著者
佐藤 雅彦
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.38, no.2, pp.21-33, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
18

We study Frege's influence on computer science mainly from the viewpoint of the formal aspect of Frege's Begriffsschrift. We argue that his analysis of a function as an unsaturated entity is related to the notion of higher-order abstract syntax in computer science, and his way of explaining Begriffsschrift should shed light on the future design of a common meta language for various mathematical systems. We also point out the influence of Frege on Martin-Löf's type theories, which led to the revival of the notion of judgment which was once almost forgotten in mathematical logic.
著者
石田 知子
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.1, pp.67-91, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)
参考文献数
30
被引用文献数
1

Most life scientists and philosophers would agree that molecular biology has produced reductionistic explanations which consist of physico-chemical terms. According to Sarkar, this means that informational terms are merely metaphors which have misled scientists and eventually ought to be discarded. However, the actual situation is the opposite; informational concepts are intensively used in the life sciences. In this paper, I will argue that informational concepts become indispensable elements which work as epistemic resources, enabling a schematic understanding of life phenomena; thus, informational terms are necessary in order for the theory of molecular biology to provide such resources.
著者
三木 那由他
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.1, pp.47-65, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)
参考文献数
20

Intention-based semantics (IBS) serves as the paradigm in the field of speaker meaning analysis. However, it has grappled with a well-known problem: the infinite regress of a speaker’s intentions. Theorists such as Grice, Schiffer, Davis, and Green have tried to remedy the situation; however, no one has found any solutions until now. The present paper claims that the inability of IBS theorists to resolve the regress problem may be attributed to the conflict between two basic assumptions that they espouse: representationalism and the transparency of speaker meaning. When both are adopted alongside each other, as the current paper shows, the regress problem immediately emerges. It follows, then, that it would be prudent to reject IBS to sufficiently analyze speaker meaning.
著者
岡本 賢吾
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, no.2, pp.23-39, 2007-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
15

Two remarkable results attained by Domain Theory, which serves as mathematical foundations for denotational semantics of programming languages, are explained and considered from philosophical viewpoints: 1) the analysis of recursion by the fix-point semantics and 2) the introduction of the notion of continuity and of compact elements. In particular, the author finds them conceptually illuminating in that firstly, they succeed in making explicit those unnoticed semantic elements lying behind the syntax of the languages which play essential roles in the construction and execution of recursive programs, and that secondly, they show the way to reconstruct various ordinary classical mathematical structures by virtue of complementing approximation processes to their infinite noncompact elements.
著者
大塚 淳
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, no.1, pp.29-41, 2007-07-30 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
30
被引用文献数
1

Much of the controversy of function revolves around two concepts, namely selected effect (SE) function and causal role (CR) function. Each of these proposals and its reciprocal critiques are examined, and it is shown that each concept embodies two different research strategies in biology, one the search for adaptation (SE function) and the other the reduction of biological phenomena (CR function). But this conceptual difference does not entail a separation in scientific practice. The proper attribution of SE function to a trait requires careful analysis of CR function in its developmental origin -- this is the idea of developmental modularity. It turns out that the ideal condition for developmental CR function analysis (i.e. near decomposability) also facilitates the mosaic evolution of -- and thus the attribution of SE function to -- organismal characters.
著者
三浦 俊彦
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, no.2, pp.69-81, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-12-07)
参考文献数
18

The question "How can I be a?" ("a" being a proper name) has been recently referred to as "The Harder Problem of Consciousness", which would remain mysterious even after "The Hard Problem" about how subjective experiences arise is solved. Since both the indexical "I" and an exemplifying name "a" are ambiguous in their references, a formal analysis is required. Then, it turns out that any disambiguated version of "Harder Problem" is logically reduced to "The Hard Problem" or its special case "How can there be a?". There is no "Harder Problem" with its additional philosophical value. This is simply a matter of logic, independent of any ontology on whether metaphysical self exists or not.
著者
鴻 浩介
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.27-47, 2016-12-20 (Released:2017-09-29)
参考文献数
20

A normative reason is a consideration that counts in favor of doing something. According to Internalism about reasons, a consideration is a normative reason for an agent to do something only if that consideration is capable of motivating the agent to do that action. Externalism about reasons denies this claim. After surveying the debate between Internalism and Externalism, I defend the oldest version of Internalism, that is, Bernard Williamsʼ deliberative Internalism. My argument is twofold: first I argue that there is a specific motivation for adopting deliberative Internalism, and then try to address the most serious objection against Internalism, i.e., the undergeneration problem.

8 0 0 0 OA 新しい行為論

著者
鈴木 雄大
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.2, pp.133-150, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)
参考文献数
28

This paper aims to put forward an alternative to the standard theory of action (STA), which I call “the teleological theory of action (TTA)”. I also examine the main argument for STA and maintain that there is a possibility to deny two premises of the argument. Each denial is called the disjunctivism of bodily movement and the disjunctivism of intention. TTA implies that an intention in action is (part of) a bodily movement, and this in turn implies the two disjunctivisms. TTA is supported by the causal dispositionalism which takes dispositions as basic and understands causation in terms of them.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.1, pp.35-48, 2015-07-31 (Released:2015-11-08)
参考文献数
17

In Realism and Naturalizing Knowledge (Keisho Shobo, 2013), Ryo Uehara carefully formulates the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds and expands it by applying this framework to artifacts and knowledge and thereby drawing them in the naturalistic picture of the world. This is a substantial addition to the development of naturalistic philosophy in Japan. In this essay I shall make general comments on his account of natural kinds in the following respects: Uehara's distinction between real and nominal kinds, his objection to the species-as-individual thesis, the relative lack of attention to the distinction between the realism of natural kinds and the scientific realism, and finally, races as possible natural kinds.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.37-48, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)
参考文献数
26

In our daily lives, we assign some value to various things. For example, we say, ‘this picture is dynamic', ‘his clothes are unfashionable' and ‘she is brave'. In these cases, we experience the value of these things. In this study, I examine the nature of such value experiences. I argue that some value experiences are cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences and that what penetrates into them is emotion. In other words, owing to the evaluative component of emotion, which affects perceptual systems, perceptual experiences can represent things as having some value to us. Furthermore, I propose that this cognitive penetration model of value experience supports the particularistic view of evaluative judgement.
著者
田中 泉吏
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_1-1_13, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
18
被引用文献数
1

Altruistic behaviors are quite impressive features in nature and call for selective explanation. Ever since Darwin, many biologists have appealed to group selection to explain altruism. In the 1960s, Williams knocked down these naïve group selectionists and alternatively promoted gene selectionism. However, group selection was highlighted again in the 1980s by Wilson and Sober, who suggested a hierarchical conception of evolution. Opposing to this conception, some philosophers, together with some biologists, proposed to adopt a pluralistic stance toward various models of selection. These three approaches give different explanations of the evolution of altruism. I compare them and show a pluralistic one is the most valid among them.
著者
大西 勇喜謙
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.2, pp.2_65-2_81, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)
参考文献数
13
被引用文献数
1

The debate over scientific realism is one of the traditional topics in philosophy of science. Today there are various types of realism and anti-realism, including entity realism, (epistemic/ontic/moderate) structural realism, semirealism, eclectic realism, and constructive empiricism. However, the main point of the dispute, which is the validity of inference from observable evidence to unobservable events, seems to have been set aside in the recent debate. To improve this situation, I propose a new approach to the scientific realism issue that utilizes the epistemological positions. As an example, I also demonstrate an analysis of the debate based on contextualism in epistemology.

7 0 0 0 OA 書評

出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.2, pp.2_135-2_148, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)
著者
横路 佳幸 高谷 遼平
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.2, pp.61-83, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)
参考文献数
56

In his “Demonstratives”, David Kaplan discussed certain nonintensional operators called monsters. The operators, unlike ordinary ones, change the reference of indexicals by shifting the parameter of context. Although Kaplan denied monsters at least in English on the ground of both the doctrine of direct reference and the principle of compositionality, many monstrous phenomena of singular terms have been confirmed by some semanticists lately, which seems to urge Kaplanian semantics to be revised. In this survey article, we offer a survey of recent developments in the semantics of indexicals, variables, and proper names by focusing on monsters, and give some suggestions about direct reference, monsters, and compositionality.
著者
水本 正晴
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.1, pp.43-59, 2004-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
31
被引用文献数
1 1

Swampan poses a problem for physicalists who adopt the teleological approach to functionalism. In this paper I reformulate the intuitive idea behind the physicalists' worry about it as "Swampman argument", and consider possible rejoinders, including Maeda (1999)'s claim that swampman is not even imaginable. This paper was originally intended as a comment on Maeda's reply to Mizumoto (2000), which criticized his (1999).
著者
島村 修平
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.29-46, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)
参考文献数
24

It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.