著者

中井 愛子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_65-189_80, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

65

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This paper clarifies the decisive role played by Latin-American “legal” regionalism in the 19th century in relativizing European international law and dismantling the European monopoly of the power to set international principles.Simon Bolivar’s pan-Americanism in 1820’s is widely known as unsuccessful project for a political union of Latin American states. Actually, however, his project had two main pillars, the creation of a political union and that of “American public law,” and what was more important to the future world was the later. When Americas achieved their independence in 1810–20’s, the governing international principles were that of Vienna, agreed among European Powers and whose basic features were dynastic legitimacy and balance of power between monarchs. These principles were not compatible with the sovereign statehood of most of newly independent American states born in decolonial revolution and declared independence without recognition by ex-monarch. Nevertheless, those rules were considered as “European public law” or “European international law,” which was at that time mere synonym of “international law” governs the general relations between civilized nations. In this situation, Bolivar begun to pursue not only a union of Latin American states but also “American public law” which should be constituted by rules and principles that are different from that of Europe and suitable for America. Bolivar’s ideal American public law contains, e. g., popular legitimacy principle, denial of forcible intervention, obligatory peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereign equality, etc.The efforts of Latin American states to realize these ideal new norms continued throughout centuries. Certain of these norms have acquired universal approval, taking the place of old European originated norms. In the late 19th century, some Latin American scholars started to argue that the assumption of identity between “European international law” and “international law” was not appropriate any more asserting the existence of American international law and possible existence of other regional international laws. In the beginning of the 20th century, the existence of American international law was accepted in Europe with rise of social or objectivist legal thoughts and European regionalism. The modern academic assumption of the identity of “European international law” and “international law as the law of civilized nations” had disappeared in 30 years from 1880’s to 1910’s. Latin American legal pan-Americanism triggered this fundamental change of the conception of international law.

著者

松尾 正人

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.81, pp.161-178, 1986-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

著者

栗原 健

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.6, pp.52-65, 1958-07-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

35

著者

植田 麻記子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.54-72,L9, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

99

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This paper examines “Ashida Amendment” and “Ashida Memorandum” with particular focus on his views on the international affairs. Both are known as the origin of the Japanese postwar security problems: Article 9 of the Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security system.It illustrates the basis of Ashida's view on the international affairs. He always saw contemporary issues from the perspective of global history. After the World War I, the establishment of the League of Nations and conclusion of Treaty of Locarno and Treaty for the Renunciation of War promoted the idea of renunciation of war. Ashida had a hope that “international partnership” would be advanced in the post-World War I era. At the same time, he understood its uneasy reality. Indeed, the progress toward “international partnership” by the League of Nations, Treaty of Locarno, and Treaty for the Renunciation of War was frustrated by World War II.Right after the war, the world pursued afresh the ideal of “international partnership.” Ashida served as chairperson in the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Revision of the Imperial Constitution from July 25 to August 20, 1946. Ashida had the idea that Japan's decision to renounce war should be guaranteed both domestically and internationally by making the Article 9 serve as de facto diplomatic documents. Thus he made a point of the autonomy of the article. This led to the making of the “Ashida Amendment”. At the same time, Ashida consistently knew that the right of self-defense was the natural right of the nation despite the trend toward the abandonment of war.The conflict between the United States and Soviet Union became inevitable and overt. With the MacArthur's statement for the early peace with Japan, Ashida, as Foreign Minister, was made to consider the security after the independence. The “Ashida Memorandum” was submitted as a response to the Eichelberger's question about a time of withdrawal of the occupation army. It was handed to Eichelberger on September 13, 1947. The conception in “Ashida Memorandum” was that the best measures of guaranteeing Japan's security was to conclude a specific agreement with the United States and to reinforce the domestic police forces.Ashida had an intention that the “Ashida Amendment” should target international community rather than domestic one. He sought to grasp Japanese opportunity to be actively involved in shaping the postwar international order by acting as a leading advocate for the renunciation of war. At the time of the issuance of “Ashida Memorandum”, the most pressing concern in Japan that was sovereignty might be limited with the stationing of the Allied forces even after the independence. With the deterioration of the conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, Ashida thought Japan could resolve security problem while defending its sovereign right by the conclusion of the treaty with the United States which is independent from the peace treaty. Accordingly, “Ashida Memorandum” limited the right of stationing of US forces only at the time of emergencies, and emphasized the necessity of the build-up of Japanese police forces.By examining the process of making “Ashida Amendment” and “Ashida Memorandum”, this paper argues that Ashida had the strong desire for the achievement of participation in the postwar international order and early peace with a full sovereignty, so contributed to realization of them with the view on international affairs.

著者

浅野 亮

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_27-41, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

8

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Main propose of this paper is to analyze the strategic culture of China. Advocates of thesis of strategic culture, both in China and Western countries, persistently claim that China has uniquely non-belligerent strategic culture which has been formulated in its long history, and that China firmly maintains its pacifistic character no matter how China's security environment becomes deteriorated.They persistently contend that military thought of Sunzi, a prominent strategic thinker in ancient China, is a humanitarian pacifist, ant that modern China as well as ancient China is essentially a peace-loving country because modern China also employs Sunzi's traditional non-aggressive military thought.However, this argument is fundamentally misleading because tremendous number of sentences and expressions of Sunzi cited in China's classical and modern documents and speeches on military strategy does not necessarily reflect reconciliatory tendency of China's actual strategic behavior. Almost no academic study on China's strategic culture could prove that China has consistently employed a pacifistic strategic behavior in its history. Most of researchers on this field have failed to show a significant positive causal relationship between China's peace-loving rhetoric and its actual behavior.Likewise, even though ancient Sunzi also stresses the imperative importance of coherent and comprehensive grand strategy which not only comprises military but also extensively covers political, diplomatic, psychological and economic factors, it does not automatically mean that China has almost always maintained a farsighted and coherent grand strategy.Academic studies on major warfare and diplomatic negotiations among the major countries during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period usually show that the main reason why Sunzi emphasized the need of minimal exertion of military force and coherent grand strategy was mainly because he intended to reduce the huge cost of actual battle thus avoiding an unexpected protract of armed conflicts; otherwise his country would be suffered by an unfavorable risk of diplomatic and military intervention by other hostile countries.Idealizing of Sunzi in Western countries has been endorsed when some leading military analysts and politicians such as Hart and Weinberger criticized the existing Western military strategy and thinking, with stressing a sharp contrast between the reality of political and military institutions and idea of Sunzi, in order to emphasize the necessity of promoting a radical reform of existing political and military institutions.In China of the 21st century, China's major strategic thinkers utilize Sunzi to convince the mainstream of China's public opinion to accept their blueprint of increasing China's international role in a prudent, patient and tightly self-restrained manner without carelessly activating a devastating confrontation/crisis with the existing powerful hegemonic countries, while some belligerent Chinese claim emotionally to accelerate the pace of increasing China's international influence and to employ a more coercive approach to challenge the “iniquitous order of international ancien regime dominated by the United States.”

著者

毛利 敏彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.66, pp.128-147,L7, 1980

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In 1871, the Japanese government sent a goodwill mission to the United States of America and the European countries. This mission was led by <i>Tomomi Iwakura</i>, vice-president of minister (<i>Udaizin</i> _??__??__??_). <i>Takayoshi Kido</i>, the member of council (<i>Sangi</i> _??__??_), was appointed a vice-ambassador of the mission.<br><i>Kido</i> who belonged to the <i>Chôshû</i> faction had rivaled with <i>Toshimichi Ôkubo</i> who was the minister of finance (<i>Ôkura-kyô</i> _??__??__??_) and belonged to the <i>Satsuma</i> faction. <i>Kido</i> had opposed <i>Ôkubo's</i> policies.<br>So <i>Ôkubo</i> tried to reduce <i>Kido's</i> influence in the government. Then <i>Ôkubo</i> succeeded to isolate <i>Kido</i> from the government as a vice-ambassador of the mission.

著者

白鳥 潤一郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_17-33, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)

参考文献数

89

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The aim of this article is to examine the role of Japanese diplomacy in bringing cooperative relationship among oil-consumers, and how it led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in November 1974 after the First Oil Crisis (FOC). The foundation of the IEA has an epoch-making significance in itself, as this institution provided a platform in which long-term policy cooperation among oil consumers could be designed and implemented. The IEA obligates signatory states to stockpile a designated certain amount of oil reserves, and it also specifies the Oil Emergency Sharing System in the agreement. This represents an effort for advanced countries seeking cooperation while the postwar international economic order was undergoing to serious changes.Most works on Japanese diplomacy dealing with the FOC period have tended to focus on Japan's stance toward the Middle East. They generally emphasize highlight the anxiety within the government to secure a stable supply of oil as the principal reason for Japan eventually swinging toward pro-Arab policy. However, such narratives do not provide us with a whole picture, since the FOC was not only brought by Arab oil embargo. If we were to fully grasp the underlying cause of Japan's policy behavior in the FOC, we must first take into account a structural change in the international oil market since the late 1960s resulting from the strengthening of oil-producers. In the same vein, it is equally crucial to analyze how the oil consumers in general responded to the oil producers united under the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).After the FOC, cooperation among oil consumer states intensified with Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, and Japan was an active participant during the process. In fact, the Japanese government was the first to announce its intention to participate in the conference. It also actively took part in Energy Coordination Group (ECG) following the Washington Energy Conference, and facilitated ECG in playing a moderating role between Great Britain and West Germany.Japan actively participated in these institutional frameworks since the policymakers shared two perceptions. The first is the recognition that the oil consumers, in order to decrease their vulnerability in oil supply, must unite. The second perception is that it is important for Japan to support the maintenance of a liberal international economic order which would ensure the stable flow of oil supplies. Seen from this context, the Japanese participation in the establishment of the IEA from the first stage is a drastic deviation from past diplomatic practice of passively joining already-existing international organizations. Although Japan's role in G7 for facilitating international cooperation among advanced countries is better known, it is significant to notice that Japan's early participation in establishing cooperative framework in the aftermath of the FOC is the true turning point.

著者

奥田 泰広

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_130-143, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

71

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This paper examines the ‘strategic culture’ of Britain, which gives importance to external intelligence activities prior to the formulation of the foreign policy. ‘Intelligence’ is sometimes narrowly defined as the activity of collecting information covertly. However, in this paper, the word ‘intelligence’ has a broader definition; it is defined as the state's activity to investigate the international environment. In history, some countries formed their foreign policies without considering the broader definition of ‘intelligence’ and subsequently encountered defeat in wars. Britain has managed to avoid serious defeats in wars owing to its intelligence-oriented strategic culture.Such a feature can be seen in the case of Britain's intelligence activity prior to the First Word War. From the late nineteenth century to the eve of the First World War, Britain conducted some important activities to investigate the international environment. While adversary relationships were hardening within Europe, the Admiralty and War Offices tried to comprehend the entire picture of the international crisis and began to clarify the ‘emergency powers’ of the government. In addition, in the process of doing so, both offices decided to reinforce their own intelligence services. Furthermore, concerns regarding both offices were shared by the higher stratum of the strategic decision-making authority—the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) —. Further, the establishment of a new intelligence service—Secret Service Bureau—was determined by the CID in 1909; this service later became MI5 and SIS as we know them today.Subsequently, in 1911, the ‘War Book’ was compiled with the cooperation of many departments such as the Foreign, Admiralty, and War Offices. Although the War Book did not describe detailed plans for the war, Britain could avoid internal confusions at the onset of the war owing to the War Book. The important point here is that the officials of the Naval and Military intelligence departments attended the meeting for the compilation of the War Book held among the officials from the other offices of the government. The War Book can be regarded as representative of the intelligenceoriented strategic culture of Britain.From a common perspective, the broader definition of ‘intelligence’ should be highly valued before making any decision. However, in reality, many countries have not conducted such policy-related activities. This paper considers the activities of the British intelligence prior to the First World War as a salient example of an ‘intelligence-oriented strategic culture’ and discusses this case in depth.

著者

安岡 昭男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.14, pp.72-82, 1960

著者

内藤 智秀

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1968, no.36, pp.85-102, 1968-05-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

23

著者

添谷 芳秀

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.1-17,L5, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

19

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Postwar Japanese diplomacy has both benefited and suffered from the Yoshida Line of foreign policy, consisting of the peace constitution and the U. S. -Japan security treaty. This set of Yoshida's choices during the occupation period became the foundation of Japan's postwar economic recovery and eventually the rapid economic growth rendering Japan a world-class economic power. Deeply embedded in the Yoshida Line, however, was the structure of “dependence” on the United States for economic growth as well as security protection. This in turn has often invited, rather inevitably, challenges from nationalism attacking the lack of “autonomy” or “independence” of postwar Japan.This structural problem was also a source of criticism by external countries, especially the United States, for Japanese inaction or “free-riding, ” and the lack of a strategy. As Japan grew into an economic power and the negative views became prevalent concomitantly, some analysts rebuffed the criticism by arguing that the Yoshida's commitment to “light armament, economic growth, and the U. S. -Japan security ties” indeed constituted a strategy of postwar Japan. Simply put, the Yoshida Line was elevated to the Yoshida Doctrine.There were three types of discourse on the Yoshida Doctrine, which began to emerge since the end of the 1970s. One was to argue that the Yoshida Doctrine had been a viable strategy of postwar Japan, but that it would now need to be modified in a more proactive fashion. The second argument claimed that nationalistic challenges against the Yoshida Doctrine should be inevitable as Japan had recovered a sense of national pride, but that domestic political balance was still favorable to the supporters of the Yoshida Doctrine. Thirdly, it was contended that the Yoshida Doctrine was a strategic representation of Japan's political realism and should be retained as such particularly against the logic of military realism.The common denominator among the three was that the deep structure of “dependence” on the United States was taken for granted, or even assumed as the source of postwar Japan's successful strategy. This meant that the structural problem, susceptible to challenges by nationalism, was kept intact, which has now re-emerged as an old and new problem for Japan as it gropes for a new diplomacy, including possible revision of the peace constitution, in the 21st century.The articles in this volume traces the development of the Yoshida Line since the occupation period to the 1960s, when the deep structural problem was dodged, rather than rectified, in the evolutionary process of Japan's foreign policy making. There are three sets of propositions relevant for this period. Firstly, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had not successfully integrated his basic foreign policy with his Asian diplomacy, particularly toward China, demonstrating the lack of independent Asian policy on the part of postwar Japan. Secondly, close examinations of the origins of the peace constitution and the U. S. -Japan security treaty, as well as the origin of economycentered approach, reveals that the leaders, including Yoshida himself, did not expect that their choices should remain unchanged after the occupation period. Thirdly, this in turn calls for the scrutiny of Japanese diplomacy in the 1960s, when Japan grew into a global economic power precisely by putting a lid on the structural problem entrenched in the Yoshida Line.

著者

犬塚 孝明

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.102, pp.22-38,L6, 1993

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During the course of forming the Meiji state, there occurred several examples of senior government officials whose views on foreign affairs and understanding of international relations directly reflected the considerations of internal politics and diplomacy. This feature is, needless to say, deeply related to the question of Japanese nationalism. Such men were constantly preoccupied with the dilemma of how to protect Japan's political independence by matching the strength of the Western powers on the international stage of Eastern Asia. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to accurately reassess Japan's diplomatic stance in the early Meiji period by investigating the international outlooks of two representative diplomatic leaders and ministers of Foreign Affairs, Soejima Taneomi and Terashima Munenori. This is presented through a comparative analysis of their respective perceptions and interpretations of international law and diplomatic relations in addition to the policies they actually implemented while in office.<br>The Confucian ethics particular to a scholar of Chinese classics were central to Soejima's international perspective, generating his argument for discipline through moral influence and inspiring recourse to the diplomatic guidelines of the chronicles of Lu in his approach towards Russia and Asian states, especially Formosa and Korea. This should be recognized as a significant element in effecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' departure from its hitherto essentially moderate diplomatic policy and the adoption instead of a hard line approach.<br>On the other hand, Terashima was a strong advocate of moderation and attached much importance to ideas of equality and negotiation between sovereign states. His subsequent appointment to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, therefore, should have presented an opportunity for revising Soejima's hard line diplomacy in favour of the more temperate model of the past. This was prohibited, however, by the lateral pressure that the powers of Europe and America were exerting in Asia.<br>In order to ride crises of internal disorder and foreign pressure, the leading voices in government ventured instead on a scheme of sustaining Soejima's uncompromising line while at the same time replacing his rationale with a Western-style logic of power politics. It is perhaps reasonable to accept the view that the double-edged character of Meiji diplomacy, with its aggressive stance in Asia and simultaneously subordinate attitude to the powers of Europe and America, first took shape when this strategy was actually in place and operating in Japanese foreign policy.

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_42-56, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

35

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Why has Iran been refusing to comply with the binding U.N. Security Council resolutions and to halt its uranium enrichment program? Why has the apparent cost that it incurs by defying the international community not deterred Iran from furthering its nuclear program? Why has postrevolutionary Iran been opposing the U.S.-led peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians and made it a rule to counter any U.S. influence in the region?In this article, I posit that postrevolutionary Iran's principled opposition to the U.S. is not just rhetoric or an ideologically-driven self-image, but that it may well be considered its self-constructed strategic cultural proclivity. While mindful not to fall into the trap of essentialist or cultural determinist arguments, I find the concept of strategic culture as a context useful. Following scholars such as Stuart Poore, I posit that decision makers perceive and interpret their strategic environment culturally, while what may be considered their constituted strategic culture give meaning to material factors.As a first step toward identifying postrevolutionary Iran's strategic culture, I examine the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the first head of the postrevolutionary Islamist state, as regards contemporary international relations and the roles of the superpowers therein. Convinced that part of the mission of the Islamic revelation was about providing salvation against oppression and fighting injustice, Khomeini went on to construct postrevolutionary Iran's dominant strategic discourse anchored in the perceived obligation to avoid and counter earthly hegemony or domination. Khomeini preached that Iran must resist the “satanic” moves of the both superpowers and find only sanctuary under the banner of Islam. While finding it logical and necessary to build and maintain good neighborly and mutually respectful relations among states, Khomeini ruled out submitting to any international hegemon.Iran in its post-Khomeini period continued to maintain its counterhegemonic stance. Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as the head of the Islamic state of Iran, cultivated its counter-hegemonic strategic culture in part to secure his own authority and build his power base. The strategic alliance constructed between Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved to perpetuate post-Khomeini-era Iran's anti-American strategic culture.In conclusion, I argue that Iran may be best regarded as a counterhegemon, not an aspiring hegemon and that the kind of power that postrevolutionary Iran has found necessary to possess is not the power for hegemony and domination, but the power to resist and persevere. This proclivity helps explain why Iran has continued its nuclear program despite the cost it incurs by defying the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also helps explain why it has maintained its principled anti-U.S. stance for the last three decades. It does not, however, seem logical to conclude that Iran's apparent pursuit of the deterrent capabilities through its nuclear or other programs is directly influenced by its counter-hegemonic strategic culture. The argument, nonetheless, supports a view that Iran's strategic posture is almost exclusively defensive and that its apparent pursuit of the means of deterrence should not necessarily be considered posing a threat to the region or the international community.

著者

石井 孝

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.14, pp.1-13, 1960

著者

藤村 道生

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.58, pp.130-136, 1978-03-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

池内 恵

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_115-175_129, 2014

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Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This "avoidance theorists" conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its "subservient" style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the "defensive" nature of Islam but expanded the concept of "defense" beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the "defense" to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as "defense" in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.

著者

石田 淳

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_56-175_69, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)

参考文献数

32

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The essence of realism is its attention to the exercise of power through which political actors pursue their goals of realizing desirable consequences. From the realist point of view, political actors aim at either maintaining or altering the status quo by getting others either to do what they otherwise would not do, or to refrain from doing what they otherwise would do. In other words, power relations and prudent actions are at the core of realism. The primary purpose of this article is to examine why this realist school of international relations went through changes of its analytical foci from the Interwar Era to the Nuclear Era in the twentieth century. The realism of the Interwar Era found its target of criticism in liberalism, which totally ignored the conflict of interests among major powers over the status quo. E. H. Carr in particular severely criticized the liberal defense of the status quo. Then, the ideological confrontation between the two crusading superpowers during the Cold War directed the realist research to the misperception of intentions. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, fully understood the seriousness of the security dilemma in the Cold War context, in which the intention of the liberal United States was naturally misperceived by the Soviet Union as demanding for change of the status quo in her favor and this misperception exacerbated the prospect for negotiated settlement of conflicts. Finally, the nuclear arms race during the Cold War generated awareness among realists that the avoidance of total nuclear war was in common interests between the Cold War rivals. In this context, realists came to be aware of not only the risks of misperceived threats but also those of misperceived promises among states. This article stresses that Yoshikazu Sakamoto, placed in a proper historical context, should be re-read as one of the few Japanese scholars of international politics, who chose to theoretically tackle contemporary American realist questions, often associated with Hans Morgenthau and Thomas Schelling.

著者

米 多

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.188, pp.188_62-188_76, 2017-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

70

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The purpose of this research is to examine the process of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan implementing its anti-communist alliance policy in the middle of the 1960s with the Vietnam War intensified as the background. After evacuating to Taiwan, the ROC government lead by Chiang Kai-shek continued to declare its intention to recapture the mainland China and build up a collective security treaty organization like SEATO with other anti-communist countries in East Asia.It is generally considered that Chiang Kai-shek eventually gave up trying to add or join any Asia military alliance in the early 1960s around 1963, but recent research in Korea has shown that the ROC still had an interest in it after that. This paper presents the truth by using the newly opened archives in Taiwan, Korea, and the U.S. Moreover, special attention is paid to the decision-makers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC as another major factor influencing the promotion of the alliance concept and their response to national and Cold War regional politics at the same time. Because whatever the outcome, the bilateral talks and negotiations for the treaty of military alliance, with the end goal being the improvement of mutual understanding between ROC and other Asian anti-communist countries, which would have a substantial effect on ROC’s foreign policy making later.At the beginning of 1964 when the French government was about to establish the diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chiang Kai-shek decided to commence military action as a countermeasure, and propose the concept of ‘Asian Anti-communist Alliance’ for setting up a new anti-communist alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of Vietnam (ROV) in advance in which the aim is to get the military support from ROK instead of U.S. and invading the mainland China through the North Vietnam, while the U.S. was starting to put great pressure on all the East Asian allies to follow the U.S. military strategy in Vietnam.The failure of the Sea battle of August 6 in 1965 made the ROC leaders recognized that the ROC’s military power was not strong enough. In the late 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek postponed the military action and let the POK take the initiative in APACL after losing interest in joining or adding a new alliance. On the other hand, the ROC’s diplomats started to coordinate their Asian foreign policy after the Concept of ‘Asian Anti-communist Alliance’ failed, in response to the regional political transformation in East Asia that most of the free countries had been seeking to improve the domestic economy rather than the ideological confrontation.

著者

田口 幸子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.40, pp.115-129, 1970-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

著者

三浦 聡

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.124, pp.27-44,L7, 2000-05-12 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

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The last quarter century has witnessed a rising scholarly interest in international institutions. Various reviews of the study have identified several schools of thought. Popular among them is a variable-focused typology: power, interests, and ideas, which in turn produces a neorealism-neoliberalism-constructivism trilogy. Also widely accepted is a distinction based on ontology, epistemology, and methodology, the schism of which is between rationalism and constructivism.While building on these works, I pose different questions: How can we conceive of actions and institutions, and how are we to characterize and explore the relationship between them? I would argue that we can answer them in three ways, namely, instrumental, deliberative, and cognitive approaches to international institutions. Appropriating insights of “new institutionalisms” in social sciences, I develop these approaches by explicating three faces of concepts such as rationality, interaction, communication, decision-making procedures, compliance, interests, and ideas.Relying upon the logic of consequentiality, instrumentalists focus on actors' calculation and ask how institutions intervene in the process. Actors live under uncertainty so that exchange of private information becomes an important aspect of strategic interaction. They regard institutions as various types of information and as procedures for aggregating various interests. Institutions are only one among many instruments, and actors utilize them as long as they serve their own interests.The deliberative approach adopts the logic of appropriateness and argues that actors match their choices not with expected consequences but with situations they find themselves in. Actors live in a world of multiple and potentially conflicting roles and rules. Appropriateness of actions, therefore, can be contested so that common standards need to be established in the process of deliberation. Consensus constitutes the basis of communicative action. Actors can change their conception of appropriateness—norms and rules—while transforming their own conception of interests and identities through socialization. Institutions construct the practice of deliberation, serve as reasons for action, and situate deliberation within the overall decision-making process.Cognitivists, with the logic of orthodoxy, explore how actors perceive the world as they know it, and argue that institutions make social cognition possible. Actors live under an ambiguous world. As templates for cognition, schema, scripts, frames, and symbols enable actors to divide the world into many components, to categorize and classify themselves to formulate their identities, and to make the world meaningful. Actors can strategically appropriate these templates from the “cultural toolkit” and construct historical narratives, through which they transform the tools themselves.I conclude with considering some implications of this typology for the furure of theories of international institutions. I propose that we should view rationality as “embedded, ” and inquire conditions under which a particular mode of rationality is dominant. Also, I suggest a need for elaborating and expanding the “theoretical toolkit” presented herein.