu and the Sino-Japanese War? This article tried to examine this problem.Shigenobu Okuma (1888-89 in office), one of the minister for foreign affairs in this period, has been thought as a political rival against Okuma's predecessor Kaoru Inoue and the succeeding prime minister Hirobumi Ito. But, when you investigate their own personal histories, the planning process for the Okuma's negotiation, and the character of the negotiating strategy after Okuma retired, it will be apparent that they three politicians —“Kaimei-Ha” or an enlightenment party— had much common points. They thought that treaty revisions, especially the recovery of tariff autonomy, should take first priority, and that an advance to East Asia should be restrained with all their might.Then, why Okuma failed and the cooperation of them three ceased? The reason was that there were some middle-management bureaucrats who were hostile to the common thought of the three politicians. They were active behind the scenes, agitated “the public opinions”, and tried to tear Kaimei-Ha into pieces to prevent the treaty revisions. The typical example was Kowashi Inoue. And as a result, Mutsu the minister for foreign affairs, who were forced to begin the negotiations under insufficient condition, was heavily criticized by “Taigai-Ko-Ha” or hard-liners for foreign affairs. And finally he decided to enter the war. Kaimei-Ha was in power almost throughout in this period because they have the clearest foresight, but small number of them made themselves powerless against internal betrayal or terrorism. So they could not yield sufficient success.
著者
岩 志津子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1994, no.107, pp.43-56,L8, 1994-09-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
54

In this article an attempt is made to analyze how the Brezhnev government coped with the Prague Spring, by focusing on the following three points; military pressure on Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's ability to control the situation, bilateral and multilateral negotiations among socialist bloc countries.CPCz April plenum adopted the Action Program as the guideline to reform socialism in Czechoslovakia. Although CPSU April plenum gave an indirect warning that such an activity might be dangerous, the Soviet Politburo sent a letter of “good will” to Dubcek's government as a conciliatory measure. In May, WTO contries, with the exception of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, discussed the situation in Czechoslovakia and agreed on military exercises there as a temporary measure. After Kosygin's and Grechko's visits, Czechoslovakia also gave its consent to such military exercises in June. Although CPCz May plenum promised not to radicalize the reform, a dicision was reached to hold an Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9.Reacting to the Prague Spring, the Soviet leadership sought negotiations with the USA and FRG. Czechoslovakia also showed an interest in the relations with FRG. As a result of these attempts, Ulbricht attacked the very possibility of such exchanges with FRG and the situation in Czechoslovakia had not changed. Then Brezhnev proposed bilateral talks with the Dubcek government in the middle of June, but Dubcek rejected the offer. This rejection influenced Brezhnev's perception of Dubcek as a leader whose policy was not in line with the orthodox communist tradition.Military maneuvers which started from June 20 were strongly opposed by the Czechoslovak people and the famous “Two Thousand Words” was published in Prague. This statement proved to be a turning point and the Brezhnev Politburo changed their policies in three main aspects. 1. The Soviets stopped the negotiations with the FRG concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 2. They postponed the end of the military maneuvers. 3. They replaced the bilateral meeting with Dubcek by the multilateral meeting in Warsaw.In the Warsaw meeting, Gomulka, Ulbricht and Zhivkov, who had attacked the Prague Spring from March, once again heavily criticised Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev also showed strong doubt in Dubchek's leadership and decided to secretly seek a puppet government. After the meeting, Soviet and Czechoslovakia had bilateral talks at Cierna nad Tisou and later a multilateral conference at Bratislava. No decisive and concrete agreements were reached, but at the time of the Bratislava conference, a letter to ask “brotherly aid” was sent to Brezhnev. The political negotiations were over. It depended on Dubcek's leadership whether to take resolute measures or not. Soviet leaders had gone on the summer vacation.Even in the middle of August, the situation in Czechoslovakia had hardly changed, and Chervonenko reported it to Brezhnev at Yalta. Ulbrichit and Shelest, who had strongly opposed the Prague Spring, also conveyed the same information.At last the Soviet Politburo gathered on August 16 in Moscow and decided on a military intervention in Czechoslovakia. There were some indications that Western countries were not likely to react too strongly if such an intervention did take place.In conclusion, it may be said that military intervention did not only result in the consolidation of the Soviet bloc and promoted the creation of the basis of the detente at that time, but also deprived the socialist countries of the reform impetus beyond the Prague Spring for twenty years.
著者
岡垣 知子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2000, no.124, pp.64-88,L9, 2000-05-12 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
85

The essay seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the international thought of Thomas Hobbes by reexamining his Leviathan and by reevaluating his views on human nature, war, and international relations in light of the current theories of international politics. Although in the study of political theory Hobbes has been most commonly known as a precursor of liberalism, advocating the right of self-preservation of individuals, his political thought has long been regarded as belonging to the “realist” paradigm in the field of international politics, which has been considered as contending with the “liberal” paradigm. One of the objectives in the essay is to fill in this gap that exists in the interpretations of Hobbes between political theory and international politics.The typical interpretations of political thought of Hobbes as “realist” in international politics are: 1) Hobbes considers war as a lasting feature of international relations; 2) Hobbes takes a pessimistic view on human nature as endlessly seeking power after power; 3) Hobbes applies the analogy of the state of nature to international relations. The essay argues that Hobbes' “war” simply means the conditions where peace cannot be guaranteed in the long term, and therefore, should not be taken literally, that Hobbes is rather an optimist especially with regard to the potential of human reason that could work toward peace by agreeing to establish “Leviathan”, and that his analogy of the state of nature applies to the individual state behavior, but not necessarily to international relations.The prevalent misunderstanding of Hobbes in the field of international politics is at least partly attributed to the tendency to regard realism and liberalism as dichotomous theories of international politics, which exaggerates the realist aspects of Hobbes to the last degree. A more careful reading of Hobbes reveals more optimistic, moralist, liberal, and peace-loving components in Hobbesian political theory than are currently recognized. This leads us to conclude that a coherent, clear “Hobbesian paradigm” is difficult to establish in the study of international politics. Rather, his contributions to the theories of international politics have been sporadic, though undoubtedly important.What we owe most to Hobbes are his deductive methodology and his insightful political concepts such as the relativity of power, the notion of time, and his rational egoistic image of a state, which still provide us with useful fresh tools of analysis in today's international politics. We should also note, however, that the historical context in which Hobbes lived limited him to focusing mainly on domestic politics. His image of international relations in Leviathan is at best a primitive, dynastic one, where no clear distinction between international and domestic politics is made. Hobbes lived in a historical period where the notion of international system had yet to exist.
著者
湯川 拓
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_58-71, 2011-02-20 (Released:2013-05-22)
参考文献数
38

What types of characteristics do the diplomatic relationships of countries with unstable “regime security” exhibit? These are countries where the use of force is used to challenge the authority of the central government, for example, by means of revolution; civil war; or coup d' état. According to the existing literature, the argument that “when domestic governance within a country is unstable, that country's relationship with other countries will also be unstable” seems to dominate most research.In contrast to these works, this paper aims to conceptualize the mechanism where countries choose to cooperate multilaterally and internationally, in order to heighten their own regime security. In particular, two types of international institutions which exist for the purpose of heightening domestic security will be introduced. The first type of institution, which is responsible for defining the concept of what a “domestic political regime” should be, seeks to actively impose sanctions on those countries which defy the concept. On the other hand, the second type of institution seeks to mutually recognize the legitimacy of its member countries' political regimes, regardless of the form that these regimes might take. In this way, the second type of institution can be described as being “negative” in nature. Examples of such institutions include Mercosur and ASEAN. This paper will demonstrate that the role of these institutions goes beyond stabilizing international relationships, but also extends into the realm of reinforcing regime security, which is the prior concern of its member countries.Moreover, since the stance adopted by this paper is that “regime security and the international institutions are closely linked”, it will also add a fresh perspective to the existing literature on the evolution of the international norms. The evolution of the international norms refers to the change in the perspective of countries over time, when they choose to replace policies of mutual non-interference with new policies. Originally, such changes used to be interpreted as a “transition in the international norms”, or as “the waning of sovereignty”. However, this paper argues differently. Instead of seeing changes in the international regime as a “break” in the existing state of affairs, this paper proposes that the change from mutual non-interference to mutual cooperation is in fact a form of continuity in the international norm, borne out of the desire of countries to heighten their own regime security.
著者
小沼 新
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1977, no.57, pp.61-81,L3, 1977-05-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
62

Ho Chi Minh is called Lenin in Vietnam. As is well known, he devoted his whole life to the liberation of his homeland. I cannot discuss all of his thoughts and political action in the limited space given to me. In addition, almost none of his diary is left anywhere and, as far as I know, there are only ten works or so on his biography. But each work has its own point of view.Therefore, I will offer my thesis as follows:1) I will take into consider the period from his birth to his entrance into the French Communist Party. In this period, however, his dominant thoughts is nationalism and anti-colonialism.2) He took part in the Fifth Congress of Comintern and grew to the orthodox Communist (Marxist). And he was sent, on a special mission of forming the revolutionary organization, to China, Hong Kong and Thailand. Another important fact was that the Comintern desided to form the anti-fascism united front in 1935.3) Along Comintern lines, he made the Viet-Minh in his homeland in 1941. As the result of political and army movement the Viet-Minh succeeded in the August Revolution, and grasped all political powers all over the country. But its victory was destructed by the Great-powers, so that the Indochina War begun. In this section, the emphasis is laid on his pliable strategy and tactics at many political crisis.4) In 1954 the Geneva Conference put an end to the Indochina War. But the Geneva Agreements divided Vietnam right in two which had been historically one country. Ho Chi Minh had a great agony. But finally he dicided at first to construct socialism in the North Vietnam and then, to liberate the South where U. S. A. and Ngo Dinh Diem regime begun to rule. In 1960 the South Vietnam Liberation National Front was born in the South and Vietnam War (The Second Indochina War) begun. This war ended on April 1975 with the liberation of Saigon; which although he died on the third of September in 1969 was named Ho Chi Minh operation. In this section the main stress in laid on the moralistic phase of Ho Chi Minh.
著者
高山 巖
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_48-63, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)
参考文献数
60

It was in his monographic essay titled “Westphalia and All That” that international relations scholar Steven D. krasner criticized the “orthodox” view that the peace of Westphalia of 1648 marks the end of the old medieval world and the beginning of a new era in international relations history. Leo Gross, a prominent internationa law expert, had similarly maintained that Westphalia was the starting point for the development of modern international law and that it was “the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world”. Krasner rejected both the “orthodox” and Gross' views as “wrong”.Krasner's criticism is based on three propositions; 1) “History is not so neatly compartmentalized”; Westphalia was neither an end nor a beginning; 2) The basic issue at Westphalia was not so much one of building a new international order based on sovereign equality of states as a more reaistic one of how the Holy Roman Empire, which had lost the war, would satisfy France and Sweden, which had won; 3)Contrary to the “orthodox” view, Westphalia was “past-oriented”, in the sense that most of the issues taken up there were those of the feudal period, such as hereditary succession, composition of the Diet, election of the Empperor, etc.The purpose of the present study is to place the “orthodox” and Gross' views against the background of Krasner's criticism in an effort to judge which side can provide more adequate and convincing evidence for a satisfactory interpretation of Westphalia. By employing what we propose to call a “symbolic monument” approach, which “constructs” history by connecting historical evidence with interpretation, we have examined such issues as the role of “world charters”, laicization of international law, the system of collective security, and the policy of prestige and diplomatic formalities, and arrived at the conclusion that the “orthodox” and Gross' views are convincing enough to warrant full recognition, while krasner fails to “construct” his own history to make his criticism meaningful. Criticism for the sake of criticism alone does not lead to a discerning knowledge and evaluation of historical realities. “Construction” of history must accompany criticism.We fully share, however, Krasner's admonition that history is not so neatly compartmentalized, and probably it is through the sharing of this admonition with him that a diaogue will begin between us.
著者
若松 邦弘
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.110, pp.23-38,L6, 1995-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
30

This paper deals with the development of British ‘race relations policy’ and its present status in terms of the commitment of central government. Race relations policy, which is defined as public initiatives aiming at the integration of immigrants and their descendants into British society, has been encouraged mainly at local government level. Though there have been some attempts to eliminate racial discrimination by legislation, central government's initiatives have been to support the actions of local authorities. Within the mutual autonomy between central and local government, race relations policy has, at the local level, established an independent policy area which has objectives and principles of its own. In the case of central government departments, the Home Office is supposed to play the central role in race relations; its actions on this issue have been mainly from a law and order perspective and little attempt has been made to coordinate policy between departments. Generally speaking, race relations have received a low priority in the policy agenda of central government. Central government maintains a non-committal posture on race relations and has delegated initiatives as much as possible to local authorities.This explains why most academic research has focussed its attention on local authorities' initiatives so far. However the influence of central government on race relations has been increasing recently. Since the mid 1980s, against a background of restrictions in government expenditure, such measures as deregulation and transfer of social service operations to the private sector or public agencies have gradually curtailed local authorities' functions. Increasing central intervention in local authorities has influenced local policy. This is also the case with race relations. Central government has come to have more impact on overall public initiatives on race relations. Local authorities' initiatives have been subject to great alteration in the mid 1990s. In this paper reference is made to three concrete measures by central government, that is, the Race Relations Acts, Section 11 grants and inner city policy. Central government's stance on race relations revealed therein is analysed.
著者
長谷川 雄一
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1982, no.71, pp.93-108,L10, 1982-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
65

When considering the Manchukuo as a whole, we shall have to reexamine a Daikoraikoku plan conceived by SUENAGA Misao (1869-1960).Against that background, there were radical changes both at home and abroad; and a new trend toward antirationalist ideas increasingly grew out of the rationalist ideas that had been dominating since the Meiji period.Gondo Seikyo's doctrine of a Shashoku State, backed by a self-ruling society, was also based on this trend. The image of state developed in the Daikoraikoku plan was a product of this indigenous idea of his.On the contrary, concerning the international affairs of the time, we can point out three changes. Firstly, an independent movement of Koreans in South Manchuria and Primorskij Kraj became active under the influence of the 3.1. movement in Korea. Secondly, Manchuria was in a power vacuum in the midst of big change in East Asia caused by Japan's withdrawal of troops from Siberia.Thirdly, the upsurging of a trend of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, which was shown in the new immigration and land laws, made a considerable impact upon Japan and influenced the Japanese “Return” to Asia.The Daikoraikoku plan was proposed as a solution to these changes in and around Japan. And it also included the principle of Odo Seizi (Righteous Way) and Minzoku Kyowa (Racial Harmony) propounded at the time of the setting-up of Manchukuo.
著者
室山 義正
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1997, no.115, pp.126-143,L16, 1997-05-17 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
48

The Japan-US security structure was built up under the situation of East-West Cold War and Japan's loss of self-defense capability after World War II. In its structure, the role of the US Forces stationed in Japan is “directly” to defend peace and stability in the Far East; while Japan's role is to provide the US Forces with bases free of charge and to support them by sharing expenses for the USFJ as well as to guarantee them freedom of actions. Thus, Japan “indirectly” contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security not only in the Far East but also in the world.The Japan-US security system functioned well as it was essentially designed to deter the then USSR threat in the region. Under such strategic environments, the Japan-US security system can militarily cope with the threats by means of Japan's “individual right of self-defense” and the “indirect supports” given to the USFJ mentioned above. However, with the end of Cold War the security environments have changed. During the Gulf War Japan could not carry out military action in that region. Japan's huge contributions based on the principle of “indirect supports” under the Japan-US security system were hardly appreciated. It even invited criticism at home and from abroad that Japan was playing a “check-book diplomacy.” Obviously the Japan-US security system malfunctioned.Nevertheless, for the US the security system with Japan is becoming increasingly important since the world's economic center was shifting from the West to the Pacific-Asia region and the US still feel the necessity of its military control over the region. Furthermore, most immediately there is the suspicion that North Korea might be developing nuclear-weapons and there is also the concern that Japan might eventually take an independent policy from the US. Indeed, there is also a worry that China might become a threat in the region in the future. At the same time, the US itself is facing the fiscal constraints to reduce its defense expenditures. Under these circumstances, it becomes logically the central US purpose to create a new Japan-US security system based on “collective defense” and “direct supports”.But the US military presense in the region that is a key element of the new “Definition” will be reduced and the US will gradually lose the military control in the region. On the other hand, Japan will grow into an independent strategic nation and China will become a real powerful state. For the stabilization of East Asia a new framework of multilateral security system is indispensable. Such framework will ensure the US's constructive commitments in the region, China's constructive participation, Korean Peninsula's stabilization and Japan's assuming the role of an independent political actor without provoking the suspicion of the neighboring nations. In the long run, Japan's security system will be based on the UN's global security system a regional security system closely connecting with it and Japan's own exclusively defense-oriented defense system. One can forecast that the Japan-US security system will gradually change into a political, rather than military alliance.
著者
山影 進
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1981, no.67, pp.5-28,L1, 1981-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
106

Starting to prevail in the end of the 1960's, interdependence studies have been much in fashion throughout the seventies. Almost all phenomena related to international relations were discussed in connection with “interdependence” despite the absence of its substantial clarification. Consequently, there were too many definitions to use it as an analytic concept; and attention shifted from interdependence proper to (1) international regime/order, and (2) policy/adaptation towards a contemporary complex world. First of all, this paper reviews a brief intellectual history of such interdependence studies as the vogue in a scholary world reflecting recent profound changes in the real world.Doubtlessly influenced by leading academic moods in America, interdependence studies became popular in the late 1970's in Japan, but an independent and isolated research on the subject had been conducted years earlier. Taking this study as a model, this paper analyzes interdependence studies as various approaches to understand international society which contains both national and non-national actors interwoven by numerous and complicated transactions, and which creates new types of problems awaiting novel ways of solution.In the course of analysis herein, the meanings of “interdependence” are redefined and compared with one another, and most importantly a theory of interdependent relations is proposed. Specifically, it attempts to explain conflict and cooperation over interests in transactions by the following factors: (1) transactions between actors, (2) actor's internal system, (3) actor's perceived cost and benefit associated with transactions, (4) actor's controllability of transactions, and (5) the international order to regulate transactions.Designing interdependence is needless-to-say extremely difficult. According to the analysis in this paper, however, the necessary fundamental structure of interdependent relations can be at least pointed out. Namely, the most basic structure which differentiates the situation of “interdependence” from other types of situations is multidimentional conflict cum cooperation over complicated transactions cum alternative regimes.
著者
勝俣 誠
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1983, no.73, pp.86-103,L12, 1983-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
33

The contemporary societies of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) are fundamentally ruled by three main relations: large scale relations with the industrialized countries, particularly with France, the former colonial power; sociocultural relations between the Maghreb states and informal Islamic institutions that structure the space of everyday life; and politico-economic relations with the Sub-Saharan African states.The present article focuses upon the first set of relations as a way of posing and examining the followng questions:(1) Why and how, even today, Maghreb's economic dependence upon industrialized economies is maintained through the emigration of Maghreb's labor force;(2) How Maghreb's external trade relations based on raw materials determine the nature of the economic and social development of the Maghreb;(3) How relations with the industrialized world can be placed in a Mediterranean geo-political context.If most studies agree on the existence of dependent relations between Maghreb society and the industrialized world, the determination of the precise components of dependence varies from one study to another. An analysis of the cultural and agricultural aspects of the movement of labor allows us to understand the motivation and role of each emigrant in perpetuating the movement. On the other hand, the anatomy of a natural resource oriented economy shows us the limited possibility of autonomous development based on the international valorization of local resources. Further, the external prospects for Maghreb society are more uncertain than ever because of the sustained world recession. That is the reason why an alternative scenario of a Mediterranean bloc is being discussed professionally as one of the regional solutions to world-wide uncertainty.This scenario corresponds with the mutually expanding interests of the EC and the Arab World. An example of the closer ties is a network of agreements which the EC has established with almost all of the Mediterranean countries, including those with the Maghreb, concluded in 1976. These treaties are restricted to economic relations. Another example is the Euro-Arab Dialogue (DEA). This idea appeared in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo in 1973. In a series of negotiations between the EC and the Arab countries, politics in the Middle East has come to the surface as a policy issue, though policies are yet to be formulated. It is obvious that the geo-political location of the Mediterranean Sea is strategically important for both the Maghreb and France. Since the late 1970s, France in particular has advocated a regional plan of cooperation based on the strategic location of the Mediterranean region. In comparison with former plans, this plan mentions that France, as the sole nuclear power in the region, is expected to make a contribution to security in the area; second, the Mediterranean countries —Southern Europe, the Maghreb and the Middle East— are located on the periphery in the structure of world capitalism. How this scenario develops still remains to be seen.