著者

曽我 良成

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.92, no.3, pp.279-317,413-41, 1983-03-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

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In the later Heian period, the officials who were in charge of political affairs used to keep the official documents issued in the process of fulfilling their duties in their own hands. These documents were handed down from generation to generation as the hereditary property of the aristocratic families From the viewpoint of the aristocracy as a whole, this practice means that they were entrusted with official documents by the government. Therefore it was considered to be a national loss when a fire broke out in one of these residences and the documents were reduced to ashes. Under such circumstances, in the Benkankyoku (弁官局) which issued orders as to the Daijokan (太政官)'s policies, it was the Daifushi (大夫史) who took custody of the documents. The main duties of the Daifushi were as follows : i)to investigate the former examples of political affairs, ii)to draw out the Daijokanpu (太政官府), the Kansenji (官宣旨) and the Senji (宣旨), and iii)to take charge of the Kanfudono (官文殿), the house for storing documents, which belonged to the Benkankyoku. Originally the Daifushi was supposed to be chosen among a wide range of nobles, but this position had never been occupied by the upper nobles of such as the Fujiwaras and the Minamotos. The Daifushi was an important post, but never thought to be a high and noble status. Around the middle of the 11th century Takanobu Ozuki (小槻孝信) was appointed as Daifushi, and from then on, the position was inherited by the Ozuki family. As a result, the Ozuki family was called as "Kanmuke", which means a family that inherits the Daifushi. The main reasons for the choice of the Ozuki family to this position can be assumed as follows : firstly, they had an excellent Skill of preserving documents ; secondly, their family was a specialist of mathematics, who fixed the amount of taxes to be imposed on and collected from various provinces. Moreover, since the middle of the 11th century, in Ochokokka (王朝国家), the government tended increasingly to intervene directly in affairs of the provinces. Accordingly, the Benkankyoku became the administrative center to deal with political matters. And, by making the position of the Daifushi hereditary, the government entrusted main duties of the Benhankyoku to a family -the Ozukis.

著者

荒船 俊太郎

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.2, pp.147-184, 2013

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This article investigates the characteristic features of the political career of Matsukata Masayoshi at the end of the Taisho Era, in order to clarify his role in the process of reorganizing the institution of Genro 元老 (Chamber of Elder Statesmen) after the death of Yamagata Aritomo. In contrast to the research attention given his activities as an expert in fiscal affairs during the Meiji Era, Matsukata's career during the Taisho Era has been little studied, and the evaluation of him as a politician has so far been quite unfavorable, depicting a senescent figure bereft of political influence. This is one reason why the actual political leadership style of Matsukata is virtually unknown. This article is an attempt to clarify Matsukata's strong commitment to integrating the Satsuma (Matsukata and his fellow politicians from Kagoshima Prefecture) and the Choshu (Yamagata and his fellow politicians and soldiers from Yamaguchi Prefecture) and to show how important a commitment it was. The author begins at a time several years after Matsukata's appointment as Inner Minister of State (Naidaijin 内大臣), showing that indeed he held no political influence to the extent of being unable to freely appoint his ministerial subordinates. However, in dealing with problems involving the Imperial Court, Matsukata won the firm trust of the empress, which began a process by which he strengthened his political leadership after the fall of Yamagata. Finally, the author turns to Matsukata's political leadership after his retirement from the post of Naidaijin, showing the fear that fellow Genro Saionji Kinmochi held towards him, attempting to respectfully distance himself and pointing to Matsukata's continuing supervision of the Kenseikai Party even into his twilight years. The author concludes that the period in question should be rightfully called the "Dual Genro Regime" under the leadership of both Matsukata and Saionji.

著者

石井 裕

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.6, pp.1071-1096, 2005-06-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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When the Alien Land Law prohibiting land ownership by aliens not eligible for citizenship (mainly Asians) was passed in the California Assembly in May 1913, Japanese officials and immigrants alike realized the merit of swaying US public opinion. To quell the rising anti-Japanese movement, the Japanese Foreign Ministry set up in 1914 two publicity bureaus-the Pacific Press Bureau (PPB) in San Francisco and the East and West News Bureau (EWNB) in New York City-disguising both as private "press agencies". Kiyoshi Kawakami, who had been invited to San Francisco by the Japanese Association as manager of the Campaign of Education, was appointed chief of PPB, a low cost operation designed to placate the local California press and contribute news items to influential papers throughout the country. The Japanese consul-general, who held the ultimate responsibility for PPB, was pleased with Kawakami's capability as a propagandist. At the onset, PPB activities were hindered due to poor cablegram communications with Tokyo; however, on the occasion of the declaration of war on Germany, the Japanese Foreign Minister took a more positive attitude and imposed upon PPB the role of an agency for war propaganda. Therefore, Kawakami came to play a dual role as a promoter of Japanese military policy in the Far East and debunker of prevalent anti-Japanese public opinion, especially the rumors of a pending US-Japanese war being spread by propagandists for the German and Chinese governments. Kawakami was also involved in intelligence work, obtaining confidential State Assembly documents for the Japanese Consulate and lobbying against anti-Japanese bills introduced during the Assembly's 42nd Session. After the war, PPB was forced to tone down its blatant propaganda due to public antipathy towards such activity on the part of Japanese and pro-Japanese Americans, conflict within the Bureau between Japanese and American staff members, and a threat that Kawakami's secret arrangements with the Japanese government would be become public. From 1917 one, Kawakami was frequently absent from his San Francisco headquarters, travelling to the Far East, New York and Washington DC courtesy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Kawakami was expected of wide-ranging activities as a Ministry intelligence agent, not merely a kind of propagandist in San Francisco. Both PPB and EWNB were shut down because of the establishment in August 1921 of the Foreign Ministry's Intelligence Office which changed the tone of its information policy from "active" and "wartime" to "moderate" and "peaceful". Kawakami left San Francisco for Washington DC in January 1923, where he continued to maintain secret connections to the Japanese Embassy.

著者

大谷 伸治

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.2, pp.237-260, 2015-02-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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This article discusses the development of political scientist Yabe Teiji's ideas about democracy in relation to the debate over how Japan's constitutional monarchy should function (kokutairon), based on an analysis of a critique of Yabe's seminar at Tokyo Imperial University submitted in 1938 by one of his students, Odamura Kojiro, as the answers to the final examination. The author begins with an examination of the copy of Odamura's list of criticisms about the seminar, which contain corrections and revisions made in Yabe's handwriting prior to Odamura's expulsion from the university after the publication of his ideas in the national press. Yabe's glosses pertained more to adding comments about the kokutai question than merely correcting a student's final exam. With the exception of the comments devoted to Japan's "sovereign dictatorship", Yabe's comments attempted to substantiate the kokutai question in more concrete terms, in an attempt to place it within the context of the discourse regarding democracy. In the correspondence that ensued between teacher and student, Yabe was again challenged by Odamura and again made revisions to his ideas, upon examination of which, the author of the present article notices wide-ranging changes occurring in Yabe's approach to democratic institutions. In sum, in response to Odamura's demands Yabe, while not referring specifically to Japan, is found emphasizing his patented understanding of "democracy as an institutional mechanism", but also attempting to more accurately describe its connections and interaction with the idea of "kokutai". However, an even more significant change occurred in Yabe's thinking on the subject after his study of the legalistic arguments on the rule of law posed by National Socialist German Workers Party jurist Otto Koellreutter and a consequent attempt to place kokutai within the fundamental norms prioritizing the positive (as opposed to natural) constitutional legal order. Therefore, Yabe offered the possibility of providing legal legitimacy to interpretations and constitutional amendments indispensable to the implementation of the further centralization of executive powers desired by the new regime. This development in Yabe's political science was, the author argues, first given impetus by Odamura's critique. Nevertheless, since Yabe was of the fundamental opinion that kokutai was a non-entity, he did not go into concrete detail on the subject. That is to say, although kokutai exists as a fundamental norm, it has no actual function as a frame of reference for constitutional interpretation. Consequently, Yabe came to the rather illogical conclusion that constitutional interpretation was ultimately determined extra-legally within the struggle for political power, an idea that became, quite unintentionally on Yabe's part, fraught with the danger of having the reverse effect on the actual process of kokutai-based reforms.

著者

網野 善彦

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.87, no.11, pp.1606-1618, 1978 (Released:2017-10-05)

著者

森田 悌

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.110, no.2, pp.315-316, 2001

著者

戸川 貴行

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.120, no.5, pp.831-837, 2011-05-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

著者

佐藤 正幸

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.116, no.5, pp.614-618, 2007

著者

出岡 学

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.112, no.4, pp.477-497, 2003-04-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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This article intends to analyze the religious policy of the Japanese Navy, which occupied Micronesia in 1914, in relation to the international situation at that time. At the beginning of its occupation, the Navy permitted German missionaries to inhabit the Islands and educate the natives out of "respect for civil rights". However, after schools were established in the Islands by the Japanese, the missionaries were sent into exile from the Islands. Their absence caused difficulties in ruling over the native people, so the Navy decided to introduce Japanese priests into the Islands. After the Germans were exiled from the territory occupied by the Allies, the Japanese Navy commanded the German missionaries to leave the Islands in June 1919. The introduction of Japanese missionaries was determined by the Japanese cabinet out of fear that American missionaries would flood the Islands. Because their activities were remarkable in the movement for the independence in Korea beginning on March 1, 1919. To banish missionaries of American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions from the Islands, the Navy, first, negotiated with the Japanese Congregational Church, but the Treaty of Versailles obliged the Navy to assign Catholic missionaries to Catholic Churches. So the Navy also began negotiations with the Vatican. Consequently, Japanese missionaries of the Japanese Congregational Church and Roman Catholic Spanish missionaries were introduced into the Islands. The author concludes that the Japanese Navy became interested in introducing missionaries into Micronesia, not simply because ruling the natives would have been difficult without religion, but because the international situation in those days compelled the Navy to introduce missionaries into the Islands, with extreme subtlety and minute attention.

著者

吉田 賢司

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.115, no.4, pp.443-485, 2006

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This article is an attempt to clarify the transformation that took place in military operations under the Muromachi shogunate after the violent protests for the remission of the debts that took place around Kyoto in 1441 (Kakitsu-no-Ran), from the time when the shogun's administrative advisors (kanrei) took control of the shogunate until Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimasa assumed leadership. Day to day military affairs during the "kanrei regime" were administered by Bakufu functionaries (bugyonin) and members of the kanrei's personal entourage (uchishu). However, in the midst of the political instability that followed the uprising, it became difficult to gain a consensus among the feudal lords (daimyo) and thus organize an allied army made up of troops led by provincial military governors (shugo). There-fore, regional conflicts that arose during this time would be pacified by local samurai (kokujin) from the nearby provinces coming to the support of the military governor of the province in question. In 1455, when Yoshimasa established firm control of the shogunate, the military system was reorganized mainly by Kanrei Hosokawa Katsumoto and the shogun's close advisor Ise Sadachika, meaning that in addition to the conventional "kanrei route" of reporting incidents to the shogun, a new route was established through Sadachika. However, between 1456 and 1461, the former route gave way to the latter, to the extent that the kanrei's position in military affairs became unclear, while Sadachika became Yoshimasa's advisor in military decision making and information reporting. During that time, troops under allied command of military governors were often deployed to quell regional conflicts, a widespread practice which caused mutiny among troops discontented over conscription, as local-based samurai were being conscripted repeatedly, to a degree of exhaustion. The period from the beginning of Yoshimasa's regime until 1460 was also a time marked by dysfunctionality in the Bakufu's system of military mobilization. It was for the purpose of correcting this problem that coercion was used to muster local-based samurai into service for the shogunate. Yoshimasa's efforts to pacify unruly provincial feudal lords, take back and directly manage proprietorships of religious institutions and mobilize local-based samurai met with failure, and he wound up faced with the rebellion of 1467 (Onin-no-Ran) without a solid military organization made up of those political forces. Yoshimasa's over-reliance on Sadachika had sorely weakened the military role of the kanrei in the Bakufu and caused its eventual hollowing out by the outbreak of the rebellion. The Hosokawa family was forced to conduct its functions as kanrei in isolation from the Bakufu's central bureaucracy. And although Yoshimasa was able to regain his control of the Bakufu through such extreme polarization and the efforts of Ise Sadamune, the Muromachi shogunate would never again play the leading role in conducting military operations.

著者

長井 純市

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.95, no.12, pp.1881-1894, 1966-1965, 1986-12-20

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The Extraordinary Postal Regulatory Law, promulgated in October of 1941, stemmed from an urgent Imperial decree that called for the censorship of the mail, with particular attention to foreign mail. Behind the enactment of this Law lay the necessity of protecting many military secrets related to the prolonged war between Japan and China. The main impetus for the Law seems to have come from the Ministry of War, although the Military Police and the Ministries of the Navy, Home Affairs and Communications also seem to have been highly supportive of it. Prior to the passage of this Law, these Ministries and the Military Police had been conducting illegal censorship of the mails for the express purpose of protecting military secrets or collecting foreign intelligence. After the enactment of the Law, Postal Inspectors or Assistant Postal Inspectors were deployed to the major post offices handling foreign mail, such as those at Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe and Shimonoseki. Their activities were centralized and overseen by the Ministry of Communications. Among these inspectors were some who held positions in the Military Police or the Special Thought Control Police. Needless to say, the volume of foreign mail exceeded the capacity of their work ; but about 10% of the foreign mail was effectively put before the censor's eyes. Of those persons who were prosecuted, there included not only those who exposed military secrets, but also those who expressed feelings of war weariness or made political criticisms. The use of the Law was not limited only to the protection of military secrets but also extended to war-time research efforts into the Japanese people's private attitudes and feelings. Such reports were actually drawn up by the Ministries of Communications and Home Affairs on the basis on their postal censorship activities. Considering the political meaning of the Extraordinary Postal Regulatory Law, it is impossible to say that the "freedom of the people" as described in the Meiji Constitution was completely overlooked. That is, those bureaucrats who were engaged in the exercise of the Law were compelled to take extreme caution for fear of the people's criticism, despite the fact that several other leading powers such at Great Britain already had similar postal censorship institutions in operation. With Japan's defeat at the end of the War, the Extraordinary Postal Regulatory Law was immediately abolished ; but under Douglas MacArthur it re-emerged under a different form during the Occupation period.

著者

西村 陽子

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.118, no.4, pp.513-550, 2009

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This article examines every aspect of the history of ninth and tenth century northern China based on the recently discovered Zhimo 支謨 Epitaph. During the ninth and tenth centuries, the region of Daibei 代北 (the northern part of what is now Shanxi 山西 province) was politically, militarily and commercially one of the most important regions throughout eastern Eurasia. It was the center of a military clique during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, and during that time, was the staging ground for repeated campaigns of advancing nomadic tribes. It is no exaggeration that the history of ninth and tenth century Daibei determined the China's historical development during the centuries that followed. Therefore, the task of decoding the Zhimo Epitaph and clarifying the movements of the nomadic powers of Daibei during the last decades of the Tang Dynasty will enable a more systematic understanding of those events occurring in ninth and tenth century northern China that would deeply influence the historical development of East Asia in the centuries to come. The author begins by transcribing the rubbed copy version Zhimo Epitaph into a text, in order to discuss 1) how the Shatuo 沙陀 Turks intended to seize the economic foundations of the Tang Dynasty from the very beginning of their territorial expansion during its last years, 2) how the historiography concerning that expansion was altered considerably as it was transmitted through the regimes formed by the Shatuo Turks during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, by comparing the Zhimo Epitaph with other extant sources, and 3) the concrete image of the upheaval staged by the Shatuo Turks at the end of the Tang period and how that upheaval influenced the history of East Asia during the following centuries. Therefore, due to the excavation of the Zhimo Epitaph, it has become possible to gain new perspectives on the formation of the Five Kingdoms.

著者

山田 康弘

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.112, no.11, pp.1790-1811, 2003-11-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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In this study, article, the author investigates the meaning that commands issued by the Ashikaga Shoguns had for the daimyo during the Warring States period from two perspectives: the relationship between them out of "utilization and restriction", and the mutual relationship of confrontation among daimyo focusing primarily on those of Western Japan as well as the nature of the effect that trends in such commands had on the behavior. In other words, (1) even during this period, daimyo required a stable relationship with the Shogun due to various circumstances such as the need to obtain legitimacy and to keep hostile forces in check and there was a tendency for them to take advantage of the shogun. (2) While they took advantage of this relationship with the Shogun, however, daimyo were also subjected to various restrictions such as the need to honor the commands of the Shogun (or, the need to honor the wishes of third parties through such commands). This made the commands of the Shogun an important tool in diplomatic relations with daimyo as confrontations between them broadened in scale and increased in complexity during the period. (3) In addition, Daimyo in the Kinki area (Kinai) gained the ability to control these commands by cooperating in the existence of the Shogun and, thereby, promoted collaboration with various other daimyo through the commands, which had become an important tool in the diplomatic relations between daimyo or secured opportunities for them to exercise influence over other daimyo. Various factors such as (1)? (3) above acted to further draw many more daimyo to the side of the Shogun, even after the advent of the Warring States, becoming a factor in the maintenance of a certain degree of influence by the Shogun over the daimyo. This influence of the Shogun on the Daimyo was extremely useful for the daimyo in their diplomatic strategies and was an authority unique to the Shogun on a dimension completely different from the control of the daimyo over their territories. It was therefore not easy for the daimyo to acquire such authority. However, by backing the Shogun, Oda Nobunaga succeeded in gaining the influence 'that the Shogun had over the daimyo and, while gradually exercising that influence, he moved ahead with the task of unifying the nation.

著者

板垣 哲夫

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.86, no.11, pp.1597-1628,1689-, 1977

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By examining with whom and how frequently Okubo Toshimichi met with different people during the December 1867 (Keio 3)-March 1877 (Meiji 10) period, the author has come to the following conclusions about Okubo's political relationships. First, his political relations with court nobles and feudal lords (daimyo) who had held high places in the traditional hierarchy of status and authority, including Iwakura Tomomi and Sanjo Sanetomi, became gradually estranged. The decline of the influence of nobles and feudal lords in politics and the contrasting rise of Okubo's influence can be regarded as causes of that trend. Second, Okubo's relations with those who came from the same Kagoshima clan were very intimate throughout this period. After around January 1876, however, he came to rely slightly less on these relations, because with his rise in politics it became more and more possible for him to win over competent officials directly without using intermediaries based on factional ties. Third, those who came from the Yamaguchi, Saga and Kochi clans worked in cooperation with Okubo during the period of the Boshin Wars. After the Boshin Wars antagonism between Okubo and Kido Takayoshi increased. At the same time opposition to the government led by these two men increased from those outside the government. Many men from these three clans played important roles in this arena of political rivalry, and it seems that the inclination towards supporting Okubo was comparatively strong among those from Saga compared to the other two clans. As his relations with the Kido group improved from around December 1870 and the centralization of the government increased, the number of officials from the three clans who attempted to secure closer relations with Okubo increased gradually. However, this trend was also influenced by Okubo's rivalry with the Kido group, the Saigo group and others in the government. Especially after the debate on the expedition to Korea, the status of Okubo rose while the strength of those who had opposed him declined and officials from the three clans tried to consolidate their relations with Okubo. Fourth, clans other than Kagoshima, except for the above-mentioned three, had relatively few persons of importance in the government. Few from such clans played important roles in the political rivalries after the Boshin Wars to 1871. On the whole the relationships between Okubo and those from such clans were not intimate. But as his political status rose rapidly after the expedition to Korea debate, many of them developed closer relationships with him as officials in the middle rank. Fifth, those who had intimate political relations with Okubo shifted, from those who held a high rank in pre-Restoration organizations to those in lower ranks.

著者

草生 久嗣

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.116, no.7, pp.1280-1281, 2007-07-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

著者

田崎 哲郎

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.90, no.11, pp.1710-1711, 1981

著者

高山 博

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.11, pp.1883-1920,2048, 1992

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The baillis and seneschals were the key men in the field administration of Medieval France. It has been generally understood that despite their different denominations in the south and the north, they had almost identical functions in the royal administration. The author calls this general understanding into question, and makes clear differences in their administrative functions. He suggests that we should treat the baillis and seneschals as different officials, because the region of bailliages and that of senechaussees were under different administrative systems. He proposes a new framework to understand the administrative structure of Philip IV.

著者

黒岩 高

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.111, no.9, pp.1499-1521,1588, 2002-09-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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Known as the greatest incident in Chines Muslim history, the Muslim rebellion in the Shaanxi and Gansu provinces (1862-1878) has also attracted attention as being one of the peasantry rebel. lions near the end of the Qing dynasty. However, by analyzing the outbreak and spread of the rumors frequently occurring before and during the rebellion, a different image of the Muslim re bellion can be conceived, There was orderly discipline between Han and Hui in the Wei River area before the rebellion, even though occasional strife, such as feuds, and a strong sense of having a different culture and society among each other existed. Focusing on the change of content of the rumors, the Muslim riots in the Wei River area in 1862 was the outbreak of the Han and Hui differentiating each other and destroying the order that had existed between them. Each society fighting for its survival, it can be said that this rebdlion had the characteristic of an "ethnic conflict". Also taking into account of the impact and spread. ing process of the "Wash away Muslims" rumors on the Han and Hui societies, this rebellion was closely related to the formation of militias. Occurring a midst of the militarization process, the Muslim rebellion of the Wei River area shared aspects similar to the other rebellions occurred all over China in this period.

著者

網野 善彦

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.85, no.5, pp.580-586, 1976-05-20 (Released:2017-10-05)

著者

家永 遵嗣

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.110, no.10, pp.1847-1855, 2001-10-20 (Released:2017-11-30)