著者

永井 陽之助

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.2-31,L5, 1986

---

I. Uniqueness of the Postwar Peace. II. The <i>Nomos</i> of the earth-Geopolitics of MAD (i) Bipolar System (ii) Geostrategic Approach to MAD (iii) Informal Rules of Game and Norms of Behavior. III. The <i>Nomos</i> of the Outer Space (i) Sanctuarization of the Space (ii) Ambiguity of the Space Weapons (iii) Issues of ABM Treaty in the Legal Context of SDI.<br>This essay aims to examine the impact of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on the <i>Nomos</i> of the outer space through revealing the secret of durability of the postwar peace. In calling for a defense that would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete, " President Reagan's goal of a perfect area defense stirred the interest of the public who have long sought a moral alternative to deterrence based on the mutual assured destruction (MAD). Yet MAD is not a strategy capable of being changed by political will or strategic considerations; it is rather "existential" condition, not unlike the condition of the market mechanism, resulted by the inevitable consequence of the super-powers having the assured capabilities of mutual destruction, closely connected with the asymmetric geopolitical positon.<br>This condition has created the mutual vulnerability of civilized urban centers, because of the strategic reality resulted from the development of the ICBM and the so-called "reconnaissance revolution." The detonation of even as few as five or ten Soviet warheads on U. S. cities would cause unparalleld destruction. It might be called the law of "impossibility of area defense". This unique combination of the bipolar system and the condition of the MAD has successfully drawed a clear distinction between a zone of sanctuarity (a zone of predictability on which mutual interest in common rules based on reciprocal sanction) and a zone of danger (a zone of unpredictabily) in the periphery of the world. They have no choice, in this condition, but to play the game of influence by means of "nuclear cheque" on the security of the nuclear arsenals.<br>Whereas we live in "neither war nor peace, " we are afraid of a radical discontinuity by turning a zone of predictablity into a zone of danger. The concept of a zone of danger-currently highlighted by the issue of the SDI in outer space-also signals the arrival of an era of opportunity on the formation of the <i>Nomos</i> of the space.<br>Any consideration of a militarization of outer space should not neglect the distinction of two different directions: the sanctuarization of the space (turning into a zone of predictability) through the passive uses such as reconnaissance and communications, in sharp contrast with the militarization of the space by turning into a zone of danger through the development of the ABM and ASAT technology, despite of the ambiguity of space weapons.<br>In all probablity, super-power rivalry in strategic defense will lead to an increased Soviet-American arms race by the exchange of the offensive and defensive in a vicious circle. This is the reason why the development of SDI might be quite different from the Manhattan and the Apollo projects, which involves no less than unlocking nature's secrets; a struggle of man against nature. In contrast, the success of the stratigic defense depends on the reactions or the counter-measureas taken by the Soviet side, as the Fletcher panel project has suggested.<br>Moreover, the SDI poses a real threat to the Outer Space Treaty, not to mention to the ABM treaty which is most significant arms-control agreement of the postwar period. Both treaties should provide us the legal framework (the <i>Nomos</i>), as a fundamental constitution, of the outer space. Such "passive" military uses as the satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, and communications are compatible with a doctrine of peaceful purposes and deterrence. Yet the ballistic missile defence (BMD)

著者

関 誠

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_12-154_28, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

104

---

In 1873, Imperial Japanese Army started intelligence activity in China under the tensions preceding Taiwan Expedition of 1874. But this attempt was almost slumbered by the confusion of Japanese civil wars.When the General Staff (GS) was founded in 1878, they restarted the intelligence activity. GS dispatched 12 officers to China for information-gathering for three years. They collected military and topographical information all over the China. Also GS sent staff officers to the short trips for strategic reconnaissance. By these activities, GS could lay out a war plan against China and military review about neighboring powers. But GS was not satisfied with intelligence reports at the earlier date.Against Russia, GS started intelligence activity in 1880. But GS disposed only 2 officers in Siberia in 1882. GS tried to focus on China, shelving Russia matters.In 1882, GS was surprised by China's dispatch of troops to Korea. In China, GS was obliged to improve their intelligence apparatus and increased the number of officers from 12 to 16. Captain FUKUSHIMA Yasumasa, Military Attaché in Peking, employed informers in the Chinese Department of Military Affairs and obtained confidential papers from them. Based on the information, he realized that Chinese military modernization would fail and criticized the Japanese diplomatic policy to concert with China.In Russia, GS reduced the number of intelligence officer to only 1. In 1885, GS's intelligence in Russia was stagnant.But then GS was shocked by the British occupation of Port Hamilton, and started to pay attention to British-Russian relations. In 1886, GS reduced personnel in China and sent staff officers to Siberia and India for strategic reconnaissance. In 1887, GS appointed Fukusima to Military Attaché in Berlin. He collected information on Russia, especially the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway. Finally, in 1892, he carried out the Trans-Siberian expedition on horseback. He concluded that the Trans-Siberian railway would be completed in 10 years and after the completion Japan would be in difficult position. He insisted that Japan should make a strategic plan against Russia as soon as possible. GS also made a report estimating about transportation capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway.In 1892, GS reinforced intelligence apparatus in Russia sending Military Attaché and 3 intelligence officers to Saint Petersburg. Adding to the officer in Siberia, GS deployed 5 officers in Russia. In China, GS disposed only just 3 officers at the end of 1893. By the First Sino-Japanese war, GS intelligence placed more emphasis on Russia rather than China.In these years, GS started the intelligence from scratch, and accommodated it to international situation. The GS intelligence activities anticipated the future situation and preceded Japanese diplomacy.

著者

光辻 克馬 山影 進

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_18-40, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

参考文献数

52

---

Multi-agent simulation (MAS), or agent-based simulation, is very powerful in representing and analyzing system's emergent properties based on interactions among agents. The emergence of social order or norms based on interactions among nations has been one of the central subjects of International Relations (IR). Mutual compatibility being taken into account, MAS could have been applied to IR more extensively. In reality, technical difficulties and excessive abstraction have been most formidable obstacles for the application of MAS. Aiming at a wider use of MAS in IR, we developed a user-friendly simulator, and have built various types of models, from the crisis decision-making to the balance of power, with lesser abstraction and more substantial attributes that represent characteristics of international society.In this paper, we focus on the spread of an international norm in the manner of cascade on the tipping point, which constructivists of IR such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) tried to understand. To date, discussions on this subject have been very suggestive, but far from conclusive. In order to give a theoretical account for norm emergence and cascade, we construct the Norm Emergence Model (NEM). NEM is the combination of the threshold model originally developed by Granovetter (1978) with the persuasion mechanism suggested by Risse (2000) and other constructivists, so that NEM can generate cascades of norm emergence based on dynamic multi-agent interactions that affect the threshold of individual agents.The case we analyze by NEM is the spread of anti-colonialism that affected the membership of intemational society in the mid 20th century, probably the most fundamental norm-change in international society as Philpott (2001) and others argue. One of the most illustrative events must be the United Nations Declaration of Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. Within less than a generation, the norm of trusteeship was completely replaced by the norm of unconditional independence.NEM represents virtual international society that sharply split over whether to accept the colonial rules as trusteeship or reject them unconditionally, with the initial condition (agents as UN members, their thresholds and their positions) that more or less reflects the reality at the end of the 1940s at the United Nations. The simulation begins with the year 1950, and finishes in 1969, during which each agent decides which position it should take, and persuades other members aiming at gaining more support of its position. New agents join in the same manner as the reality.The result of MAS depends on the setting of parameters, and we show results based on four scenarios. Scenario 1 makes persuasion impossible, which means only the entry of new members affects norm emergence. The cascade did not take place. Although ex-colonial countries increase in number, their positions were not as radical as socialist countries. Scenario 2 allows persuasion. Norm change did not happen either. For, socialist countries are persuaded, and change their position so as to accept trusteeship. Scenario 3 allows persuasion, but only anti-colonial norm is influential; trusteeship lost legitimacy. Now, the cascade happens in the mid 1950s with much more sudden pace than the reality. In addition to the setting of Scenario 3, Scenario 4 limits the range of successful persuasion so that agents are affected only when the distance of thresholds is close enough. The cascade takes place in the late 1950s that looks like the reality. Thus, the specific type of interactions and the entry of new members turn out to generate a norm cascade, sometimes after the confrontation for a few years, which seems to reproduce what happened in the arena of the United Nations.NEM is a very simple model, but can reproduce a cascade of international norm from trusteeship to unconditional independence to a successful degree. ...

著者

中沢 志保

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.83, pp.126-142,L14, 1986-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

62

---

Nuclear disarmament negotiations began with “the Baruch Plan” of June 14, 1946. The Baruch Plan was the first proposal for the international control of atomic energy presented by the United States to the United Nations.It was evaluated as an epochal proposal that the United States, then the only nuclear weapon state, publicly expressed her intention to abandon its monopoly on nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the “strictness” of that plan—namely, its provisions of “punishment against violators” and “restriction of the veto power” in the United Nations—brought about rejection by the Soviet Union.As a result, the first negotiations for nuclear disarmament were completely upset. But that failure provided an important suggestion regarding those factors which decide disarmament negotiations and international relations after World War II. And we cannot forget the great contributions of atomic scientists to ideas on the international control of atomic energy.This article re-examines the process of establishing the first plan for international control of nuclear energy focussing on the viewpoints of atomic scientists. David E. Lilienthal and his group, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, drew up a plan for the international control of atomic energy in March, 1946. “The Acheson-Lilienthal Report”, as it was usually known, was a draft plan of the Baruch Plan. But these two plans contain important differences in their contents.The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which was based on Oppenheimer's ideas, proposed setting up an international organization which should possess all the fissionable materials and should control all nuclear activities. This organization was envisioned to be the center for research and development in this field.The Baruch Plan, which laid the foundations of United States atomic policy, partially followed the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, but it emphasized inspection and sanctions against violations. Namely, the Baruch Plan demanded enforceable punishment of violators rather than cooperation in atomic energy development. It is well known that the emphasis of punishment and problems relating to the veto in the United Nations became obstacles in gaining Soviet approval of the plan.Disarmament negotiations to follow inherited this kind of disharmony. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, which aims to prevent the appearance of any new nuclear powers, supports the dominant positions of the nuclear big powers rather than protects the benefits of non-nuclear states. The political character of the treaty meant severe antagonisms between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers. If we try to find the beginning of such deadlock in disarmament negotiations, we must re-examine the Baruch Plan. And if we compare that plan with the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, more significant facts will be found. One is the ideas of Oppenheimer, who represents both scientists and politiciants. And the other is the paradoxical meaning that his ideas exerted no influence on decision making, which provides a case study to consider the close relationship between scientists and nuclear policy.

著者

野口 和彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_157-184_165, 2016-03-30 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

21

著者

鳥潟 優子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.156, pp.156_90-106, 2009-03-30 (Released:2011-09-10)

参考文献数

75

---

In 1963, about one and a half year after he had ended the Algerian War, French President Charles de Gaulle started to publicly criticize the US military intervention in Vietnam and proposed “Neutralization” as a path to peace settlement. But the US government, especially the Johnson administration, already familiar with and tired of, de Gaulle's critical attitudes, flatly rejected this proposal, considering it just another way of attacking the US government and its policies. Then de Gaulle's criticism toned up, culminating in his infamous Phnom Penh speech in 1966, that increased the tension across the Atlantic.What was the purpose of de Gaulle's peace initiatives? This article reexamines de Gaulle's Vietnam policy in light of new archives disclosed recently (in 2003) in France as well as in the US.According to my analysis, the new documents seem to show that, contrary to the American perception, with his “Neutralization” proposal, De Gaulle was really trying to mediate a peace between the US, North Vietnam and the NLF. Based on lessons drawn from the disastrous colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, he was sincerely convinced that it would be absolutely impossible even for the US to win the war against such a well-rooted nationalist movement.If so, however, another puzzle arises. Why did de Gaulle fail to persuade the American government of the utility of his peace plan? What was the cause for this fundamental misunderstanding between the two presidents?In order to answer these questions, the author is focusing on the duality of de Gaulle's diplomacy toward the US. It is certain that his peace initiative on Vietnam was initially meant as serious and friendly advice. As one of the American allies, France didn't want to see the leader of the Western camp stuck in the mud of Vietnam. It was feared that the American power wasted in Southeast Asia might eventually cause US withdrawal from Western Europe. De Gaulle was far from being a simple anti-American, as was assumed by the Americans. On the other hand, however, De Gaulle's “Neutralization” proposal was inseparable from his World strategy, seeking to enhance the French international influence and status with all possible means. His criticism of the Vietnam War stemmed also from his strong desire to gain France more autonomy from the US hegemony. It is well know that attaining equality with the US was one of de Gaulle's diplomatic ambitions. This position was also so flagrant in his Vietnam proposal that the Americans couldn't help simply rejecting it.

著者

宮坂 宏

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.15, pp.29-42, 1961-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

11

著者

植木(川勝) 千可子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_1-203_16, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

47

---

This special issue explores the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations. This problem is particularly important because several changes are underway that may alter our understanding of nuclear weapons and how they might shape and be shaped by international relations. What is the situation surrounding nuclear weapons today and have the changes increased or decreased the likelihood of war?The changes we observe are threefold. First is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are now in what some call the “second nuclear age.” There has been an emergence of new and potential nuclear powers, such as India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. Second, we see the development of lower yield nuclear weapons. Third, there is a growing and strong support in the world community for the ban on nuclear weapons.Then, what are the impact of these changes? And how will we be able to reach the answers? I offer several hypotheses about nuclear weapons and war. How does the acquisition of nuclear weapons change the behavior of the state that has acquired them? Secondly, will smaller nuclear weapons decrease or increase the chances of war? What are the arguments in favor of and against lower yield nuclear weapons? And thirdly, how do norms help deter the first use of nuclear weapons?The articles in this issue share this understanding of these changes and seek to offer insights into overcoming the problems. They analyze the current situation and seek to find answers from past cases of success and failure. Several articles focus on the future of nuclear disarmament and arms control. They seek to identify causes for success from past agreements and analyze possible problems in the future. One article tests competing hypotheses on nuclear stability and bipolar stability and finds that nuclear hypothesis offers a stronger explanation. Still another looks at the strength of norms on nuclear weapons. Others explore the policies of Russia, Japan and the United States.

著者

上村 威

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_174-187_177, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

大島 美穂

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_1-189_16, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

22

---

The purpose of this volume is to review the relationship between International Politics and Regional Studies from the perspectives of each field, and to re-examine Regional Studies contribution to International Politics. It has been quite some time since Stanley Hoffmann, among others, indicated that International Relations (IR) was an American social science, and it has become commonplace to affirm that IR is not “international” at all, but is rather characterized by a pervasive Anglo-American mode of thought and resulting conceptual and spatial boundaries. Since then a limited number of studies have emerged to enhance our understanding of how IR is perceived in distinct places around the globe, and one of the most important of these is a series on “geocultural epistemologies in IR” by Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver. The configuration of the JAIR membership shows that in Japanese academic circles IR has developed in a dual format with one branch focusing on theoretical research and global studies and the other on regional studies and historical research, and, moreover, that those tendencies are different from American IR. As another distinct feature, these two areas of research do not exist in an isolated manner, and more than a few members not only carry out regional studies but also incorporate a profound knowledge of theoretical research into their work, which has led to the development of significant resources and achievements. However, it is difficult to sustain this linkage as a steady process, and it seems that the majority of members, throughout their careers, study in a very narrow range of specialization with limited crossover into alternates branches of the field.It can be said that regional histories, as well as their political, economic, and social structures, have been formed in the context of international politics and that we cannot discuss regional issues without regard to international politics and vice versa. In this volume, by presenting the relationships between international politics and regional issues in the Middle East, Latin America, East Asia, South-East Asia, Russia and Europe, and by engaging in analysis of regional alliances in international conflict, we would like to try relativizing IR and the interaction of regional and international politics in evidence based research.

著者

高橋 良輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_146-184_156, 2016-03-30 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

65

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_75-195_91, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

70

---

This article re-examines the historical process of framing Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which is called Renunciation of War Clause, and focuses on its function as reassurance by the loser. Dealing with the function, this research explains the reason why postwar Japan-U. S. relationship could dramatically progress conflict resolution from the total war to the restoration of peace from both theoretical and historical standpoints.To answer the question mentioned above, this article argues that, in terms of a theory of reassurance by the loser, Postwar Japan intended to treat the victor’s anxiety on its challenge by relying on the normative self-restraint of Article 9 of the Constitution. The argument regards the provision of the Article as a signal justified by an appropriate norm. While the U. S. was concerned about Japan’s challenge and intended to make it impossible by prohibiting armament, Japan dealt with the fear of the U. S. by reassuring its own intention. Japan sent a normative signal of reassurance, which bound itself by denying war and armament. Therefore, it is appropriate to understand that, in essence, Article 9 of the Constitution had practical meaning as a signal of reassurance in order to let the U.S. and other countries know Japan’s peaceful intention, rather than an abstract norm derived from the idea of pacifism, which came from regret for the war.Tracing the historical process of framing Article 9 of the constitution reveals that it worked as the loser’s reassurance. The process was the opposite direction of the order of the completed text. The U. S. home government decided to disarm Japan at first, and the local commander MacArthur followed the policy. On the other hand, as Japanese leader, Prime Minister Shidehara proposed renunciation of war to MacArthur. However, it was just an ideal promise regarding peaceful intention, and lacked reassurance in terms of the capability. The Japanese government hoped to maintain the provision of armament in the constitution. It was unacceptable for the U.S., so it prepared a draft of the constitution which included renunciation of war proposed by Shidehara as well as the prohibition of arms. The U.S. presented the draft to Japan in order to confirm its peaceful intention. The draft imposed the cost of the prohibition of arms, while it mitigated the impression of burden by referring to the normative legitimacy of renunciation of war. The draft as the U.S. screening set up a hurdle that Japan should clear. Japan reassured the U.S. and other members of the international society by sending a signal which became costly due to the democratic institutional constraint of diet deliberations. It made Renunciation of War Clause a national pledge.

著者

安岡 昭男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.14, pp.72-82, 1960-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

著者

湯川 勇人

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.190, pp.190_130-190_144, 2018-01-25 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

67

---

This article investigates that how Japan pursued inconsistent diplomatic conceptions, establishing a New Order in East Asia and avoiding the deterioration of the U.S.-Japan relationship, by focusing on Foreign Minister Arita’s diplomatic strategy toward the United States from the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War to 1940. It argues that Arita tried to maintain the U.S.-Japan relationship within the framework of the Nine Power Treaty by rectifying the open door policy for establishing a New Order in East Asia.During the initial stage of the Second Sino-Japanese war, Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita devoted his primary attention to the creation of so called Toa Shin Chitsujo (New Order in East Asia) by establishing an economic block with China and a puppet state “Manchukuo.” The United States had been opposing this policy as it infringed upon the Nine Power Treaty which reaffirmed the open door policy and guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. At the same time, Japan was economically dependent upon the US especially for raw materials that were of vital importance for Japan’s war against China.The preset study reveals in what way Arita pursued two inconsistent diplomatic goals: avoiding the deterioration of US-Japan relations while attempting to establish a New Order in violation of the Nine Power Treaty. Previous researches interpreted Arita’s Statement of 18 November 1938 as abandonment of the Nine Power Treaty and alteration of the status quo. However, this article shows that Arita made efforts to keep Japanese engagement consistent with the Nine Power Treaty by asking the Department of State, through the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, to rectify the interpretation of the open door policy in exchange for the protection and respect of the US rights in China. In that sense, the Nine Power Treaty served to Arita as a valuable asset in achieving inconsistent diplomatic objectives.In order to alleviate the Depart of State skepticism about Arita’s approach and gain the US trust, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to engage in protection of the US interests in China. Then policy makers of the Foreign Ministry decided to settle the problem of the blockade of the Yangtzu River. However, this policy had never been implemented because of the strong opposition from young diplomatic officers. As a result, the Department of State made their perception of Japan worse, and it bankrupted the Arita’s foreign policy.

著者

土山 實男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_146-155, 2012-02-29 (Released:2014-03-31)

参考文献数

15

著者

佐伯 喜一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.5, pp.40-59, 1958-06-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

18

著者

大串 和雄

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.207, pp.207_49-207_64, 2022-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

40

---

This article identifies the characteristics of transitional justice (TJ) in Latin America compared to other world regions and explores the causes of such characteristics. The author highlights seven discernible aspects in TJ as practiced in Latin America. First, Latin America pioneered the current wave of TJ in the mid-1980s. Consequently, the Latin American experience inspired and contributed to the development of the TJ “field” at the global level. Truth commissions and “the right to the truth” may be counted among such contributions. Further, numerous perpetrators were successfully prosecuted in Latin America, perhaps on par with the Western Balkans. Second, the “post-authoritarian type” predominates in Latin America’s TJ, as opposed to the “post-conflict type.” Only four countries, i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, had “post-conflict TJ.” Third, the punishments of the perpetrators were almost exclusively assumed by the national courts rather than international or hybrid courts. Nevertheless, prosecutions in the national courts of foreign countries had some significance. Fourth, regional human rights institutions, i.e., the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, were instrumental in advancing victims’ rights. Fifth, domestic factors were far more important than international factors in Latin America’s TJ. The limited international involvement may be explained by the pioneering character of Latin America’s TJ (as the international community only began to involve itself in TJ in the 1990s). More importantly, it may be attributable to the predominance of the “post-authoritarian type” (because the international community often serves as a mediator in internal armed conflict, but not in democratization settings). Sixth, the driving force of TJ in Latin America has been victims and their supporters, especially domestic human rights NGOs, which were far more instrumental than international and foreign NGOs in advancing TJ in their countries. Seventh, in Latin America, the principal demands of victims were the punishment of the perpetrators and the truth, although this conclusion should be qualified by several important caveats provided in the article. The truth can be divided between the “micro truth” (what happened to the particular victims) and the “macro truth” (the overall pattern of human rights violations and war crimes in the country). The victims were eager to discover the micro truth and, although most knew the macro truth, they demanded that it be recognized by the state and society. The article advocates for considering the Latin American experience to obtain a less skewed and more diversified representation of TJ around the world.

著者

小泉 直美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_81-189_97, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

58

---

The question why the Soviet Union radically changed its foreign policy course which led to the end of the Cold War has been the subject of controversy in various academic journals on international relations. Realists argue that the economic downturn brought Gorbachev and other conservative leaders including the military to rethink its antagonistic policy toward the United States seeking for some respite. Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that the radical change in foreign policy was caused by the new idea and identification which Gorbachev had acquired through learning of the Common Security concept from Western peace researches. While these debates have shed light on how the end of Cold War began, they have been indifferent to how the U.S.-Soviet Cold War really ended. This paper focused on this missing point of these controversies.From the perspective of Russian regional studies, the Gorbachev initiative including bold unilateral concessions were extremely rare in the history of a country with deep concerns on its national security like the Soviet Union. Those unilateral concessions were their tactics to make the Western nations believe in the Soviet sincerity to overcome mutual distrust and make Europe more safer place for their conducting economic reform. Even Gorbachev noticed mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the West would not disappear overnight. Therefore what the Gorbachev’s team really aimed at was the lower -leveled parity of strategic forces between the West and the East. Since this simple fact was forgotten in the euphoria of Russian renouncement of communism and the alleged U.S. victory over the Soviet Union, the ‘ending’ of the end of the Cold War became quite ambiguous. START II was hastily signed in January 1993 by Boris El’tsin and George H. W. Bush. This treaty was to sum up a series of arms control negotiations which was to create the strategic stability between the two sides, but in reality it was much disadvantageous to weakened and confused Russia and only left a sense of unfairness to Russians.

著者

大内 勇也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.192, pp.192_33-192_49, 2018-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

59

---

The adoption of international human rights treaties has been a subject of great interest in International Relations. As human rights protection has been regarded as a domestic matter, it is understandable that many states were reluctant to restrict their sovereignty by treaties in this field.Existing studies therefore focus on treaties with implementation mechanisms like human rights courts or individual petitions. At the same time, these studies assume that agreements on human rights treaties depend on governments’ acceptance of principled norms of human rights. And based on discourse theory, they claim that states agree on the treaties because they are “persuaded” by arguments referring to principled norms.Yet such norms do not always imply specific means to realize human rights. Therefore, treaty implementation mechanisms are often contentious issues in negotiations, and the results of negotiations vary. Existing studies cannot explain the differences in these results. What explains the incorporation of implementation mechanisms?To answer this question, this article focuses on legal experts as political actors in “epistemic communities” and explains how they incorporate implementation mechanisms into human rights treaties. I argue that legal experts are able to define agendas and specific policy for governments in two ways. First, when human rights problems are internationally recognized, these experts create a legal framework for international policy and take the initiative in drafting. Second, they prepare the draft of their policy preferences and direct the course of governmental negotiations.In the two steps above, three conditions affect the extent of legal experts’ influence on governments’ positions. First, the higher the level of agreement between legal experts on treaty provisions, more influential the experts become. Second, the more uncertain governments are about the nature of human rights problems and the prospect for policies, more dependent they are on legal experts. Third, the greater the level of disagreement between governments on treaty provisions, the more influential legal experts become. When these conditions are favorable for legal experts (i.e., agreement between experts, high government uncertainty, and disagreement between governments), they can realize a treaty that matches their preferences.To test my argument, I analyze the drafting process of the European Convention on Human Rights adopted at the Council of Europe in 1950. This convention is a significant case of providing both the human rights court and individual petitions. Yet most states were unwilling to provide these implementation mechanisms in the beginning. My analysis shows that legal experts of the European Movement succeeded in incorporating these provisions into the convention, because the three conditions were favorable for legal experts. These conditions made it possible to realize their human rights project despite the major power, Britain, strongly opposing both of the implementation mechanisms.

著者

金 栄鎬

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.177, pp.177_42-177_56, 2014-10-30 (Released:2015-11-13)

参考文献数

47

---

This paper examines South Korea’s change of foreign policy toward Japan due to its changes of government since democratic transition in 1987 by taking into account the three points of view: First, I focus on the policy makers’ ideal inclination, conservative or progressive, as well as on power relations among ruling party, opposition party and public opinion; Second, South Korea’s policy toward Japan have to be analyzed in connection with ones toward North Korea and US; Third, I take the 1965 regime, under which diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan was established with containing not merely communism but also post-colonial issues, as an indicator to classify continuity and change of the policy. The two conservative governments after the 1987 transition, Roh Tae-Woo and KIM Young-Sam administration, showed continuity of foreign policy toward Japan as seen from the perspective of the 1965 regime. The two administrations cooperated with Japan when Japan kept adopting hard-liner policy toward North Korea. The two also continued containing post-colonial issues although South Korea instead confronted Japan when Japan tried soft-liner policy toward North Korea. The change of power on election in 1997, unprecedented in the South Korean political history, brought about a significant change. Kim Dae-Jung’s “National Government” developed reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and simultaneously maintained cooperation with Japan. Roh Moo-Hyun’s “Participatory Government” forged ahead with such a change. It pursued peace and prosperity with North Korea despite confronting US because a fear of entrapment was mounted among South Korean public opinion. Roh, moreover, promoted policy toward Japan to overcome the colonial past, which have had been contained under the 1965 regime. Lee Myung-Bak’s “Practical Government”, inaugurated in return of power to conservatives after 10 years’ progressives. Lee administration adopted again hard-liner policy toward North Korea and reintensified the alliance with US while adhered to the 1965 regime with Japan. Lee, however, confused coherence of policy and strategy toward Japan by sudden landing on Takeshima/Dokdo in just before his term expired. The present Park Geun-Hye administration, irrespective of her conservative ideal inclination, couldn’t but tackle with the post-colonial issues from the beginning of the term, as well as is trying a kind of soft-liner policy toward North Korea.