著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.38-53,L7, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

57

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Among wartime leaders in Japan, no one was more aware that the issue of World War II centered on decolonization than Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (April 1943-April 1945). As Ambassador to China (January 1942-April 1943), Shigemitsu had become the strong supporter of Japan's “New Deal for China” to approve the Wang Ching-wei regime's voluntary self-independence and freedom. When he became Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu continued to promote “independence, freedom, and mutual equality” towards Asian occupied area as the main principles of Japan's “New Deal for Greater East Asia”. This set of “New Deal” policy could provide a “basic maneuver” for peace proposals towards the Allied Powers. In othe words, if Japan changed its war aims in accordance with those of Great Britain and the United States, there would be no more reason for Japan to keep fighting with China, the United States and Great Britain. At the opening of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943, Shigemitsu and the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry used the Greater East Asian Declaration as an opportunity to redefine Japan's war aims and to appeal to the Allied Powers with their basic peace maneuver. From the viewpoint of Shigemitsu, however, “New Deal” policy including the Greater East Asian Declaration was as much for domestic as for foreign use, to give the Japanese people a clearer conception of war aims, and to reform the militarism which had caused Japan to fall into military colonialism towards Asia. When he was aware that it was impossible to use the “New Deal” policy for domestic reform to exclude military colonialism from Japan, he insisted that the Japanese Government should accept “unconditional surrender” on their own initiative for the attainment of the same purpose.

著者

三上 昭美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.26, pp.1-21, 1964

著者

中村 栄孝

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1974, no.51, pp.1-24, 1974-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

95

著者

信夫 清三郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1974, no.50, pp.147-153, 1974-05-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

村井 友秀

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.108, pp.55-68,L9, 1995-03-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

77

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In many developing countries, the arms industry is the most advanced sector of all industries, and that has raised the technical level and productivity of civil industries. For those reasons, many countries in the Third World have developed arms industries. Now, India, Korea and Sountheast Asian countries are expanding their arms industries.Recently, China has emerged as a major arms exporter to the Third World. In the time of Mao Zedong, China exported small weapons to socialist countries and revolutionary forces by its “friendly price.” But after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, national interest took precedence over ideology, and china began to export large and expensive weapons. For example, China exported tactical ballistic missiles to Syria and Pakistan, and China exported nuclear reactors to Algeria. In 1985, China exported fifty medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia for two billion dollars. Saudi Arabia is an anti-communist and fundamental Islamic country.In 1980's, the objective of arms export was to earn foreignn currency for the “Four Modernizations” Programme. China also sold weapons to both Iran and Iraq. At that time they fought a long war of attrition.Chinese weapons are competitive in the world arms market. They are basically copies of Soviet weapons of 1950's and 60's. China insists that Chinese weapons are cheap, tough and easy to handle. But complicated weapons, such as tanks and fighters, are said to have many defects. Nevertheless, for developing countries, cheap Chinese weapons are very attractive.Chinese weapons cannot fight against the high-tech weapons of the advanced countries. But Chinese weapons can fight well against the old weapons of the developing countries. Above all, developing countries can import Chinese weapons in a short period of time. In many advanced countries, arms exports are strictly controlled by the government. Technical procedure of arms exporting has to take lengthy steps, and sometimes it takes a few years. But in China, there is no congress or mass media which can check the Communist Party. For those countries, that may cause political or economic frictions with the advanced countries, China is a convenient country, or the only choice to deal with. Chinese low price weapons, which are easy to import, lower the threshold of war.China influences the devloping countries not by economic aid but by arms export. Looking back over the Cold War era, one of the most powerful resources of the superpowers was their superior military capability which enabled them to control the world arms market. China's national strategy is to be the hegemon in East Asia and to have influence over the world. China's active arms export strengthens the Chinese influence upon the Third World, and advances its national strategy.

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014

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For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950's Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960's was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan.<br>Chapter I examines Nagai's works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai's behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao's work, <i>The World of Politics</i>, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell's works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950's, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon's work, <i>the Vocabulary of Politics</i>, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau's criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai's ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960's.<br>Chapter II investigates Nagai's works on international politics in 1960's focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950's. and 1960's His first article on international politics, "American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong" founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as "situation", "institution" and "organization". His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950's. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai's ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred<br>Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960's upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article "Why dose socialism exist in America?", Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with "utopian socialists" in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.

著者

吉川 洋子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, no.75, pp.130-149,L13, 1983-10-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

58

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Japanese-Philippine negotiations on war reparations lasted from 1951 through 1956, often interrupted by disagreements on the terms of payment. Significantly, the diplomatic deadlocks were often broken by informal channels of communications and secret talks. A host of political and business leaders who had varying degrees of interests in each other's country participated.A most important breakthrough in deadlocked talks was made in New York and Washington in November 1954 by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose secret meetings were arranged by the Premier's confidants on Philippine affairs, Nagano Mamoru and Shiohara Tamotsu. Nagano, a leading steel industrialist, had business interests in the Philippine iron mines and other resources, and had his own proposal on a variety of development projects to be financed by reparation funds. Shiohara, Executive Director of the Philippine Society of Japan, had been a personal friend of Senator Laurel since the Japanese occupation period when Laurel was President of the Republic and Shiohara served his government as an advisor on internal affairs.Nagano played several other roles during the whole process, including one as a member of the Japanese delegation for reparations talks. So did many other leaders such as former Ambassador Murata Shozo, Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and businessmen like Furukawa Yoshizo who had lived in the Philippines before the war and claimed to be experts about the country.Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in May 1955 by Ferino Neri, chief Philippine reparations negotiator, who ran a series of secret meetings in Tokyo with political and business influentials regarding the terms of payment. He finally obtained Prime Minister Hatoyama's confidential endorsement of his proposed terms. This success was made with the skillful help of Hatoyama's Deputy Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto Takizo, who apparently had many Philippine acquaintances primarily through the Free Masonry whose members pointedly included Hatoyama, Senator Camilo Osias, and most probably Senator Laurel.The long negotiations demonstrated the significant roles played by informal contact-makers on both sides. Many of them were those with official capacity seeking secret contacts, but some without official capacity also volunteered secretly to help the talks. Both Japanese and Philippine political cultures weigh personal ties, particularly, ties based on clientelism, in political dealings. The interaction of the two cultures over such difficult negotiations multiplied the effectiveness of informal contact-makers.

著者

斎藤 聖二

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.97, pp.154-177,L14, 1991-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

104

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Japanese warships transported five hundred million yen in gold bullion (about 450 tons) equivalent to about one trillion five or six hundred million yen at current prices, from Russia to Canada in the middle of the First World War. This bullion was the specie which was transferred to the Russian account at the Bank of England in Ottawa to supplement the overseas specie reserves. These reserves were for the purpose of purchasing munitions from America. Japan undertook to take part in this operation for the sake of showing cooperative unity with the Allied Powers. The supreme commander of the operation was the president of the Bank of England who oversaw allied finances. The operation was carried out according to a secret treaty between Russia and Britain which had been concluded at the urging of the American government.As the First World War developed into a major conflict, the Allied Powers relied heavily on imports of munitions from America which was at the time neutral. Russia had purchased vast amounts of munitions from America with the financial support of Britain. When the limit of this support was reached the trade finance situation between Russia and America reached an impasse. Britain wished to relieve the situation and enable the munitions trade to Russia to continue, as it was strategically vital that Russia maintain the Eastern front. The most effective method would have been for Russia to make one colossal transfer of specie. However, the threat of German U-boats in the sea near Europe had made that idea unfeasible. Therefore, a plan was worked out whereby Japanese warships would transport the gold across the Pacific Ocean to Canada. By taking on the role of transporter, Japan was able to impress upon the Allied Powers her cooperative attitude and turn Allied indebtedness to her advantage at the peace conference and in post-war deplomacy. Further, during the war the Japanese government had had difficulty in repatriating her foreign specie holdings. When Britain offered to sell Japan a part of the specie gold if she agreed to the transport plan, the Japanese government was more than happy to accept. In all, Japan imported a total of about 65 tons (worth about 80million yen)of gold in this way.During the First World War the center of international finance shifted from London to New York. The colossal specie transfer operation from Russia mentioned above was one of the events which symbolized the change. Japan played an unusual role in this event, a role which helps us to understand both Japan's position and in what ways she coped with international relations during First World War which pivoted on the international financial situation.In the first chapter, we look at the tight financial situation governing the munitions trade between Britain, Russia and America and consider how this gave rise to the necessity for the Russian specie transfer. In the second chapter, we discuss the process of the Japan-Russia munitions trade and the negotiations regarding the settlement of accounts. The third chapter gives a detailed description of the negotiations between Japan and Britain concerning the transportation of the gold and actual voyages of the Japanese warships.

著者

土山 實男

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_114-172_128, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

32

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What is Japan’s grand strategy in the 21st Century and where is Japan’s diplomacy heading now? These are the questions we are often asked by international affairs specialists both inside and outside of Japan. To answer these questions, I am suggesting that the strategic and diplomatic debates conducted in the 1960s, when Japan was looking for appropriate policies, be re-examined. Japanese were looking for the answers to the following diplomatic questions: Should Japan go nuclear in the light of the fact that China succeeded in obtaining nuclear weapons? Should Japan request the government of the United States to withdraw the nuclear weapons the United States was deploying in Okinawa after the Okinawa reversion? Should Japan remain in the U.S.-Japan alliance, or should Japan take more independent course of diplomacy? What kind of diplomatic relations does Japan hope to build with a growing China? To review the diplomatic decisions the Japanese government made as well as the diplomatic arguments conducted at that time, this article focuses on the international studies and strategic arguments made by three leading international affairs specialists who had a strong influence on Japanese international studies and on Japan’s diplomacy. These specialists are Yonosuke Nagai, Masataka Kosaka, and Kei Wakaizumi; the latter was also known as an emissary between Tokyo and Washington who served under Prime Minister Eisaku Sato from 1967–1971. Although each of these specialists had different approaches to international affairs, I call them realists because they were all searching for a policy “solvent”—a word Walter Lippmann used in his U.S. Foreign Policy (1943)—for Japan, rather than looking for diplomatic goals designed by ideas or philosophy. They also share the understanding that reading the situation governments are facing and predicting the next move of their opponents are most difficult. These specialists had basically the same answers to the questions mentioned above, even though they had some differences regarding how to realize policy goals. They said, for example, that Japan should not go nuclear; the U.S.-Japan alliance is a fundamental base for Japanese diplomacy and security; and Okinawa should be returned to Japan without the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons in Okinawa. Compared to the diplomatic problems Japan is facing today, the diplomatic and security problems of the 1960s were more complexly related to each other. By re-examining the theoretical analyses and practical applications made by the three specialists mentioned above, this article suggests that we may be able to learn lessons from their analyses of Japanese diplomacy.

著者

御厨 貴

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.99, pp.201-206, 1992-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

秦 郁彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.17, pp.130-133, 1961-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

森山 優

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.113, pp.152-166,L17, 1996-12-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

64

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This article analyzes how the Tojo Cabinet arrived at an agreement to go to war with America, Britain and the Dutch East Indies. The Tojo Cabinet would not to be bound by the ‘Guidelines for Implementing National Policy’ that were adopted by the Third Konoe Cabinet and would ‘return to white paper’. But the Guidelines which were adopted after two weeks reconsideration, specified a deadline for concluding talks with Washington, after which war was to be decided upon. Does this decision meant that The Tojo Cabinet overcome the structural defect of the Meiji Constitution? The decision-making system of the Third Konoe Cabinet was characterized by Ryoron-heiki that incorporate the interests of all the opposing government institutions and Evasion of Decision-Making that evaded decisions in order to avoid conflict. The prime minister could not override the interests of the various government organs. It was owing to the structural flaw in the Meiji Constitution which saw legislative power shared between the Cabinet and the General Staff.Togo agreed to be Foreign Minister on condition that The Tojo Cabinet was committed to work hard to bring negotiations with the United States to a success. Togo and Finance Minister Kaya stated that if Japan could not win a long war, there was no reason for going into it. Then, how did the Tojo Cabinet come to such a conclusion? This paper examines the following points.1) Analyzing the logic of ‘Reconsideration of National Policy’. The main purpose of the reconsideration was to deny the possibility of the policy of ‘perseverance and patience’. There were not enough reasons to conclude that the war was the better selection. The reconsideration did not examine the situation of a long drawn-out war. Nevertheless, to get such a conclusion, it was essential for it to be reinforced by uncertain factors such as a favorable change of the international situation, the establishment of ‘selfsufficiency and economic invincibility’.2) Examination of the ‘concessions’ of Japanese Foreign Policy to America. Foreign Minister Togo adopted, many ‘concessions’. Fixing a term to withdrawal from China, preparation to remove the Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the nothern part, were the most important proposals. The Third Konoe Cabinet had collapsed when war Minister Tojo resigned in rejecting plans for the Japanese Army to withdraw from China. The explanation of why and how Togo could succeed to reach an agreement with the Cabinet and the General staff. Can be drawn from the complex decision-making system of the Meiji Constitution.

著者

久保田 貫一郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1965, no.29, pp.107-149, 1965-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

安岡 昭男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.33, pp.1-9, 1967

著者

小阪 裕城

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_92-193_107, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

62

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This article examines the politics involved in the right to petition the United Nations (U.N.) in the drafting process of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Experiences of war and ideas such as “the Atlantic Charter” published by the allied countries inspired people around the world to become politically active. They started to seek not only a victory over the Axis countries but also a victory over injustices they face in their respective countries. When the U.N. Human Rights Commission began drafting the International Bill of Rights in 1947, it had already received many petitions from those people. This paper tries to answer the question of how nations responded to this situation, and how and why the article on the right to petition the U.N. was finally deleted from the drafting process of the declaration.As major African American civil rights groups were trying to send their petition to the U.N., internationalizing racial problems in the United States, the issue concerning the right to petition became an important issue for the U.S. government. The Interdepartmental Committee on International Social Policy, which was established by the Truman administration in 1946, discussed the issue of whether the international bill of human rights should be a legally binding “convention” or “declaration,” which was not supposed to be legally binding. While some countries such as Australia and India proposed mechanisms to implement a human rights charter, the U.S. State Department was reluctant to draft a binding convention at that moment, fearing that it was so provocative for the conservatives that they would disagree with the U.S. commitment to the United Nations.Separate from the American concern, the U.N. Human Rights Commission decided to draft both a convention and a declaration and started to make a series of drafts of the declaration that included the article on the right to petition the U.N. U.S. policymakers discussed these and were concerned about the article of the right to petition. What worried the U.S. is that recognizing the right to petition would stimulate “unwarranted hopes” around the world. The U.S. tried to revise the draft articles by replacing the “right to petition the U.N.” with the “right to communicate with the U.N.” From the U.S. viewpoint, the right to petition the U.N. was misleading because people might think that the U.N. would consider petitions and would take action for redressal of grievances in their respective countries.Eventually, in 1948 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without an article on the right to petition. Most of the earlier studies on the drafting process of the declaration have not examined international and domestic politics over the right to petition. Thus historians have usually described the Declaration as a part of the history of the formation of U.S. hegemony or as the beginning of the history of the successful development of the international human rights regime. Keeping in mind individuals as a subject of international law and politics, politics concerning the article on the right of petition allows us to analyze history from a different angle.

著者

臼井 勝美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.197-200, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

安岡 昭男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.33, pp.1-9, 1967-06-01 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

39

著者

鈴木 陽一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.144, pp.69-84,L12, 2006-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

57

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In 1998, the Public Record Office released a top-secret file. The file contained Britain's 1945 war plans against Russia, her ally at the time. Just after the German surrender, Winston Churchill, the then British Prime Minister, instructed the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) to draw up war plans against Russia. This apparently contradicted the British policy towards the wartime grand alliance. Through reviewing these war plans and their background, this essay will re-examine Churchill's image as a wartime leader. In particular, it will consider the following questions: Why did Churchill enter the World War II? Why did he instruct war plans against Russia to be drawn up? Why did the planned war never eventuate? What was the implication of the failure of these plans?In May 1940, just after the German advance into the Low Countries, Churchill took the office of the Prime Minister. Despite this crisis, he decided to continue the war, calling for the New World to enter the war. It seemed, however, that Britain's dependence on America might trigger the dismemberment of her empire. Churchill, unlike conventional statesmen, envisioned a new world order under the Anglo-American tutelage. He believed that with common citizenship and the common use of military bases, Britain and America could work together. His vision was, however, obstructed by Russia's unexpected victory over Germany in 1941, which was considered to be a serious threat to the British Empire and Western civilization.To save his civilized world, Churchill instructed the JPS to make two war plans against Russia just after the German surrender. The first plan, “Operation Unthinkable, ” was an offensive war plan. The object of the plan was “to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire.” The planned date for the opening of hostilities was 1 July 1945. The Allied powers were to count upon the use of German forces. However, the JPS concluded that UK-US numerical inferiority on land rendered even a limited and quick success doubtful, thus proving Churchill's surprise attack plan ultimately unthinkable.The second plan, retaining the codeword “Unthinkable, ” was a defensive one. Wearying after the pessimistic first report, Churchill asked the JPS to study how Britain could defend her islands against a possible Russian advance into France and the Low Countries. This time, they concluded that Russia, without rockets and other new weapons, would not develop into a serious threat to the security of Britain.Churchill was a statesman who fought for his ideal of a civilized world order under the Anglo-American tutelage. His war, however, spawned unexpected and disastrous results. Russia became an enemy of the Empire. The Cold War, an Anglo-American imperial war, became inevitable. Thorough inviting the Americans into her empire, and also decolonizing her empire, the British fought the war against communism. This became a basis for a new globalizing world order under America and her allies.

著者

浜 由樹子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_114-189_129, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

44

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As is frequently argued by scholars of international politics, particularly in the school of constructivism, identities and national interests are cognitive phenomena and are socially constructed. A state’s collective, regional identity constitutes recognition of threats, opportunities, enemies, and allies. However, theoretically, there remains ambiguity about endogenizing identity change or transformation. Case studies concerning Russia’s new identity formation after the collapse of the Soviet Union can contribute to strengthen this point.Under the Putin administration, Russia has vigorously attempted to get involved in the regional cooperation in Asia. Especially in the past three years after the Ukraine crisis, perhaps in response to the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the “West”, not a few specialists have observed its “pivot to the East.” Russia’s Eurasian identity plays an essential role in this attempt. The study examines how Russia’s Eurasian identity was formed, how it developed, and how the concept of “Eurasia,” referring to the region bridging Europe and Asia, has been argued in the discourse of diplomacy.In the author’s view, there are several groups of “Neo-Eurasianists” currently. Some scholars speculated the influence on Russian politics of ideologues who claimed Russia to be an anti-Western, Eurasian power; however, most of them focused too much on some extremists, such as Alexandr Dugin. To explain the association between the Eurasian idea and diplomacy, more attention should be paid to the specialists of or working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Leading Russian scholars and specialists in East Asian studies took considerable time to conceptualize Russia’s new regional identity. Some of them rediscovered the old idea of “Eurasianism” which originated in the 1920s–30s among the émigré intellectuals. To consolidate the ties of the Russian nation with states in the post-Soviet space and its regional integration with Asia, those who were searching for a new regional identity found it and modified it into “Neo-Eurasianism.” In several respects, the updated version of Eurasianism is relevant to the present situation of Russia.In their recent discourses, “Eurasia” has the following two features. (1) It represents a “mega region” in the ongoing project to connect several regional architectures such as EAEU, SCO, Chinese SREB project, and ASEAN. In the project, Russia characterizes itself as a hub of Eurasian regional powers, and (2) as an intermediary concept to legitimize cooperation with China, it subsequently appeals its orientation to multipolarity in the world, which has been the vision as well as the goal of Russia’s diplomacy since the mid-1990s. In brief, Eurasian identity motivates Russia’s policies and behaviors during the “Pivot to the East”.

著者

小木曾 照行 桜井 敏照 藤村 道生 義井 博

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.151-169, 1962