著者

伊勢田 哲治

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.61-78, 1995-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

15

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There have been interesting debates between Hilary Putnam and his critics on his argument against metaphysical realism. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the nature of the debates and to defend Putnam's position in several important points. There are two types of criticism, one is to defend the correspondence theory of truth, and the other is to defend metaphysical realism without the correspondence theory of truth. Putnam seems to be able to answer these criticism effectively. Of course this isn't exhaustive survey, but I think this limited survey is enough to indicate the remaining problems.

著者

水本 正晴

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.63-77, 2006

被引用文献数

2

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David Chalmers presented a zombie argument, from which the falsity of physicalism allegedly follows. Although many authors who criticize this argument attack the derivation of the metaphysical possibility of zombies from the logical possibility of zombies, in this paper I will argue against the very first premise of the argument: the logical possibility of zombies. I will show the a priori impossibility of zombies, through what I call the Blinking Qualia argument.

著者

山田 友幸

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.77-89, 2004-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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This book is the last book of Iida's celebrated series, "Summa". It includes a detailed argument for homophonic semantics and an equally detailed exposition of his truth-conditional semantics for three fragments of Japanese, the third of which contains indexical expressions and tensed verbs. As one might expect, the semantics given for this fragment is far from being homophonic. I will examine what role his argument for homophonic semantics plays in his defense of his non-homophonic semantics. I will also examine how Iida avoids treating moods in his semantics, and point out the need to treat illocutionary acts within semantics.

著者

大畑 浩志

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.169-189, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

27

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Haecceitism is the idea that each particular object has a haecceity: the property that determines its uniqueness as an object. Thus, for example, we could say that Socratesʼs haecceity is the property of being (identical with) Socrates. However, haecceitism seems to face the “Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem,” namely, that, especially in the case of fission of an amoeba, it is unclear how to set an explanatory order between the two facts: the destruction or generation of particular objects and the instantiation of their haecceities. In this paper, I distinguish between two versions of haecceitism and address this issue with the version I call “primitivist haecceitism.”

著者

小草 泰

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_17-1_33, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)

参考文献数

18

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A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.

著者

佐藤 広大

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.43-53, 2020-09-30 (Released:2020-09-30)

参考文献数

15

被引用文献数

1

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The buck-passing accounts of values, which analyze values in terms of reasons, have lately attracted attention. There are thought to be counterexamples, such as the toxin puzzle, to the buck-passing accounts. However, it is a question whether the toxin puzzle is really a counterexample to this account. This paper shows that if two theses, namely the strong relationship between normative and motivating reasons and the guise of the good, are true, the toxin puzzle is not a counterexample to this account. It follows from this that in discussions of counterexamples to the buck-passing accounts the meanings of “reasons” and “values” need to be made explicit.

著者

田中 裕

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.91-106, 1982-11-13 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

29

著者

山口 まり

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.115-131, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

65

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The microscopes have been showing us the invisible entities since their invention. The magnified images with the optical microscope convinced us of their existence, such as blood capillary and the cell nuclei during cell divisions. And the electron microscope visualized viruses that people had doubted their existence. This paper explores the history of observations of dislocations in crystals with the microscopes from the 1940s to the 1960s to show how microscopists visualized the dislocations to verify the existence of dislocations. The visualizations of dislocations with the Transmission Electron microscope in 1956 had a critical role in the acceptance of the reality of dislocations. Also, this historical case would offer an opportunity to analyze the relationship between representations and existence.

著者

中山 康雄

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.145-148, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

米盛 裕二他

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, pp.103-113, 1980-11-20 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.85-90, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)

参考文献数

11

著者

寺中 平治

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.31-41, 1988-11-05 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

石原 孝二

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.17-32, 2014-12-20 (Released:2015-11-08)

参考文献数

42

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Throughout the history of modern psychiatry, descriptive methods and operational definitions have featured prominently in endeavors to objectively refer to and classify mental disorders. An alternative to these descriptive approaches is the argument based on the concepts of “natural kinds” and “dysfunction” such as Wakefieldʼs “harmful dysfunction” model. However, none of these approaches seem promising for understanding the nature of mental disorders. This paper proposes that we abandon the prevalent tendency to objectively classify mental disorders, revert to the original meaning of psychiatry (Psychiaterie), a term coined by J. C. Reil, as a method of therapy, and reexamine the concept of mental disorder.

著者

吉満 昭宏

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.1-14, 2004-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

20

被引用文献数

1 1

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It is commonly known that C. I. Lewis started modern modal logics (S1-S5) because of his dissatisfaction with material implication. But his original intention was to construct a logic of strict implication rather than a logic of modality. Then he had got involved in the latter gradually against his original intention. In this paper, I clarify where his original intention lay and how he was involved in modal logics tracing his writings chronologically. Considering his contemporary logicians' responses, I sum up the argument.

著者

佐々木 崇

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.55-67, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

15

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Quine characterizes "What is there?" as the ontological question. In this paper, I tried to make clear what Quine asserts by his ontological discussion. In Quine's philosophy, ontology should be closely related to epistemology. This relation between ontology and epistemology is expressed by the reciprocal containment between both, which is followed from his naturalism. The important point of naturalism is the affirmation of a circular argument. In this paper, I considered Quine's ontology as divided into two aspects, that is, his formal considerations about ontology and his own ontological assertions, and then I pointed out that a crucial problem arises in Quine's own ontological assertions. Quine's solution to this problem is an example of how the circular argument takes a central role in his ontology. By this consideration, we can ascertain the relation between ontology and epistemology in Quine's philosophy, and the significance of ontology for the examination of Quine's philosophy.

著者

太田 雅子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.45-54, 1999-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

9

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Higher-level (mental, sociological and biological, etc.) entities are said to be supervenient on more basic, lower-level (physical, micro-level) entities, and there is a view that lower-level theories can completely and sufficiently explain higher-level events. But Harold Kincaid criticizes such a view. He does not deny that lower-level theories do explain something, but argues that they are only partial and incomplete, because they cannot refer to higher-level kinds which supervene on the relevant lower-level entities and answer important questions about causal laws. I will argue that the completeness or sufficiency of explanation is often evaluated interest-relatively, and, against Kincaid, that higher-level explanation cannot be sufficient without mentioning lower-level causal mechanism.

著者

服部 裕幸

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.91-94, 2018-12-30 (Released:2019-11-27)

著者

源河 亨

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.83-86, 2018-12-30 (Released:2019-11-27)

著者

源河 亨

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.87-103, 2014-12-20 (Released:2015-11-08)

参考文献数

24

被引用文献数

1

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According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.) of objects, but some kind of “modes of presentation” of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics.

著者

村井 忠康

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.99-114, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)

参考文献数

24

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According to the standard form of conceptualism, which comes from McDowell (1994), the conceptual content of experience is propositional. But this is at variance with naive realism, which conceptualism craves for. Given that, we should seek non-propositionalist forms of conceptualism, which make room for naive realism. In this paper I propose such a conceptualism, exploiting Sellarsʼs idea of visual experience as “thinking in color”, although he himself has never been conceptualist. Elaborating the idea will lead to the conception of visual experience as analogous, in a unique way, to drawing a picture. I argue that this enables conceptualism to take seriously the particularity and concreteness of perception, which are emphasized by naive realism.