著者

梶浦 篤

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.85, pp.97-114,L12, 1987-05-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

74

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One of the causes of the Northern Territories Problem was the failure to apply to the territories “the principle of non-aggrandizement” which the Allied countries, including the Soviet Union, confirmed during World War II. Why did such a thing happen? In an attempt to solve this problem, I will analyze how the Northern Territories were dealt with in the policy of the United States when the Japanese Peace Treaty was drafted by John Foster Dulles.The provisions of the treaty concerning the Northern Territories are as follows. In Article 2, Japan renounces the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto. We can find two problems here. First, “the Chishima Islands” are not defined. Second, the future status of the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto are not defined. According to Dulles, Article 22, which provides that a dispute concering the interpretation or execution of the treaty could be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice, is of use for solving the first problem. But, the article is practically useless, because the Soviet Union would not sign the treaty. Moreover, due to Article 25, the Soviet Union cannot gain “any rights, titles or benefits” by the treaty. Therefore, the second problem also was not settled in the treaty.Article 26, too, has a problem. It says, “Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.” In 1956, when Japan was about to recognize the possession of the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto by the Soviet Union in the bilateral peace negotiations, Dulles intervened on the grounds that if such a settlement was realized, the United States also should be rewarded with the Ryukyu Islands by Article 26.Why has the treaty, drafted by Dulles, a competent lawyer, presented so many problems regarding the Northern Territories? Dulles tried to make the Soviet Union sign the treaty with the bait of the Northern Territories, and he had to overcome the difference of opinions regarding the disposition of Taiwan with the United Kingdom. He also had to take the opinions of the Senate and the Pentagon into consideration. Moreover, Dulles was afraid that the Japanese would be dissatisfied with the separation of the Ryukyu Islands and would then arouse anti-American feelings. Therefore, he devised such provisions that the Japanese would be more frustrated with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories.Dulles adopted realism and power politics, treating the Northern Territories as a bargaining chip. This was one of the main reason why “the principle of non-aggrandizement, ” which conformed with idealism and democracy, was not applied to the Northern Territories.

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.17, pp.91-106, 1961-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

著者

石田 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.117, pp.49-65,L8, 1998-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

40

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Realists regard the anarchic structure of international relations as exogenous constraints on the foreign policy decisions of sovereign states. They do not explain but assume anarchy. They explain, instead, that the absence of centralized authority, which enforces international agreements, hinders the efficient solution of political conflicts among states, as in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. But why is this anarchy as an inefficient institution sustained by rational actors? Why don't the rational states attempt to establish international institutions that would facilitate the centralized making and enforcement of international agreements?They do not do so because the centralized making of agreements would fail to serve their common interest for the following four reasons even if the centralized enforcement would serve their common interest. First, the decentralized control of information by sovereign states can be a bargaining advantage. Second, even if states comply with agreements without centralized enforcement, as in the case of policy coordination, they often have divergent preferences over which policy to choose as a common policy. Third, it is extremely difficult to establish a centralized authority which clearly defines property rights beyond national borders even if the clear definition of property rights could improve the efficiency of decentralized bargaining over the regulation of economic activities with international externalities, as Ronald Coase argues. It is because the international definition of property rights is expected to generate serious distributional consequences. Fourth, developed and developing countries have divergent interests in agreements that would have redistributional effects among them.

著者

石田 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.224-227, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

黒崎 輝

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_125-182_139, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

参考文献数

63

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In the late 1960s, the Japanese government’s Cabinet Research Office secretly investigated Japan’s nuclear weapons capability and then produced a report in 1968. From a technological and financial standpoint, the report concluded that Japan could build a small number of nuclear bombs without difficulty. Meanwhile Prime Minister Eisaku Sato had announced the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” in December 1967, but the Japanese government policy did not explicitly prohibit Japan from possessing a nuclear weapons capability. Relying on the 1968 report and other materials, some published works insisted that the Sato government sought to maintain Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. This article questions the validity of this argument by reexamining the 1968 report and Japan’s atomic energy development in comparison with a U.S. government study from the mid-1960s on nuclear non-proliferation policy toward Japan.Comparison of the analyses of the 1968 report and the U.S. study on Japan’s fissile material production capability reveals that the latter was based on a more realistic scenario of Japan’s nuclear armament than the former. The 1968 report assessed that Japan could build nuclear bombs by using the plutonium produced by a modified Calder Hall reactor purchased from the U.K. because Japan would obtain reprocessing capability in the early 1970s. To do so, however, required Japan to refuse the safeguards stipulated in the 1958 Japan—U.K. atomic energy agreement. The 1968 report found that it would be damaging and unlikely for Japan to consider such a course of action. In contrast, the U.S. study, which also concluded that Japan had the ability to manufacture plutonium bombs, assumed that Japan would construct a heavy-water moderated reactor using safeguards-free natural uranium to evade international safeguards. Unlike the U.S. study, the 1968 report did not explore feasible measures for Japan to build nuclear bombs.This article also argues that the Sato government lacked political determination to develop and maintain Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. In the late 1960s, Japan was acquiring a nuclear weapons capability as a result of its atomic energy development, which did not follow the scenario in the aforementioned U.S. study. The delay in the construction of a reprocessing plant in Tokai Mura illustrated that the Japanese government did not prioritize the development of Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, it became more difficult for Japan to go nuclear against the will of the U.S. because in the late 1960s the former deepened its dependence on the latter for atomic energy development. Nevertheless, Japan’s atomic energy complex and national security circles had a common interest in promoting Japan’s atomic energy development as a national policy, and consequently Japan retained its nuclear weapons capability.

著者

渡邉 昭夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_148-157, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

参考文献数

1

著者

木村 昌人

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.97, pp.14-31,L6, 1991-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

50

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The purpose of this paper is to describe clearly the effects of the World Monetary and Economic Conference held in London in 1933 on Japan-United States relations.Generally speaking, the London Economic Conference was largest international economic conference between the Wars, but it was not successful because of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's opposition to the European nations'plan. That is, Roosevelt wanted freedom to devalue the dollar in order to raise domestic prices as a counter to the deflationary effects of the depression. The London Economic Conference could not rebuild the international monetary system. However, there have been few studies about this topic in connection with Japanese diplomatic history, but I believe the result of the conference had a tremendous effect on Japan-United States relations, and this analysis will illustrate Japan's cooperation towards the United States after leaving the League of Nations on March 27, 1933.Japan's response to the London Economic Conference was as follows:(1) Japan wanted freedom to carry out its own domestic economic policy. Therefore, Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi was opposed to a return to the gold standard system and did not want to participate in any treaty which aimed at stabilizing the yen exchange rate.(2) Because Japan believed that tariff wars would prevent the recovery of industry and trade for each nation, government and businessmen were anxious to reduce high tariffs and to conclude an international treaty to sweep away limits and embargoes on exports and imports.As a result, the conference could not conclude international treaties not only on a monetary system, but also on trade issues.Japanese businessmen thought that the failure of the conferece became a common symbol of a basic change in the world economy. It brought unstable exchange rates and rampant protectionism. But the Japanese government was calm, because the United States also abandoned the gold standard system and President Roosevelt had exactly the same idea about economic policy, that is, both wanted a managed monetary system. Also, Secretary Cordell Hull's proposal for a reciprocity treaty fascinated Japan, when faced with the European nations' protectionism.In conclusion, the result of the London Economic Conference brought about a situation where Japan could cooperate with the United States economically.

著者

中島 琢磨

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_101-206_116, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

72

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify empirically the political and diplomatic processes centering on nuclear submarines’ visits to Japan in 1964. When the Security Treaty with the United States was revised in 1960, Japan legally stipulated that bringing nuclear weapons into its territory should be a matter for prior consultation. However, during the negotiations to revise the treaty, it did not place explicitly on the agenda the issue of port calls by nuclear-armed ships.On the other hand, the U.S. was rapidly advancing the development of nuclear weapons to be mounted on submarines. After the revision of the treaty, it successfully launched a Polaris missile from an underwater nuclear submarine, and proceeded with the development of Subrocs to be mounted on submarines. Under these circumstances, in June 1961 and January 1963, it requested Japan to accept visits by its nuclear submarines.The development of nuclear weapons technology and the existence of public information on it are factors that are essentially outside of alliance politics. And the former was originally intended by the U.S. to maintain its superiority over the Soviet Union and increase its credibility in the eyes of the allies. The development of Polaris missiles and Subrocs, however, put the Japanese government in a difficult position in domestic politics. Opposition legislators were able to grasp the development status of new nuclear weapons from information released by the U.S. and to take up the issue in the Diet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus had to consider how to handle, under the prior consultation system, cases of visits by submarines equipped with Polaris missiles and Subrocs.At the time MOFA, on the basis of pre-existing official documents and government statements that had been made in the Diet, offered legal and policy interpretations of such cases. However, there were various limitations in applying to sea-based nuclear weapons past policies that presupposed those that were land-based.In the end, while the government could not officially allow visits by nuclear-armed ships to Japanese ports, it also fell into a situation where it could not come to an explicit agreement with the United States on how to handle such visits under the Security Treaty. In this way, the development of new nuclear weapons to increase America’s credibility in the eyes of its allies had rather the political consequence of creating, for Japan, an alliance management dilemma. In 1964, in the absence of any resolution of the dilemma, Japan made a highly political decision to allow nuclear submarines to visit its ports.

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.Special, pp.168-193, 1986-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

10

著者

永井 陽之助

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.Special, pp.2-31,L5, 1986-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

28

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I. Uniqueness of the Postwar Peace. II. The Nomos of the earth-Geopolitics of MAD (i) Bipolar System (ii) Geostrategic Approach to MAD (iii) Informal Rules of Game and Norms of Behavior. III. The Nomos of the Outer Space (i) Sanctuarization of the Space (ii) Ambiguity of the Space Weapons (iii) Issues of ABM Treaty in the Legal Context of SDI.This essay aims to examine the impact of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on the Nomos of the outer space through revealing the secret of durability of the postwar peace. In calling for a defense that would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete, ” President Reagan's goal of a perfect area defense stirred the interest of the public who have long sought a moral alternative to deterrence based on the mutual assured destruction (MAD). Yet MAD is not a strategy capable of being changed by political will or strategic considerations; it is rather “existential” condition, not unlike the condition of the market mechanism, resulted by the inevitable consequence of the super-powers having the assured capabilities of mutual destruction, closely connected with the asymmetric geopolitical positon.This condition has created the mutual vulnerability of civilized urban centers, because of the strategic reality resulted from the development of the ICBM and the so-called “reconnaissance revolution.” The detonation of even as few as five or ten Soviet warheads on U. S. cities would cause unparalleld destruction. It might be called the law of “impossibility of area defense”. This unique combination of the bipolar system and the condition of the MAD has successfully drawed a clear distinction between a zone of sanctuarity (a zone of predictability on which mutual interest in common rules based on reciprocal sanction) and a zone of danger (a zone of unpredictabily) in the periphery of the world. They have no choice, in this condition, but to play the game of influence by means of “nuclear cheque” on the security of the nuclear arsenals.Whereas we live in “neither war nor peace, ” we are afraid of a radical discontinuity by turning a zone of predictablity into a zone of danger. The concept of a zone of danger-currently highlighted by the issue of the SDI in outer space-also signals the arrival of an era of opportunity on the formation of the Nomos of the space.Any consideration of a militarization of outer space should not neglect the distinction of two different directions: the sanctuarization of the space (turning into a zone of predictability) through the passive uses such as reconnaissance and communications, in sharp contrast with the militarization of the space by turning into a zone of danger through the development of the ABM and ASAT technology, despite of the ambiguity of space weapons.In all probablity, super-power rivalry in strategic defense will lead to an increased Soviet-American arms race by the exchange of the offensive and defensive in a vicious circle. This is the reason why the development of SDI might be quite different from the Manhattan and the Apollo projects, which involves no less than unlocking nature's secrets; a struggle of man against nature. In contrast, the success of the stratigic defense depends on the reactions or the counter-measureas taken by the Soviet side, as the Fletcher panel project has suggested.Moreover, the SDI poses a real threat to the Outer Space Treaty, not to mention to the ABM treaty which is most significant arms-control agreement of the postwar period. Both treaties should provide us the legal framework (the Nomos), as a fundamental constitution, of the outer space. Such “passive” military uses as the satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, and communications are compatible with a doctrine of peaceful purposes and deterrence. Yet the ballistic missile defence (BMD)

著者

中逵 啓示

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.105, pp.1-13,L5, 1994

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The Korean war has been almost exhaustively studied as an important part of the escalation process of the cold war. The historical significance of the Korean war is not however limited only to this point. The Korean armitice negotiation was one of the first cases of East-West talks, which have led the world to detente and ultimately to the end of the cold war. Thus the Korean war should be noted as an important beginning of the descalation process of the cold war as well.<br>Based on this historical understanding, the paper describes how the Korean armistice negotiations started. The author believes that three conditions are indispensable for the start of the peace talks in general. First, a stable war situation is necessary, because, only through military deadlock, could both sides realize the difficulty of a military solution. Second, an agreement on the negotiation agenda should be achieved. Third, there should be an influential mediator.<br>From July 1950 through July 1951, the governments of India and Britain continued their mediation efforts. But their peace proposals, both the simultaneous solution plan of China and Korean problems and the demilitarized zone plan, could not work out any UN-communist agreement, mainly because the military situations were too fluid and too tempting for military unification to have any meaningful negotiation. The limited influence of the mediators did not help the situation either. In addition the efforts on the part of the United Nations in early 1951 also hardly bore any fruit.<br>Only after the military situation became stable and the commencement of powerful Soviet involvement on mediation efforts, could China and the United States agree to begin the peace talks. Last, but not least, the fear of World War III indiscriminately brought both the mediators and the war parties together to manage the crisis.

著者

中井 和夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.104, pp.99-116,L12, 1993

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The agreement reached in Minsk on 7-8 December 1991 to create a Commonwealth of Independent States was signed by the leaders of three slavic countries. The agreement stated that, "the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases its existence". Ukrainian president Kravchuk stated that it had prevented the uncontrolled disintegration of the former Soviet Union, but "We cannot allow ourselves to be locked in the Commonwealth, we should go in search of wide ranging relations with other countries", added he. Many Ukrainians regarded CIS more sceptically than president Kravchuk. According to an opinion poll conducted after signing of the Minsk accords, Ukrainians were the most pessimistic of the three founding states.<br>Elected as the first president of Ukraine, Kravchuk shortly succeeded to establish an authoritarian regime. He introduced several new institutions which strengthened his presidential power. By shifting his position from "sovereign communist" to the "fighter for Ukrainian independent statehood" Kravchuk neutralized his former opponents. Also he recruited many key persons from opponents camp to the higher governmental posts. But Kravchuk's authoritarian regime lasted barely one year. New prime minister L. Kuchima challenged Kravchuk in power game and weakened Kravchuk's position last winter. Kravchuk's authoritarian regime was further weakened by the economic crises in Ukraine.<br>Since Ukraine's ratification of its independence in December 1991, its quarrels with Russia grabbed international headlines. During the early months of 1992, Russo-Ukrainian relations reached so low an ebb that many observers felt the big possibility of the Ukraine's retreat from the CIS. However, an reapprochment has taken place. An agreement was reached between the two sides on many of the outstanding areas of conflict at the Dagomys summit meeting in June 1992 between president Yeltsin and Kravchuk. Although there are still many points of conflict between them, relations between them have become quite stable.<br>From the begining Ukraine did not possess strong loyality to the CIS. Ukraine regarded CIS as an economic cooperative organization. Therefore, Ukraine was always against the CIS as a unit of political-military integration. If CIS would be strengthened as a political institution like the former Soviet Union, Ukraine would likely choose the alternative of "exit" from the CIS.<br>Finally, what is the meaning and impact of the independence of Ukraine in the region? From the Baltic to the Black Sea, there are now six new independent states, including Ukraine. These western parts of the former Soviet Union can be called the "New Eastern Europe". thrusts Central Europe (former Eastern Europe) to the west and at the same time pushes Russia to the east.

著者

村上 友章

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_93-170_108, 2012

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The Soviet Union invaded the Kuril Islands after the end of the Pacific War and Russian border guards had often apprehended Japanese fishing boats on the sea around these islands for the invasion of "Soviet territorial waters". These numerous incidents by Russian authorities in capturing Japanese fishing boats and their crews seriously damaged the livelihood of the Japanese fishermen involved. They continued to demand the Japanese government to secure the safety of fishing on the sea especially around the Habomai and the Shikotan islands. In June 1963, a part of their earnest wish was realized. The Japan Fisheries Association concluded a private agreement with the Soviet government. This agreement allows seaweed harvesting by the Japanese fishermen in a small area within "Soviet territorial waters". This article will examine the negotiation process of this agreement.<br>It took a long time since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956 to reach the agreement because it involved an intractable territorial dispute over a Russian-held chain of islands. The Soviet Union proposed to Japan to conclude a Peace Treaty in which Japan world accept to have only two of the islands (Habomai and Shikotan) returned as part of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. However, the government of Japan could not accept this condition and asked the Soviet Union to return not just the two islands but also Kunashiri and Etorofu. Therefore, in order to secure the safety of the Japanese fishermen on the sea, either the Soviets would drop the condition, or Japan would accept the proposal and conclude a Peace Treaty with such provisions. However, both countries exhibited an uncompromising attitude to each other. In addition, many Japanese were indifferent to this local problem.<br>The individual who resolved this difficult problem was the Chairman of Japan Fisheries Association Takasaki Tatsunosuke. He was a famous conservative political leader known for his contribution in signing a private trade agreement with the People's Republic of China in 1962. When he participated in the Japan-Soviet Negotiations on Fishery, he personally tried to lead both countries to conclude a Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty by making Russia recognize "residual sovereignty" of Kunashiri and Etorofu and return Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Soviets took a stern approach toward the government of Japan because of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The government of Japan was not sympathetic to his initiative either. Hence, Takasaki decided to adopt a stopgap measure and sought to conclude a private agreement with the Soviet government in order to avoid the territorial issues. His proposal succeeded in gaining concessions from both countries and in securing the safety of the Japanese fishermen in the given small area. But as a result, ironically, the stability of the Japan-Soviet relations reduced the need for a Peace Treaty and Takasaki's "residual sovereignty" plan.

著者

高橋 和宏

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_46-170_60, 2012

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During the Ikeda administration (1960–1964), Japan's index of import liberalization accelerated from 40% in 1960 to 93% in 1964, approximately same as in the European Economic Community countries. Such rapid liberalization, however, prompted severe anxiety among the Japanese, who feared their economy might be swallowed up by "black ships." Focusing on actions of the Economic Affairs Bureau (EAB) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, this article explores the rising of Japan's economic nationalism, its underlying logic, and how Japan government restrained it.<br>Under insistence from the U.S. government, Japan decided to liberalize its trade restrictions in 1960. Such overt foreign pressure, however, fueled economic nationalism among Japan's governmental agencies. Believing trade liberalization was needed to not only meet U.S. demands to expand free trade and defend the dollar but also strengthen Japan's economy, EAB urged Ikeda to take assertive action. Consequently, Ikeda expressed his determination to hasten the removal of trade restrictions when he visited the U.S. in 1961.<br>Nonetheless, intense nationalism was inherent in the Japanese government, especially among its economic agencies. Although they considered trade liberalization necessary, they rejected its basic theory—the principle of comparative advantage—fearing that Japan's infant heavy industries might be forced out, obliging Japan to specialize only in light industries. Hoping to avoid that outcome, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced legislation titled "Temporary Measures for Promotion of Specific Industries" intended to create a new industrial structure and strengthen competitiveness of the Japanese heavy industry through public-private cooperation. However, this bill could not muster enough support for enactment because it emphasized regulation rather than free trade.<br>Instead of trade regulations, Japan's economic agencies regarded higher tariffs as the means to prevent acceleration of imports. In opposition, the U.S. and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) called for linear tariff cuts at the start of the Kennedy Round negotiations. MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture resisted drastic tariff cuts, but their insistence on protecting domestic industries was so self-serving that Japan was reproached during the GATT negotiations. It was Ikeda's initiative that persuaded the intractable economic agencies and enabled Japan to participate affirmatively in the Kennedy Round negotiations.<br>This article concludes that Ikeda's leadership was essential to Japan's overcoming of the forces of economic nationalism and liberalizing its trade policies. Ikeda believed that the Japanese economy would become more vigorous and competitive through trade liberalization.

著者

山本 章子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_111-182_124, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

参考文献数

56

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This article aims at reconsidering the decision making process of the Eisenhower administration on the revisions to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 as part of the policy for the U.S. oversea bases. The previous studies have argued the treaty revisions as part of American policy toward Japan with a motive to prevent her from neutralization. But so-called “New Look”, the cold war strategy of the Eisenhower’s administration which depended on nuclear weapon capability, built in the presence of oversea bases all over the world. Therefore, the U.S. government addressed lessening the complaint of the host nations to maintain the oversea bases. This article discusses the treaty revisions from the point of its relations with the Nash Report, the survey and recommendation on the situation and issues surrounding U.S. oversea bases, to point out how the treaty revisions have a close link with the comprehensive U.S. oversea-bases policy. Furthermore, my analysis focuses on the attitude of the U.S. military including the Pentagon. The previous studies have ignored the role of the U.S. military in terms of the treaty revisions, but they are a key actor as well as the Department of State and the American embassy in Japan because the U.S. military has a veto of security policies.During the period of the Eisenhower’s administration, the USSR’s success in hydrogen-bomb test and appeal for change for peace after death of Stalin escalated fear of entrapment and demand of reducing U.S.-Soviet tension among the U.S. allies. In addition, the success of the USSR in development of ICBM missiles and Sputnik I launching in 1957, persuaded the host nations to limit their alliance commitment to the United States. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. military forces for a long time and criminal jurisdiction procedures involving U.S. military personnel unfair to the host nations also led to public protest against the security policy of their government. As for Japan in 1950s, the presence of U.S. military bases was considered as an ongoing symbol of the “U.S. occupation”. What is more, the strong anti-nuclear sentiment everywhere in Japan strengthened the public’s fear of entrapment. The neutralists in Japan succeeded in propagating the idea that the U.S. military presence would increase the risk of entrapping Japan into unwanted nuclear wars after so-called “Sputnik shock”.Reflecting such a situation, the Nash Report recommended that the U.S. should examine alternatives to their base system in Far East. This recommendation became discussed seriously by the Operation Coordinating Board in spite of the opposition by the U.S. military. These altered the negative attitude of the U.S. military toward the treaty revisions.

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_62-154_78, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

96

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The purpose of this research is to explore political dynamics of the ways of Japan's defense capability, asking why the “Concept of Basic Defense Capability” (kibanteki boeiryoku koso), which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Planning Outline (boei taiko), has been maintained for over 30 years and how this concept has affected defense capability construction.The ways of defense capability can be typified as four genres. Type I recognizes the threat level as low and emphasizes the autonomy of Japan's defense capability. Type II also admits the importance of autonomy but does not consider the threat level as low. Type III and IV emphasize operability with forces of Japan's ally, the United States. Type III is distinguished from type IV based on the level threat recognition. In the preceding studies, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was understood as a type I defense concept.In fact, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has consisted of a number of diverse interpretations, so it can be explained by any of the above ways of defense capability. Around the period that the 1976 NDPO was developed, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had type I-III interpretations. The vice minister of defense, Kubo Takuya, understood the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was a type I defense concept, but other defense bureaucrats interpreted the Concept of Basic Defense Capability as type II. Some Self-Defense Force officials downplayed low threat recognition and the autonomy of defense capability. In the new cold war era, some defense officials and politicians insisted on restoring the Concept of Necessary Defense Capability (shoyo boeiryoku koso) or modifying the schedule form (beppyo) in the NDPO. However, these counter-concepts against the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had been co-opted in these interpretations of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability, because it included two interpretations other than Kubo's opinion. When the 1995 NDPO was formulated after the cold war period, the interpretation of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was expanded to type IV.In conclusion, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has continued for over 30 years, co-opting its counter-concepts in itself, restoring the cracks among domestic groups, and permitting a consensus to be made over the ways of defense capability through its diverse interpretations.

著者

信夫 隆司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_146-178_155, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

27

著者

中村 覚

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_176-193_179, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

著者

石野 裕子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.165, pp.165_156-170, 2011-07-25 (Released:2013-08-05)

参考文献数

59

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the ideological background in the transition of “Greater Finland (Suur-Suomi)” idea by examining the interpretations of Finnish national epic, the Kalevala, focusing on three researchers: Kaarle Krohn, Jalmari Jaakkola and Martti Haavio.Today “Greater Finland” idea is often regarded as “expansionism”, but at first it was a sentiment only by Finnish intellectuals on Finnish “relative tribes”, mainly Karelians living in Russian Karelia adjacent to Finnish eastern border. This sentiment of Finnish “relative tribes”, however, was intended to unite Finnish and Karelians under Russian Empire rule. It was spread around Finnish people through diffusion of the Kalevala by a compiler Elias Lönrrot who gathered oral songs mainly from Karelians in Russian Karelia at the end of 19th century. This developed the theory that Karelians had kept Finnish national epic since ancient times.“Greater Finland” idea had been politicized when Russian Empire shifted policy from appeasement to deprivation of Finnish autonomy, called Russification policy at the end of 19th century. Resistance group, Aktivisti recognized Russian Karelia as a defense area against Russia, and also regarded it as a target of Finnish irredenta. This idea overlapped with independence of Finland after the outbreak of the First World War, which triggered the military action for gaining Russian Karelia just after Finish independence. Meanwhile, before and after the independence of Finland, Finnish folklorist Krohn claimed that Finland had culturally connected to Russian Karelia and Estonia in his studies.On the contrary, Finnish historian Jaakkola, who flourished between World Wars, denied the cultural relations between Finland and Estonia, and stressed the unity of Russian Karelia and Finland in ancient times instead. He also tried to place Finland as the European outpost against the attack of “barbarian Russia”. According to Jaakkola's opinion, heroes in the Kalevala were real people who expedited from Western Finland to Russian Karelia, and settled there. This interpretation had been a popular theory of Karelian origin until advocate of new theory in 1950's : Karelians and Finnish were different origins. His theory was made use of the military negotiation with Germany just before the outbreak of the second Soviet-Finnish War (19411944). Finnish government utilized Jaakkola's study for the justification of Russian Karelia's annexation.After the Second World War, Haavio claimed that Finland had come under the cultural influence of all over the world including Russia, and had had the cultural connection with Russia. Therefore the Kalevala had the nature of international epic. Now his Kalevala study was widely accepted among Finnish society which tried to build a new relationship with Soviet Union for promoting the area cooperation with Russian Karelia.It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that the concept of “Greater Finland” idea was changed from “Unity” to “Separation”, and furthermore to “Cooperation” in the transition of time.

著者

秦 郁彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1968, no.37, pp.96-115, 1968-10-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

54