著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.61, pp.149-164_L9, 2010 (Released:2011-01-18)

参考文献数

10

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According to the widely accepted correspondence theory of truth, each atomic contingent truth has its own truth-maker, i.e., an entity existing in the world that makes contingent proposition true. And at least for the metaphysical realist, the first and obvious candidates for truth-maker are entities called “facts” or “states of affairs”. These are entities normally designated by expressions like “a's being F” or “the fact that a is F”.Although it seems natural to assume that states of affairs exist, there is a famous objection to this assumption, known as “Bradley's regress”. Roughly put, the objection proceeds as follows. The states of affairs are supposed to be complex entities. However, what accounts for the unity of constituents in the state of affairs, say, Fa? If one appeals to the exemplification relation E to bind the constituents a and F together, the explanatory job is not yet finished. For, in that case, the unity of a, F, and E now raises the same problem. It is no use to add further and further exemplification relations E', E'', E'''..., because each time one adds a new relation, one gets only a new explanatory task, and never the unity of a and F. Thus, since the unity of constituents cannot be accounted for, the assumption that states of affairs exist should be regarded as groundless.Against this objection, F. Orilia replies as follows. Though the regress objection above seems to seriously threaten the assumption that states of affairs exist, in fact it does not. For, the thought that there is an infinite explanatory sequence does not involve any inconsistency. As for myself, I agree with him as far as his last claim is concerned, namely the claim that there is no inconsistency in the idea of infinite explanatory sequence. However, I disagree with him as far as the evaluation of the regress objection is concerned. I claim that the alleged explanatory sequence generated in the regress objection is in fact vacant in its explanatory power, and hence that this objection in any way shows the failure of explanatory task.

著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.62, pp.329-344_L19, 2011

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In Plato's <i>Gorgias</i> 474c4-475e6, the issue of whether it is worse to do injustice or suffer it is considered. Socrates and Polus discuss this issue, regarding it as a problem in relation to their own choice of action and way of life. Polus thinks that suffering injustice is worse than doing it. He also thinks, on the other hand, that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. Socrates shows him that it is by exceeding in evil that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. As a result, Polus concedes that doing injustice is worse than suffering it.<br>Here, we can find a surface and a deeper significance in the judgment that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. At the surface level, (1) a &lsquo;fine or shameful&rsquo; judgment has no effect on a judgment of good or bad, and (2) a &lsquo;fine or shameful&lsquo; judgment is not linked to one's choices of action and way of life. However, the judgment that doing injustice is more shameful indicates, deep down, a truer sense of good and bad which are not equated with pleasure and pain, i. e., the judgment reveals what is good and bad for the soul. In this discussion, Polus is, at first, only aware of the surface meaning of his own judgment that doing injustice is more shameful. Socrates shows him the deeper meaning.<br>We can find, here, a fundamental problem with rhetoric: rhetoric concerns persuasion about what is just and unjust, and, faced with public opinion, orators cannot deny that what is just is fine and what is unjust is shameful; but rhetoric cannot make clear the true meaning of the fineness of justice and the shamefulness of injustice, because it aims at pleasure without regard for the good for the soul. Rather, the fineness of justice and the shamefulness of injustice are based on taking care of the soul by political <i>techne</i>.

著者

奥 雅博

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1971, no.21, pp.163-171, 1971-05-15 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

42

著者

小野木 芳伸

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.11-20,1, 1995

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My claim here is that, as to the two characters of Er&ocirc;s "intermediate" and "procreation", the former expresses its character of desire distinguished from its object-thing and that the latter is the purpose (not the object-thing) of this desire. And the crucial points in this formula are: 1) it is not "right opinion" but "philosopher" that exemplifies the "intermediate" between ignorance and wisdom which expresses the desire proper to Er&ocirc;s; 2) the "procreation" which is the final purpose of Er&ocirc;s is not a succession of things of the same kind but the action of procreation itself (i.e. the true virtue).

著者

菅谷 慎

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.19, pp.219-234, 1969

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I attempted to interprete the &ldquo;Cratylus&rdquo; in which plato set forth his philosophy of language.

著者

中沢 務

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.44, pp.p166-175, 1994-04

著者

松井 貴英

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.243-255,32, 2004

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In Plato's <I>Phaedo</I> 74b2-3, at one stage of the argument for the theory of recollection, Socrates and Simmias agree that they have knowledge of equality itself. The aim of this paper is to answer the following two questions concerning this agree-ment : (1) What is equality itself, which they claim to know, the Platonic Form of Equality or some mathematical object different from Platonic Forms?(2) Is recollection a form of ordinary learning accessible to ordinary people or some kind of higher learning?<BR>In our approach to question (1), we deal first with 76b10-12. This passage suggests that only Socrates is capable of giving an account of Forms, including the Form of Equality, and this can be taken to imply that Simmias does not know this Form. The knowledge he has attained so far concerns only mathematical objects. This conclusion may be supported by 74c1-3, where the equality itself which Sim-mias is said to know is represented in the plural.<BR>As to question (2), Socrates says that whenever we recollect something through something like it, we necessarily recognize that the latter is defective in its similarity to the former (74a5-7), and this statement suggests that recollection is not simple concept formation, but rather a kind of higher learning, which requires reflective thought.<BR>Now in this process of recollection, where does Simmias, who doesn't have knowledge of Forms, stand? The 'Divided Line' in the <I>Republic</I> and the comparison with the slave boy in the <I>Meno</I> help us to answer this question : his state of mind corresponds to 'dianoia' in the 'Divided Line', but is nearer to 'noesis' than the slave boy in the <I>Meno</I>, who is supposed to have just begun his attempt to reach 'dianoia' starting from 'pistis'. Recollection is supposed to be a long and arduous process of learning in the journey toward 'dianoia' and 'noesis', starting from 'pistis'.

著者

山野 弘樹

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.243-253, 2020

著者

斎藤 慶典

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.48, pp.1-18, 1997-05-01 (Released:2010-01-20)

参考文献数

6

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古代から現代にいたるまでの哲学は、自我ないし人格の問題を、それぞれの時代に応じて、その時代に特有の概念装置を通して、思い考えかつ生きていた。自我・人格は、ときに「魂」であり、「小宇宙」であり、また「社会契約」の主体であり、「知覚の束」であった等々。自我の同一性という古くまた新しい問題をめぐって、「実体」「因果」「反省」等の概念が交錯する。これらの思考の遺産を、今日的状況の中から、 (ときに東洋的思考の伝統との接点をさぐりながら) 、あらためて根底にたちかえって検討してみたい。

著者

斎藤 慶典

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.37, pp.186-198, 1987-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.179-192,28, 2004

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Being a highly traditional question of metaphysics, the so-called &ldquo;Ultimate Why-Question&rdquo; still interests some contemporary philosophers. To ask this question amounts to asking where, if anywhere, &ldquo;why-chains&rdquo; can stop.<BR>Whereas the most traditional approach to the Ultimate Why-Question has been to try to answer it by &ldquo;God&rdquo;, i. e., &ldquo;Necessary Existence/Being&rdquo;; the most usual ap-proach in contemporary analytical philosophy has been to dismiss it as a nonsense pseudo-problem because it is &ldquo;logically unanswerable&rdquo;. I call the former tradition as a whole the &ldquo;old tradition&rdquo; and the latter the &ldquo;new tradition&rdquo;.<BR>In this article, I propose a &ldquo;third alternative&rdquo;, by suggesting that the Ultimate Why-Question is not necessarily unanswerable but can be answered by a kind of &ldquo;Necessary Existence/Being&rdquo;, which cannot be anything in particular at all (in-cluding even &ldquo;God&rdquo;) but only the &ldquo;Absolute Totality of Reality&rdquo;.<BR>The following three procedures would be required to make the above sugges-tions assertions:<BR>(1) to show whether the &ldquo;Absolute Totality of Reality&rdquo; exists at all, <BR>(2) to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be the &ldquo;Nec-essary Existence/Being&rdquo; that would stop all possible why-chains, <BR>(3) to decide whether only the &ldquo;Absolute Totality of Reality&rdquo; satisfies the above conditions.

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.51, pp.278-288, 2000

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いかなる部分的存在者でもない存在者全体は存在するか。つまり、世界全体は、その個々の部分と同じく存在するだろうか。これは、形而上学全般にとって重要であり得るにもかかわらず、十分に検討されてこなかった問題である。本稿で我々は、この問題を主として現代の英米系の哲学の流れをもとに検討する。<BR>我々はまず、存在者全体、世界全体の存在の問題を明確にし ( (1) )、その上で、その存在についての主要な疑問点を考察し ( (2) ~ (3) )、その考察から得た結論を示す ( (4) ) ことにする。

著者

加藤 裕

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1966, no.16, pp.103-110, 1966

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Anaxagoras wurde bei anderem Namen &ldquo;&Nu;&omicron;&upsilon;&sigma;f;&rdquo; gennant, denn er glaubte, da&szlig; die urspr&uuml;ngliche Stoffe des Weltalls unendlich viele Keime (&sigma;&pi;&epsilon;&rho;&mu;&alpha;&tau;&alpha;) oder Substanzen (&chi;&rho;&eta;&mu;&alpha;&tau;&alpha;) war, und der Nus (&nu;&omicron;&upsilon;&sigma;f; ) anfangs an diesen Keime eine Wilbelbewegung hervorbrachte. Es ist eben die Frage, ob es ganz recht ist, den Nus ins Deutsche &ldquo;Vernunft&rdquo; zu &uuml;bersetzen.-Bisher ist er, nebenbei bemerkt, mit &ldquo;Geist&rdquo; oder &ldquo;Verstand &rdquo; &uuml;bersetzt worden. (Siehe Hauptrede Anmerkung (23), (45)) -<BR>Der Nus des Anaxagoras ist eine Ursache, welche alles anordnet, und eine Kraft der Weltentstehung, d.i. der <Keime-Komposition> (&delta;&iota;&alpha;&kappa;&omicron;&sigma;&mu;&eta;&sigma;&iota;&sigma;f; ), dagegen ist der des Platon die menschliche Bildungskraft auf dem Ideeblick. Man kann von Nus nicht den moralischen Mut zur Pflichterf&uuml;llung, seinen immanenten Charakter erwarten. Vielleicht ist er eine kosmische Kraft zum Endzwecke der Natur, wie die <I>causa finalis</I> in der Bewegungslehre des Aristoteles. Diese Kraft aber ist f&uuml;r ihn die theoretische Vernunft, die die h&ouml;chst menschliche Seele als eine von der &ldquo;Psyche (&psi;&nu;&chi;&eta;)&rdquo; ist, w&auml;hrend die Psyche selbst bei Anaxagoras, sozusagen, die <Seelen-Keime> ist, welche kraft des Nus angeordnet wird. Man kann auch von Nus mit Aristoteles nicht die g&ouml;ttliche Transzendenz des stofflosen Geistes, der reinen Form, erwarten. Der Nus ist folglich der konstruierende Verstand oder die kosmische Vernunft, im Vergleich mit der theoretischen oder moralischen Vernunft. Das ist die Grenze der unseren Auslegung des Nus von Anaxagoras, abgesehen von seinem Beiname-Gedanke.

著者

加藤 裕

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1959, no.9, pp.1-5, 1959

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周知の通りヘラクレイトスの根本思想は、「万物流転 (ηαντα ρετ) 」である.それは「万物がロゴスに従って (κατα τον λογον) 生起する」 (H. Diels: Fr. der Vorsokratiker. Fr. 1) ことである.それ故「万物流転」の思想を把握する最大の鍵は「ロゴス」にあると言うことができる.「万物」及び「流転」ということに根拠がないと言う訳ではもとよりないのであるが、言わば「万物流転」という根源体験に理性的照明を与えるものが、「ロゴス」であると言うことはできるのではあるまいか.小論は、その「ロゴス」に焦点を合せたヘラクレイトス研究の覚書である.

著者

鈴木 貴之

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.193-205,29, 2004

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Some anti-physicalists claim that the conceivability of zombies itself shows in an a priori way that physicalism about consciousness cannot be true. We have to see if this argument is successful before we start to build a physicalistic theory of con-sciousness. There are two popular physicalist objections to the argument. The ob-jection based on necessity a posteriori does not succeed because of the equivocality of the statements in question.Another objection, based on non-ascriptivism about meaning, fails because non-ascriptivism mistakenly thinks that conceivability is a quite empty notion. Despite the failure of these objections, we can object to the con-ceivability argument by emphasizing the possible inappropriateness of concepts. Our present concepts do not necessarily depict reality in an appropriate way. So, conceivability based on our present concepts has no consequences for metaphysical possibility if the concepts used are inappropriate ones. We have reason to think that our current concept of consciousness is inconsistent, so the conceivability of zom-bies is not a reliable guide to their metaphysical possibility. We may see that physi-calism about consciousness is true and zombies are inconceivable when we have the appropriate concept of consciousness.

著者

藤野 渉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.12, pp.55-68, 1962-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

7

著者

中村 秀吉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1971, no.21, pp.93-107, 1971-05-15 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

7

著者

加藤 将之

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1957, no.7, pp.23-31, 1957

著者

石田 隆太

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.67, pp.153-163, 2016-04-01 (Released:2017-06-13)

参考文献数

2

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This paper examines diverse meanings of the term individuatio (individuation) in Thomas Aquinas’s writings. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on the extent to which diverse meanings of individuatio can be found. In On the Book of Causes (Super librum de causis), Lecture 9, Aquinas presents two kinds of individuatio. One is the case where something (i.e. forma) is received in subiectum and becomes individual. The other is the case where something does not need to be received in subiectum, but is already individual. Similarly, Aquinas posits individuatio through matter (materia), and individuatio by itself separately in A Disputed Question on Spiritual Creatures (Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis), Article 5. Moreover, in Summa of Theology (Summa theologiae), Part I, Question 3, Article 3, Aquinas indicates that the latter individuatio is the individuatio of form (forma) by itself. From these writings, it is obvious that there are a variety of individuationes in Aquinas’s thought.The second section proposes the possibility of formulating diverse principles of individuation (principium individuationis) according to the diverse meanings of individuatio. The proposal is as follows: the principle of individuation can be formulated as matter in material substances, as form (strictly speaking, a separated form different from being) in angels, and as being (esse) in God. This section mainly discusses some related and important texts from On Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Super libros Aristotelis metaphysicae), Book VII, Lecture 11, and Summa against Gentiles (Summa contra gentiles), Book IV, Chapters 10 and 14. The former discussion examines a difficulty in understanding form as the principium individuationis in angels, and seeks to defend that concept. The latter discussion shows how the concept of principium individuationis is applied to God. From these discussions, we can infer that there are also a variety of principia individuationis.

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.70, pp.205-219, 2019

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<p>Aristotle's <i>APo</i>. claims that scientific knowledge requires a cause serving as the middle term in the demonstration. <i>APo</i>. II 11 considers how the well-known "four causes" should be understood in the theory of demonstration. What is key is the relation of the final cause to the other three causes. This paper discusses how the theory of demonstration handles these causes by considering their status and interrelation. </p> <p>Aristotle examines the four causes from the perspective of the major and minor terms in a demonstration. The grounding cause states the essence of the minor term, and the essential and efficient causes state the essence of the major term. However, there are difficulties in considering the final cause. For, in the example of being healthy, illustrating the final cause involves two demonstrations. In the first demonstration, the middle term (food not staying on the surface) explains the essence of the major term (being healthy). In the second demonstration, however, the middle term (being healthy) does not explain the essence of the major term (food not staying on the surface) or the minor term (walking after dinner). In order to answer this problem, we have to mention two points: First, the final cause appears last in generation but arises first as the initial point of the explanation; secondly, the final cause explains the processes to the end as for the end. By considering these facts, I show that the second demonstration explains the major term and the minor term by the middle term from the viewpoint of temporal order that the first demonstration establishes. </p> <p>This paper argues that <i>APo</i>. II 11 divides the four causes into the final cause and the other three causes and claims that the second demonstration includes "hypothetical necessity". Consequently, this paper shows that Aristotle aims to exclude chance from a demonstration having the final cause as the middle term by introducing hypothetical necessity. </p>