著者
芝崎 厚士
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.156, pp.156_18-36, 2009-03-30 (Released:2011-09-10)
参考文献数
51

This paper explores the life and thought of Tomonaga Sanjyuro (1871–1951) from historical and theoretical perspective, in order to find out formation of the epistemological base of understanding modern international relations in Japan. ‘Epistemological base’ is what all people in a certain time and place cannot help depend on or start from, when they try to conceive and explain the question, “What is International Relations?”, regardless of their theoretical or methodological or political standpoint. In other word, this paper aims at founding the proto-paradigm of IR/International Thoughts, or the episteme that made modern IR/International Thoughts possible before such paradigm or school or discipline emerged.First part of the paper deals with the importance of Tomonaga's Thought, which has been hidden by the presupposition of his historical role as merely an introducer or interpreter of history of modern Western Philosophy. Although his main academic work concentrating on introduction of Western philosophy, he wrote many articles about how Japan or Japanese should be-have as a civilized nation, when trying to receive Western customs, cultures, and way of thinking. He developed his argument by citing and applying his knowledge of the history of Western philosophy, sometimes almost going beyond rigid academic restraint. Tomonaga was not an ivory-tower scholar. Actually he was in a sense a critic of Japanese civilization. His concern is always what is the best philosophical position or attitude Japanese nation should import and incorporate, by amalgamating these western philosophy and traditional way of thinking.Second part analyzes his one of the two main works, Kant No Heiwa Ron (Study of Kant's discourse on Peace) (1922). Tomonaga always faced with twofold project. One is how to make Japan/Japanese philosophically independent and stable, by make them understanding the history of Western philosophy from his lectures in Kyoto University and his first main book, Kinsei Ni Okeru Ga No Jikaku Shi (Awakening the consciousness of Self in the history of modern Western philosophy) (1916). The other is how to construct the world that Japan/Japanese was stably founded in modern world, as a subject who has the same entitlement as other western states or nations. Kant No Heiwa Ron has been understood as an interpretation of Kant's Perpetual Peace (1795). However this book made a vital role of explaining how self (man), state, and international relations tightly connected by cross-reference structure. His main contention was not how Kant thought peace, but how to use and interpret Kant's argument in his unique way in order to construct the modern world. This paper concludes the validity of his constitution of ‘Self-State-International Relations’ after his death in 1951 and to the present.
著者
福井 治弘
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1975, no.52, pp.97-124,L3, 1975-05-10 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
51

The article attempts to analyze and explain the decision process of Okinawa reversion in the Japanese government as a case of what the writer calls a model of “critical” decision making. The model and its general paradigmatic perspective are outlined in the first section, while the middle section discusses in terms of the model five selected events in the evolution of the reversion issue in the years 1964-69. The last section summarizes the major points of the discussion and suggests that the model used in the study deserves further elaboration and refinement as a potential additional tool of empirical research and theory building in foreign policy decision making, in the Japanese government and in general.
著者
波多野 澄雄
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1978, no.58, pp.86-104,L4, 1978-03-10 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
98

Leith-Ross mission's visit to Far East (1935-36) was made along the Chamberlain-Fisher Line, and one of purposes of the visit was to attain an Anglo-Japanese cooperation on China issues through co-operative aid to monetary reforms in China.The monetary crisis in China arose from America's 1934 silver policy. The policy makers in Japan, however, had a very optimistic view about the crisis and took Leith-Ross mission's proposals forming a line in the chain of past co-operative economic aid to China. Therefore Japan accepted the proposals within the frame-work of Japan's China policy as was represented by the Amau doctorine.The Japanese Army particularly interpreted the decisive monetary reforms of November in 1935 as defense and expansion of England's rights and interests in China. As a result, the Army took measures to destroy the new monetary system by swiftly propelling the autonomous movement in North China which included the separation of monetary system in North China from Nanking government. The Army also helped the smuggling trade through the demilitarized zone in North China leading to the destruction of the maritime customs.Leith-Ross mission holding the stabilization of the new monetary system as its first aim came to lack a strong confidence in the Army who conducted those political and economic maneuverings in North China. In addition to that, the policy makers in Japan still relying upon the logic of the Amau doctorine tried to treat the maneuverings in North China as domestic affairs of the Nanking government.As far as those circumstances existed there couldn't be found favourable conditions to realize an Anglo-Japanese co-operation on China issues.
著者
福島 啓之
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_109-170_124, 2012

This paper examines how Postwar Japan's initiatives of material assistance and verbal apology promoted reconciliation with Asian neighbors; I address the topic in terms of the interplay of theories and history. After World War II, Japan sought to improve relationships with Asian neighbors,such as South Korea and China, on which it had inflicted suffering through war and colonization. Historical case studies reveal the details of the process of moving toward the normalization of diplomatic relations, and I can find theoretical studies that support these historical descriptions.<br>However, it is not easy to provide consistent, congruent explanations that account for all of the historical studies. Careful analysis supports a mixture of the view that an economic approach to diplomacy has contributed to reconciliation with neighbors, and the criticism that Japan's atonement for the past was not enough. The limited inferences that can be drawn from international relations theories make the situation more confusing. I should transcend the fragmented accounts provided by both history and theories by fusing the two. To achieve this, I can re-examine history by introducing the scientific knowledge of cognitive psychology, as applied to the decision-makers of the parties concerned. This approach sheds light on the fact that perceptions of the historical past, which were products of nationalism, greatly affected the diplomatic positions of Japan and its neighbors, and were relevant to the progress or lack thereof in reconciliation.<br>Based on this perspective, I provide a theoretical framework of diplomacy that focuses on the cognitive psychology of decision-makers in order to reconstruct relationships between the history of Postwar Japan's reconciliation diplomacy and nationalism. I pay attention to both the intentions of offenders who offer reconciliation and the perceptions held by victims.<br>By comparing different Postwar Japanese administrations' efforts at reconciliation with South Korea and China, I can find interactions between an offender's diplomatic options and the influence of nationalism on a victim's diachronic perceptions. The offender's choice between assistance and apology interacts with the victim's relative interests in the past and future, and thereby has effects on the progress of reconciliation. Depending on the perceptions of victims, both assistance and apology can be effective signals, or counterproductive. While assistance is a useful tool for reconciliation with future-oriented victims, apology is an effective signal for nationalistic, pastoriented victims. This suggests that symbolic words and material goods are complementary to each other in international politics, and that their functioning is profoundly related to the characteristics of the perceptions of human beings.
著者
柴山 太
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_46-154_61, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)
参考文献数
46

This article presents an analytic sketch of the Hattori Group's thoughts and behavior in 1947–1952. This group, headed by ex-Colonel of Imperial Japanese Army HATTORI Takushiro, consisted of ex-members of General Staff of Imperial Japanese Army, and it sought for Japan's rearmament and its military independence from U. S. strategic influence. The group, after its establishment in 1947, intended to realize a Japanese rearmament, following the successful model of German Army's rearmament in the 1920s and 1930s. Its members admired Generals Hans von Seeckt and Paul von Hindenburg as spiritual mentors. In spite of the outbreak of the Cold War, the group never changed its original nature of Prussian-style staff officers, characterized by conviction of military rule over politics, militaristic mind, and pride of staff officers. The group vigorously waged lobbying activities for its future enrollment in a new Japanese Army and a reintroduction of prewarstyle military and governmental systems. Moreover, this group intended to revive prewar army dominance in politics, and, if possible, it desired to regain prewar continental resources and interests in Korea and China.Despite the Hattori Group's posture of aiming at Japanese military autonomy from the U. S. auspice, it had been financially and politically dependent on Major General Charles Willoughby, Chief of G-2 (Intelligence), GHQ, the Far East Command. It was the most significant discrepancy, though the group members persuaded themselves that they simply used his support as a temporary measure. Since Willoughby's influence inside GHQ was gradually waning away, even more so after the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the group had to find another political patron. On the one hand, the group developed its political tie with ex-General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, who was once Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru's military adviser. On the other hand, it endeavored to win a support from HATOYAMA Ichiro.Prime Minister Yoshida, however, denied the Hattori Group's participation in Japanese National Police Reserve, forerunner of Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan. The group continued to advocate the reintroduction of Prussian-style professional army. This vision, no doubt, contradicted Yoshida's vision of founding an Anglo-American style democratic army in Japan. Before Yoshida's unshakable refusal, Hattori and his colleagues became so desperate to consider a coup d'état, aiming at an assassination of Yoshida and an introduction of the Hatoyama cabinet. The group eventually abandoned the coup plot, but it continued to influence over Japanese politics.
著者
伊藤 融
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, no.136, pp.62-78,L9, 2004-03-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
39

The aim of this essay is to analyze the principle of India's foreign policy, mainly on security. In general, its policy has been illustrated in terms of idealism/realism paradigm. That is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru pursued idealistic policies such as Non-Alignment Movement, whereas Indira Gandhi changed India's policies into more realistic one's, whose lines A. B. Vajpayee also takes over. This essay challenges such dominant discourse and proposes alternative approaches to India's foreign policy.Firstly, most of the observers exclusively focus on the attitude of political leaders or the trend of the times without taking the different fields into account. Turning our attention to the difference of policy fields, we will easily find historical continuity and political consensus in India's foreign policy. Outside the region, India has consistently demanded the revision of global structure and regime. At the same time, inside the region, it has opposed to any change of the situation as its own superpower. In other words, it has adopted both ‘extraregional revisionism’ and ‘intraregional status quo’ as guides to foreign policy-making since its independence.Secondly, more importantly, idealism/realism discourse is devoid of the consideration of India's ‘nation-state’ itself which differs entirely from that of Western ideal type. Political leadership in India has never been able to take the unity of the ‘nation-state’ for granted because of its own diverse and plural society as well as the existence of cross-border ethno-religious identities. India's ruling elite has been exposed to the internal threat and has been obliged to counter it first of all. That is why its foreign policy has been worked out and carried out not only based on its geopolitical strategic interest but also constrained by the recognized vulnerability of ‘nation-state’. Successive Governments of India have endeavored to approximate to the ideal of ‘nation-state’ or at least prevent it from breaking up completely. It is this type of realism against the vulnerability of ‘nation-state’ recognized by every political leader that has affected the decision-making in India.
著者
植田 麻記子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.151, pp.54-72,L9, 2008

This paper examines "Ashida Amendment" and "Ashida Memorandum" with particular focus on his views on the international affairs. Both are known as the origin of the Japanese postwar security problems: Article 9 of the Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security system.<br>It illustrates the basis of Ashida's view on the international affairs. He always saw contemporary issues from the perspective of global history. After the World War I, the establishment of the League of Nations and conclusion of Treaty of Locarno and Treaty for the Renunciation of War promoted the idea of renunciation of war. Ashida had a hope that "international partnership" would be advanced in the post-World War I era. At the same time, he understood its uneasy reality. Indeed, the progress toward "international partnership" by the League of Nations, Treaty of Locarno, and Treaty for the Renunciation of War was frustrated by World War II.<br>Right after the war, the world pursued afresh the ideal of "international partnership." Ashida served as chairperson in the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Revision of the Imperial Constitution from July 25 to August 20, 1946. Ashida had the idea that Japan's decision to renounce war should be guaranteed both domestically and internationally by making the Article 9 serve as de facto diplomatic documents. Thus he made a point of the autonomy of the article. This led to the making of the "Ashida Amendment". At the same time, Ashida consistently knew that the right of self-defense was the natural right of the nation despite the trend toward the abandonment of war.<br>The conflict between the United States and Soviet Union became inevitable and overt. With the MacArthur's statement for the early peace with Japan, Ashida, as Foreign Minister, was made to consider the security after the independence. The "Ashida Memorandum" was submitted as a response to the Eichelberger's question about a time of withdrawal of the occupation army. It was handed to Eichelberger on September 13, 1947. The conception in "Ashida Memorandum" was that the best measures of guaranteeing Japan's security was to conclude a specific agreement with the United States and to reinforce the domestic police forces.<br>Ashida had an intention that the "Ashida Amendment" should target international community rather than domestic one. He sought to grasp Japanese opportunity to be actively involved in shaping the postwar international order by acting as a leading advocate for the renunciation of war. At the time of the issuance of "Ashida Memorandum", the most pressing concern in Japan that was sovereignty might be limited with the stationing of the Allied forces even after the independence. With the deterioration of the conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, Ashida thought Japan could resolve security problem while defending its sovereign right by the conclusion of the treaty with the United States which is independent from the peace treaty. Accordingly, "Ashida Memorandum" limited the right of stationing of US forces only at the time of emergencies, and emphasized the necessity of the build-up of Japanese police forces.<br>By examining the process of making "Ashida Amendment" and "Ashida Memorandum", this paper argues that Ashida had the strong desire for the achievement of participation in the postwar international order and early peace with a full sovereignty, so contributed to realization of them with the view on international affairs.
著者
井手 康仁
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.136, pp.18-32,L6, 2004

Nowadays, foreign policy appears not only to be carried out by governments but also by civilian activists. Nishihara Masashi has developed a profound classification of unofficial contact-makers which includes civilian activists. Upon dividing unofficial contact-makers into the following three groups; (1) Official=unnanounced contact-makers, (2) Unofficial=unnanounced contact-makers, (3) Unofficial=pre-announced contact-makers, Nishihara highlights the limited role of the 3rd type contact makers, indicating that serious negotiations can only progress at unannounced negotiations. There is however a case in Japanese-Soviet relations which is not applicable to his conclusion.<br>According to the Japanese history of civilian diplomacy with the Soviet Union, civilian activities carried out by either leftists or pro-Soviet activists had attracted much attention. Matsumae Shigeyoshi who Nishihara refers to as a type 3 activist, acted as the head of the Japan Cultural Association. The Japan Cultural Association was established in 1966 upon accepting the USSR's proposal, having the Japan Socialist Party play its central role. Since Matsumae was personally close to Ivan Kovalenko, the deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department, the Japanese-Soviet round table conference (<i>Entaku-kaigi</i>) was further established through their efforts in 1979. The round table conference was successful to a certain extent since the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started attending the round table conference as an observer. The Japanese public, however, considered Matsumae's activities highly influenced by Socialist ideology. For this reason, Matsumae's activities didn't receive sufficient support to have made a significant influence within the country.<br>Suetsugu Ichiro, on the other hand, also referred to as a type 3 contact-maker, is said to have had an enormous impact on Japanese-Soviet relations. Upon participating in various social movements, he established a lobbyist status, which was very rare in Japan then. The Soviet Ambassador in Japan suggested Suetsugu to partake in promoting academic exchange with Soviet scholars. Suetsugu thus took and realized this opportunity by bringing the Council of National Security lead by Suetsugu, and scholars from the USSR together, whereby establishing the Japanese-Soviet Joint Symposium.<br>So why was Suetsugu, being a type 3 unofficial=pre-announced contactmaker able to act so effectively? In my opinion, one of the reasons was that Suetsugu had strong connections with Japanese political leaders. Another reason is that he was a well-known nationalist within the country. In this way, he was completely different from Matsumae and the other leftists and pro-Soviet activists. As a result, having established close relations with Soviet scholars who in time turned to play leading roles within the Soviet office during Gorbachev's rule, he maintained a trustworthy channel in the center of the Soviet regime. He had managed to act as an activist trusted both by Japanese and Soviet counterparts.
著者
梶田 孝道
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.110, pp.1-22,L5, 1995

The rights of foreigners, including their right to vote in local elections, are expanding in the European Union as the integration of Europe not only allows people to freely travel across the borders in the region but also has brought about the new legal concept of European citizenship.<br>Western Europe, however, has experienced an inflow and settlement of Asian and African immigrants and faces a serious problem concerning their social, economic and political rights. The purpose of this article is to explain the current status of the right of foreigners to vote in local elections in Western Europe and to generalize over the issue by comparing Western European countries with each other.<br>The current status of suffrage of foreigners in local elections in Western Europe will be briefly discussed. The countries which have granted foreigners the right to vote in local elections include Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. The remains of colonialism can be seen in the United Kingdom's approach to the issue, because the country has vested citizenship and suffrage to people from the Commonwealth of Nations. Ireland has also granted foreigners the right to vote, while the country decides whether it grants foreigners suffrage based on the historical relations between the United Kingdom and the countries the foreigners are from. The suffrage of foreigners has not yet been granted in France and Germany which have attracted many foreign workers, of whom Asian and African immigrants and Muslims account for a large percentage, although the issue has aroused much controversy in the two countries. These examples clearly indicate that the situations surrounding each country affect its approach to the issue of the right of foreigners to vote in a subtle way.<br>We will next examine a group of factors which enable countries to grant foreigners the right to vote and a group of factors which prevent them from doing so. The former group of factors includes the history of granting foreigners suffrage in a certain region, such as North Europe, a close relation between the former colonies and suzerains, the diplomatic policy of the country concerned (e. g. Sweden), free trade and the openness of the country. The latter group includes the ideology of a strong nation state (e. g. France), strong nationality (e. g. Germany), the ratio of foreigners to total population, a large cultural and religious distance between society which foreigners come from and society which accepts them (e. g. France and Germany) and the existence of a strong anti-foreigner movement.<br>Next, the logic behind granting the suffrage to foreigners and the logic against it will be discussed, and based on this discussion, the reasons why some countries have granted foreigners the right to vote and why others have not will be examined. The experiences in Western Europe could offer many suggestions to Japan which is facing the problem of whether to grant foreigners the right to vote in local elections. The problem of the suffrage of foreigners tends to be discussed at the level of norms, and there is little discussion on the matter from a positive point of view, such as how foreigners will be granted the right to vote and how heavy their turnout will be. Japan will be able to learn many things from experiences of Western Europe concerning this problem.
著者
石野 裕子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.165, pp.165_156-170, 2011

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the ideological background in the transition of "Greater Finland (Suur-Suomi)" idea by examining the interpretations of Finnish national epic, the <i>Kalevala</i>, focusing on three researchers: Kaarle Krohn, Jalmari Jaakkola and Martti Haavio.<br>Today "Greater Finland" idea is often regarded as "expansionism", but at first it was a sentiment only by Finnish intellectuals on Finnish "relative tribes", mainly Karelians living in Russian Karelia adjacent to Finnish eastern border. This sentiment of Finnish "relative tribes", however, was intended to unite Finnish and Karelians under Russian Empire rule. It was spread around Finnish people through diffusion of the <i>Kalevala</i> by a compiler Elias Lönrrot who gathered oral songs mainly from Karelians in Russian Karelia at the end of 19th century. This developed the theory that Karelians had kept Finnish national epic since ancient times.<br>"Greater Finland" idea had been politicized when Russian Empire shifted policy from appeasement to deprivation of Finnish autonomy, called <i>Russification policy</i> at the end of 19th century. Resistance group, Aktivisti recognized Russian Karelia as a defense area against Russia, and also regarded it as a target of Finnish <i>irredenta</i>. This idea overlapped with independence of Finland after the outbreak of the First World War, which triggered the military action for gaining Russian Karelia just after Finish independence. Meanwhile, before and after the independence of Finland, Finnish folklorist Krohn claimed that Finland had culturally connected to Russian Karelia and Estonia in his studies.<br>On the contrary, Finnish historian Jaakkola, who flourished between World Wars, denied the cultural relations between Finland and Estonia, and stressed the unity of Russian Karelia and Finland in ancient times instead. He also tried to place Finland as the European outpost against the attack of "barbarian Russia". According to Jaakkola's opinion, heroes in the <i>Kalevala</i> were real people who expedited from Western Finland to Russian Karelia, and settled there. This interpretation had been a popular theory of Karelian origin until advocate of new theory in 1950's : Karelians and Finnish were different origins. His theory was made use of the military negotiation with Germany just before the outbreak of the second Soviet-Finnish War (19411944). Finnish government utilized Jaakkola's study for the justification of Russian Karelia's annexation.<br>After the Second World War, Haavio claimed that Finland had come under the cultural influence of all over the world including Russia, and had had the cultural connection with Russia. Therefore the <i>Kalevala</i> had the nature of international epic. Now his <i>Kalevala</i> study was widely accepted among Finnish society which tried to build a new relationship with Soviet Union for promoting the area cooperation with Russian Karelia.<br>It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that the concept of "Greater Finland" idea was changed from "Unity" to "Separation", and furthermore to "Cooperation" in the transition of time.
著者
中井 和夫
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.114, pp.135-150,L13, 1997

The first Ukrainian state already has lasted five years. But it does not mean the end of long dreamed of statism, but the beginning of hard ways for building a nation.<br>The border of Ukraine has a peculiar character. Almost all border lines were drawn by dividing regions, each of which comprised historically one region. This condition also makes the task of building a nation difficult.<br>In the western part of Ukrainian border, such regions are Galitsia, Carpathian, Bukovina and Bessarabia. If you turn to the east, there are two divided regions, the Donbass and the Slobidska Ukraine.<br>The Ukrainian border was made by dividing regions that caused difficulties in building the Ukrainian nation-state. Because of the dividing the regions automatically made Ukrainian Diaspora or <i>irredenta</i> outside Ukraine. In Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, Ukrainians have been living as a minority group. At the same time the opposite sides, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, consider the regions which were incorporated with Ukraine their <i>irredenta</i>. Between Ukraine and Russia there is another but major border dispute on the Crimean Peninsula.<br>Ukraine herself is divided into two parts, Eastern and Western. The Western part of Ukraine, called Galicia, has some characteristics which are not seen in other parts of Ukraine.<br>On the contrary to the Galicia, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine have different characteristics. The Donbass and Crimea belong to these regions. These regions have strong tles with Russia although they belong to Ukraine. The Crimea, now an autonomous republic in Ukraine, belonged to Russia until 1954. A part of the Donbass was belonged to Russia before the 1917 revolution as the Don Army District.<br>The contrast between the West and the East in Ukraine can be seen on the map. There is an interesting piece of evidence to show the dichotomy between the West and the East. It shows the change of support for the first president Leonid Kravchuk and the second president Leonid Kuchma. In Ukraine we can hear a new Ukrainian proverb, saying, "Ukrainian Presidents born in the East will die in the West". This proverb well explains the dichotomy between the East and the West in Ukraine.<br>For Nation-building in Ukraine there are some obstacles in terms of integration of people into one consolidated group. Ukraine is divided not only by geography but also by culture and identity.<br>Language problems may be the most visible problem in today's Ukraine. The second obstacle for the integration of the Ukrainian nation-state is religious splits among the people. Ukraine is, of course, a secularized state. But the history of the suppression of national churches such as the Uniate Church (Ukrainian Catholic Church) and Ukrainian Orthodox Church made these churches political factors.<br>Ukrainians have failed to form a nation-state. Russians have also failed to form their own nation-state. Russians have always been a subject of a big empire, first the Russian Empire and next the Soviet Union. Above all things they carried out their mission to build and maintain an empire. Ukrainians, in contrast, are eager to build their own nation-state, not an empire. This is an identity difference between two nationalities. And this difference reflects the dichotomy in Ukraine between the East and the West.<br>The geopolitical position of Ukraine in the International arena has been a factor of difficulties for the building a nation state. For Ukraine, located between the West and the East, between Germany and Russia, inevitably it has been geopolitically in either a buffer zone or a battleground. In the Northern War in 18th century, the Napoleonic War, Crimean War, World War I and World War II, Ukraine was one of the major battlefields. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the region which includes the territory of Ukraine became a battlefield between Europe and Russia b
著者
清水 謙
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_87-172_99, 2013

The impact of 9/11 was strong enough to change the Swedish security doctrine of neutrality that had existed since the Cold War. The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson and Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated that the security policy of 1992, that is "Military non-alliance making it possible to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in the vicinity", had served well. This means that Sweden has practically abandoned its neutrality, confronting international terrorism.<br>Swedish society, generally known as 'an open society', has many internal "security holes" and the terrorist incident in central Stockholm on December 11th 2010 exposed such kind of vulnerability. That incident was "home-grown" and the generous migration policy was challenged again.<br>This article investigates 'the securitization of migration' in Sweden using the analytical framework of 'securitization' the Copenhagen School provided. The Copenhagen School insists that 'speech act' by securitizing actor(s) and 'acceptance of the audience' are required in the process of securitization and that 'extraordinary measures' beyond the state's standard political procedure will be legitimated. The first two steps mentioned above are well discussed in Sweden in earlier research (<i>e.g. </i>by Abiri), while the third one is still controversial. Therefore, my aim in this article is to present a crucial example of an extraordinary measure.<br>Indeed, the securitization of migration started to occur already in the 1990s or earlier, but a conclusive extraordinary measure was not implemented until December 2001, namely the case of repatriation of two Egyptians (<i>Egyptenavvisningarna</i>). In 2005 the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (<i>Justitieombudsmännen</i>) and the Committee on the Constitution (<i>Konstitutionsutskottet</i>) investigated this deviant case and declared that the governmental action was too optimistic and that the method of the repatriation was inappropriate. The repatriation itself has been treated as an accomplished fact in the Parliament even though the decision was adopted in irregular procedure. Therefore, this result leads us to the conclusion that the process of the securitization of migration has been fulfilled.<br>The Securitization of migration in Sweden is still idling and there are no signs of 'desecuritization' after the terrorist incident in Stockholm. Furthermore, the sequential terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011 are thought-provoking and indicate that the Nordic societies have to cope with migrational issues.
著者
種稲 秀司
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.152, pp.98-114,L13, 2008

Foreign Minister Shidehara kijuro intended to lead the nations of the world in diplomacy oriented towards China. Around the time of his second term as foreign minister, the US had responded to the customs treaty revisions of the Nanjing government and the world's nations had kept apace, but Japan was lagging behind and was deadlocked in relation to China. In order to resolve the situation, Japan aimed at taking the lead in resolving the negotiations that had run into difficulties between China and the other nations regarding the revocation of extraterritorial rights, and indicated their favorability on the issue to Nanjing.<br>Under those circumstances, Shidehara regarded the Sino-Soviet conflict as a violation of the Sino-Soviet pact and advocated the Soviet position of status quo ante, as the Chinese had instigated that conflict leading to the compulsory restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Nanjing, however, sought the understanding of Japan regarding the restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, while also unsuccessfully requesting the mediation of Germany and the League of Nations. Consequently, the only effective means left to China for settling the Sino-Soviet conflict was through Japanese arbitration, but the Nanjing government was adamant about the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway and was halfhearted in this matter. Shidehara, seeing in mid-October that the Soviets had expressed a willingness to negotiate directly with the Northeastern government which had softened its stance, sounded out a solution based on direct negotiations between the Soviets and the Northeastern government, but the Nanjing government was not responsive. The government at Nanjing realized the necessity of arbitration after the Soviet army attacked in force in mid-November. However, by this time the US was demonstrating through the extraterritoriality issue a more favorable stance towards China than Japan was, and Nanjing was pinning their hopes on that. Nanjing in the end accepted the status quo ante solution worked out in negotiations between the USSR and the Northeastern government because of the expanding Soviet military threat, armed attack, and US support of Chinese Eastern Railway status quo ante. That thirtyeight nations joined the US-led statement calling for a non-belligerency pact speaks of the inability of Shidehara, who had aimed at conflict resolution led by Japan, to shape opinions among the nations. Japan was not able to recover its leading role in Chinese-oriented diplomacy because of the expansion of US influence, and Japanese diplomacy towards China continued in that state.