著者

小谷 賢

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_94-107, 2012

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There are lots of studies on the Suez Crisis, which show us why the British government carried out such an infamous military intervention in Egypt in 1956. Various reasons of the intervention have been discussed since 1960s; some explain British intentions of regaining control over the Suez Canal, dealing a heavy blow to Nasser's regime and holding the British Empire in the Middle East, while others refer to political inside stories of Anthony Eden's administration, especially impact of hawks in the Tory, "Suez group" and Eden's health conditions.<br>These interpretations can be persuasive for understanding the crisis, but we should also view the problem from a different perspective: that is, why could Eden carry out his plan despite the fact that some of his ministers and the Foreign Office opposed to Eden's belligerent attitude. One of the keys to reconsider the crisis is to examine senior government bureaucrat in the Whitehall who personally supported Eden's foreign and military policy, but it has been difficult to follow these senior staffs' influence on the crisis. When Anthony Nutting, ex-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs published his book, <i>No End of a Lesson</i> in 1967 (which is still one of the basic works for Suez watchers), the British Government censored the book and eliminated most secret matters, including names of senior bureaucrat alleged to have an involvement with the crisis decision-making. However the British National Archives opened record of the censor and we come to know their roles, especially Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Kirkpatrick's subordinate at the Foreign Office.<br>Recent studies such as <i>Whitehall and the Suez Crisis</i> (2000) and <i>Reassessing Suez 1956</i> (2008) reveal the role of the senior officials during the crisis. This essay also focuses on the influence of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department (PUSD) on the crisis decision making, which Kirkpatrick and Dean were involved in. Documents released at the National Archives, Kew, oral history records of the Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives, King's College London and private papers of the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford would give us a chance to reconsider the crisis.

著者

村島 滋

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.45, pp.75-92, 1972

著者

岡部 広治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.57, pp.23-41,L1, 1977

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The Cuban Revolution had progressed from the democratic phase to the socialist without interruption, soon after its triumph over the Batista dictatorship backed by the U. S. imperialism in 1959.<br>The problem on which we should like shed light in this paper is: Why could Fidel Castro lead such a revolution as a passionate <i>non-communist</i> revolutionary, in spite of the fact that the Popular Socialist Party (the Communist Party in Cuba) had been relatively strong in Latin America? We could find a principal reason for it in his basic thoughts and activities as their realization.<br>In the first place, he has always emphasized the role of the <i>popular masses</i> in the revolutionary process. Even in formulating the armed struggle as the principal way to the revolution, as in the Moncada attack and the guerrilla warfare in Sierra Maestra, he had striven to develop the revolutionary consciousness of the people. The idea that the people make history has been running as a constant current in his mind.<br>Secondly, he has persistently pursed for the formation of the <i>united front</i> against the Batista dictatorship and the U. S. imperialism. It is true that the 26th of July Movement led by him could not reach to the agreement of common struggle with the Popular Socialist Party until immediately after the victory of the revolution, but it was because of the profound anti-communism, the main obstacle to the united front, of the other bourgeois opposition party leaders, who had signed the "Pact of Caracas" with the Movement. Fidel has never had any animosity against the communism, having read and learnt the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin since his university years, though he had had some "prejudices" against the Communists. Hence, his constant presence in the revolutionary leadership.<br>Thirdly and finally, he has consistently looked for the <i>democracy</i>, not only in the political aspect, as did the bourgeois opposition political leaders, but also in the economic and social, that is, in the true sense. Thanks to his profound conception of democracy, he could naturally and spontaneously transform himself from the simple democrat into the assiduous socialist. And he could add some particular hues to the Cuban socialism, with the democratic emphasis.

著者

北村 治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.150, pp.52-65,L9, 2007

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It is often mentioned that democracies do not, or are very unlikely to, make war against other democracies. This "democratic peace" theory has become a commonplace not only in international political thought but also in the mindsets of American presidents and diplomats. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, for example, have referred to this international ethical cycle: promoting democracy would make world peace. The idea of democratic peace was advocated by Kant. Kant thought that a majority of the people would never vote to go to war under the republican (democratic) governments because they were cautious of war.<br>However, the road to democracy may involve war. Democratic peace increasingly seems to be linked to war. It is obvious that democracies are peaceful towards each other but in general they are as war-prone as any other regime type. The theory of democratic peace, therefore, remains fragmentary as long as it fails to account for the practice of war on the part of democracies. At the dark side of democratic peace, "democratic war" occurs. According to Harald Müller, "democratic war" means the resort to the use of force by democracies in order to promote democracy for peace.<br>In the history of international political thought, some thinkers acknowledge that democracies tend to be war-prone. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, pointed out that democracy in America was likely to go to war. It is true that America foreign policy contains this Tocqueville's legacy. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has justified wars and military interventions to export democracy to non-democratic states. Moreover, in order to prevent transnational terrorism, American foreign policy supports. "war against terrorism" under the just war tradition. For American foreign policy, "war against terrorism" is a just war. Promoting democracy is strongly related to combating against terrorism. Moral justification of war is one of the most important things for American foreign policy after the Cold War.<br>There was same logic behind the justification of the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the United States' invasion of Iraq was justified in part as a preventive war for making democratic peace. American "democratic wars" are developed by the universalistic (Kantian-Wilsonian) principles of democratic peace. However, attempts to make democratic peace by using external force would have failed eventually. Without regard to humanitarian purpose or not, it is obvious that democracy in America is more war-prone rather than the reverse.

著者

川崎 剛

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.123, pp.211-214, 2000

著者

今井 静

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_44-178_57, 2014

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The Middle East is characterized by repeated conflicts that are rooted in the incongruity of state territories and national identities. This political instability has often engendered refugees, as in the present Syrian conflict that broke out in March 2011 during the so-called Arab Spring. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has protected refugees from adjacent areas for more than 60 years, such as Palestine, Iraq, and Syria, a policy which has given this small buffer state greater access to international politics. However, studies of Jordan's foreign policy and the international relations of the Middle East have not focused on this issue, although they have discussed the relationship of refugees to its domestic politics or the exploitation of its geo-political position for financial aid.<br>In light of this foreign policy and refugee context, this paper analyses the development of the Jordan's refugee protection policy and its strategy to diminish the impact of the Syrian conflict based on the UNHCR reports, local newspapers, and interviews with the UNHCR staffs in Amman office and refugees. The analysis focuses on the Jordanian government's relationship with the international regime, led by the UNHCR and 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, for refugee protection, and it demonstrates that Jordan's pursues a strategy of strengthening its international legitimacy by the acceptance the refugee regime's norms. The first section discusses Jordan's protection of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees before the Syrian crisis. The second section emphases the granting of refugee rights to displaced Syrians in Jordan; it places this process alongside the actions of the Syrian regime that have partially shaped refugee protection under the UNHCR's Syrian Regional Response Plan established. A final section looks at the expansion of the Syrian refugee community and its status as a domestic issue in Jordan. It examines the process of Jordan's self-evaluation as a country contributing to a global refugee protection policy.<br>The examination reveals that the Jordanian government's strategy of attaining international legitimacy by the acceptance of refugee protection norms is an attempt to avoid the negative impact of changes in regional politics. For the government of Jordan, cooperation with the UNHCR involves more than the ratification of treaties and the fulfilment of obligations; rather, its "approach" derives from a larger strategic perspective. In this way, Jordan fulfils its regional political role by contributing to the maintenance of order through aiding refugees as part of its larger strategy for national stability and survival.

著者

西村 もも子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.161, pp.161_125-139, 2010

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In recent years, a growing number of transnational cooperation among private firms has come to play a significant role in making international public institutions. While much of the recent empirical works on this topic emphasize the increasing impact of private interests in international politics, the process of how they exercise the power remains poorly examined. It is still widely believed that only states make international institutions and that the relationships between states are enough to explain the formation process. However some cases show that a firm in one country cooperates with other firms in foreign countries, aiming to make an international public institution without governments' involvement. Here we can see a new political process, which is different from firms' conventional lobbying to their governments. Why does a firm cooperate with a foreign firm so as to make an international institution instead of relying on its government? Under which conditions does such an involvement influence international institutions? In this article, I address these research questions.<br>This article provides one hypothesis with respect to the formation of an international institution and firms by focusing on the regulatory process at domestic level: A firm attempts a direct commitment in building international institution, when its government refuses to change its domestic regulation for a new international institution. In other words, when the government is reluctant to change its domestic regulation that the firm sought, the firm cooperates with those in foreign countries to form an international institution without relying on the government, so that it ultimately enables the domestic regulation to be changed. Furthermore I investigate the effect of this business-to-business cooperation in the formation of international institution, by analyzing the government's reaction to regulatory changes the firm sought.<br>I examine the above hypothesis with one important case: the making process of the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights (TRIPs) administered by the WTO. In this case, there were three private business groups involved; the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC; US), Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe (UNICE) and Nippon Keidanren. They cooperated to craft a proposal and presented it to the GATT Secretariat and the governments that participated in the Uruguay Round. Some researchers regard this business-to-business cooperation as the critical factor to the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement. However the existing studies focus only on the behavior of the US industry. The meeting joined by their counterparts in Europe and Japan remains unstudied. Therefore, this article investigates behaviors of both the government and the firms in each country to draw the conclusion that the domestic regulatory change is the critical factor in the relationship between transnational cooperation among firms and the formation of an international institution.

著者

大木 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.109, pp.22-37,L6, 1995

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Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Hack is famous for his attempt at peacemaking between Japan and the United States in Switzerland at the end of the Second World War. But he cut a figure not only as a peace-maker, but also as a Key player in Japanese-German naval relations in the 1930's. The aim of this article is to reconstruct the life of Friedrich Hack as for as possible and thereby to shed light on the not well known role of the Imperial Japanese Navy in Japan's policy toward Germany between the two World Wars.<br>Dr. Hack, who was taken POW by the Japanese at the siege of Tsingtao in 1914, became a weapons broker after the First World War and became influential in Japanese-German aero-naval relations, because the Japanese Navy was interested in acquiring German advanced technology, for example U-Boat and war planes, while Germany maintained the level of weapon-technology that was prohibited by Versailles Treaties by selling them to Japan.<br>After the Nazi seizure of power Hack's activity expanded into the sphere of foreign policy. His influence upon Japan absorbed the attention of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the chief of the intelligence department of the German armed forces, and Joachim v. Ribbentrop who intended to bring about better relations with Japan. So Hack played the role as the initiator of "Anti Comintern Pact". But his success brought conflicts with the Nazi Party and others in "National Socialistic Polycracy" and resulted in his arrest.<br>Through the help of the Japanese Navy, Hack could live the life of an exile in Switzerland after the outbreak of the Second World War and served as an informant for the Japanese Navy. This activity of Hack led to the peace-mediation between the Japaneses Navy and the U. S. Office of Strategic Services.<br>Friedrich Hack symbolizes a aspect of Japanese-German naval relations in the 1930's and the early 1940's.

著者

森田 吉彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.139, pp.29-44,L7, 2004

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During the Sino-Japanese negotiations of the mid-nineteenth century, from the Shanghai voyage of the official ship <i>Senzai-maru</i> in 1862 to the treaty conclusion in 1871, one of the first problems was understanding the past and future conditions of the East Asian world order.<br>At first, Japan wanted China to allow Japanese merchants to go and trade there, in the same way as Chinese merchants had been able to come and trade in Japan since the "national isolation" period. However, in addition, China had to argue about whether or not they should treat an Eastern country like Japan like a Western non-treaty country. Although there were also opinions such as in Japan, that they wanted to exclude the Western monopoly for commerce and, that in China, they should be more flexible toward neighboring Japan, their talks did not advance.<br>But in Japan, people like Nagura Nobuatsu continued groping for the possibility of Sino-Japanese strategic cooperation, and this agreed with Iwakura Tomomi's idea of national strategy. On the other hand, in China, people like Li Hung-Chang continued to think about a strategic dynamism between China, Japan and the West. In the 1869-70 argument in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, Nagura aggressively claimed that Japan must promote "<i>tsüshin</i>" (a traditional communication, which needed no new treaty) relation with China. He was opposed to the prudent opinion that Japan needed to create a Western-style treaty with China so as not to arouse Western suspicion. Under his initiative, preliminary negotiations regarding diplomaticrelations with China were accepted. It was also significant that when China had changed her attitude, Li Hung-Chang refuted objectors pointing out that Japan had not been a tributary state. He advocated a plan to bind Japan and contain the West.<br>The Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty of 1871 was almost unchanged from the original China draft. It also lacked a (one-sided or bilateral) most favored nation clause, and it was not only the second article that caused Western powers to become suspicious of the Sino-Japanese alliance and press for the prevention of a ratification. It was symbolic that the Chinese word "<i>tiaogui</i>" was used and not "<i>tiaoyue</i>" (the usual translation of the word "treaty"). From the beginning, the treaty was planned as special. A most important point was that China had deleted the sovereign names of both countries so that they did not stand on an equal footing. Also, in the latter part of the first article, China aimed to restrain the Japanese regarding the Korean Peninsula, but they hid the Chinese meaning of the words in the treaty. The Japanese will to build an even relationship with China as a traditional communication or a treaty was suppressed.

著者

白鳥 潤一郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_164-175_167, 2014

著者

大久保 綾子 真田 康弘 石井 敦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.166, pp.166_57-70, 2011

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This paper aims at revising the analytical framework of institutional interaction established by Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, and applies the revised framework to the international regimes related to cetacean management in order to demonstrate the usefulness of our proposed revision and to systematically describe the regime complex of cetacean management.<br>After reviewing the relevant literature and explaining the institutional interaction framework, we evaluate the framework and describe our revisions.<br>Based on the evaluation we propose to revise the framework by incorporating the utilitarian causal pathway of institutional interaction.<br>The revised framework is applied to the following regimes: International Whaling Commission (IWC); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR); North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO); Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species ofWild Animals (CMS); Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS); Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS); Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).<br>International organizations such as FAO and UNEP were excluded from the study.<br>The case study revealed that, first, the institutional interactions involved in the cetacean management regime complex have synergistic effects when it comes to cognitive interaction.<br>Because this result is consistent with other studies, this feature can be generalized to a significant extent.<br>Second, some effects caused by institutional interaction other than cognitive interaction cannot be determined because it will depend on the actors'perspectives; and, such undetermined effects are caused only by unintentional interaction.<br>Third, the IWC is mostly the source of institutional interaction and there are only two cases that the IWC is the target of interaction.<br>Fourth, there were some cases of forum shopping in the samples, and the driving force of such forum shopping was the difference in the membership which largely determines the expected success to pursue the forum shopper's interest.<br>Fifth, the regime complex of cetacean management has the IWC as a hub regime and the other regimes function largely as mutually complementary to the IWC.<br>For example, the NAMMCO provides international oversight to the whaling operation, and ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS, and CMS provide governance means for managing small cetaceans.<br>These functions cannot be provided by the IWC because of its dispute over its basic objectives.<br>Sixth, there are actually cases that exhibit long-term cumulative effects resulting from institutional interaction.<br>We conclude that the proposed revision of the framework proved fruitful, and suggest some policy implications to the IWC and further work necessary to analyze institutional interaction.

著者

樹中 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.152, pp.67-82,L10, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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E. H. Carr has commented the politics between the periods of the two World Wars as “The Twenty Years' Crisis”: the democracy versus fascism, especially, the conflict between the Bolshevik and the fascist was the source of crisis. However, the composition of ideological opposition in Europe did not directly reflect the Asian power politics in the same era.This study is to analyze the domestic and international power politics with a specially proposed concept “strategic linkage”. The concept can be used to discuss Chiang's closeness towards Leninism and fascism through three levels:(1) Choice of national revolutionary tactic and foreign strategy(2) Institutionalization of ruling(3) and Resistance to Japanese imperialismThere were three characteristics of the pattern of strategic linkage reflecting the Kuomintang's political system.First, Chiang's choice of national revolutionary tactic and foreign strategy (policy of associating Soviet Russia and Germany) was directly linked. Chiang tried to strengthen the national movement of China in order to resist Japanese invasion through the “World Revolutionization” of national revolution and the “Sinicization” of fascism. However, by no means did Chiang intend to meddle with class revolution or overseas invasion. Preferably, he tried to win over the union and independence of the Republic of China through associating Soviet Russia and Germany under the Versailles regime.Second, Chiang used the Bolshevik and the fascist organizational principle and the centralism technique models for his party state, and through formal and informal institutionalization he established dictatorship. Under the democratic centralism and the principle of party leadership, Chiang set up party state, and through imitating the fascist Blue Shirts Movement, he consolidated his political power.Originally, Leninism was created to realize the Marxist revolution, while fascism was characterized by conquest and ethnocentrism; however, Chiang Kai-shek separated class conflicts from Leninism and disconnected fascism from ethnocentrism. In this way, without incorporating the concepts of communism and conquest, Chiang modified the western ideology of dictatorship and turned it into a simple model for dictatorship. Thus the mixed polity of Leninism and fascism was the main feature of Chiang's authoritarian regime based on military force.Third, Chiang combined the leadership-dictatorship and the united front line, and through uniting the KMT and the Chinese communist, he organized a one-party dictatorship regime like that of Leninist party or fascist party, trying to overcome the splitting situation of China. To reach the goal of national union, Chiang was able to cooperate with the communist. Though Chiang believed in the KMT's ideology, he accepted Leninism and fascism based on realism, associating Soviet Russia and Germany to get close to Stalin and Hitler to resist Japan. In “The Twenty Years' Crisis” of Asia, Leninism and fascism were not necessarily antagonized, but combined tactics for organizing national emancipation and independent movement.

著者

内田 孟男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.137, pp.12-29,L6, 2004-06-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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The prototype of the post-World War II order was formulated at the Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods conferences in the summer of 1944. The United Nations system has since occupied a central place in the international collaborative framework in peace and security as well as in development and environment. The accelerated process of globalization, however, in the wake of the end of the cold war, has increasingly eroded the existing “international” order and transformed the role of the states. Non-state actors such as civil society, NGOs, the private sector, and other social forces have appeared on the global arena, to supplement if not supplant, the states in the making of a new order.Against this historical backdrop, this essay purports to examine the possible role that can and should be played by the United Nations in constructing a humane and more equitable global order. After reviewing briefly the impacts of globalization and the concepts and theories of global governance, the essay focuses on the UN's role in various phases of global public policy making, starting from the identification of global issues, consensus-building on goals and principles, deliberations and decision-making, implementation, and review and evaluation. The UN's unique status that enjoys legitimacy as the sole general and universal organization has contributed to each of these phases. A difficult phase is that of deliberation and decision-making. The decision-making in the Security Council reflects quite directly the power configuration of the permanent members and by constitution is restricted to the issues of international peace and security. The General Assembly decision-making, on the other hand, mirrors the concerns of the majority of the developing countries. The consensus arrived at by the General Assembly serves as guidelines, though not legally binding, for world society to act as well as for the UN system.The implementation of the decision is possibly the most problematic phase in the global policy making since the bulk of its actual execution has to be done by the states. This is a crucial phase of providing the global public goods. In further elaborating this phase, the essay attempts to demonstrate the relevance of the concept of global public goods in the making of global public policy within the all-inclusive perspective of global governance. Through this exercise, we may build a manageable theoretical frame on the UN's role in the new global era. It finally addresses the role of the UN Secretariat in particular the leadership and initiative in mobilizing the resources through forming and developing partnerships with NGOs, business and regional organizations. Such efforts led by the Secretary-General augur the nature of a nascent new global order.

著者

石田 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_161-154_165, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

著者

岸田 純之助

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.32, pp.53-71, 1967-05-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

9

著者

申 国柱

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.31-51, 1962-04-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

154

著者

池井 優

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.34, pp.58-74, 1967-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

86

著者

秦 郁彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.11, pp.71-84, 1960-01-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

大庭 三枝

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.124, pp.137-162,L15, 2000-05-12 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

58

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Since Erikson theorized the concept of identity in psychology, it has been applied to other academic fields such as sociology and political science. Especially in the 1990s, identity theory has been introduced to IR theory and much academic writings has argued on the importance of the concept of identity in international relations from several viewpoints. The purpose of this article is to develop a frame of reference to the concept of identity in IR theory.This article, firstly, tries to clarify what “identity” means. “Identity” means the contents of self-identification—one's thinking about “what I am” or “what we are”. About the concept of identity, there are two important points. The first point is that other members in the society should recognize one's insistence about his/her own self-identification. Without the recognition by other members in the society, one's self-identification is only equal to his/her self-image. The second point is that the definition of “I” or “we” simultaneously defines “the other” and the difference between “I”/“we” and “the other” tends to be emphasized.Secondly, this article surveys literature focusing on identity in international relations in the 1990s, for example, arguments by Wendt, Katzenstein, Campbell, Neuman and others. Then it points out that most of them overlook the existence of “double contingency”. For meaningful arguments over “identity”, “double contingency” should be considered and possible gaps between one's perception about the content of self-identification and the other members' should be explicitly dealt with. When such gaps exist over one's self-identification, he/she often falls into “identity crisis”. The above arguments hold true with respect to collective identity.Finally, this article takes Japan and Australia as examples of identity crisis in international society and describes how national leaders and intellectuals have tried to overcome such crises.

著者

藤原 帰一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.128, pp.1-11,L5, 2001-10-22 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

5

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It has been quite some time since Peter Gourvitch, among others, had indicated that the interaction between international relations and domestic political change might have a more dynamic and theoretically interesting character than previously believed. A lot of water under the bridge since then, but not much has changed: the linkage between international politics and comparative politics has yet to be established. As a preface to the featured articles, this paper illustrates both the origins of this divide, as well as the important attempts that have been made to fill the gap.There are two sources for the conceptual divide between domestic politics and international politics. The first is the legacy that has been carried over from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which not only ended religious wars in Europe but also established a world composed of secular sovereign states. Such transition to a world divided into secular states, however, was always limited and was placed under various challenges against that division. The Westphalian legacy, in many ways, has been elevated from history into a simplified myth.A more academic source that established the domestic-international divide will be the works of Kenneth Waltz and his distinction of three analytical levels in international studies, one that effectively ruled out the search for domestic determinants of foreign policy as reductionist. But in effect, Waltz may have been working on a reductionism of his own, where domestic political priorities are reduced to that of a monolithic state, state priorities reduced to a mere outcome of anarchy, where patterns of power distribution appears as the only viable arenas for inquiry.For students of international political economy, in their studies of the interactions between the international market and individual governments, Waltz's rigid category appeared too narrow and inadequate. Thus started a stream of academic works that aimed to move away from Waltz's third image, first studying the second image in reverse, and then directly castingdoubts on his dismissal of the second image. In this paper, I trace such theoretical developments, first in the field of international political economy, then on regional integration and international sociology, and finally on more regime-level transitions and the role played by international factors in such transition.