著者

中逵 啓示

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.105, pp.1-13,L5, 1994

---

The Korean war has been almost exhaustively studied as an important part of the escalation process of the cold war. The historical significance of the Korean war is not however limited only to this point. The Korean armitice negotiation was one of the first cases of East-West talks, which have led the world to detente and ultimately to the end of the cold war. Thus the Korean war should be noted as an important beginning of the descalation process of the cold war as well.<br>Based on this historical understanding, the paper describes how the Korean armistice negotiations started. The author believes that three conditions are indispensable for the start of the peace talks in general. First, a stable war situation is necessary, because, only through military deadlock, could both sides realize the difficulty of a military solution. Second, an agreement on the negotiation agenda should be achieved. Third, there should be an influential mediator.<br>From July 1950 through July 1951, the governments of India and Britain continued their mediation efforts. But their peace proposals, both the simultaneous solution plan of China and Korean problems and the demilitarized zone plan, could not work out any UN-communist agreement, mainly because the military situations were too fluid and too tempting for military unification to have any meaningful negotiation. The limited influence of the mediators did not help the situation either. In addition the efforts on the part of the United Nations in early 1951 also hardly bore any fruit.<br>Only after the military situation became stable and the commencement of powerful Soviet involvement on mediation efforts, could China and the United States agree to begin the peace talks. Last, but not least, the fear of World War III indiscriminately brought both the mediators and the war parties together to manage the crisis.

著者

中井 和夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.104, pp.99-116,L12, 1993

---

The agreement reached in Minsk on 7-8 December 1991 to create a Commonwealth of Independent States was signed by the leaders of three slavic countries. The agreement stated that, "the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases its existence". Ukrainian president Kravchuk stated that it had prevented the uncontrolled disintegration of the former Soviet Union, but "We cannot allow ourselves to be locked in the Commonwealth, we should go in search of wide ranging relations with other countries", added he. Many Ukrainians regarded CIS more sceptically than president Kravchuk. According to an opinion poll conducted after signing of the Minsk accords, Ukrainians were the most pessimistic of the three founding states.<br>Elected as the first president of Ukraine, Kravchuk shortly succeeded to establish an authoritarian regime. He introduced several new institutions which strengthened his presidential power. By shifting his position from "sovereign communist" to the "fighter for Ukrainian independent statehood" Kravchuk neutralized his former opponents. Also he recruited many key persons from opponents camp to the higher governmental posts. But Kravchuk's authoritarian regime lasted barely one year. New prime minister L. Kuchima challenged Kravchuk in power game and weakened Kravchuk's position last winter. Kravchuk's authoritarian regime was further weakened by the economic crises in Ukraine.<br>Since Ukraine's ratification of its independence in December 1991, its quarrels with Russia grabbed international headlines. During the early months of 1992, Russo-Ukrainian relations reached so low an ebb that many observers felt the big possibility of the Ukraine's retreat from the CIS. However, an reapprochment has taken place. An agreement was reached between the two sides on many of the outstanding areas of conflict at the Dagomys summit meeting in June 1992 between president Yeltsin and Kravchuk. Although there are still many points of conflict between them, relations between them have become quite stable.<br>From the begining Ukraine did not possess strong loyality to the CIS. Ukraine regarded CIS as an economic cooperative organization. Therefore, Ukraine was always against the CIS as a unit of political-military integration. If CIS would be strengthened as a political institution like the former Soviet Union, Ukraine would likely choose the alternative of "exit" from the CIS.<br>Finally, what is the meaning and impact of the independence of Ukraine in the region? From the Baltic to the Black Sea, there are now six new independent states, including Ukraine. These western parts of the former Soviet Union can be called the "New Eastern Europe". thrusts Central Europe (former Eastern Europe) to the west and at the same time pushes Russia to the east.

著者

村上 友章

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_93-170_108, 2012

---

The Soviet Union invaded the Kuril Islands after the end of the Pacific War and Russian border guards had often apprehended Japanese fishing boats on the sea around these islands for the invasion of "Soviet territorial waters". These numerous incidents by Russian authorities in capturing Japanese fishing boats and their crews seriously damaged the livelihood of the Japanese fishermen involved. They continued to demand the Japanese government to secure the safety of fishing on the sea especially around the Habomai and the Shikotan islands. In June 1963, a part of their earnest wish was realized. The Japan Fisheries Association concluded a private agreement with the Soviet government. This agreement allows seaweed harvesting by the Japanese fishermen in a small area within "Soviet territorial waters". This article will examine the negotiation process of this agreement.<br>It took a long time since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956 to reach the agreement because it involved an intractable territorial dispute over a Russian-held chain of islands. The Soviet Union proposed to Japan to conclude a Peace Treaty in which Japan world accept to have only two of the islands (Habomai and Shikotan) returned as part of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. However, the government of Japan could not accept this condition and asked the Soviet Union to return not just the two islands but also Kunashiri and Etorofu. Therefore, in order to secure the safety of the Japanese fishermen on the sea, either the Soviets would drop the condition, or Japan would accept the proposal and conclude a Peace Treaty with such provisions. However, both countries exhibited an uncompromising attitude to each other. In addition, many Japanese were indifferent to this local problem.<br>The individual who resolved this difficult problem was the Chairman of Japan Fisheries Association Takasaki Tatsunosuke. He was a famous conservative political leader known for his contribution in signing a private trade agreement with the People's Republic of China in 1962. When he participated in the Japan-Soviet Negotiations on Fishery, he personally tried to lead both countries to conclude a Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty by making Russia recognize "residual sovereignty" of Kunashiri and Etorofu and return Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Soviets took a stern approach toward the government of Japan because of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The government of Japan was not sympathetic to his initiative either. Hence, Takasaki decided to adopt a stopgap measure and sought to conclude a private agreement with the Soviet government in order to avoid the territorial issues. His proposal succeeded in gaining concessions from both countries and in securing the safety of the Japanese fishermen in the given small area. But as a result, ironically, the stability of the Japan-Soviet relations reduced the need for a Peace Treaty and Takasaki's "residual sovereignty" plan.

著者

高橋 和宏

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_46-170_60, 2012

---

During the Ikeda administration (1960–1964), Japan's index of import liberalization accelerated from 40% in 1960 to 93% in 1964, approximately same as in the European Economic Community countries. Such rapid liberalization, however, prompted severe anxiety among the Japanese, who feared their economy might be swallowed up by "black ships." Focusing on actions of the Economic Affairs Bureau (EAB) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, this article explores the rising of Japan's economic nationalism, its underlying logic, and how Japan government restrained it.<br>Under insistence from the U.S. government, Japan decided to liberalize its trade restrictions in 1960. Such overt foreign pressure, however, fueled economic nationalism among Japan's governmental agencies. Believing trade liberalization was needed to not only meet U.S. demands to expand free trade and defend the dollar but also strengthen Japan's economy, EAB urged Ikeda to take assertive action. Consequently, Ikeda expressed his determination to hasten the removal of trade restrictions when he visited the U.S. in 1961.<br>Nonetheless, intense nationalism was inherent in the Japanese government, especially among its economic agencies. Although they considered trade liberalization necessary, they rejected its basic theory—the principle of comparative advantage—fearing that Japan's infant heavy industries might be forced out, obliging Japan to specialize only in light industries. Hoping to avoid that outcome, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced legislation titled "Temporary Measures for Promotion of Specific Industries" intended to create a new industrial structure and strengthen competitiveness of the Japanese heavy industry through public-private cooperation. However, this bill could not muster enough support for enactment because it emphasized regulation rather than free trade.<br>Instead of trade regulations, Japan's economic agencies regarded higher tariffs as the means to prevent acceleration of imports. In opposition, the U.S. and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) called for linear tariff cuts at the start of the Kennedy Round negotiations. MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture resisted drastic tariff cuts, but their insistence on protecting domestic industries was so self-serving that Japan was reproached during the GATT negotiations. It was Ikeda's initiative that persuaded the intractable economic agencies and enabled Japan to participate affirmatively in the Kennedy Round negotiations.<br>This article concludes that Ikeda's leadership was essential to Japan's overcoming of the forces of economic nationalism and liberalizing its trade policies. Ikeda believed that the Japanese economy would become more vigorous and competitive through trade liberalization.

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_62-154_78, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

96

---

The purpose of this research is to explore political dynamics of the ways of Japan's defense capability, asking why the “Concept of Basic Defense Capability” (kibanteki boeiryoku koso), which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Planning Outline (boei taiko), has been maintained for over 30 years and how this concept has affected defense capability construction.The ways of defense capability can be typified as four genres. Type I recognizes the threat level as low and emphasizes the autonomy of Japan's defense capability. Type II also admits the importance of autonomy but does not consider the threat level as low. Type III and IV emphasize operability with forces of Japan's ally, the United States. Type III is distinguished from type IV based on the level threat recognition. In the preceding studies, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was understood as a type I defense concept.In fact, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has consisted of a number of diverse interpretations, so it can be explained by any of the above ways of defense capability. Around the period that the 1976 NDPO was developed, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had type I-III interpretations. The vice minister of defense, Kubo Takuya, understood the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was a type I defense concept, but other defense bureaucrats interpreted the Concept of Basic Defense Capability as type II. Some Self-Defense Force officials downplayed low threat recognition and the autonomy of defense capability. In the new cold war era, some defense officials and politicians insisted on restoring the Concept of Necessary Defense Capability (shoyo boeiryoku koso) or modifying the schedule form (beppyo) in the NDPO. However, these counter-concepts against the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had been co-opted in these interpretations of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability, because it included two interpretations other than Kubo's opinion. When the 1995 NDPO was formulated after the cold war period, the interpretation of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was expanded to type IV.In conclusion, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has continued for over 30 years, co-opting its counter-concepts in itself, restoring the cracks among domestic groups, and permitting a consensus to be made over the ways of defense capability through its diverse interpretations.

著者

石野 裕子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.165, pp.165_156-170, 2011-07-25 (Released:2013-08-05)

参考文献数

59

---

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the ideological background in the transition of “Greater Finland (Suur-Suomi)” idea by examining the interpretations of Finnish national epic, the Kalevala, focusing on three researchers: Kaarle Krohn, Jalmari Jaakkola and Martti Haavio.Today “Greater Finland” idea is often regarded as “expansionism”, but at first it was a sentiment only by Finnish intellectuals on Finnish “relative tribes”, mainly Karelians living in Russian Karelia adjacent to Finnish eastern border. This sentiment of Finnish “relative tribes”, however, was intended to unite Finnish and Karelians under Russian Empire rule. It was spread around Finnish people through diffusion of the Kalevala by a compiler Elias Lönrrot who gathered oral songs mainly from Karelians in Russian Karelia at the end of 19th century. This developed the theory that Karelians had kept Finnish national epic since ancient times.“Greater Finland” idea had been politicized when Russian Empire shifted policy from appeasement to deprivation of Finnish autonomy, called Russification policy at the end of 19th century. Resistance group, Aktivisti recognized Russian Karelia as a defense area against Russia, and also regarded it as a target of Finnish irredenta. This idea overlapped with independence of Finland after the outbreak of the First World War, which triggered the military action for gaining Russian Karelia just after Finish independence. Meanwhile, before and after the independence of Finland, Finnish folklorist Krohn claimed that Finland had culturally connected to Russian Karelia and Estonia in his studies.On the contrary, Finnish historian Jaakkola, who flourished between World Wars, denied the cultural relations between Finland and Estonia, and stressed the unity of Russian Karelia and Finland in ancient times instead. He also tried to place Finland as the European outpost against the attack of “barbarian Russia”. According to Jaakkola's opinion, heroes in the Kalevala were real people who expedited from Western Finland to Russian Karelia, and settled there. This interpretation had been a popular theory of Karelian origin until advocate of new theory in 1950's : Karelians and Finnish were different origins. His theory was made use of the military negotiation with Germany just before the outbreak of the second Soviet-Finnish War (19411944). Finnish government utilized Jaakkola's study for the justification of Russian Karelia's annexation.After the Second World War, Haavio claimed that Finland had come under the cultural influence of all over the world including Russia, and had had the cultural connection with Russia. Therefore the Kalevala had the nature of international epic. Now his Kalevala study was widely accepted among Finnish society which tried to build a new relationship with Soviet Union for promoting the area cooperation with Russian Karelia.It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that the concept of “Greater Finland” idea was changed from “Unity” to “Separation”, and furthermore to “Cooperation” in the transition of time.

著者

秦 郁彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1968, no.37, pp.96-115, 1968-10-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

54

著者

竹田 いさみ

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.68, pp.23-43,L2, 1981-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

133

---

The Barton government, the first federal government in Australia in 1901, refused to meet the Japanese demands that Japan should be exempted from the White Australia Policy. There was a vicious circle that the Japanese protest made the policy more anti-Japanese and this upset Japan immensely, since it put the prestige of Japan at stake. For Australia, there were several reasons not to negotiate with Japan over the immigration questions. Firstly, the New South Wales colonial legislation of immigration restriction, fundamentally the same as the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, was approved by Takaaki Kato, Japan's minister in London; hence, the Japanese protest in 1901 was contradictory to Kato's approval. Secondly, the Barton government finally passed the act after adjusting the different interests of the political parties and the British Colonial Office so that they would be in harmony with each other. To complete the legislation, Barton found Japan's demands difficult to meet. Thirdly, Barton found Great Britain as a lever to solve the Japanese questions.From 1894 to 1901, the Australian attitude toward Japan was primarily to promote trade but not to allow Japanese migrants to Australia. The Queensland's Nelson government's adhesion to the 1894 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation promising the freedom of entry into the contracting parties, caused the federalist government to legislate the Unified Federal Act which excluded Asians. Nippon Yusen Kaisha's steamship service between Japan and Australia, even though contributing to increased trade, was regarded cautiously since it encouraged Japanese migrants to Australia. There was mainly no military consideration on the Japanese immigration questions. It was after the Russo-Japanese War that Australia considered Japan as a military threat.

著者

篠崎 正郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_29-42, 2011-02-20 (Released:2013-05-22)

参考文献数

85

---

It is widely believed that the United Kingdom had decided to retreat from “East of Suez” in January 1968. It planned to withdraw all its forces stationed in South-Eastern Asia and Middle East by the end of 1971. However, the next Heath government made a small change in this policy, left some forces in the area and maintained military commitment beyond 1971. These forces were finally withdrawn by Harold Wilson who was back in power in March 1974. Few studies, however, mention the British forces in the “East of Suez” after 1968. This thesis clarifies the detail and the logic through the policy of retrenchment from 1974 to 1975.The Conservative government decided to maintain military commitment in the “East of Suez.” First, there were still lots of British bases in South-Eastern Asia, Indian Ocean and Middle East though the force level was reduced. Second, the United Kingdom retained the general capability which would be available to be deployed outside Europe. Finally, there were regional organisations like CENTO or FPDA (Five Power Defence Arrangements) which enabled the United Kingdom to cooperate with the local countries.However, the British economy in the 1970s could not support these commitments. Roy Mason, the Secretary of State for Defence in the Labour government, began the Defence Review as soon as he entered office. The principal object of the Review was to reduce defence budget from 5.5% to 4.5% of GNP in the next 10 years. The non-NATO commitments were preferred to be cut since the British government tried to concentrate its defence efforts in the NATO area. In addition, he also decided to abandon the reinforcement capabilities outside NATO.The Defence Review was so drastic that it needed consultation with allies. However, the negotiations were not easy. Most countries tried to keep the British forces in the “East of Suez” because they recognised the importance of the British presence. The United States was concerned about the abandonment of intervention capability outside NATO and desired the British presence in the Mediterranean. As a result, the British government compromised with some of these demands and decided to stay in some areas. Apart from this concession, the British government could carry out the withdrawal as it originally planned.This study indicates the British aspect as an “Empire detained”. British departure was regretted not only by the United States but also by the Commonwealth countries. Britain's retreat from the Commonwealth marks the transformation of British external policy from the world to the Atlantic community.

著者

酒井 啓子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.149, pp.30-45,L7, 2007-11-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

39

被引用文献数

1

---

Women in Iraq have been always at the “periphery” of the multi-layered centre/periphery structures. They were located at the periphery of the traditional Muslim/Arab society in a Western/modernist sense. Iraq itself, on the other hand, is located at the periphery of the colonial and global economic system. Consequently, Iraqi women have found themselves in a double peripheral position, both at the international as well as the domestic level.The leftist political elites who became dominant in Iraq after 1958 understood the liberation of women as evidence of the progressiveness of modern society, as they opposed both feudalism and Western colonialism. The state under the Ba'thist regime in the 1970s controlled women's organizations and included them in the system of revolutionary mobilization. State control was strengthened during the war period in the 1980s as a means to mobilise women into the labour force.The leftist regimes in Iraq pursued this secular and de-Islamisation policy until after the Gulf war, but in the 1990s Saddam Hussein introduced a re-tribalisation and re-Islamisation policy as a means to compensate for the state's lack of ability to govern local society. This revival of traditional Muslim and tribal social systems drove women again to the periphery.The US invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam's regime has led to a change in the previous central/peripheral relationship. Iraq was placed at the periphery of the world political system under US/UK control. At the same time, the new Iraq regime, established following the general election in 2005, is led by Islamist political parties, which were in a peripheral/outlaw position in Iraq before 2003. Under this new situation, women have been divided into three categories. First, there is a group who utilise the US/Western support to “liberate/democratise” Iraq and demand the introduction of a Western legal and social system to protect women's rights. A second group accepts the newly introduced Western electoral system but not the Western-type equal political rights for women. The third are women members of Islamist political parties, who act as a part of the revolutionary forces pursuing the establishment of an Islamic state.Under both the leftist and Islamist regimes, revolutionaries have consistently pursued their own goal of “liberating” their nation from the rule of the “centre” of world politics, which is led by the Western system; sometimes they play up the nominal status of women to the state elites, but in other cases pursue their own aims at the expense of women's rights.

著者

樋口 敏広

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.134, pp.103-120,L14, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

66

---

The Bikini incident of 1954, ushering in a new era of atomic plenty, aggravated nuclear fear and a danger of neutralism among the Japanese public. This article examines how the Japanese and U. S. governments tackled a problem of antinuclear sentiment which emerged as a hotbed for neutralism in 1954-1957. Focusing on a unique nature of Japanese antinuclear sentiment as a form of nationalism, this article sheds light upon a role of diplomacy as a communication tool to address antinuclear sentiment and nationalism.This study argues that the Yoshida administration succeeded in settling an immediate problem of the Bikini incident but failed to address the question of nationalism deeply rooted in spreading antinuclear sentiment among the public. Worried about a weak leadership of the Japanese conservative government, the Eisenhower administration could not simply overlook this failure. Then it tried to directly confront the growing antinuclear sentiment through a coordinated public relations diplomacy it regarded as “education.” With “education, ” it intended to lead Japan to embrace continued nuclear-testing. This “education” failed, however, when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi embarked upon anti-nuclear-testing diplomacy. By positively responding to the growing nationalism embedded in the antinuclear sentiment, Kishi thought, he could win popularity for pro-American conservative LDP and therefore contain a danger of neutralism. Containment of neutralism was, ironically, exactly what the Eisenhower administration had envisaged. Kishi's diplomacy, therefore, shared the goal with U. S. educational efforts, but adopted a different approach. His diplomacy finally nullified “education, ” which raised a voice inside the Eisenhower administration calling for changing U .S. policy on nuclear testing rather than changing Japan through “education.” The eventual course of antinuclear nationalism in U. S. -Japan relations once again remained to be seen.

著者

浅羽 祐樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.156-169, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

41

著者

山下 光

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_144-175_157, 2014

---

This article examines new/neo humanitarianism in a wider context of post-Cold War international relations and argues that its emergence corresponds to an important shift in the meaning of the political in today's international relations. It describes the shift in terms of the contrast between two logics of politics: the conventional "logic of distinction," whereby political processes take place between territorially separated, sovereign entities, and the newer "logic of translucency" in which new values (and risks) are generated by the actor's ability and will to extend beyond its material and ideational boundaries. The logic of translucency has been adopted by many actors who thereby aim to generate new values and extend the reach of their own activities. From this perspective, new humanitarianism, which seeks linkage to the activities that were once off limits to traditional humanitarianism (military intervention, development and governance), can be seen as another example of the ideational and practical socialization to a new political landscape. However, as political actors acting on the logic of translucency each try to extend themselves beyond their traditional realms, dilemmas, contradictions, clashes and conundrums tend to occur: the logic of translucency ironically thus generates diverse forms of "murkiness," creating in turn a new desire for translucency.<br>The current crisis in humanitarian assistance (kidnappings, killings and obstructions against humanitarian personnel) can be seen as part of the murky consequences of new humanitarianism and politics and, as such, cannot be blamed solely on the post-911 tendency of the humanitarianization of politics, i.e., the utilization by state authorities and militaries of humanitarian arguments and programs to serve their ends. This article also suggests that new humanitarianism as well as its murky consequences cannot be wished away by insisting that humanitarianism should go back to the basics, because the changing nature of humanitarianism has deeper roots in the changing nature of politics in general.

著者

大山 梓

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.6, pp.149-151, 1958

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.117, pp.121-139,L12, 1998

---

This essay intends to analyse the formative process of discourses on international politics in post-war Japan, and by doing so shed light on the hitherto neglected aspects of Japanese political thought. Most of previous studies have understood discourses on international politics in post-war Japan as a simple dichotomy, realism/idealism, and paid little attention to the intellectual contexts in which these discourses had their own roots; While "idealists" have searched for their identity in that Japan was reborn as a "peace-loving" nation after the end of the Pacific War, "realists" have acused the "idealists" of being naive. Both of them, however, seem to have overlooked or possibly masked from what kind of historical background discourses on international politics in post-war Japan had emerged and to what extent post-war discourses had been influenced by pre-war ones. Therefore, this essay will uncover the complicated relationship of political thought between post-war and pre-war Japan.<br>Chapter I "Morality, Power and Peace" treats how relationship between morality and power in international politics was argued during the early post-war era. Dogi-Kokka-Ron (Nation Based on Morality), the dominant discourse on peace immediately after Japan's surrender, insisted that Japan search for morality rather than power and by doing so exceed the principle of sovereignty, characterestic of modern states. In spite of its appearance, however, Dogi-Kokka-Ron contained echoes of philosophical argument of the Kyoto School which had advocated morality of Japan's wartime foreign policies vis-à-vis Western imperialism. Thus Maruyama Masao and other leading intellectuals, who belonged to the school known as Shimin-Shakai-Ha (Civil Society School), tried to differentiate their arguments from Dogi-Kokka-Ron and create another discourse on morality, power and peace. Since the Kyoto School had criticised harshly the modernity and nationalism during the Pacific War, Shimin-Shakai-Ha's undertakings resulted in reestimation of the modern nation-state. This chapter further elucidates Shimin-Shakai-Ha's ambivalent attitudes toward power and norm in international politics with special reference to its understandings of the concept of the equality of states.<br>Chapter II "Regionalism and Nationalism" focuses on Royama Masamichi's argument on regionalism. Regionalism was a difficult topic to handle during the early post-war era because it could bring to mind the idea of the Great East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Pacific War. Royama, founder of the study on International Politics in Japan, was one of the rare figures who continued to advocate the significance of regionalism. This chapter surveys Royama's argument on regionalism from the mid-1920's to the mid-1950's and investigates how his concern about development and nationalism of Asian countries appeared within the framework of regionalism. Royama's argument is also suggestive for better understanding of the context in which the "Rostow-Reischauer line" surfaced in the early 1960's.<br>Chapter III "Collective Security and Neutralism" elucidates several aspects of this issue which have not been hitherto fully investigated. Whether positively or negatively, neutralism in post-war Japan has been understood as a typically "idealistic" attitude toward international politics. However, the context in which the concept of neutrality was understood and argued in the early post-war Japan was more complicated. Discourses on neutralism at that time had still echoes of the controversies over collective security during the inter-war years. The Yokota-Taoka Controversy which took place in the late-1940's witnessed the continuity of pre-war and post-war arguments on this issue. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the Yokota-Taoka Controversy and analyses its impact on the following arguments of

著者

柳田 陽子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.35, pp.91-110, 1968

著者

永井 陽之助

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.2-31,L5, 1986

---

I. Uniqueness of the Postwar Peace. II. The <i>Nomos</i> of the earth-Geopolitics of MAD (i) Bipolar System (ii) Geostrategic Approach to MAD (iii) Informal Rules of Game and Norms of Behavior. III. The <i>Nomos</i> of the Outer Space (i) Sanctuarization of the Space (ii) Ambiguity of the Space Weapons (iii) Issues of ABM Treaty in the Legal Context of SDI.<br>This essay aims to examine the impact of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on the <i>Nomos</i> of the outer space through revealing the secret of durability of the postwar peace. In calling for a defense that would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete, " President Reagan's goal of a perfect area defense stirred the interest of the public who have long sought a moral alternative to deterrence based on the mutual assured destruction (MAD). Yet MAD is not a strategy capable of being changed by political will or strategic considerations; it is rather "existential" condition, not unlike the condition of the market mechanism, resulted by the inevitable consequence of the super-powers having the assured capabilities of mutual destruction, closely connected with the asymmetric geopolitical positon.<br>This condition has created the mutual vulnerability of civilized urban centers, because of the strategic reality resulted from the development of the ICBM and the so-called "reconnaissance revolution." The detonation of even as few as five or ten Soviet warheads on U. S. cities would cause unparalleld destruction. It might be called the law of "impossibility of area defense". This unique combination of the bipolar system and the condition of the MAD has successfully drawed a clear distinction between a zone of sanctuarity (a zone of predictability on which mutual interest in common rules based on reciprocal sanction) and a zone of danger (a zone of unpredictabily) in the periphery of the world. They have no choice, in this condition, but to play the game of influence by means of "nuclear cheque" on the security of the nuclear arsenals.<br>Whereas we live in "neither war nor peace, " we are afraid of a radical discontinuity by turning a zone of predictablity into a zone of danger. The concept of a zone of danger-currently highlighted by the issue of the SDI in outer space-also signals the arrival of an era of opportunity on the formation of the <i>Nomos</i> of the space.<br>Any consideration of a militarization of outer space should not neglect the distinction of two different directions: the sanctuarization of the space (turning into a zone of predictability) through the passive uses such as reconnaissance and communications, in sharp contrast with the militarization of the space by turning into a zone of danger through the development of the ABM and ASAT technology, despite of the ambiguity of space weapons.<br>In all probablity, super-power rivalry in strategic defense will lead to an increased Soviet-American arms race by the exchange of the offensive and defensive in a vicious circle. This is the reason why the development of SDI might be quite different from the Manhattan and the Apollo projects, which involves no less than unlocking nature's secrets; a struggle of man against nature. In contrast, the success of the stratigic defense depends on the reactions or the counter-measureas taken by the Soviet side, as the Fletcher panel project has suggested.<br>Moreover, the SDI poses a real threat to the Outer Space Treaty, not to mention to the ABM treaty which is most significant arms-control agreement of the postwar period. Both treaties should provide us the legal framework (the <i>Nomos</i>), as a fundamental constitution, of the outer space. Such "passive" military uses as the satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, and communications are compatible with a doctrine of peaceful purposes and deterrence. Yet the ballistic missile defence (BMD)

著者

光辻 克馬 山影 進

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_18-40, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

参考文献数

52

---

Multi-agent simulation (MAS), or agent-based simulation, is very powerful in representing and analyzing system's emergent properties based on interactions among agents. The emergence of social order or norms based on interactions among nations has been one of the central subjects of International Relations (IR). Mutual compatibility being taken into account, MAS could have been applied to IR more extensively. In reality, technical difficulties and excessive abstraction have been most formidable obstacles for the application of MAS. Aiming at a wider use of MAS in IR, we developed a user-friendly simulator, and have built various types of models, from the crisis decision-making to the balance of power, with lesser abstraction and more substantial attributes that represent characteristics of international society.In this paper, we focus on the spread of an international norm in the manner of cascade on the tipping point, which constructivists of IR such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) tried to understand. To date, discussions on this subject have been very suggestive, but far from conclusive. In order to give a theoretical account for norm emergence and cascade, we construct the Norm Emergence Model (NEM). NEM is the combination of the threshold model originally developed by Granovetter (1978) with the persuasion mechanism suggested by Risse (2000) and other constructivists, so that NEM can generate cascades of norm emergence based on dynamic multi-agent interactions that affect the threshold of individual agents.The case we analyze by NEM is the spread of anti-colonialism that affected the membership of intemational society in the mid 20th century, probably the most fundamental norm-change in international society as Philpott (2001) and others argue. One of the most illustrative events must be the United Nations Declaration of Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. Within less than a generation, the norm of trusteeship was completely replaced by the norm of unconditional independence.NEM represents virtual international society that sharply split over whether to accept the colonial rules as trusteeship or reject them unconditionally, with the initial condition (agents as UN members, their thresholds and their positions) that more or less reflects the reality at the end of the 1940s at the United Nations. The simulation begins with the year 1950, and finishes in 1969, during which each agent decides which position it should take, and persuades other members aiming at gaining more support of its position. New agents join in the same manner as the reality.The result of MAS depends on the setting of parameters, and we show results based on four scenarios. Scenario 1 makes persuasion impossible, which means only the entry of new members affects norm emergence. The cascade did not take place. Although ex-colonial countries increase in number, their positions were not as radical as socialist countries. Scenario 2 allows persuasion. Norm change did not happen either. For, socialist countries are persuaded, and change their position so as to accept trusteeship. Scenario 3 allows persuasion, but only anti-colonial norm is influential; trusteeship lost legitimacy. Now, the cascade happens in the mid 1950s with much more sudden pace than the reality. In addition to the setting of Scenario 3, Scenario 4 limits the range of successful persuasion so that agents are affected only when the distance of thresholds is close enough. The cascade takes place in the late 1950s that looks like the reality. Thus, the specific type of interactions and the entry of new members turn out to generate a norm cascade, sometimes after the confrontation for a few years, which seems to reproduce what happened in the arena of the United Nations.NEM is a very simple model, but can reproduce a cascade of international norm from trusteeship to unconditional independence to a successful degree. ...

著者

中沢 志保

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.83, pp.126-142,L14, 1986-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

62

---

Nuclear disarmament negotiations began with “the Baruch Plan” of June 14, 1946. The Baruch Plan was the first proposal for the international control of atomic energy presented by the United States to the United Nations.It was evaluated as an epochal proposal that the United States, then the only nuclear weapon state, publicly expressed her intention to abandon its monopoly on nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the “strictness” of that plan—namely, its provisions of “punishment against violators” and “restriction of the veto power” in the United Nations—brought about rejection by the Soviet Union.As a result, the first negotiations for nuclear disarmament were completely upset. But that failure provided an important suggestion regarding those factors which decide disarmament negotiations and international relations after World War II. And we cannot forget the great contributions of atomic scientists to ideas on the international control of atomic energy.This article re-examines the process of establishing the first plan for international control of nuclear energy focussing on the viewpoints of atomic scientists. David E. Lilienthal and his group, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, drew up a plan for the international control of atomic energy in March, 1946. “The Acheson-Lilienthal Report”, as it was usually known, was a draft plan of the Baruch Plan. But these two plans contain important differences in their contents.The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which was based on Oppenheimer's ideas, proposed setting up an international organization which should possess all the fissionable materials and should control all nuclear activities. This organization was envisioned to be the center for research and development in this field.The Baruch Plan, which laid the foundations of United States atomic policy, partially followed the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, but it emphasized inspection and sanctions against violations. Namely, the Baruch Plan demanded enforceable punishment of violators rather than cooperation in atomic energy development. It is well known that the emphasis of punishment and problems relating to the veto in the United Nations became obstacles in gaining Soviet approval of the plan.Disarmament negotiations to follow inherited this kind of disharmony. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, which aims to prevent the appearance of any new nuclear powers, supports the dominant positions of the nuclear big powers rather than protects the benefits of non-nuclear states. The political character of the treaty meant severe antagonisms between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers. If we try to find the beginning of such deadlock in disarmament negotiations, we must re-examine the Baruch Plan. And if we compare that plan with the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, more significant facts will be found. One is the ideas of Oppenheimer, who represents both scientists and politiciants. And the other is the paradoxical meaning that his ideas exerted no influence on decision making, which provides a case study to consider the close relationship between scientists and nuclear policy.

著者

鳥潟 優子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.156, pp.156_90-106, 2009-03-30 (Released:2011-09-10)

参考文献数

75

---

In 1963, about one and a half year after he had ended the Algerian War, French President Charles de Gaulle started to publicly criticize the US military intervention in Vietnam and proposed “Neutralization” as a path to peace settlement. But the US government, especially the Johnson administration, already familiar with and tired of, de Gaulle's critical attitudes, flatly rejected this proposal, considering it just another way of attacking the US government and its policies. Then de Gaulle's criticism toned up, culminating in his infamous Phnom Penh speech in 1966, that increased the tension across the Atlantic.What was the purpose of de Gaulle's peace initiatives? This article reexamines de Gaulle's Vietnam policy in light of new archives disclosed recently (in 2003) in France as well as in the US.According to my analysis, the new documents seem to show that, contrary to the American perception, with his “Neutralization” proposal, De Gaulle was really trying to mediate a peace between the US, North Vietnam and the NLF. Based on lessons drawn from the disastrous colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, he was sincerely convinced that it would be absolutely impossible even for the US to win the war against such a well-rooted nationalist movement.If so, however, another puzzle arises. Why did de Gaulle fail to persuade the American government of the utility of his peace plan? What was the cause for this fundamental misunderstanding between the two presidents?In order to answer these questions, the author is focusing on the duality of de Gaulle's diplomacy toward the US. It is certain that his peace initiative on Vietnam was initially meant as serious and friendly advice. As one of the American allies, France didn't want to see the leader of the Western camp stuck in the mud of Vietnam. It was feared that the American power wasted in Southeast Asia might eventually cause US withdrawal from Western Europe. De Gaulle was far from being a simple anti-American, as was assumed by the Americans. On the other hand, however, De Gaulle's “Neutralization” proposal was inseparable from his World strategy, seeking to enhance the French international influence and status with all possible means. His criticism of the Vietnam War stemmed also from his strong desire to gain France more autonomy from the US hegemony. It is well know that attaining equality with the US was one of de Gaulle's diplomatic ambitions. This position was also so flagrant in his Vietnam proposal that the Americans couldn't help simply rejecting it.