著者
佐藤 弘夫
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.66, pp.9-24, 2015-04-01 (Released:2017-06-10)
参考文献数
1

So, if this is the way things are, the task before us is not simply a matter of demanding conviviality and arguing for social care and its various methods. In a society in which resentment and ill-will between nations worsens on a person by person level, we need to ask ourselves what position conviviality and social care has held within the long history of mankind. This paper takes for perspective the changes in the interactions between people and deities on the Japanese archipelago, and brings out some of the problems particular to the modern period that stand in the way of social care and a caring society. These days, all over the world, people are calling for multicultural conviviality and arguing for the importance of care in society. Take a look at society as it actually is, however, and we see mass-murder committed for no better reason than differences in ideology, creed, language or ethnicity; and we see seething enmity between nations over the possession of uninhabited islands. There was once a time when people thought that all problems would naturally be solved with the progress of reason and the development of society. In the mature Japanese society of today, however, class and income gaps widen, and on the internet there is an epidemic of malicious slander and hate campaigning. We live in an age in which development only seems to worsen social problems.
著者
久保 元彦
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1969, no.19, pp.263-276, 1969

Im Mittelpunkt der Philosophie Immanuel Kants steht die Problematik des Grundes des Daseins, um die sein Denken, sowohl in der vorkritischen als auch in der kritischen Periode, immer kreist. Die Frage nach dem Grunde des Daseins offenbart sich in der vorkritischen Periode als die nach dem letzten Grunde des Daseins &uuml;uherhaupt. In der traditionellen Metaphysik, und vor allem in der Lehre von Leibniz, gegen die Kant sich wendet, ist dieser letzte Grund das Wesen des ens necessarium. Kant sucht ihn dagegen in dessen Dasein. Nach seiner Ansicht ist das Dasein beim ens necessarium dem Wesen &uuml;bergeordnet. Diese These des unbedingten Vorranges des Daseins vor dem Wesen, die er auch durch seine eigenen Beweise vom Dasein Gottes best&auml;tigt zu sehen glaubt, stellt aber der traditionellen Metaphysik gegen&uuml;ber nichts gr&auml;ndsatzlich Neues dar. Denn diesen beiden Standpunkten liegt das Gemeinsame zugrunde: die Annahme, da&szlig; die Bestimmung des Zusammenhanges von Dasein und Wesen beim ens necessarium zugleich den eindeutigen Begr&uuml;ndungszusammenhang des Daseins des Seienden im Ganzen entstehen lasse. Insofern Kant nur unter dieser fundamentalen Annahme zur Anerkennung des unbedingten Vorranges des Daseins vor dem Wesen gelangt, bleibt die Weise, wie er auf die Frage nach dem Grunde des Daseins antwortet, noch immer im Rahmen der traditionellen Metaphysik stecken.<BR>In seiner Kritik an den &uuml;berlieferten Gottesbeweisen der spekulativen Theologie fa&szlig;t Kant diese unter einem einheitlichen Prinzip zusammen und widerlegt sie aus einem einzigen Grunde der Unbestimmbarkeit des Begriffes vom ens necessarium. Durch diese Kritik wird der Rahmen jener gemeinsamen fundamentalen Annahme uberschritten. Kant in seiner kritischen Periode mu&szlig; nun in einer grunds&auml;tzlichen Neuorientierung des Denkens nach dem Grunde des Daseins fragen. Ein neuer Ausblick auf das Problem dieses Grundes ergibt sich nur dann, wenn es sich erhellt, da&szlig; das synthetische Urteil zu diesem Problemkreis geh&ouml;rt. Nachdem jene fundamentale Annahme der vorkritischen Periode widerlegt wurde, kann der Satz &uuml;ber das Dasein Gottes nicht mehr als eill analytischer Satz angese-hen werden. Der Satz &uuml;ber das Dasein Gottes ist auch synthetisch. Kant mu&szlig; daher sagen: &ldquo;Ein jeder Existentialsatz ist synthetisch&rdquo;. Als ein Urteil &uuml;ber das Dasein &uuml;berhaupt wird das synthetische Urteil von besonderer Bedeutung. Die Frage nach dem M&ouml;glichkeitsgrunde des synthetischen Urteils erh&auml;lt in der Kr. d. r. V. eben darum eine Sonderstellung, weil sie mit dem Problem vom Grunde des Daseins, mit diesem Kernproblem der Kantischen Philosophie, verklammert ist.
著者
高橋 哲哉
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2003, no.54, pp.111-128,238, 2003-04-01 (Released:2009-12-08)

The Yasukuni Shrine has been a privileged device of wars and nationalism inmodern Japan and as such it remains today a focus of both national and international conflicts. The problems of this shrine are, on the one hand, to be considered as those of national worship of fallen soldiers which is common to modern nationstates in general, but on the other hand, they have particular Japanese features which are concerned with State-Shintoism.In this article, I examin these problems successively from four points of view. That is, (1) the worship of Japanese war criminals, (2) the constitutional principle of the separation of religion and politics, (3) the enshrining of the fallen soldiers who were mobilized from Korea and Taiwan by the Imperial Japan, and (4) the alternative idea of the new secular momument for national mourning of fallen soldiers.Finally, I would like to question the system of a nation-state which requires the sacrifices of its members, that is, the nation-state as civil religion.
著者
川本 隆史
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2001, no.52, pp.1-13,312, 2001

John Rawls' seminal work, <I>A Theory of Justice</I>, which was published in 1971 and has received widespread attention, brought a recovery of substantial moral philosophy to us. And subsequently began exciting debates over social and distributive justice. In my opinion, the three important issues brought about by this dispute are as below: 'Care vs. Justice', 'Plurality and Justice', and 'Evil and Justice'.<BR>My aim in this article is to examine Rawls' unique methodology, i.e. 'wide reflective equlibrium' and to investigate the first point ('Care vs. Justice').<BR>To this end, I confront firstly 'reflective equlibrium' with 'a new plan for post-war philosophy' (proposed by Shunsuke TSURUMI), secondly 'an ethic of care' (by Carol Gilligan)with 'self-motivated obligation' (by Satoru SAISHU), and lastly 'local justice' (by Jon Elster) with 'socializing nursing care within concrete relationships' and 'nursing care insurance system with a human face' (by Haruki MIYOSHI).<BR>In conclusion, I develop my motto, 'Don't make away and don't intrude' and argue for the integra-tion of care and justice again.
著者
川本 隆史
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.60, pp.33-50_L4, 2009

Confronting a host of difficult issues of widening disparities which emerge within domestic and international affairs, I attempt in this paper to flesh out the conception of a just and caring society by considering appropriate conditions for the taxation system thereof.<br>For this purpose I conjointly apply two methodologies: reflective equilibrium (Rawls) and &lsquo;dis-aggregation&rsquo; (attributed to Sen by Yoichi Mine). Firstly I examine three joint ideas bridging a gap between difference and equality in Rawlsian social justice; (1) fraternity, (2) reciprocity, and (3) democracy. Then I dig into Rawls' and Kant's theories of taxation in some detail and propose a way of reinterpreting the Rawlsian concerns with justice in terms of Sen's notion of capabilities. (In this regard Makoto Yuasa's Japanese translation of &lsquo;capability&rsquo; as &lsquo;tame&rsquo; is highly suggestive.) The classical ideal of fraternity proves in need of careful elaboration.

1 0 0 0 OA 決定論と自由

著者
吉田 夏彦
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1961, no.11, pp.1-10, 1961-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)
参考文献数
2
著者
鈴木 登
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1984, no.34, pp.173-183, 1984-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
著者
三谷 鳩子
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, no.57, pp.227-239,13, 2006

<I>In De Veritate</I>, Thomas mentions the "habitual self-cognition" along with the "actual self-cognition". However, he does not deal with the "habitual self-cognition" in <I>Summa Theologiae</I> any more. How should we interpret this change?<BR>He insists in <I>Summa Theologiae</I> that everything is known through its act, and not through its potentiality. As a habit fails in being a perfect act, it is also insufficient to be knowable. Therefore, "habitual self-cognition" can not be called a "self-cognition" in a strict sense, but it should be called a "self-knowledge".<BR>Moreover, Thomas says that a habit is present in our intellect, not as its "object", but as its "form". Thus, in <I>Summa Theologiae</I>, the "habitual self-cognition" lost its place as a "cognition", but plays a role of its "form".<BR>Along with these affirmations, Thomas states that there are two kinds of self-cognition, a particular one and a universal one. In the former case, the mere "presence of the mind" suffices, since the "habitual self-knowledge" plays a role of its "form"; one knows itself reflexively. In the latter case, one knows itself understanding through the act of cognition of other being, so that its possible intellect can be activated by its "species". Thus, one has to examine its nature carefully in order to determine what one should be, and even to "the image of God" in the light of the divine Truth.<BR>When we return to ourselves through the self-cognition, and reach the "Existence Itself" as a principle of intelligibility, we will find out what we should be, as participants of this "Existence". Hence, Thomas re-organized the frame of "self-cognition" in the manner of act, and re-defined more clearly the nature of man and the image of God in <I>Summa Theologiae</I>.
著者
松田 毅
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.65, pp.73-89_L7, 2014

While Spinoza, rejecting the project of "theodicy", insists on "absolute necessity"of the world from the view point of eternity, Leibniz, as the originator of the concept of "possible worlds," advocates the optimism, namely the logical contingency and moral necessity of the best of this world. Given this seemingly fatal opposition of two 17th century major metaphysicians about modalities, it is philosophically important to see the causes of this tension and, thereby to have some prospect for better understanding of the problems of modalities.<br>Firstly, from the representation of recent interpretations of "the necessity of finite modes" in Spinozaʼs <i>Ethica</i>, especially from Huenemannʼs about "the instantiation of geometrical essence" in the finite modes; secondly from contextual understandings of Leibnizʼs comments about texts such as IP29 of <i>Ethica</i>; and thirdly,characterizing the distinction between modal inferences of <i>consequentiae</i> and <i>consequentis</i> in Leibniz, I maintain that the ontologically irreducible status of agency of actions and the proper concepts of logical contingency turn out to be decisive in the controversy on modalities. Finally, it is argued that the modal sentences as such are seen by Leibniz as a type of reflexive proposition the truth values of which cannot be unconditionally decided.

1 0 0 0 OA 夢とうつつ

著者
山本 信
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1961, no.11, pp.45-61, 1961-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)

私がここで夢をとりあつかうのは、意識に関する一連の問題のうちの一環としてである。それも、たとえばフロイドの理論におけるように、内容的な側面からする夢の成立機構や意味についての問題ではなくて、夢における意識のあり方一般についての問題、もつと限定していえば、夢と知覚との区別の問題である。直接の機縁となつたのは、いわゆるデカルトの方法的懐疑であつて、それが成りたたないということを、私としては示したいのである。これは一つの小さな特殊問題にすぎない。しかし夢そのものに私の哲学的興味が向けられているわけではなく、目差すところはやはり正常な意識にある。その「正常さ」ということの意味や、意識存在の特性といつたことを考えるにあたつて、夢体験をどう性格づけるかが、少くとも一つの論点になると思われる。従つてこの考察は、知覚や想像や普遍概念などに関する認識論的な諸問題にも、また世界と人間とのかかわり方に関する存在論的な問題にも、直接間接に結びついてくるであろう、多少なりともそのことを示すため、最初に一節をついやし、哲学史を借りてこの問題の由来をのべ、また最後に、ここでえられた結論と関連のある幾つかの私見を附記しておく。
著者
井上 達夫
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2001, no.52, pp.14-17,312, 2001

Philosophical critics of the idea of justice have been motivated by a misperception of this idea: they depicted it as an ideological device for rationalizing our desire to castigate and dominate others in a pharisaic and self-righteous way. They "debunk" the hegemonic function of justice that reproduces and reinforces our self-centered will to power.<BR>I will correct this misperception by showing that the truth is the other way around. I argue that the test of reversibility implied by the universalistic idea of justice requires us to carry out a searching self-critical scrutiny of justifiability of our rights-claims and power-claims to others by imagining ourselves not just in their <I>places</I> but in their <I>perspectives</I>. This means that justice requires us to transcend our self-centeredness and seek for <I>public</I> reasons that are intelligible and acceptable both from our own and the others' viewpoints.<BR>I also argue that the idea of public justification inherent in the idea of justice guides us in designing a fair political decision-making system that accommodates and resolves the value conflicts about what constitutes public reasons. The political corollaries of the universalistic justice that serve this purpose are the liberal idea of the priority of jusitce over specific conceptions of the good life and the idea of critical democracy that integrates constitutional protection of minority rights on a fair and principled basis with the promotion of the public-spirited democratic deliberation that overcomes the vices of interest-group pluralism.
著者
浅田 稔
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2019, no.70, pp.14-34, 2019-04-01 (Released:2019-04-18)
参考文献数
46

In this article, I propose a working hypothesis that the nervous system of pain sensation is a key component to shape robots’ (artificial systems’) conscious minds through the developmental process of empathy, morality, and ethics based on the MNS that promotes the emergence of concept of self (and others). First, the limitation of the current progress of AI focusing on deep learning is pointed out from a viewpoint of the emergence of consciousness. Next, the outline of ideological background on issues of mind in a broad sense is shown. Then, cognitive developmental robotics (CDR) is introduced with two important concepts; physical embodiment and social interaction both of which help to shape conscious minds. Following the working hypothesis, existing studies of CDR are briefly introduced and missing issues are indicated. Finally, an issue how robots (artificial systems) could be moral agents is shown.
著者
花崎 皋平
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1971, no.21, pp.36-54, 1971-05-15 (Released:2009-07-23)
参考文献数
24
著者
長澤 英俊
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2001, no.52, pp.267-275,303, 2001

Science systematically re-organizes our ordinary experience. It seems to me that we can speak of the idea of a conceptual scheme here, while avoiding difficulties which Davidson points out. The idea of a conceptual scheme does not necessarily lead either to scheme-content dualism or to relativism. We have our ordinary experience as organized from the outset, not as totally unorganized. We do not need the notion of totally unorganized content. If a defender of the idea of a conceptual scheme distinguishes incomparability and incommensurability, he does not have to be committed to relativism. Davidson claims that translatability makes the difference of conceptual schemes nonsensical. But his identification of a conceptual scheme with a language is disputable. For we can use the words 'elm' and 'beech', even if we cannot tell an elm from a beech. The principle of charity that Davidson resorts to does not work well for such highly theoretical knowledge as science, though it is important in itself. The process of coming to know is analogous to an action in that it follows a certain set of norms. A conceptual scheme serves as a system of norms. Davidson ignores the normative aspect of conceptual schemes. For he accepts only causation as the source of knowledge.
著者
杉田 孝夫
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.62, pp.57-71_L4, 2011 (Released:2011-12-09)
参考文献数
9

Zwischen 1780 bis 1820 standen die drei Elemente, die den modernen deutschen Familienbegriff konstituierten, zur Verfügung. Besonders in den drei Familientheorien Kants (1797), Fichtes (1797) und Hegels (1821) finden wir die theoretische Entwicklung des Konzepts der Familie als die moderner Kleinfamilie (engl. nuclear family). Einerseits lässt sich der Entstehungsprozess der Vorstellung der Familie begriffsgeschichtlich nachvollziehen. Andererseits lässt sie sich auch in Beziehung zwischen der Familie und der modernen individualistschen und liberalistischen Gesellschaft erklären. Die Vorstellung von der Familie symbolisierte die neue freie individualistsche Gesellschaft in Abgrenzung zur alten ständischen und häuslichen Gesellschaft (ancien régime). Die Eheschließung des freien Mannes und mit der freien Fau, die einander herzlich lieben, schafft eine Familie, und sie produzieren freien Menschen (Kinder), ziehen sie groß und pflegen sie. Wenn das Kind erwachsen wird, unabhängig und frei, kommt die Rolle der Familie an ihr Ende.Aber die neue Gesellschaft hat eine neue moderne Geschlechterdifferenz produziert und strukturiert. Der Mann repräsentiert seine Familie in der öffentlichen Sphäre, und die Frau wird die Zentralfigur der Liebe und des Glaubens in der Familie, also in der privaten Sphäre. Das ist die Geburt des Mythos der Mütterlichkeit. Gerade zu Beginn war Die Vorstellung von der Familie die Basis für die Menschenbildung, die Freiheit und die Gemeisamkeit der Geschlechter, aber mit der Vergrößerung der Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten für Frauen und der Verbesserung der Bedingungen für sie in Ausbildung, Arbeit und allen anderen Tätigkeitsfelder wurde die Familie in der Vorstellung so etwas wie ein Symbol für die Hinderniss, welche die Freiheit der Frauen einschränkten. Warum?Aus der Gender-Perspektive und im Dialog mit der feministischen Kritik werden die Möglichkeiten und Problematik der Familie als Basis der Bildung und Freiheit des Individuums in unserem Zeitalter diskutiert.