著者
出岡 学
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.112, no.4, pp.477-497, 2003-04-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

This article intends to analyze the religious policy of the Japanese Navy, which occupied Micronesia in 1914, in relation to the international situation at that time. At the beginning of its occupation, the Navy permitted German missionaries to inhabit the Islands and educate the natives out of "respect for civil rights". However, after schools were established in the Islands by the Japanese, the missionaries were sent into exile from the Islands. Their absence caused difficulties in ruling over the native people, so the Navy decided to introduce Japanese priests into the Islands. After the Germans were exiled from the territory occupied by the Allies, the Japanese Navy commanded the German missionaries to leave the Islands in June 1919. The introduction of Japanese missionaries was determined by the Japanese cabinet out of fear that American missionaries would flood the Islands. Because their activities were remarkable in the movement for the independence in Korea beginning on March 1, 1919. To banish missionaries of American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions from the Islands, the Navy, first, negotiated with the Japanese Congregational Church, but the Treaty of Versailles obliged the Navy to assign Catholic missionaries to Catholic Churches. So the Navy also began negotiations with the Vatican. Consequently, Japanese missionaries of the Japanese Congregational Church and Roman Catholic Spanish missionaries were introduced into the Islands. The author concludes that the Japanese Navy became interested in introducing missionaries into Micronesia, not simply because ruling the natives would have been difficult without religion, but because the international situation in those days compelled the Navy to introduce missionaries into the Islands, with extreme subtlety and minute attention.
著者
吉田 賢司
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.115, no.4, pp.443-485, 2006

This article is an attempt to clarify the transformation that took place in military operations under the Muromachi shogunate after the violent protests for the remission of the debts that took place around Kyoto in 1441 (Kakitsu-no-Ran), from the time when the shogun's administrative advisors (kanrei) took control of the shogunate until Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimasa assumed leadership. Day to day military affairs during the "kanrei regime" were administered by Bakufu functionaries (bugyonin) and members of the kanrei's personal entourage (uchishu). However, in the midst of the political instability that followed the uprising, it became difficult to gain a consensus among the feudal lords (daimyo) and thus organize an allied army made up of troops led by provincial military governors (shugo). There-fore, regional conflicts that arose during this time would be pacified by local samurai (kokujin) from the nearby provinces coming to the support of the military governor of the province in question. In 1455, when Yoshimasa established firm control of the shogunate, the military system was reorganized mainly by Kanrei Hosokawa Katsumoto and the shogun's close advisor Ise Sadachika, meaning that in addition to the conventional "kanrei route" of reporting incidents to the shogun, a new route was established through Sadachika. However, between 1456 and 1461, the former route gave way to the latter, to the extent that the kanrei's position in military affairs became unclear, while Sadachika became Yoshimasa's advisor in military decision making and information reporting. During that time, troops under allied command of military governors were often deployed to quell regional conflicts, a widespread practice which caused mutiny among troops discontented over conscription, as local-based samurai were being conscripted repeatedly, to a degree of exhaustion. The period from the beginning of Yoshimasa's regime until 1460 was also a time marked by dysfunctionality in the Bakufu's system of military mobilization. It was for the purpose of correcting this problem that coercion was used to muster local-based samurai into service for the shogunate. Yoshimasa's efforts to pacify unruly provincial feudal lords, take back and directly manage proprietorships of religious institutions and mobilize local-based samurai met with failure, and he wound up faced with the rebellion of 1467 (Onin-no-Ran) without a solid military organization made up of those political forces. Yoshimasa's over-reliance on Sadachika had sorely weakened the military role of the kanrei in the Bakufu and caused its eventual hollowing out by the outbreak of the rebellion. The Hosokawa family was forced to conduct its functions as kanrei in isolation from the Bakufu's central bureaucracy. And although Yoshimasa was able to regain his control of the Bakufu through such extreme polarization and the efforts of Ise Sadamune, the Muromachi shogunate would never again play the leading role in conducting military operations.
著者
西村 陽子
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.118, no.4, pp.513-550, 2009

This article examines every aspect of the history of ninth and tenth century northern China based on the recently discovered Zhimo 支謨 Epitaph. During the ninth and tenth centuries, the region of Daibei 代北 (the northern part of what is now Shanxi 山西 province) was politically, militarily and commercially one of the most important regions throughout eastern Eurasia. It was the center of a military clique during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, and during that time, was the staging ground for repeated campaigns of advancing nomadic tribes. It is no exaggeration that the history of ninth and tenth century Daibei determined the China's historical development during the centuries that followed. Therefore, the task of decoding the Zhimo Epitaph and clarifying the movements of the nomadic powers of Daibei during the last decades of the Tang Dynasty will enable a more systematic understanding of those events occurring in ninth and tenth century northern China that would deeply influence the historical development of East Asia in the centuries to come. The author begins by transcribing the rubbed copy version Zhimo Epitaph into a text, in order to discuss 1) how the Shatuo 沙陀 Turks intended to seize the economic foundations of the Tang Dynasty from the very beginning of their territorial expansion during its last years, 2) how the historiography concerning that expansion was altered considerably as it was transmitted through the regimes formed by the Shatuo Turks during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, by comparing the Zhimo Epitaph with other extant sources, and 3) the concrete image of the upheaval staged by the Shatuo Turks at the end of the Tang period and how that upheaval influenced the history of East Asia during the following centuries. Therefore, due to the excavation of the Zhimo Epitaph, it has become possible to gain new perspectives on the formation of the Five Kingdoms.
著者
山田 康弘
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.112, no.11, pp.1790-1811, 2003-11-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

In this study, article, the author investigates the meaning that commands issued by the Ashikaga Shoguns had for the daimyo during the Warring States period from two perspectives: the relationship between them out of "utilization and restriction", and the mutual relationship of confrontation among daimyo focusing primarily on those of Western Japan as well as the nature of the effect that trends in such commands had on the behavior. In other words, (1) even during this period, daimyo required a stable relationship with the Shogun due to various circumstances such as the need to obtain legitimacy and to keep hostile forces in check and there was a tendency for them to take advantage of the shogun. (2) While they took advantage of this relationship with the Shogun, however, daimyo were also subjected to various restrictions such as the need to honor the commands of the Shogun (or, the need to honor the wishes of third parties through such commands). This made the commands of the Shogun an important tool in diplomatic relations with daimyo as confrontations between them broadened in scale and increased in complexity during the period. (3) In addition, Daimyo in the Kinki area (Kinai) gained the ability to control these commands by cooperating in the existence of the Shogun and, thereby, promoted collaboration with various other daimyo through the commands, which had become an important tool in the diplomatic relations between daimyo or secured opportunities for them to exercise influence over other daimyo. Various factors such as (1)? (3) above acted to further draw many more daimyo to the side of the Shogun, even after the advent of the Warring States, becoming a factor in the maintenance of a certain degree of influence by the Shogun over the daimyo. This influence of the Shogun on the Daimyo was extremely useful for the daimyo in their diplomatic strategies and was an authority unique to the Shogun on a dimension completely different from the control of the daimyo over their territories. It was therefore not easy for the daimyo to acquire such authority. However, by backing the Shogun, Oda Nobunaga succeeded in gaining the influence 'that the Shogun had over the daimyo and, while gradually exercising that influence, he moved ahead with the task of unifying the nation.
著者
板垣 哲夫
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.86, no.11, pp.1597-1628,1689-, 1977

By examining with whom and how frequently Okubo Toshimichi met with different people during the December 1867 (Keio 3)-March 1877 (Meiji 10) period, the author has come to the following conclusions about Okubo's political relationships. First, his political relations with court nobles and feudal lords (daimyo) who had held high places in the traditional hierarchy of status and authority, including Iwakura Tomomi and Sanjo Sanetomi, became gradually estranged. The decline of the influence of nobles and feudal lords in politics and the contrasting rise of Okubo's influence can be regarded as causes of that trend. Second, Okubo's relations with those who came from the same Kagoshima clan were very intimate throughout this period. After around January 1876, however, he came to rely slightly less on these relations, because with his rise in politics it became more and more possible for him to win over competent officials directly without using intermediaries based on factional ties. Third, those who came from the Yamaguchi, Saga and Kochi clans worked in cooperation with Okubo during the period of the Boshin Wars. After the Boshin Wars antagonism between Okubo and Kido Takayoshi increased. At the same time opposition to the government led by these two men increased from those outside the government. Many men from these three clans played important roles in this arena of political rivalry, and it seems that the inclination towards supporting Okubo was comparatively strong among those from Saga compared to the other two clans. As his relations with the Kido group improved from around December 1870 and the centralization of the government increased, the number of officials from the three clans who attempted to secure closer relations with Okubo increased gradually. However, this trend was also influenced by Okubo's rivalry with the Kido group, the Saigo group and others in the government. Especially after the debate on the expedition to Korea, the status of Okubo rose while the strength of those who had opposed him declined and officials from the three clans tried to consolidate their relations with Okubo. Fourth, clans other than Kagoshima, except for the above-mentioned three, had relatively few persons of importance in the government. Few from such clans played important roles in the political rivalries after the Boshin Wars to 1871. On the whole the relationships between Okubo and those from such clans were not intimate. But as his political status rose rapidly after the expedition to Korea debate, many of them developed closer relationships with him as officials in the middle rank. Fifth, those who had intimate political relations with Okubo shifted, from those who held a high rank in pre-Restoration organizations to those in lower ranks.
著者
高山 博
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.101, no.11, pp.1883-1920,2048, 1992

The baillis and seneschals were the key men in the field administration of Medieval France. It has been generally understood that despite their different denominations in the south and the north, they had almost identical functions in the royal administration. The author calls this general understanding into question, and makes clear differences in their administrative functions. He suggests that we should treat the baillis and seneschals as different officials, because the region of bailliages and that of senechaussees were under different administrative systems. He proposes a new framework to understand the administrative structure of Philip IV.
著者
黒岩 高
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.111, no.9, pp.1499-1521,1588, 2002-09-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

Known as the greatest incident in Chines Muslim history, the Muslim rebellion in the Shaanxi and Gansu provinces (1862-1878) has also attracted attention as being one of the peasantry rebel. lions near the end of the Qing dynasty. However, by analyzing the outbreak and spread of the rumors frequently occurring before and during the rebellion, a different image of the Muslim re bellion can be conceived, There was orderly discipline between Han and Hui in the Wei River area before the rebellion, even though occasional strife, such as feuds, and a strong sense of having a different culture and society among each other existed. Focusing on the change of content of the rumors, the Muslim riots in the Wei River area in 1862 was the outbreak of the Han and Hui differentiating each other and destroying the order that had existed between them. Each society fighting for its survival, it can be said that this rebdlion had the characteristic of an "ethnic conflict". Also taking into account of the impact and spread. ing process of the "Wash away Muslims" rumors on the Han and Hui societies, this rebellion was closely related to the formation of militias. Occurring a midst of the militarization process, the Muslim rebellion of the Wei River area shared aspects similar to the other rebellions occurred all over China in this period.
著者
旗手 瞳
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.123, no.1, pp.38-63, 2014

This article focuses attention on the Mgar Family, which during the late 7th century monopolized power within the Tibetan Empire (吐蕃) after it rose up on the Tibetan Plateau and embarked on the conquest of the kingdom of Tuyuhun 吐谷渾, which was accomplished in 670. Specifically, the author analyzes 1) how the Mgars were involved in ruling Tuyuhun, 2) what policies the Tufan Empire enacted after its invasion of Tuyuhun and 3) how the purge of the Mgars in 698 influenced the way in which Tuyuhun would be ruled. With respect to objective 1), Mgar Stong rtsan acted as commander-in-chief of the Tuyuhun expedition between 659 and 666; and after his death in 667, military activities in the occupied areas of Tuyuhun were commanded by his sons Mgar Khri 'bring and ^*Mgar Btsan ba. Next, regarding objective 2), after the conquest, the Tibetan Empire enthroned its own king of Tuyuhun, while at the same time embarking on a proactive agenda aiming at taking full advantage of Tuyuhun as a base of operations for the invasion of Tang China. The author argues that in the Mgars played a leading role, similar to their military command, in the implementation of this agenda. Finally, concerning objective 3), as the result of the 698 purge, the Mgar Family, which had taken charge of the Tibetan agenda for Tuyuhun, was for all intents and purposes completely removed from power, and the incident also provided the Tuyuhun people with the opportunity for a large scale estrangement from the Tibetan Empire. Consequently, the author argues that a major crisis in Tibetan rule over Tuyuhun followed from the 698 purge. After the fall of the Mgar Family, the 'Bro, Dba's and Cog ro Families took control of the Tibetan Empire's central government; and during almost every year between 706 and 714 dispatched ministers appointed from among their family members to Tuyuhun, in addition to arranging the marriage of a Cog ro woman to the king. The author argues that through these diplomatic moves, the Tibetan Empire was able to reestablish relations of trust with Tuyuhun. Consequently, around 714 the Tibetan Empire was once again able to reopen its invasion of Tang China with Tuyuhun as its front line base of operations.
著者
大津 透
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.95, no.12, pp.p1831-1880, 1986-12

Because of a shortage of the materials, former studies of the financial administration before the Kai-yuan (開元) period do not elucidate how the administrative departments actually worked. The legislative documents of the period excavated in the Turfan basin in 1972 are thought to be possibly part of the Ordinance of the Department of Public Revenue (度支式). In a former monograph, the writer took up the fragments with 'ampero' marks on of the Ohtani Documents (which the Ohtani Expeditionary Party excavated in Turfan and brought back to Japan in the early twentieth century), and restored them to their original form, which was found to be the main part of the above-said legislative documents. In this monograph the writer studies the documents left in Japan and China, to show that they refer to the national budget during the Yi-feng (儀鳳) period and to throw a light on that budget system, the actual operation of the financial administration and the annual schedule concerning the budget under the Code-Statute (律令) regime of the Tang Dynasty. The documents show the facts that 1)the Department of Public Revenue (度支) reported the national budget for the next year 674 to the throne (in this case, the prince) in the zou-chao (奏抄) form on the 28th day of the tenth month of 673 (儀鳳3) and the throne assigned it ; 2)the Department of Treasury (金部) sent an imperial directive (旨符) to enforce the budget to Xi prefecture (西州), the prefecture received the imperial directive and carried it into effect ; and 3)though the directive was sent to Xi prefecture, it seems to involve the whole national budget applied all through the Tang's territory. The documents not only include the detailed orders concerning conversions of the kind of yong-diao (庸調) tax, official purchases, transportation of the tax, the expense of its transportation and the other various expenditures, but also refer to the permanently applicable regulations about the tax register (計帳), the account-list (勾帳), the delivery date of the goods of tax to the capital or other places and so on. That is to say, they include all kinds of orders concerning financial administration. Important is the procedure that the Emperor examine and assign all the orders every year. By that procedure the Emperor Supervised the financial administration under the Tang Dynasty. The writer makes clear the annual schedule concerning the budget system in the documents. First, every prefecture presents its tax register (計帳) to the Board of Finance (戸部) in the fifth month, and the Board calculates the number of the taxable individuals, on which the budget should be made for the next year. Secondly, every prefecture balances its account at the end of a year, and presents the account-list (勾帳) to the Department of Judical Control (比部) for audit, and the balance is carried over to the revenue of the next year. Thirdly, several departments report their annual expenditures and balances to the Department of Public Revenue in the first decade of the eighth month. According to these reports, the Department of Public Revenue draws up the budget for the next year and reports it to the throne in the zou-chao form by the end of the tenth month. In the beginning of the next year the Department of Treasury sends the imperial directive to enforce the budget to every prefecture. Every prefecture collects the goods for the yong-diao (庸調) tax in the eighth month and transports them to the capital or other designated places in the ninth month. This system of annual budgeting became more and more laborious and clumsy and was abolished in the year 736 (開元24). A new system started, based on 'permanently applicable directives' (長行旨条) consisting of five chapters. The major part of the budget became fixed. In the year 780 (建中元) the liang-shui (両税) tax system was established and the financial administration was fundamentally changed on the policy of 'regulating income by measuring expenditure' (来
著者
平井 上総
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.118, no.4, pp.576-589, 2009-04-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

This article attempts a textual criticism of the Chosokabe Motochika Shikimoku (hereafter Keicho Shikimoku) purported to have been promulgated in Tosa Province during the Toyotomi Hideyoshi regime in the second year of Keicho (1597). The article begins with a comparison between Chosokabe family institutions and the content of the Keicho Shikimoku, by focusing on a set of provincial-wide bylaws (Chosokabe-shi Okitegaki) promulgated during that same time. The comparison reveals marked differences between the two documents in both wording and institutional arrangements. The author concludes that the content of the Keicho Shikimoku conflicts with Chosokabe family custom in many ways. Next, a comparison is made between the Keicho Shikimoku and the legal codes promulgated by the Yamauchi family for it Tosa Han fief during the Tokugawa Period, revealing similarities between the two documents in both content and form. The author concludes that the so-called "Keicho Shikimoku" was not a legal code of the Chosokabes, but must have been compiled after the formation of Tosa Han sometime during the 17^<th> century or after. In order to pinpoint the date of compilation, the author compares the Keicho Shikimoku with revisions made in the Tosa Han legal codes between Kan'ei 18 (1641) and Genroku 3 (1690), and discovers that the greatest similarity occurs with respect to the revisions made in Kanbun 3 (1663). Moreover, the fact that the Keicho Shikimoku prohibition on samurai attending dance performances and sumo wrestling tournaments reflects the actual situation during the several years following Kanbun 3 also suggests that the 1663 legal code for Tosa Han was its source. As to the reason why the Keicho Shikimoku was written, the author argues that it was an attempt by local samurai facing extinction in the midst of the political upheaval that occurred in Tosa during Kanbun 3 to reinforce their legitimacy by emphasizing historical ties to the Chosokabe family. The author concludes that the Keicho Shikimoku was a fictitious legal code modeled after legal codes in force in Tosa Han during the late 17^<th> century and shows that the Chosokabe family did not use the phrase "ichiryo gusoku" 一領具足 (allowing cultivators to arm themselves; later how local samurai-cultivators referred to themselves) in any of the legal codes it promulgated or any official document it issued, indicating that ichiryo gusoku was merely a popular phrase, not an official legal institution.
著者
鈴木 蒼
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.129, no.3, pp.38-62, 2020 (Released:2021-09-09)

本稿は、文化史上特に重要とされながら、これまで研究が僅少であった、平安時代における書筆に優れ文字を巧みに書いた人々、「能書」の性質について考察を行ったものである。当該期における「能書」は、種々の依頼(命令)に応じてさまざまな文書の清書を行うという、彼らにしか行い得ない独自の社会的役割を持っていた。こうした彼らの書に関する能力は、九世紀初頭より十世紀後葉頃までは、紀伝道を中心とする大学での学習、あるいは親族間による書の技術の伝習という、二つの方法を中心として育成された。この二つを巧みに利用した小野氏をはじめとするいくつかの一族は、能書の一族として九・十世紀の間勢力を保持した。また、彼らはその能力を、天皇・皇太子といった権力者と人格的関係を築く一助としても活用した。 十一世紀前後より、能書は自身の臣従する主君(権門)の命令による清書のみを行うようになる。また、十一世紀中葉までに摂関家に臣従した能書とその後裔以外の人物は、能書としては没落してしまう。こうした変化の背景として、十世紀後葉以降、権門が官人を掌握するようになるという、貴族社会の質的変容が考えられる。 またこの時期、故実や特定の血統といった単純な書の能力以外のものが、能書にも求められるようになる。その中で、藤原行成という優れた能書を祖に持ち、故実の創出を行った世尊寺家(藤原行成子孫)が、十一世紀後葉には有力な能書の一族として立ち現れてくる。しかしそのために、九・十世紀に比べ、大学出身者の能書は大幅に減少する。また、鳥羽・後白河院政期には、院近臣の一族である勧修寺流藤原氏が、摂関家の能書藤原忠通との人格的関係や、複数の権門と良好な関係を築いたことによって、書の一族として急成長する。しかし、後白河院政の終了後、彼らは急速に能書役から退いたため、平安時代以降に書の一族として残ったのは世尊寺家のみであった。