著者

佐々木 隆

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.88, no.3, pp.309-323,408-40, 1979-03-20 (Released:2017-10-05)

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The political influence of the Japanese military rapidly expanded amid the tense domestic and international events following the Manchurian incident of 1931. For the purposes of coordinating national defense, foreign and financial policies, the Saito Cabinet in October, 1933. convoked the "Five-Minister Conference" as an inner cabinet. An additional significance of the meeting was its role in the political fortunes of Army Minister Araki Sadao and his personal clique within the Army. Following Araki's appointment as Army Minister in December, 1931, the group surrounding the Generals Araki, his close friend Masaki Jinzaburo and Hayashi Senjuro-they are to be called the protetype of the "Imperial Way Faction" -was elevated by factional patronage to a position of dominance within the Army. The institution of the Five-Minister Conference offered Araki, the group's leader, an excellent opportunity to increase his power. The Conference also had its dangers to Araki, however. When he failed to gain the Conference's approval of increased armaments to implement the Army's demands for a hard line against the Soviet Union, Araki found himself politically stymied. He had attended the Five-Minister Conference in anticipation of Foreign Minister Hirota Koki's support and hence had taken no precautions. With the refusal of Finance Minister Takahashi on financial grounds, the Army's request was effectively rejected, and the Foreign Minister also withheld his support. Araki next pinned his hopes for recovery on securing approval for his proposals of domestic reform from the Domestic Policy Conference, held in November and December. Once again, his plans could not gain a firm financial base and were defeated. Araki found himself faced with a dilemma. He believed his resignation would bring down the Saito Cabinet, but he was apparently unwilling to take this action in the fear that new minister might be from an anti-or non-Araki faction. On the other hand, if he stayed on in his present state without prospect his strong position within the Army would be badly shaken. The problem seemed conveniently solved when Araki was incapacitated by an attack of influenza in January, 1934. His successor Hayashi Senjuro, on the contrary, allied himself with Nagata Tetsuzan and Tojo Hideki. Then they formed what I call "the early Control Faction" and together they entered into competition with Araki and Masaki as the "Imperial Way Faction (in a narrow sense)" began to break up. It had been the Five-Minister Conference which had led to these developments.

著者

山田 邦明

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.96, no.3, pp.310-341,412-41, 1987-03-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

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Conventional research on Kamakura-Fu (鎌倉府), which ruled the ten eastern provinces of the Kanto region during the Muromachi period, has tended to concentrate more on its relationship with the Muromachi Bakufu in Kyoto and less on what kind of power structure supported it and how this government controlled the various classes in the Kanto area. The present paper starts out to consider Kamakura-Fu's power structure and its control over the Kanto Plain, especially the power base of the Kamakura Kubo (鎌倉公方). Then, the author switches attention to the Hoko-shu (奉公衆) itself, which formed the military and political base of the Kamakura Kubo's ruling power ; and together with identifying that group of attendants from existing documents, he summarizes the Hoko-shu's conditions of existence and its organizational process. Concerning the Hoko-shu's conditions of existence, from the historical source entitled Kamakura Nenchu Gyoji (鎌倉年中行事), describing yearly events and ceremonies in that administrative town, we find three statuses within the Hoko-shu, namely 1)the Hyojo-shu (評定衆), 2)the Hikitsuke-shu (引付衆) and 3)other members. We see clear status discrimination toward those "other members" excluded from (or positioned below) statuses 1) and 2). Also, as the Hoko-shu formed a rotation system for guarding the Kubo's palace (gosho 御所), there were also members located (or living) in the provinces. The author was able to identify from the available sources 74 members of the Kamakura-Fu Hoko-shu. Their names and conditions of membership may be summarized as follows : A)The Ashikaga clan families including the Kira (吉良), Shibukawa (渋川), Isshiki (一色), Imagawa (今川), Kako (加子) and Hatakeyama (畠山). B)The original Ashikaga family vassals including the Uesugi (上杉), Ko (高), Kido (木戸), Noda (野田), Teraoka (寺岡), Kajiwara (梶原), Ebina (海老名), Shidara (設楽) and Yanada (簗田). C)Traditional Kamakura based bureaucrats including the Nikaido (二階堂), Nagai (長井), and Machino (町野). All of the families included in A, B and C served the Kamakura Kubo from the inception of Kamakura-Fu ; and during the era of Kubo Motouji (1349-67), the B group of Ashikaga vassals formed the dominant power group of the Hoko-shu. However, beginning from the era of Kubo Ujimitsu (1367-98) the Kamakura Kubo more and more included in the Hoko-shu many provincial bigmen (kokujin 国人) throughout the Kanto Plain. And so, when Mitsukane became Kubo (1398-1409), the number of Hoko-shu members had greatly increased, and their main source of power had shifted to a new group (D) made up of these same Kanto Plain kokujin. These included the likes of the Ohmori (大森) of Suruga, the Honma (本間) and Miura (三浦) of Sagami, the Edo (江戸) of Musashi, the Satomi (里見), Yamana (山名), Nawa (那波) and Takayama (高山) of Kozuke, the Sano (佐野) of Shimotsuke, the Shishido (宍戸), Tsukuba (筑波) and Oda (小田) of Hitachi and the Unagami (海上), Indo (印東) and Ryugasaki (龍崎) of Shimousa. During Mitsukane's reign such families as the Shishido and Unagami even appear in the elite corps of Kubo palace functionaries (gosho bugyo 御所奉行). As a result of their personal hold over these Kanto Plain kokujin, the Kamakura Kubos were able to expand quite successfully their own direct military bases.

著者

髙鳥 廉

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.130, no.9, pp.41-67, 2021 (Released:2022-09-20)

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足利将軍家の子弟や室町殿の猶子が門跡寺院に入室する目的としては、しばしば門跡寺院支配や統制が先行研究によって挙げられている。室町殿と血縁関係ないし擬制的親子関係を有する僧が門跡寺院へ入室するのだから、彼らの入室により室町殿の寺院に対する影響力が強まっていったであろうことは想像に難くない。 ただし、これまでの研究では、肝腎であるはずの入室の契機に関する検討を欠いたまま室町殿の主体性を自明視してきたため、室町殿と公家・寺院との関係性や、寺院に対して室町殿の影響力が強まっていく背景が適切に捉えられていない。とりわけ、門跡寺院の附弟選定が各権門間における合意形成の場であったにもかかわらず、それまで寺院に子弟を送り込んできた天皇家や公家、あるいはその受け皿となった寺院側の動向が検討の対象とされてこなかった点は研究史上の不備であり、入室の多様な意義を曇らせてしまっている。 そこで本稿では、将軍家子弟や室町殿猶子の門跡寺院入室の契機を検討し、「貴種」の入室がいかなる社会的意義をもったのかについて論じた。その結果として、将軍家子弟が皇族を中心とする「貴種」の払底を補填する役割を演じたこと、競合者(御連枝や庶流などの足利一族)を俗界から追放する意味をもったこと、寺院側から室町殿に対して庇護の要求があったこと、入室者とその尊属への統制を強める意味があったこと、幕府所縁の門跡(三宝院)を継承する僧に対する身位保護などの意味があったことを指摘した。さらに、猶子政策の頂点と評価されてきた足利義政期についても再検討を行ない、義教期こそが最も強力に猶子政策が進められた時期であったと結論した。

著者

柿本 昭人

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.104, no.1, pp.111-117, 1995-01-20 (Released:2017-11-30)

著者

山家 浩樹

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.130, no.6, pp.1-38, 2021 (Released:2022-06-20)

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室町幕府の経済基盤は、基本的に、鎌倉幕府のそれを継承して、直轄領からの収入と、地頭御家人の経済的奉仕に依拠していた。しかし、両者ともに機能が低下するなか、室町幕府は、建武政権の施策を参考に、新たな賦課を開始した。地頭御家人に恩賞として給与した所領に、低額の年貢を賦課する制度で、「新恩地年貢」と呼ばれた。 本稿では、室町幕府初期の財政基盤を検討するため、おもに「新恩地年貢」を分析した。史料上に「五十分一年貢」とある賦課も同じものとみなし、以下のように分析した。幕府が所領の年貢総量を把握している場合は、年貢の五十分一を賦課し、把握していない場合は、把握した耕地である「公田」の面積を基準に算出して賦課した。年貢総量を基準とする賦課は、建武政権で採用された新しい方式である。南北朝期における年貢総量の把握の様子も概観した。また、対象となる新恩地は、室町幕府が給与したものだけでなく、建武政権が給与したものも含む。新恩地年貢は、使途や徴収方法の点で、恒例の地頭御家人役に近く、その収入減を補う役割を担った。 また、室町幕府は、鎌倉幕府から継承した直轄領を「本役所」と称し、年貢徴収に務めている様子も分析した。 しかし、鎌倉幕府から継承した財源ばかりでなく、新恩地への賦課も、実効性は低かった。戦乱のなか、恩賞地の経営も、全国一律の課税の徴収も難しかったためであろう。次第に、幕府に直接勤務する地頭御家人などに限り、新恩地年貢を幕府に負担するようになる。南北朝中期以降、「新恩地年貢」という表記は減り、「五十分一年貢」という表記が増える。「五十分一年貢」の記述には、新恩地からの負担という意識が見えない。その理由は、この負担が立場を表す指標となり、新恩地からの支出という意識が薄れていったためであろう。 室町幕府財政は、都市商業への課税など、あらたな財源で安定していくことになる。

著者

佐藤 雄基

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.129, no.10, pp.4-34, 2020 (Released:2021-12-01)

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治承・寿永の内乱の偶然の産物として、前例のない武家政権が関東に成立した鎌倉時代において、天皇と武家の関係をどのように考えるのかは中世国家論の焦点であったが、鎌倉時代人の《現代史》認識においても難問であったため、鎌倉時代には様々な天皇像・歴史叙述が生み出されていた。本稿では、そうした天皇像の語りが、政治状況と交錯しながら、どのように変化してきたのかを論じた。現実に機能した天皇像・歴史像のもとでどのように「史料」が生成し、それらを後世の歴史家がどのように読みといたのか、複層的に議論を進める。 鎌倉時代は三度の皇統断絶を経て、天皇像の危機的な状況が生まれる一方で、新たに登場した武家政権の位置づけをめぐって武家像(将軍像)を含みこんだかたちで、天皇像が新たに語られ、また、人びとも天皇像について自らと関連づけて語り始めていた。武家を組み込んだ天皇・藤原氏の像を歴史叙述として体系化したのは『愚管抄』の著者慈円であった。第一章では、慈円の言説が黒田俊雄の提唱した権門体制論と親和的な像であること、また、源頼朝が自らを諸国守護の権門として位置づけようとした構想とも無関係ではなかった。但し、慈円の国制像は必ずしも同時代的に共有されていた訳ではない。後鳥羽院は武芸をはじめとする諸芸能を好み、文武を包摂した君主像を追求していたし、幕府の側でも源実朝が後鳥羽院を模倣して「文」に基づく統治者意識を高めていた。前例のない「武」の権力をどのように位置づけるのか、様々な模索のもとで幕府像も揺れ動いた。 こうした慈円の構想が現実味をもつのは、承久の乱後の摂家将軍・九条道家の時代であった。第二章では、「文武兼行」の摂家将軍の国制構想が、京・鎌倉に及ぼした影響を検討した。必ずしも九条家に対抗する国制像をもっていなかった鎌倉北条氏は、寛元・宝治・建長という十三世紀半ばの政変を経て、九条家を排除して、後嵯峨院政を支持し、親王将軍を擁立する。京都・公家とは異なる関東・武家が明確に成立し、公武関係が整序された。 得宗(北条氏の家督)は天皇・公家を包摂する国制像をもたなかった。鎌倉後期の治天は幕府への依存を深めながら、武家を包摂する国制像をもたず、得宗(北条氏)が天皇・親王将軍をそれぞれ支えるという国制となった。北条氏は公家政権の徳治主義を模倣し、独自に「文」を担うとともに、裁判を担うことを自己の任務としたが、天皇・公家と《距離を置く》ことを志向した。そうした北条氏の姿勢ゆえにかえって、幕府の圧倒的な実力を背景にして、人びとの間で得宗をめぐって天皇像とも関連づけて様々な噂が語られるようになった。武家独自の政道観・式目観や得宗・天皇の観念融合の結果、武家が公家・天皇と併存するかたちで中世社会のなかに定着した。

著者

長谷川 博隆

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.104, no.9, pp.1519-1565,1683-, 1995-09-20 (Released:2017-11-30)

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I. Bis heute war das Problem des Greisenalters als Sozialfrage im Forschungsbereich der griechisch-romischen Geschichte nicht so bedeutsam wie im literarisch-philosophischen Fachgebiet. Seit kurzem ist der Generationenkonflikt auch ein wichtiges Forschungsthema in der historischen Entwicklung des klassischen Altertums geworden. In diesem Vortrag mochte ich die in der eigenartigen, sprichwortlichen Wendung "Sexagenarios de ponte in Tiberim deicere" verbreitete Volkssage als Frage des Greisenalters behandeln. Trotz Mangels an Quellen versuchten schon viele Forscher, von Wagner (1833) bis Neraudau (1978), Guarino (1979) und Lugli (1986), die Entstehung dieser Redensart genauer zu beschreiben. Wem und welcher Zeit schlieBlich dieses Sprichwort zu verdanken ist, scheint mir nicht so bedeutend sein. Aus diesen Grunden will ich hier vor allem den historisch-theoretischen Hintergrund dieser Redewendung klaren. II. Nach sorgfaltiger Untersuchung der Beweise in Cic., Varr., Fest., Ovid., Dion. Hal., Non., Arnob., Lact., Macrob. usw. laBt sich deutlich der EntstehungsprozeB und auch der ursprungliche Sinn dieses Ausdruckes zeigen. Im Laufe der Quellenforschungen fand ich vor allem Varros Standpunkt und seine Rolle bemerkenswert. Dann analysierte ich vier verschiedene Schichten der Uberlieferungen, d.h. 1)Argeerfrage, 2)Menschenopfer, insbesondere die Aussetzung der Alten wie uberall im klass. Altertum (auch in Japan!), 3)Frage der Sechzigjahrigen in der romischen Welt, 4)AusschluB der "Sexagenarii" vom Komitienrecht (freilich ist die reale Bedeutung sehr problematisch. Bezuglich der Stimmungslage der Redewendung beschranke ich mich hier nur auf Hinweise). Auf die vierte als die wichtigste der obengenannten Fragen konzen triert sich jedes Element dieser Redewendung. Vom weltgeschichtlich-volkstumlichen Standpunkt dus laBt sich uberdies auch die im wesentlichen religiose Rolle der Briicken und Flusse, insbesondere des Tibers, als Hauptbestandteil dieser Redensart sowohl im Volksempfinden wie in der Realpolitik klarmachen. III. Meiner Meinung nach forderte aber die sozial-politische Entwicklung def spaten romischen Republik auch die Entstehung der Bedingungen und Stimmungen dieses Sprichwortes. Selbstverstandlich hat es auch in Rom, wie uberall, seit jeher Spannungen zwischen jung und alt gegeben. Seit der 2. Halfte des 2. Jh. v. Chr. entwickelten sie sich zu politischen Spannungen und erreichten im 1. Jh. v. Chr. ihren Hohepunkt. Auf dieser Basis tritt schlieBlich die ungewohnlich klingende Redensart" Sexagenarii de ponte" auf. Von diesem historischen Gesichtdwinkel aus muB man dem Generationenproblem in Bezug auf den sogenannten "Schwarzen Humor" doch eine entscheidende Bedeutung beimesden.

著者

曽我 良成

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.92, no.3, pp.279-317,413-41, 1983

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In the later Heian period, the officials who were in charge of political affairs used to keep the official documents issued in the process of fulfilling their duties in their own hands. These documents were handed down from generation to generation as the hereditary property of the aristocratic families From the viewpoint of the aristocracy as a whole, this practice means that they were entrusted with official documents by the government. Therefore it was considered to be a national loss when a fire broke out in one of these residences and the documents were reduced to ashes. Under such circumstances, in the Benkankyoku (弁官局) which issued orders as to the Daijokan (太政官)'s policies, it was the Daifushi (大夫史) who took custody of the documents. The main duties of the Daifushi were as follows : i)to investigate the former examples of political affairs, ii)to draw out the Daijokanpu (太政官府), the Kansenji (官宣旨) and the Senji (宣旨), and iii)to take charge of the Kanfudono (官文殿), the house for storing documents, which belonged to the Benkankyoku. Originally the Daifushi was supposed to be chosen among a wide range of nobles, but this position had never been occupied by the upper nobles of such as the Fujiwaras and the Minamotos. The Daifushi was an important post, but never thought to be a high and noble status. Around the middle of the 11th century Takanobu Ozuki (小槻孝信) was appointed as Daifushi, and from then on, the position was inherited by the Ozuki family. As a result, the Ozuki family was called as "Kanmuke", which means a family that inherits the Daifushi. The main reasons for the choice of the Ozuki family to this position can be assumed as follows : firstly, they had an excellent Skill of preserving documents ; secondly, their family was a specialist of mathematics, who fixed the amount of taxes to be imposed on and collected from various provinces. Moreover, since the middle of the 11th century, in Ochokokka (王朝国家), the government tended increasingly to intervene directly in affairs of the provinces. Accordingly, the Benkankyoku became the administrative center to deal with political matters. And, by making the position of the Daifushi hereditary, the government entrusted main duties of the Benhankyoku to a family -the Ozukis.

著者

野村 玄

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.121, no.11, pp.1878-1900, 2012-11-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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This article examines the backdrop against which Toyotomi Hideyoshi was deified with the title of Toyokuni Daimyojin instead of Shin-Hachiman, the title he himself specified in his last will and testament. Despite the fact that who actually promoted deification has by no means been made clear, the author argues that it is necessary to keep in mind that deification was a policy implemented in the midst of the unstable political situation that characterized post-Hideyoshi Japan, and therefore any discussion over who promoted that policy should proceed from an appraisal of the actual situation at that particular time. As a result of the examination of new historical sources clarifying the meaning of the title of Daimyojin and the Toyokuni Shrine and helping to identify those who were involved in their creation within the context of the contemporary political situation, the author has reached the following four conclusions: 1) The title of Daimyojin, which conflicted with Hideyoshi's own wishes, was instituted between the 5th day of the 3rd month and the 10th day of the 4th month of the 4th year of the Keicho Era (1599) under the auspices of Emperor Goyozei, Tokugawa Ieyasu and the vassals of the Toyotomi Clan. 2) Regarding the creation of a brand new title contrary to the wishes of its recipient by emphasizing the idea of Japan as "Toyokuni" (land of prosperity), the consent of Tokugawa Ieyasu was obtained amidst the political chaos arising from the sudden death of the country's supreme commander from ill health during the expeditionary campaigns being waged in Korea and for the purpose of maintaining the centrifugal character of the Toyotomi regime and stabilizing every possible political situation. Consequently, for Ieyasu deification was intended to not only deeply honor the fallen leader, but also to make a clear political statement that Japan had never nor would ever be defeated and conquered by the likes of the Ming Dynasty. 3) In addition, there is the distinct possibility that Ieyasu initially considered between the time just before Hideyoshi's death and the 7th month of Keicho 4 (1599) changing the name Toyotomi to Minamoto. 4) Viewing the situation from Ieyasu's personal political standpoint, the deification of Hideyoshi with the title of Shin-Hachiman would have meant linking him to the genealogy of the patron deity of the Minamoto Clan; however, concluding that Hideyoshi even after his death should be recognized as a Toyotomi as he lived, Ieyasu decided to abandon the initial plan, ignore Hideyoshi's wishes and newly establish the title Toyokuni Daimyojin.

著者

栗原 麻子

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.118, no.5, pp.994-998, 2009-05-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

著者

辻 浩和

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.116, no.7, pp.1230-1251, 2007-07-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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This article focuses on the interest and participation of retired emperor Gotoba in performing arts, understood as shodo (lit. various pursuits) during his regime, and compares his activities with those of other emperors. In concrete terms, the author collected approximately 3000 items regarding performing arts related to the imperial courts during the regimes of the retired emperors (In) during the early medieval period, focusing on the term shodo and extracting common elements from items related to it, in order to show that from the regime of Goshirakawa-In, the emperors' participation in the performing arts became one ideal of Japanese kingship and was a determining factor in the diversity and talent characterizing Gotoba-In. From the fact that emperors in medieval Japan were expected to be well-versed in all aspects of the performing arts, it should be a problem that the court culture of the In regimes would be characterized by unprecedented popularity and breadth in forms of entertainment, surpassing the traditional imperial pursuits, which were limited to merely poetry and music. Although the emperors of the In regimes were expected to be personally involved in a wide range of cultural pursuits, in fact such attempts were not always successful. Goshirakawa-In, partly succeeded, but on the other hand he did not become actively involved in either poetry or music and did not live up to his expected role as a participating patron of the arts. It was Gotoba-In who filled this gap and became a leader in promoting and participating in the lively cultural aspects of court life. Diversity was the trademark of the Gotoba-In performing arts, and with the exception of a partial interruption due to the Jokyu Incident (1221), set the cultural standards for kingship during the entire medieval period.

著者

小野 将

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.102, no.6, pp.1135-1157,1265-, 1993

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The study of the Hayashi Family 林家 (also pronounced Rinke) and the Shoheiko 昌平黌 academy Neo-Confucian orthodox intellectuals under the Tokugawa Bakufu's direct control is indispensable to understanding the intellectual milieu of the period. However, the research literature of them especially for the latter part of the period, is still very small. In the present paper the author utilizes the new methodology developed recently by such scholar as Fujita Satoru, and conducts the first historical study on the previously unknown involvement of the Rinke in Bakufu-Court relations, in an attempt to illuminate their role played in state affairs from the Kansei era (i.e. during the 19th century) and their perception of politics. During the late Tokugawa period, high-ranking Bakufu officials often consulted Daigaku-no-Kami 大学頭, who was the head of the Rinke, concerning their negotiations with the Court in Kyoto. These officials usually adopted the advice as policy. Therefore, the position of the Rinke in Bakufu politics seems to have been much more important than it used to be during the earlier period. Due to its leadership in the compilation of state documents, the Rinke were considered to be experts in political precedents and decorum. This specialized knowledge and its interpretation functioned, and was in reality employed to answer the demands for rationale to legitimate the Bakufu's authority. For example, on the occasion of state ceremonies in which the Court bestowed titles (kan'i, kanshoku) on the shogun in 1827 and 1837, the Daigaku-no-Kami at the time, Hayashi Jussai 林述斎, took part in the preceding negotiations between the Bakufu and the Court. He not only outlined in detail the ritual forms to be performed, but also played a role in deciding what honorary titles the Court was to confer upon the shogun at that time. The author proves that Jussai fully understood the effectiveness of decorating the authority of the shogun with honorary titles, and was well aware of how to use traditions and institutions of ancient states past to supplement that authority. On the other hand, such protocol was also related to legitimizing the authority of the Court and strengthened the idea that the traditional authority prior to Tokugawa was still meaningful in the early modern state and politics, and thus resulted in the Bakufu's approval and promotion of its existence. The Rinke was also involved in many other things that symbolized the authority of the shogunate, and as such could be called ideologues who consciously attempted to supplement the authority of the shogun by manipulating a whole system of such symbols. In the process of creating the forms for representing the kind of authority the Rinke favored, what happened was a substitution of shogunal authority for very highly symbolized things, thus furthering a tendency already evident within the Bakufu to give great emphasis and respect to pomp and circumstance and build a state organization through the medium of such symbolized forms. The author draws the following conclusions. The interpretations offered by the Rinke contained highly political elements, and such intentions were actually approved by the Bakufu's high ranking officials. For this reason, the political character of the Rinke can no longer be ignored. Concrete examples of this process working to strengthen the authority of the Bakufu can be seen in the relations conducted between the Bakufu and the Court. The utilization by the Rinke of various traditions and symbols was a very important element to the ideological complex inherent to the Tokugawa state.

著者

中村 博司

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌

巻号頁・発行日

vol.125, no.11, pp.40-64, 2016

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本稿は、内田九州男が1988・89年に相次いで発表した、羽柴(豊臣)秀吉による「大坂遷都構想」をめぐる一連の論考を再検討することを通じて、羽柴政権と当該期朝廷との関係性、ひいては秀吉の政権構想を明らかにしようとするものである。天正11年(1583)4月の賤ヶ岳合戦に勝利して織田信長の後継者たる地位を獲得した秀吉は、間もなく大坂に新たな居城構築を始める(大坂築城工事)が、内田は一連の論文を通じて「秀吉はこれと並行して大坂遷都を断行し、そのうえで自らが将軍となって大坂に幕府を開くという構想を持っていた。しかし、朝廷の招致に失敗したために将軍任官も大坂幕府開設も頓挫し、止む無く秀吉は関白となって同14年に関白公邸としての聚楽第を京都に構築することになる」としたのである。この大坂遷都論は早くから注目され、現在でもなお多くの研究者が支持しているが、そこには自ら検証したうえでのものはない。その一方、羽柴政権と朝廷との関係性を取り扱った論文・著書等において、内田の論文は等閑視されるという状況も存在する。これは「大坂遷都構想」および将軍任官・大坂幕府開設というテーマが、羽柴政権と当該期朝廷との関係性について考察する上での最重要課題の一つであるのみならず、中近世移行期における天皇制の在り方にもかかわる論点であることを考えると誠に奇妙な状況と言わざるを得ない。しかもそれが今日まで四半世紀という長年の間、実証的な検証が行なわれることなく、いわば両論並立のような状況のままで推移してきたことは、長年このテーマに関心を抱いてきた者として誠に残念なことでもあった。そこで、改めて大坂遷都論にかかわる根拠史料の再吟味を通じて検討したところ、大坂遷都、将軍任官、大坂開幕のことごとくがなり立たず、「大坂遷都論」は総体として成立しないことが明らかとなった。その結果を踏まえ、大坂遷都論の評価の上に立って秀吉の関白政権樹立に至る構想を明らかにしてきた横田冬彦の仕事を俎上に乗せて検討したところ、秀吉が大坂遷都を断念した理由が必ずしも明確でないことに加え、断念の最大の理由とする小牧長久手合戦の敗戦についても、そうした評価は早計で、むしろ長引く小牧長久手の講和を探るなかで、秀吉の視野に新たな政権構想として公武の頂点に立つ関白職を獲得するという方針が入ってきたとし、そういう積極的な評価こそ妥当とした。そして、こうした一連の経過のなかに大坂遷都構想とその断念という事象を入れる歴史的必然性は無いものと結論付けた。

著者

永村 眞

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.97, no.7, 1988

著者

設楽 薫

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.96, no.7, pp.1142-1159,1255-, 1987-07-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

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Historians specializing in Muromachi politics during the rein of the 10th shogun Ashikaga Yoshiki 足利義材 have thus far focused their attention on his banishment in 1493 (the Meio Incident), which resulted in the assumption of power by the Hosokawa family. Very little interest, however, has been shown toward the problem of Yoshiki's shogunal governance itself. By analyzing the characteristics and background of Yoshiki's direct judgments (gozen sata 御前沙汰), the author attempts to redress this imbalance and also to improve our understanding of the actual status of Yoshiki's reign. The shogun's direct judgments were usually recorded in the ukagaigoto kiroku 伺事記録, a record kept by the officials who screened matters for the shogun's approval. The record for 1490 and related documents illuminate the shifts in procedure and personnel affairs after the Onin War. The judgment process originally took place only in the presence of the shogun, but Yoshiki always received applications and transmitted his decisions through a rapporteur (moshitsugi 申次). Two reasons for this change can be adduced : (1)the new process provided an effective means of dealing with the increasing number of suits and applications, regardless of when the next shogunal audience was scheduled or what personnel were on duty ; and (2)the shogun's cloistered father, Yoshimi, exercised the real power within the administration, although he had himself never been shogun. The rapporteurs were selected from among those long-term confidents of Yoshimi and Yoshiki, such as HAMURO Mitsutada 葉室光忠, TANEMURA Gyobu 種村刑部 and ISSIKI Jibu 一色治部. Yoshimi and his son lacked confldent retainers within the court at the time of Yoshiki's succession, because Yoshimi had been the very leader of anti-shogun Western force during the Onin War (1467-1477). Yoshimi and Yoshiki therefore tended to place greater trust in their long-term confidents than in those who newly came into service at Yoshiki's court. As close retainers these rapporteurs were entrusted with supervising matters involving the shogun's direct judgment. The shogun's liege vassals can be divided into the three categories : (1)those who had served with him before the Onin War, that is, men who were not hereditary servants of the bakufu ; (2)those who came to serve under Yoshimi during the Onin War ; and (3)those who came into service after Yoshiki's succession. Most of the persons whose names came up in gozen sata documents represented categories (1) and (2). Shogunal confidence in them was 'high' but his reliance on them inevitably led to feelings of estrangement on the part of hereditary servants of the bakufu. This, in turn, hastened the decline of Yoshiki himself in the Meio Incident.

著者

久住 真也

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.109, no.6, pp.1143-1164,1256-, 2000

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There are only a few studies written about the Choshu War at the end of the Tokugawa period from the view point of political history. The War finally deprived the Bakufu of its influence, and should be recognized as an important event in the political process between 1864 and 1866. It has been generally understood as a war between the Bakufu and Choshu, but one of the major purposes was to punish Choshu as traitors to the imperial court in Kyoto. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the war as a political affair involving the court, the Bakufu and the clans. In this paper the author analyzes the process of Shogun Tokugawa Iemochi's departure from Edo on June 16, 1865 in order to attack Choshu, for the purpose of viewing the war as the result of contradiction and opposition in the form of government at that time. He conculdes that the Shogun's departure was created by political conflict among the court, the Bakufu and the clans, and also had another purpose to hold a meeting between the Shogun and the Emperor in Kyoto. It was Choshu that legitimized that Shogun'sdeparture. On the other hand, the Hitotsubashi, Aizu and Kuwana clans, which promoted political cooperation between the court and the Bakufu, thought that a meeting between the Shogun and the Emperor would be effective and urgent. They persuaded the court to approve the Shogun's departure meeting with the Emperor in Kyoto. The policy toward the ChoShu would be decided by the form of government. It would also produce a great effect on the Bakufu and the form of government.

著者

上里 隆史

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.7, pp.1179-1211, 2005-07-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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This article investigates the migration of Japanese in the China Sea region, especially in and around Naha, the capital of the Kingdom of Ryukyu, between the 16th and 17th centuries. Previous research on the Japan-Ryukyu relations during medieval times has chiefly focused on the diplomatic relations between the Muromachi government, the Shimazu family of Satsuma, and the Ryukyus. It goes without saying, however, that the focus on state trade alone does not fully explain the historical relations between the two states. It is also necessary for us to consider such private aspects of trade as the activities of people who participated as well as recent findings on medieval maritime trade for a proper understanding of the relationship between medieval Japan and the Ryukyus. The migration of people from Japan to the Ryukyu Islands dates back to the 15th century. The "Ryukyu Kokuzu 琉球国図", a map of the Kingdom in those days depicts Japanese and Ryukyuans living together in Naha. According to the genealogical data on the Ryukyus, Japanese who had emigrated there during the 16th and 17th centuries through the transportation mode which had evolved at that time, can be divided into three groups, based on their places of origin: Kinai, Hokuriku, Kyushu groups. Those people were probably maritime merchants who commuted between the Ryukyus and Japan, but resided permanently in the Ryukyus and engaged in certain occupations, such as the administration of Naha, foreign affairs, medicine, and the tea ceremony. As for the structure of the port city of Naha, Naha-Yomachi 那覇四町, literally, the four townships of Naha, had developed on the fringe of the Chinese settlement of Kumemura 久米村, which was the core of Naha. The fact that Japanese institutions, such as a Shinto shrine, were located on the periphery of Naha-Yomachi shows that, like the goddess Mazu 媽祖 for the Chinese people, Naha was one of the overseas territories of Japanese merchants. Japanese immigrants resided together with Ryukyuans in Naha-Yomachi. During the 16th century, wajin (倭人), or armed Japanese merchants would throng into Naha in quest of the Chinese goods when ever Chinese envoys visited the Ryukyus. The Ryukyu royal government tried to restrict armaments, but failed. Japanese trading facilities called Nihon Kan 日本館 were set up in Naha. During the latter half of the 16th century, Kumemura, the center of Naha and the Chinese settlement, declined, while Naha-Yomachi prospered. During this period, the trade route between Japan and Fujian via Manila was established based on the active circulation of Japanese and new continental silver and Chinese raw silk. The Ryukyus functioned in it as an entrepot between Japan and Manila. It has been thought that the route from the Ryukyus to Southeast Asia was completely abolished in 1570, however, this is not true, for the Ryukyus changed its form of trade from state-sponsored trade to private trade carried out by wajin maritime merchants. The Ryukyus thus become a node connecting East to Southeast Asia.

著者

吉村 忠典

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.108, no.3, pp.344-367,463-46, 1999-03-20 (Released:2017-11-30)

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It is well-known that many translations of European concepts were made in Japan during the 19th century in order to adapt to European ways of thinking, and then were adopted by the Chinese. One example of this is the term teikoku 帝国 as the translation of the English word empire. This is a Sino-Japanese word, which the Japanese of the 30th century believed to have authority in the Chinese classics, but which the Chinese did not know until the end of the 19th century when they learned it from Japan. The word teikoku seems to have been invented in the 18th century as the literal translation of the Dutch word keizerrijk ([Germ. Kaiserreich]; keizer = tei, rijk = koku), and then the compilers of English-Japanese dictionaries of the 19th century (since 1814) adopted this word as the translalion for empire, for they misunderstood the European dictionaries available to them; and, moreover, a great political unity without a monarch (such as the Athenian Empire of the 5th century B.C. and the Roman Empire of the 2. century B.C.) was inconceivable for the people of East Asia at that time. (Incidentally, the Sino-Japanese term for the "republic", 共和政治, first appeared in 1845). Ever since, this translation of empire prevailed in Japan. Even now, many high school teachers in Japan cannot understand why the British Empire was an Empire, since it had no emperor. They believe also that the Roman Empire was not yet known to Pompey and Caesar, because the first emperor Augustus came later. As the word teikoku, understood as equivalent to keizerrijk, spread in Japan from the middle of the 19th century,the Sino-Japanese version (1865) of H. Wheaton's "Elements of International Law" was enthusiastically received in Japan. According to modern international law, an "empire" was now nothing but a kind of modern sovereign "state" stricto sensu alongside kingdoms and dukedoms and so on, while the empire once stood over and embraced such principalities and feudal lords. Thus, even now, the Japanese are not free from confusion over the usage of the word teikoku. In this paper the author tries to disentangle the confusion, which arose from the equation: keizerrijk = teikoku = empire, modern and pre-modern.

著者

山本 英貴

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.126, no.6, pp.62-84, 2017 (Released:2018-10-20)

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小稿は、奥右筆文書に収録される諸大名より幕府に提出された行列道具の所持願、その願い出を認めるかどうかを記した幕府役人の評議書などを総合的に分析し、江戸幕府の政務処理の流れを復元したものであり、家斉期の幕府と藩(大名家)との関係について、次の点を明らかにすることができた。 まず、行列道具の所持願の処理過程について、大名が月番老中に提出した所持願は、月番より大目付・目付に渡され、それは両名より、願い出を認めるか否かを記した評議書とともに、月番へ返上された。行列道具の所持は、大名の家格に関わる問題であり、願い出の採否については、月番と他の老中とが大目付・目付の評議書を参考に、合議により決めていた。その際、老中が採否にあたって重視したのが、願い出を認めると他の大名に支障が出るか、という点であった。この基準があればこそ、幕府は大名に行列道具を持たせることを、その家格と序列を操作するための手段として活用できたのである。 次に、家斉期の幕政については従来、将軍家斉の子女と縁組した大名は官位が上昇したりする不公平なもの、として理解されてきた。小稿においても、家斉の息女と縁組した会津松平・鍋島の両家が、以前に断られた所持願を、新規に先例を提示することなく認められていた点を確認した。その一方で、家斉の子女と縁組していない藤堂家も、前述の基準により、新規に先例を提示することなく、これまで断られていた所持願を認められた、という事実を明らかにした。 以上により、小稿では、家斉期に行列道具の所持願が多く認められた背景として、①家斉の子女と縁組した大名に道具の所持が認められ、それ以外の大名も幕府に所持願を出したこと、②老中を始め幕府の諸役人に、他の大名との兼ね合いから所持願を認めようとの考えがあったこと、の二点を明らかにしたのである。

著者

石原 比伊呂

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.116, no.6, pp.1033-1063, 2007-06-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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This article is an attempt to 1) clarify the relationship between Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimochi 足利義持 and the Japanese imperial family (i. e., ret. Emperor Gokomatsu 後小松 and Emperor Shoko 称光 by reconstructing the manner in which Yoshimochi conducted himself as a member of the aristocracy and 2) place this shogun within the context of existing relations between the warrior and aristocratic classes. Within his role as a "member of royalty," Yoshimochi held the posts of deputy Kampaku 関白, serving as a quasi-imperial regent and the reigning emperor's personal secretary (Kuroudo-no-To 蔵人頭). He also served as instructor to Crown Prince Shoko and was by his side both at his initiation ceremony and coronation. In addition to his advisory role in connection with the emperor, Yoshimochi was involved with the retired emperor as a functionary in his household (Inshi 院司) and also internal minister of state (Naidaijin 内大臣), both advisory roles, to the point of being an indispensable member of his entourage. In this dual role, he was also called upon to settle disputes that arose between the two emperors. From such involvement on the part of Yoshimochi within the imperial household, the author describes his shogunate as an attempt to re-empower the Gokomatsu royal house.