著者

宮坂 宏

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.15, pp.29-42, 1961-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

11

著者

安岡 昭男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.14, pp.72-82, 1960-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

著者

土山 實男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_146-155, 2012-02-29 (Released:2014-03-31)

参考文献数

15

著者

松本 弘

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.143, pp.168-171, 2005-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

川崎 剛

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_115-154_128, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

17

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The study in Japan of modern Japanese foreign affairs has been dominated by diplomatic historians. Consequently, we still have a poor understanding as to how much Japanese diplomatic experiences actually support the general theories of international relations. This paper attempts to rectify the problem in the area of alliance formation. It tests Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat hypothesis while taking into account the “bandwagon for profit” argument advanced by Randall Schweller. Its core finding is that the Japanese cases overwhelmingly support the balance-of-threat hypothesis: Japan formed 12 alliances against threats out of its 14 threat-facing experiences (in the remaining 2 cases, Japan could not find alliance partners and did not bandwagon with the sources of threat). The paper also identifies one case of “bandwagon for profit” (the third Anglo-Japanese alliance). It furthermore has found many dual-purpose alliances in which Japan used its alliance not only as a military instrument against threats but also as a political tool to manage its hegemony over subordinate polities.

著者

中西 寛

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.18-35,L6, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

59

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Despite the quite number of writings on Yoshida Shigeru, his relationship with Asia has not been treated from a broad perspective. The omission is regrettable, for Yoshida had deep involvement and concern with Asia, China in particular both in his prewar diplomat years and in his postwar statesman years. In addition, Yoshida's record of struggle and lack of substantial fruit in his Asia diplomacy is suggestive of the weakness of Japanese modern diplomacy towards Asia from the Meiji period down to the current era. So long as the so-called Yoshida doctrine is said to be the orthodox policy line for postwar Japan, any of the three elements of the said doctrine, light armament for self-defense, Japan-US alliance, and economy-oriented diplomacy, does not give direct clue in terms of Japanese policy towards Asia.By examining Yoshida's involvement with Asia, Korean peninsular and China among others, this paper delineates the continuity of Yoshida's attitude and perspective on Asia from his early diplomat days to the final years of his life. Following his natural father's concern with Korean railway, Yoshida was groomed among the diplomats and soldiers who saw the “Continental Governance” (Tairiku Keiei) holding the vital significance for Japanese security and economic interest. This policy line was thought to be compatible with European and American great powers in the sense that the imperialism was conducted primarily by economic, cultural, and scientific means. At the same time, the policy was seen as spearheading the modernization process in Asia. In the postwar period, Yoshida adjusted his policy towards Asia to the reality of dissolution of Japanese Empire and chose to follow the path of “Maritime State” (Kaiyo Kokka). Despite this shift, Yoshida had to deal with Korean issues such as Korean inhabitants in Japan or normalization with South Korea, while assisting the US for the latter's commitment to the Peninsula. Yoshida also took pains to lull both the US and Great Britain to his cherished idea of detaching Communist China from the Soviet Russia by penetrating into Chinese society via non-military means such as commerce and propaganda. It was his belief that the Chinese culture and tradition would ultimately lead to the conflict with Russia. But Yoshida's main concern was to form the concerted policy among Japan, the US and Great Britain. His policy towards China lacked concreteness and was subject to his higher consideration over Japanese relations with the US and other Western powers.All in all, throughout the prewar and postwar periods, Yoshida's policy toward Asia was quite consistent. He saw the Korean peninsular from Japanese security perspective and almost ignored Korea as a nation. When it comes to China, Yoshida had ambivalent view on Chinese culture and his policy towards China oscillated. These characteristics of Yoshida's Asia involvement was typical for the modern Japanese diplomatic tradition, taking Fukuzawa Yukichi's civilizational perspective and seeing Japan as naturally most advanced in Asia. This conviction no doubt helped Japan to be proud of its rapid modernization, but posed difficulty in handling with neighboring Asia, especially when Asia showed its own way of modernization and demonstrated its own relationship with the West.

著者

若月 秀和

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.197-217,L23, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

104

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The purpose of this essay is, firstly, to analyze how the Japanese government coped with the international situation before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced and how the government aimed at a continuation of détente and secondly, to evaluate the essence and significance of the doctrine, with a greater focus on Mr. Fukuda's diplomatic idea, namely omnidirectional-peace diplomacy. The doctrine was announced during his visit to Southeast Asia in August 1977. The basic principles are (1) to reject the role of a major military power, (2) to establish reliable relationships with Southeast Asian countries, and (3) to contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia by cooperating with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina.The essay consists of five sections. In the first section, I review the international circumstances surrounding the Fukuda Doctrine, where so-called “détente” and unstable international relations were mixed. In the second section, I review the omni-directional-peace diplomacy which Mr. Fukuda advocated. Based on the US-Japan relationship, this policy was intended for friendly relationships with all countries, refusing to be a major military power. And this idea was a major influential factor in making the basic nature of the doctrine. Japan's intention to overcome the structure of the cold war was also another influential factor for the doctrine. In the third and fourth sections, I explain concretely how relationships with ASEAN and the countries of Indochina were established before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced. Mr. Fukuda's insight and leadership, together with the accumulation of steady contacts with those countries by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enabled the announcement of such diplomatic policies for Southeast Asia. In the fifth section, I review the essence and significance of the Fukuda Doctrine. The doctrine stabilized international relations directly after the Vietnam War. It consolidated the foundation of Japan's diplomacy for Southeast Asia and strengthened the feeling of togetherness among free nations. Though Japan could not prevent the diffusion of Soviet-China enmity to Indochina and the new cold war in 1980s, the doctrine left a legacy for Japan's diplomacy and international society after the cold war

著者

長谷川 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.81, pp.61-80,L9, 1986-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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The weapons procurement process in the Soviet Union is crucial in understanding the interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics as well as the interconnection in the domestic political dynamics among politics, economy and military factors. This article aims to examine the political dynamics in the Soviet weapon procurement process.The article is divided into three parts. The first part, “the static anlysis of the weapons procurement in the Soviet Union, ” explains the actors and their role in the process. Specifically, the three-layered structure consisting of the party, the military, and the government is examined. The actors explained here include: the Politburo, the Defense Council, the Central Committee Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, each military service, the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), each military industrial ministry, its research institutes and design bureaus, and its enterprises.The second part, “the dynamic analysis of the weapons procurement process, ” examines how these actors interact each other in the actual process of weapons procurement. Requests for weapons development usually originate in one of two ways: from below and from above. From below each military service may request a development of new weapons sytem necessitated from operations requirements. In actuality, it may originate from design bureaus trying to push their new designs. The request must be approved by the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Council, the VPK, and the Politburo. When a request originates from above, the VPK will translate the decision into an actual policy. When a decision is made to develop a weapons system, the VPK, through the appropriate military industrial ministry, begins the process of design competitions among design bureaus. Two or three design bureaus are allowed to proceed to the construction of a prototype. After the prototype is tested by the State committee, only then a decision to proceed to a series production is made. Design bureaus and the voenpredy sent by the military service serve to control the quality of the weapons produced in enterprises.The third part singles out some of the salient characteristics of the Soviet weapons procurement process. First, the Soviets take several measures to ensure the high quality of weapons systems within the framework of the planned economy. These measures include high priority given to the military industry, the existence of the consumer's sovereignty in the military industry, free competition among design bureaus, and stability of the weapons procurement elite. But the high quality of Soviet weapons does not mean efficiency of the military industy. In fact, it has caused waste and delays in modernization. The deepening Soviet economic crisis and the sharp rise in the unit cost of weapons production will no longer make it possible for the Soviet government to treat the military industry as a sacred cow. Second, history and the organizational restrictions have led the Soviets to develop a unique design philosophy, which stresses three principles, “simplicity, ” “commonality, ” and “evelutionary revision.” This approach has both advantages and disadvantages: it helps the Soviet military to be provided with inexpensive, mass-produced weapons, easy to operate and maintain. But the Soviet weapons procurement process is not conducive to generate innovations. Therefore, the systemic crisis of Soviet economy will inevitably engulf the military sector, which has been successfully insulated from the inefficiencies of the command economy.

著者

前田 寿

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.12, pp.80-92, 1960-05-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

11

著者

高坂 正堯

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1959, no.10, pp.17-26, 1959-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

22

著者

川村 暁雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.143, pp.155-164, 2005-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

22

著者

井口 武夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.144, pp.85-98,L13, 2006-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

46

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60 years after the Pacific War, Japanese Foreign Ministry published on October 14 2004 relevant documents related to Japan's Final Memorandum delivered to the U. S. Government at the outbreak of the War. The documents were found in the files of diplomatic archives by the author in 1999. They reveal that the Ministry was supposed to submit to the U. S. Government the Final Memorandum which was originally worded to express an intention to enter into war. This formula was not accepted and the Memorandum was changed to simply inform Japan's intention to terminate the Japan-U. S. negotiations. When Final Memorandum which was divided in fourteen parts was cabled to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, the 14th cable embodying the concluding paragraph was withheld for 15 hours while its phrase underwent subtle wording change. A withholding of cabling the final phrase as well as additional corrigenda for 15 hours caused a fatal delay in transmitting the Memo to the State Department at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time), just before Pearl Harbor attack.There had been no serious in-depth investigation by the Japanese Government to pursue the reason for suspending the telegram of the 14th part of the Memo at the Tokyo side, and in its stead, a wrong search focused on a confused cable-handling and typing of the Final Memorandum by the Japanese Embassy. The delayed dispatch of final part of the Memo could be traced to an obstruction made at Tokyo Central Telegraph Office on the same day in connection with a clandestine army operation carried on by Major Tomura of Communication Section of Japanese Army's General Command when they withheld for ten hours the American President's message to the Emperor. During the seizure of Roosevelt's message, it is conclusively analyzed that a secret decoding was done by the Army before its delivery to the U. S. Embassy at 10: p. m. on December 7 (Japanese time). Major Tomura admitted later that he feared the Emperor might be induced to accommodate the President's appeal to delay the war. This Paper examines that the Foreign Ministry must have been informed of the decoding, and therefore, it had to adjust the wording of the last paragraph of the Final Memo to respond to the final position of the U. S. Government. Also a cover-up of delayed dispatch of correcting cables to Washington was made to block reinvestigation up till now.Author observes that President's Message intended to delay war with Japan since he preferred to fight with Hitler first. Roosevelt opted for a last-minute attempt to send his Message directly to the Emperor to avoid war, as suggested by the Japanese Embassy.

著者

小林 良樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.158, pp.158_182-195, 2009-12-25 (Released:2012-02-20)

参考文献数

59

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In December 2004, the United States Congress passed “the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004,” which created the Director of National Intelligence (hereafter DNI). This was the most significant overhaul of the basic framework of the U.S. Intelligence Community since it was established in 1947. The basic idea of this reorganization mainly came from so-called “the 9/11 Commission Report” published in July 2004. The report criticized the weak management of the intelligence community headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who was also the head of the CIA, then recommended that the DCI should be replaced by a newly created National Intelligence Director to bring more integration and cooperation to the intelligence community. The object of this paper is to try to examine the following question; “Is the DNI functioning as was expected or not? In other words, is the DNI actually overseeing the Intelligence Community as a real head or not?”Evaluation of Major Factors(1) Status: The DNI, to some extent, has successfully demonstrated his leadership status over the intelligence community. However, some members of the community such as the Department of Defense seem to be still reluctant to recognize DNI's leadership status.(2) Man Power: The DNI has already established his own large institutional manpower base to support him, although it has only analytical function and does not have operational function.(3) Support from the President: The DNI also seems to enjoy strong support from the President to secure his leadership.(4) Budgetary and Personnel Power: The budgetary and personnel power of the DNI endorsed by the legislation is vague and not so strong, more or less similar to the power given to the DCI. The DNI seems to have established actual influence, to some extent, over personnel matters of civilian intelligence institutions such as CIA. However, DNI's actual influence on budgetary and personnel matters of military intelligence institutions affiliated to the Department of Defense seems very limited.(5) Quality of Intelligence Product: There has been some improvement for information sharing in the community after the reform. However, still it is too early to say that the new system has achieved significant improvement in the quality of the analytical products of the community.ConclusionTo some extent, the DNI seems to be successfully overseeing the intelligence community as new head of the community, especially over the civilian intelligence institutions such as CIA. However, DNI's oversight has not been perfect yet, rather partial. Especially DNI's budgetary and personnel power over the military intelligence institutions seems very limited. In other words, as a reality, the intelligence community may be divided into two parts; the civilian part overseen by the DNI and military part overseen by the Secretary of Defense.Given the above-mentioned limitations, it is unlikely that the DNI's oversight on military intelligence institutions would be improved significantly unless the current legislation is amended. The future success or failure of the DNI system also would depend on personality of those who will be actually appointed as the DNI as well as their personal relations with the president and other senior leaders.

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.34, pp.36-57, 1967

著者

土山 實男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.90, pp.33-53,L8, 1989-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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This essay reviews the renewed strategic debate, with a particular focusing on the issue of deterrence failure. If nuclear deterrence should fail, how will it fail and why? In other words, what are the obstacles to a successful deterrence strategy? It is theoretically impossible to prove or falsify the success of deterrence strategy as long as no aggressive action is taken by an adversary. Only when an aggressive action is taken do we know that the strategy is not working.Based on the various case studies conducted by Alexander L. George, John D. Steinbruner, Robert Jervis, and Richard Ned Lebow, part one of this paper discusses why and how deterrence failed in the past. The historical cases include the 1914 European crisis, the US-Japanese crisis prior to Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the Middle East conflict in 1973. Special attention is paid to the perceptual and psychological factors in the challenger's decision-making process. The evidence suggests that a deterrence strategy may be ineffective, risky, or, at worst, counter-productive under certain conditions. To avoid the tragedy of deterrence failure in the nuclear era, it is essential to maintain crisis stability so that no party has an incentive to launch a pre-emptive attack. Furthermore, it is argued that a strategy of deterrence must be supplemented by crisis prevention measures.The second part of this paper examines why some strategists believe that strategic stability is undermined. We trace the arguments of Fred Charles Iklé, Colin Gray, and others with critical eyes. We also compare the key logic of the strategies with concept of Mutual Assured Destruction and of Limited Nuclear Options.The last part of this essay examines which strategic concepts are valid for stable deterrence, and which concepts are invalid. Finally, we discuss the possibility of reassuring an adversary through the creation of “security regimes, ” as suggested by as Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Alexander L. George.

著者

バークマン トマス・W 酒井 眞理

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.56, pp.102-116,L6, 1977

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The label "Silent Partners of the Peace" is commonly applied to the Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. This epithet belies the intense interest of the Japanese government and public in the issues of the post-World War I settlement and masks the extent of Japanese efforts to make major documents of thepeace amenable to her national interests.<br>The historical record reveals that Japan was very uneasy about the kind of global power structure that was taking shape in the wake of Germany's demise. Foreign policy spokesmen feared that Woodrow Wilson's peace program would thwart Japanese intentions to become the predominant power in the Far East. At Paris the emerging international order was taking on concrete embodiment in the Covenant of the League of Nations. At the conference table and behind the scenes Japan made concerted efforts to bring the Covenant and its sister document, the International Labor Convention, into line with her diplomatic goals. Heretofore unpublished amendment drafts found in the papers of Japan's leading spokesman at Paris reveal in a tangible way Japan's fundamental dissatisfaction with the Versailles system and suggest some Japanese alternatives to the Wilsonian vision.<br>Japanese efforts to modify these instruments of international organization were directed at some ten articles encompassing the issues of mandates, disarmament, arbitration, collective security, racial and national equality, and labor standards. Japanese diplomats achieved considerable success in diluting provisions on disarmament and labor. While many of the delegation's actions reflected the nation's search for status equal with the major powers, opposition to the strict standards of the International Labor Convention revealed that Japanese leaders did not regard the prize of equality as worth the price of accelerated domestic social change. On the whole, Japan's modification efforts showed a desire to make the Covenant and the Convention more flexible and hence less enforceable. While the extent of her involvement in the peace conference reflected an internationalist trend, Japan at the same time was intent upon protecting the unique economic, political, and strategic regional advantages accorded by her geographical position.

著者

森井 裕一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_88-101, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

46

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Germany ceased conscription for its military, the Bundeswehr, in July 2011. Ever since the establishment of the Bundeswehr, the system of conscription had played a key role in connecting the Bundeswehr and German society. The concept of “Staatsbürger in Uniform” (citizen in uniform) was a guarantee to keep the Bundeswehr as a military for peace. This paper discusses why Germany stopped conscription, even though it had long been regarded as a vital component of Germany's postwar security culture.In the first section of this paper, historical developments in the German security culture and the role of the Bundeswehr are discussed. During the process of German rearmament in the 1950s, a new military was established in a way that would prevent it from being able to become an independent and undemocratic institution outside society—as it did in the days leading up to World War II. The Bundeswehr gained respect from society and became one of the most successful institutions in postwar Germany.In the second section, the changing role and the military transformation of the Bundeswehr after the end of the Cold War are examined. The changing international security environment forced Germany to reconsider the role of its military. During the period up until the end of the Cold War, the use of Germany's military was restricted to the defense of its own and its allies' territories. However, this previously respected self-imposed restriction became an obstacle in the new international environment. The 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) made the deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO areas legally possible, although the FCC at the same time gave more power to the Bundestag, the German parliament, to control the deployment of the Bundeswehr. In the 1990s, the new military role for international crisis management demanded the military transformation of the Bundeswehr. Since the mid-1990s, many proposals were made to reform and reorganize the Bundeswehr, but they were not totally successful, because the domestic political discourse did not change as rapidly as the technical needs had changed. In addition, constraints upon the state budget made the reform even more difficult. After more than ten years of discussion, conscription was finally suspended under the strong leadership of the politically popular defense minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. According to zu Guttenberg's reform, the Bundeswehr would be an effective, efficient and flexible military for international crisis management.The final section analyzes the implications of the reform of the Bundeswehr on Germany's security culture and foreign policy. Germany's security policy defined in multilateralism, i.e. within NATO and the EU, would stay unchanged. However, the new security environment might change the domestic understanding of Germany's military, and thus Germany's security culture in the future.

著者

今井 宏平

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.150, pp.186-202,L18, 2007-11-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

52

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The aim of this paper is to explore how Turkey contributes to American foreign policy during the Post-Cold War era, especially Middle Eastern dimension.The discussion has three parts. Firstly, this deals with American foreign policy toward the Middle East during Post-Cold War era and demonstrates American failure. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, international order started to change and the United States intensified its hegemonic power. But America failed to manage Iraq War, and Middle East region is becoming disorder and nest of terrorism. Furthermore, Anti-Americanism is spreading rapidly in this region. The United States is coming to reach a deadlock.Secondly, Turkey will be situated “Transmission Middle Power” after Iraq War. Since the word of “Middle Power” is ambiguous, it has to be conceptualized at first. In this paper, “Middle Power” is classified as “Classical Middle Power”, “Functional Middle Power” and “Transmission Middle Power”. Historically, Turkey has been described as “Middle Power”. However, its role and quality of power have been changed by relationship of Great Power and international structure. Now, Turkey pioneers “Transmission Middle Power” by using historical and cultural factors.Thirdly, this focuses on American-Turkish relations. Since both states faced the Soviet threat during the Cold War period, Turkey contributed American containment policy. The end of bipolar system, however, changed their relationships. During the Gulf War, Turkey assisted the United States through economic sanction against Iraq and offered the multinational force to military bases. Turkey acted as “Classical Middle power” in the Cold War era. But after the Gulf War, both countries disagreed with OPC (Operation Provide Comfort) and OPCII in Northern Iraq. In Iraq War, Turkey did not offer to military bases. This was watershed of American-Turkish relations. After this decision, Turkey seeks to contribute to Middle Eastern stability as “Transmission Middle Power”. In particular, the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) is a good deliberative place among Middle Eastern countries to prevail democracy. Turkey is one of chair countries in Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), which is a component of BMENA..In conclusion, Turkey is “Middle Power” so it has to keep good relationships with the United States to spread its influence toward International politics in the Post-Cold War era. However, the forms of cooperation have changed all the time by international affairs and structure. Now, “Transmission Middle Power” is the best form both America and Turkey.

著者

山田 満

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.116, pp.46-63,L8, 1997-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

50

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ASEAN will be composed of ten countries in the near future. The forms of government in the ASEAN countries is conceptualized as authoritarian regime for development. Authoritarian regimes in ASEAN take many forms such as military regime, single-party dictatorships, the ruling coalition, personalist autocracies, and absolute monarchies. They refuse the concept of Western democracy claiming that it does not bring stability and development for developing countries. The authoritarian characteristics of the Indonesian government and the Malaysian goverment are analyzed in this paper.The Suharto government is called the “New Order”. Suharto controlled the army, the bureaucracy, and the business community. He is supported by Golkar, which is a corporatist group that includes the entire bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the business sector. Golkar has won six elections overwhelmingly since the advent of the New Order. He promotes the economy for development in Indonesia based on the authoritarian system which is supported by the army, technocrats, and Golkar.The Mahathir government is supported by an UMNO-led coalition of parties representing the three ethic groups. The Malaysian government has promoted the New Economic Policy which eradicates poverty and channels more of the nation's wealth to the Malays during 1971-1990. Mahathir attempts to complete his developmental policies through some visions such as “Look East policy, ” “Malaysia Incorporated, ” and “Vision 2020.” The purpose of his authoritarian regime for development regime is to realize the ethic balance after the disturbance of 1969. His popularity becomes higher and higher because of his leaderships. This was seen in the overwhelming victory of the 1995 election.Finally, the middle class is growing in ASEAN. Do they contribute to democratization in their own countries? In the case of both countries, they are conservative generally because their consumptive lives depend on the developmental government. However, I conclude that the degree of democratization between the two becomes greater and greater because of the size of population, the characteristics of leaderships, the rise of the middle class, and the distribution of economic development.

著者

中見 立夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1980, no.66, pp.109-127,L5, 1980-11-05 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

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The purpose of this article is to clarify China and Russia's attitudes toward the Russo-Chinese negotiation concerning Mongolia in 1913.In 1911, the Mongols declared independence, and organized the Bogdo Khan government. Bogdo's Mongolia aimed to be a comlete independent state which united all Mongolians. However, Russia, just after the Mongol declaration of independence, aimed at creating an Autonomous Outer Mongolia. Opposed to these, China categorically opposed to the independence or autonomy of Outer Mongolia, but consented only to abolish the “New Policy” and reinstate the old Ch'ing administrative system in Mongolia.At first, Russia planned to mediate between Mongolia and China, but abandoned the plan because of China's over bigoted attitude. Then, Russia changed her attitude toward establishing a tentative diplomatic relations by concluding an agreement with Mongolia. Russian aim was to force China into negotiation with Russia.The Russo-Chinese negotiation concerning Mongolia, as Russia wished, was started in Reking in November 23, 1913, just after the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of November 3, in which Russian rights and interests in Outer Mongolia were widely recognized. In this negotiation, Russia, in exchange of her support of China's suzerainty over Mongolia, demanded China to recognize Outer Mongolia's autonomy and the validity of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement. China not only refused to recognize the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, but also demanded Russia to confirm China's sovereignty over Mongolia. Moreover, China wanted only to continue the old administrative system in Mongolia. The negotiation, once, was about to be settled. However, China's inordinate persistence to the reinstatement of the old system in Mongolia brought the rupture of the negotiation.Mongolia herself, kept an eye on the Russo-Chinese negotiation about her future status, and demanded Russia for Mongolia's participation in any negotiation which concern her fate.After an interruption, the Russo-Chinese negotiation was held again on September, 1913. Russia, at this negotiation, sought to establish only the principles to resolve the problems concerning Mongolia between China and Russia. The final settlement of the questions was to be entrusted to a future conference among Mongolia, Russia and China.In November 5, 1913, the Russo-Chinese Declaration was signed. The content of this declaration was that China gave up the reinstatement of the old regional system in Mongolia and confirmed the new one or the Autonomous Outer Mongolia under China's suzerainty. At th same time, the declaration also proclaimed the begining of the so-called Tripartite conference among Mongolia, Russia and China for the final settlement of the Mongol problems.