著者

神谷 大介

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.120, no.5, pp.782-786, 2011

著者

小野寺 拓也

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.11, pp.1927-1936, 2013

著者

吉原 弘道

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.111, no.7, pp.35-59, 142-143, 2002-07-20

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The conventional research on the position held by Ashikaga Takauji 足利尊氏 within the government formed after the Kenmu 建武 imperial restoration (1334) tends to argue that the warrior leader was excluded from all of its affairs. However, Amino Yoshihiko 網野善彦 has proposed that such a view be reconsidered in the light that the Kenmu government officially gave Takauji charge over Chinzei 鎮西 (Kyushu) military affairs, a subject that is now being pursued by Mori Shigeaki 森茂暁 and Ito Kiyoshi 伊藤喜良. Nevertheless, the conventional skeptical view of Takauji's role has yet to be reconsidered ; and his involvement in the Kenmugovernment has by no means been thoroughly investigated. In the present article, the author conducts a detailed analysis of the time from Takauji's turn against the Kamakura Bakufu in the 4th month of Genko 3 (1333) through the post-coup de'etat settle ment. The research to date has tended to look upon Takauji's involvement in the settlement as anti-government in attitude ; however, it is a fact that 1) Takauji utilized his close relationship with Emperor Go-Daigo to raise troops during the conflict, and 2) petitions for Imperial recognition of deployment (chakuto-jo 着到状) to the battles fought in the Kanto and Chinzei regions were submitted to the Emperor through Takauji. Moreover, Takauji's receipt of these petitions stemmed not from any personal ambition, but rather from his position as an intermediary for the Emperor ; and the authority that Takauji assumed during the incident was not personally usurped, but always based on his relationship to the Emperor, and was finally officially recognized in his appointment as military commander-in-chief of Chinju-fu 鎮守府 on Genko 3/6/5. In addition, his investiture as a minister of state (kugyo 公卿) was an attempt by the Emperor to define his position within the imperial court's organization. The author concludes that rather than being excluded from the affairs of the Kenmu government, Ashikaga Takauji was placed in one of its positions of military responsibility, and from the standpoint of Takauji himself, this role was not the result of some move to expand his own political influence, but rather stemmed from the powers invested in him through his official appointment as commander-in-chief of Chinju-fu.

著者

服部 英雄

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.92, no.8, pp.1304-1331,1419-, 1983-08-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

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Among those diplomatics during Japan's medieval period, there exist several items which have been dated with an era name before the official change to that era name, it was called mirainengo 未来年号 ; and conversely, there are those items which have been dated with an era name despite the official change to a new era. In this report, the author carries out an investigation of such items from five diplomatics related to the following proprietary estates (shoen 荘園) : Kuroda-no-sho 黒田荘 owned by the temple, Todaiji 東大寺, Yamamoto-no-sho 山本荘 owned by the Matsuo Shrine 松尾神社, Kagado-no-sho 香登荘 owned by the temple, Negoroji 根来寺, estates directly managed by the temple, Eizanji 栄山寺, Kono-makuni-no-sho 神野真国荘 owned previcusly by Jingoji 神護寺, and then Koyasan 高野山. As a result of his investigation, the author has been able to make clear the fact that these items are diplomatics which have been falsified for the purpose of deceiving their recipients out of personal interest. Therefore by means of this type of historical material textual criticism, it is hoped that researchers can use obviously falsified diplomatics (gimonjo 偽文書) to ferret out those true facts of manorial history which have heretofore escapednotice by scolars.

著者

川越 美穂

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.116, no.2, pp.153-189, 2007

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This article analyzes how Emperor Meiji participated in the process of political decision-making during the early years of his reign by looking mainly at his role in document between from after Sanjo Sanetomi 三条実美 was inaugurated as chief minister of state (Daijodaijin 太政大臣) in 1871 until 1873. Under the government reforms of 1871, there was a design to assume the Emperor the person of last approval among the planner of political system reform. But the approval act of the Emperor was not codify then, it was carry out not an arbitrator as a recognizer when a political system was reformed again in May, 1873. In this time, the approval of the Emperor was named "Gyohi (御批)". In this way, it was realized once in the early Meiji era that the Emperor participated in politics decision. And by having found "Gyohiroku (御批録)" which was an approval record of the Emperor, I confirmed that it was the seal of a character "裁" that was used as approval mark. This is important as the example that the Emperor participated in politics decision for the first time. But the government was not going to let the Emperor participate in all politics decision. The documents submitted to the Emperor in "Gyohiroku" were limited to legislation such as a rule and a system decided newly. And it is recognized that the Emperor gave permission of execution formally. Therefore, I suppose that the government had intention to let the Emperor hold a legislative power and the judicial power. But the government gave up the approval of the Emperor about the legislation area in a short time. It was the reason that cabinet decision was unstable because adjustment between administrations was not enough. Therefore, to realize an idea in principle that the Emperor makes politics, it was necessary that the system to coordinate an opinion of each administration and the legislative proceeding were established.

著者

岡本 真

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.4, pp.38-62, 2015

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&emsp;本稿は、従来大内氏の独占時代とされてきた寧波の乱後の遣明船派遣の実像を明らかにするため、史料上に「堺渡唐船」と記される遣明船について、関係諸勢力の立場、搭乗者と派遣目的、歴史的位置づけの三点を究明した。その結果明らかになった事柄は以下の通りである。<br>&emsp;まず、関係諸勢力については、『天文日記』やその他の古文書等に見られる遣明船が、いずれも「堺渡唐船」を指すことを確認したうえで、同船の派遣を中心となって推進したのは、細川晴元と堺商人だった点を論証した。また、本願寺や土佐一条氏は協力者に過ぎず、大内義隆や畠山稙長は同船の派遣を阻止しようとしていた点を指摘した。<br>&emsp;次に、搭乗者と派遣目的については、その解明に先立ち、新史料である『活套』所収外交文書二通を紹介し、同書の収録内容や文書末尾の年月日をもとに、これらが「堺渡唐船」関連文書であることを明証した。そして、これを根拠に、従来の遣明船と同様に朝貢使節としての形態を整えたうえでの派遣が図られており、正使は忠叔昌恕という禅僧で、ほかに医師半井明英も乗り組むことになっていたことを指摘した。また、派遣目的は、寧波の乱の際に明側に留められていた前回使節の朝貢品の献上、同使節の遺留品の返却、収監されていた宋素卿の送還、新勘合および新金印の下賜、半井明英の明医学伝習の許可などを要請することだった点を解明した。<br>&emsp;それから、歴史的位置づけについては、寧波の乱後に足利義晴・細川高国が明側とおこなった交渉の延長上に「堺渡唐船」があることを明らかにし、従来の研究では存在が確認されていなかった嘉靖准勘合に関する考察をもとに、状況の推移を論じた。また、大内義隆の経営した天文八年度船と同船を比較すると、寧波の乱の際の遺留品の返却や新勘合の獲得などが、両者に共通する派遣目的だった点を指摘した。<br>&emsp;そして、以上を踏まえて、これまで大内氏の独占時代とされてきた寧波の乱後においても、それ以前と同様、遣明船をめぐる同氏と細川氏の抗争が継続していた点を明らかにした。

著者

上杉 和彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.11, pp.1855-1877, 1970-1971, 1990-11-20

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The Kamakura Bakufu from its inception carried out and tried to maintain three fundamental policies concerning its house vassals (gokenin): 1)the prohibition on unlimited official appointments; 2)an emphasis on the jogo 成功 insitution of selling official appointments; and 3)a commitment to continued service in the capital after appointments were made. However, the above three measures should not be regarded as a policy inherent only to the Bakufu, but rather as common to all the bureaucratic institutions urider the ruling elite (kenmon 権門) during those times. However, while these three measures continued to form the Bakufu's basic policy concerning its bureaucracy, amendment no.96 to its Joei Shikimoku 貞永式目 law code, which was promulgated in 1243 by Shogun Minamoto-no-Yoritsune while visiting the capital, contains language that significantly alters the existing customs governing the operation of the jogo institution. This amendment was epoch-making in the sense that efforts were now being made to follow the spirit of the traditional bureaucratic system more strictly than what the Bakufu had done up to that point. The jogo custom as practiced by the Bakufu increased in importance as a means of garnering revenues for the support of the court at Kyoto. However, on the other hand, due to the self-seeking attitudes of the functionaries in charge of selling official appointments, the actual fees paid were often reduced below the officially established rates. This in turn was causing a very unstable flow of funds into the royal treasury. While amendment no.96 quite correctly assesses the actual situation, in the background of its successful promulgation stood the royal court led by Kujono-Michie, who was closely connected to the Kamakura Shoguns. And so in this sense we can see the move to correct jogo practices as part of an overall effort in the movement for mutual cooperation between the aristocracy and the warrior class in controlling the capital bureaucracy. With respect to a bureaucratic polity centering around the jogo institution from this time on, we can observe quite contrasting approaches adopted by the court and the Bakufu. On the one hand, the court showed little initiative in preventing the reduction of fees paid for appointments, while the Bakufu took far more positive steps to insure that such fees were maintained at their official rates. In the background of this positive attitude taken by the Bakufu was the deepening involvement by the Hojo regents in appointing Kamakura house vassals to official positions, a practice that had traditionally been the sole perogative of the Shogun himself.

著者

木村 聡

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.128, no.8, pp.33-58, 2019 (Released:2021-09-02)

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従来、ワシントン軍縮会議後の問題は、その後の海軍における統帥権独立の問題や海軍軍令部の独立問題、大臣人事の問題に注目が集まり、条約に対する具体的な対応策については十分に議論がなされなかった。本研究はその後の海軍の在り方に影響を与えたとして、連合艦隊の常置化とその役割の変遷を取り扱う。 海軍という組織は、軍政を掌る海軍省と軍令を掌る軍令部の二元組織と解釈されるが、正確には、軍政権と統帥権の並立の下に、最高機関として海軍大臣、艦隊・鎮守府の司令長官、海軍軍令部長(軍令部総長)が存在するという構造である。そして、艦隊司令長官や鎮守府司令長官の役割は指揮統率であった。 それが、ワシントン条約への対応策として精兵主義の方策がとられた。連合艦隊はその中で常置化された。これにより、海軍の主兵力が連合艦隊に一本化され、さらに連合艦隊司令長官の平時における権限や役割が明確に規定された。こうして連合艦隊は、非常時に指揮権を統一するための組織から、平時から海軍の指揮統率と実戦部隊の軍政を、その施行のみならず計画までも担う恒常的な組織へと変化した。 戦争の危機が認識されると連合艦隊の規模は急激に拡大した。そこで連合艦隊司令部とその麾下の各艦隊の司令部とが分離し、司令部は後方での全体の作戦指導と戦線の統合を担うようになる。軍令部と機能を同じくした連合艦隊司令部は、海軍中央で問題視される一方で、麾下の艦隊指揮官との間にも精神的に距離が生じるようになった。この結果、海軍の戦争指導は、後方での戦争指導を行う大本営海軍部、後方にあって作戦を練り、その指揮を執る連合艦隊司令部、そしてその戦場で戦う各艦隊や部隊の三者からなる遠心的な三重構造となった。 連合艦隊はワシントン条約後の常置化以来、その性質を全く異なるものに変化させ、それは海軍全体の組織の在り方にも影響を与えた。

著者

バレット トーマス

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.131, no.2, pp.1-38, 2022 (Released:2023-02-20)

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本稿は、一八七七年から一八八〇年にかけて、清朝駐日公使館に勤務した米国人館員のマッカーティ(Divie B. McCartee)に焦点を当て、琉球問題をめぐる彼の私的活動を考察したものである。 マッカーティは、公使館の中で主に事務と翻訳作業を担当していた。しかしながら、明治政府が一八七九年に「琉球処分」を断行すると、彼は清と琉球との旧来の「宗属関係」を復活させるべく、個人的な活動の中でいくつかの対抗策を模索し、用意することとなった。 本稿が明らかにしたのは、以下の二点である。第一に、マッカーティは琉球を二つ、また三つに分割する案の考案・具体化に深く関わり、両案をこの問題の調停に当たった元米国大統領グラント(Ulysses S. Grant)に提示したという点である。日本側は、二分割案はグラントの支持を得たものであると考え、一八八〇年の日清交渉において、実際の解決策として清朝側に提案した。第二に、マッカーティは、明治政府の「琉球処分」を正当化しようとする作意を徹底的に批判した論説を英字紙『ジャパン・ガゼット』(Japan Gazette)に匿名で発表したという点である。この論説は、明治政府の歴史認識の不備を指弾して話題を呼んだばかりでなく、一八八〇年に日本側が二分割案を妥協策として清朝側に提示することとなった要因の一つと考えられる。 清朝駐日公使館の下級館員だったマッカーティは、従来ほとんど注目されることはなかったが、私的活動を通じて清琉間の旧来の「宗属関係」の復活のために尽力し、琉球問題をめぐる外交に「透明」な足跡を残した。本稿の考察によって、「外交」のプロセスを、代表者というアクター、公文書という媒体、そして交渉現場という「公」的場に押し込めるのではなく、より広い意味で捉える視野の有効性がはっきりと示されるだろう。

著者

松井 直人

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.131, no.4, pp.1-26, 2022 (Released:2023-04-20)

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室町幕府にとって、都市京都、及び京都を包含する山城一国の支配を実現することは、政権の存立基盤を維持してゆくうえで重要な意味を持った。そのため、当該地域の支配の様相を探ることは室町幕府論に不可欠な課題といえる。しかし、京都支配に比して山城国支配に関する研究は停滞著しく、基礎的な点を含め、改めて総合的な検討を行う必要がある。そこで本稿では、領域支配の担い手であった山城守護を通じた幕府の山城国支配の展開を論じるとともに、同国を拠点とした室町幕府の特質に迫ることを目指した。 本論では、幕府開創期から応仁・文明の乱前後を主な検討期間として山城守護の機構や支配方式の展開を跡づけた。14世紀中葉以降、山城国では幕府の軍事統括者であった侍所が所領問題の対処にあたっていたが、14世紀末に幕府による隣国大和国に対する統制の実現を契機に、侍所権限の分割と山城守護の新設が行われ、国内支配機構の充実が図られた。また、足利義満の権勢が確立すると、義満は将軍直臣(結城満藤・高師英)を山城守護に任じ、彼らを手足として諸勢力との取次や諸役の徴収を担わせた。その後、15世紀前半には在京大名が守護職を巡役で担当する仕組みが定着する。しかし、15世紀中葉を境に、畠山氏が独自に守護権を行使して国内支配を進めたことで、幕府による国内支配の体制は衰退へと転じた。 以上からは、①将軍の直臣か、あるいは大名かという守護就任者の属性の違いが、幕府による山城国支配の方式に大きな影響を及ぼしたこと、②幕府の山城国支配は国内寺社本所領の保護を基調とし、守護自身による恣意的な国内支配は、15世紀中葉以降に本格的に進展したことなどが明らかとなる。このような幕府の山城国支配の様態からは、公家・武家・寺社勢力が並立する同国を拠点としたことで、彼らの間の複雑な利害関係を丸抱えする形で政権を成り立たせることとなった幕府権力の特質が見て取れる。

著者

中見 立夫

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.9, pp.1647-1651, 2015

著者

梅村 卓

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.2, pp.277-284, 2015

著者

熊谷 隆之

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.113, no.7, pp.1262-1284, 2004-07-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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The present article is an attempt to open a new line of discussion about the Kamakura Bakufu's functionary in Kyoto, the Rokuhara Tandai 六波羅探題, beginning with an examination of the term itself and a clarification of the context in which the position was placed.The term "tandai" indicated the highest ranking jurist in Kamakura, Rokuhara and Hakata ; however, it was by no means widely used during the period. At the time, the Kyoto functionary's post was described using such terms as shugo 守護 (protector, military governor) and kanrei 管領 (overseer, administrator). It was only during the Edo period that we find the term "Rokuhara Tandai" in a reference work entitled Buke Myomoku-Sho 武家名目抄 compiled by Hanawa Hokiichi 塙保己一. Given the above facts, the history of the Rokuhara Tandai may be laid out as follows. The post of "Rokuhara Tandai" was established in 1221 as the shugo of Kyoto, the imperial capital. Later, as the actual administrative structure of the office was set up, its executive officer came to occupy the position of kanrei. It was the judicial aspect of this administration that the Rokuhara functionary took on role of a tandai. Furthermore, the research to date has considered Rokuhara as a place secondary to the shogun's main residence in Kamakura. However, there is plenty of room for considering Rokuhara as the shogun's main or original residence. For example, the Lord of Kamakura (kamakura-dono 鎌倉殿) was originally dispatched by the emperor from Kyoto to Kamakura in the capacity of Shogun (seiitaishogun 征夷大将軍), and during the Kamakura period the term "buke" 武家 (the shogun and his entourage) referred geographically to Rokuhara, not Kamakura, thus making it impossible to consider "Rokuhara Tandai" on the same level as "Chinzei Tandai 鎮西探題, the Bakufu-appointed functionary in Hakata. During the late Kamakura period, when the Bakufu's control over western Japan became part of the pluralistic system of elites, including the aristocracy and religious institutions (kenmontaisei 権門体制), it was Rokuhara that represented the Bakufu in that system. In this sense, one could very well argue that Rokuhara existed as the headquarters of the Bakufu. The possibilities offered by the above discussion rest for the most part on the place and influence that Buke Myomoku-Sho has and will have in the historical study of the Kamakura period.

著者

相馬 和将

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.130, no.9, pp.68-97, 2021 (Released:2022-09-20)

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本稿は、中世後期にしばしばみられる公家衆や将軍家庶流の子弟が室町殿の猶子となって寺院に入室する現象(猶子入室)の意味を検討したものである。 猶子入室は、これまでの研究において、室町殿による「寺院統制策」の一環として理解されてきた。しかし、実際には入室先の寺院や出身母体たる公家衆の側からの申請によってなされた事例が多いことを明らかにし、その背景として、室町殿猶子になることで有利な待遇を得られたことや、門跡の後継にふさわしい「貴種」が払底していたという中世後期の社会状況があったことを指摘した。 また、猶子入室は王家や摂関家の猶子をはじめ、各身分階層において確認でき、室町殿猶子だけを取りあげて室町殿による「寺院統制策」であると評価することは難しいとしたうえで、王家猶子の微増と室町殿猶子の減少が相関関係にないことも論じた。 さらに、室町殿猶子の数量や、猶子の出身家門に着目したとき、義満・義持期は足利庶流を猶子にした事例が大半で、公家からの申請も二条流だけに限られていた。しかし、義教期・義政期は、猶子申請する家門が幅広い階層にわたっていたことから、将軍家の尊貴性・貴種性・権威が格段に上昇しており、特に義政期は猶子からみたとき、政治的には不安定ながらも、将軍家権威が最高潮に達していたと評価した。足利将軍家は「貴種」だから寺院・公家社会から猶子申請されたのと同時に、寺院・公家社会から猶子申請される構造が将軍家の権威をさらに上昇・固定させたものと考えられる。 最後に、本稿の要約と戦国期への展望を示し、門跡・出身家門・室町殿のつながりの分析は中世後期を考察するうえで不可欠の視座であることを述べ、その一例が猶子入室という現象だったことを指摘した。

著者

坂口 太助

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.119, no.10, pp.1718-1742, 2010-10-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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Japan lost more than eighty percent of its vessels during the Pacific War (1941-1945), mostly due to submarine attacks. These massive losses caused not only the interruption of maritime communications, but also greatly contributed to the collapse of the Japan economy. Within the research to date, it has been pointed out that the Imperial Japanese Navy did not establish a command dedicated to protecting maritime communications until November 1943, leading to the conclusion that the prime cause of the massive losses was the Navy's focus on front line battles rather than protecting maritime communications. However, the author of this article argues that this research has not paid enough attention to the process by which the General Escort Command was formed and proceeds to reexamine that process and the Navy's response to the maritime communications issue through the perceptions of the Japanese government and Imperial Army. The number of vessels lost between December 1941 and March 1943 exceeded the prewar estimate. However, many of these losses were sustained in transport operations to the front; and the number of vessels destroyed by submarine attack while transporting resources back to the homeland was below expectations. Lacking one large fleet like an escort command at that time, the response of the Navy to Allied submarines was to assign groups of smaller units to each area. Rather than submarine attacks, it was the situation at the front that was more closely related to the loss of vessels, due to requisitions by both the Navy and the Army for vessels to replace ships lost at the front. The author argues that this was the main factor in the decrease of vessels available for transporting resources. The government, Army and Navy all attached their highest priorities to establishing dominance at the front and the promotion of building new ships. After the Allied Forces' counteroffensive and the commercial destruction being caused by submarines became more and more evident, the Navy decided to review its organization for protecting maritime communications and consequently established the General Escort Command to control existing units. According to the trends of vessel loss during the war, it is clear that organizing a special command had not been necessary until the spring of 1943. Therefore, the author concludes that the focus on the front did not necessarily mean slighting maritime communications and that the Navy responded to the issue at the appropriate time.

著者

中野目 徹

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.8, pp.1433-1438, 2013

著者

沼田 哲

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.7, pp.1297-1300, 1990

著者

佐藤 次高

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.86, no.4, pp.464-465, 1977-04-20 (Released:2017-10-05)

著者

池上 裕子

出版者

史学会 ; 1889-

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.125, no.7, pp.1278-1287, 2016-07

著者

中島 楽章

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.113, no.12, pp.1967-2003, 2004-12-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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From the late 16^<th> to the early 17^<th> century, amidst the "Age of Commerce" in the East Asian maritime region, many Chinese, including merchants, smugglers, captives, and drifters, came to south-west Japan. Especially in Kyushu, where most of the Chinese arrived, not a few Chinese settlements were formed in various seaports and castle towns. In this paper, the author discusses emigrant Chinese intellectuals in this maritime region, by focusing on physicians who sojourned in south Kyushu. Nearby the castle town of Obi 飫肥, There are two epitaphs on gravestones of Xu Zhilin 徐之〓, who had served as a physician in Obi domain during the 17^<th> century. According to these epitaphs, Xu zhilin was borne in the gentry lineage of Shangyu 上虞 county of Zhejiang province. In 1619, He made a voyage to Beijing aspiring to pass the civil service examinations, but was captured by pirates along the way. He was first taken to Nagasaki, then later moved to Satsuma, where he learned medicine from a Chinese physician residing there. Five years later, He was invited by the lord of Obi domain to serve as one of his physicians until 1666. Concerning the pedigree of Xu Zhilin, except the two epitaphs, no available sources had been found in Japan. But I had found three editions of genealogies of Xu lineage in Shanghai Library which describe the family line of Xu Zhilin in detail, and accounts on ancestors of him are almost coincide with these of epitaphs. From these genealogies, we can ascertain that he actually was a member of elite, lineage producing numerous scholar officials from the 16^<th> century. From the late 16^<th> century onward, the lift of prohibition of private maritime trade remarkably stimulated the oversea trades with south Fujian as its node. Although the ban on voyages to Japan remained, many Fujian traders had sailed to Kyushu. Particularly, south Kyushu was gradually integrated into the network of Fujian merchants. Arrivals of many Chinese physicians were also one aspect of the expansion of the Fujian network, which accompanied transfers of culture, technology, and human resources. During 16^<th> and 17^<th> century, enormous amount of silver continued to flow onto the southeast coast region of China, particularly south Fujian, from Japan and the New World. The imported silver was gradually diffused all over China, and a considerable part of it went to Beijing as taxes, then thrown onto the frontier bases of the northern border region as military expenditures. As a result the influx of silver produced booming trade and economic prosperity in the maritime Asia and China's northern border. Numerous Chinese attracted by economic chances also flowed, into these regions as traders, peasants, soldiers, and various specialists. It should be noted that the Chinese who immigrated to foreign countries included marginal intellectuals such as lower literati, merchants, and physicians. They often served the military-commercial powers in those respective regions and countries, offered advanced Chinese cultures and technology, and mediated commercial or military negotiations between the Ming Dynasty and foreign powers. Arrivals of Chinese physicians in Japan were one phenomenon, of such emigration by Chinese marginal intellectuals during the "Age of Commerce" in East Asia.