著者

薄井 尚樹

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.201-214, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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Over the last twenty years, the study of implicit attitudes has been significantly developed. Meanwhile, the existence of these attitudes raises an important philosophical question about their relations with our ”real self, ” which makes a moral appraisal of ourselves possible. Do implicit attitudes constitute our real self? In other words, do these attitudes express who we really are? In order to address this problem, I shall divide the model of the real self into the synchronic and the diachronic model, by drawing from the works of H. Frankfurt and his critics. As is commonly-known, Frankfurt provides a hierarchical account in this context, which has been criticized by some philosophers. Thus, I will first examine the controversy between Frankfurt and his critics, and then I shall elicit the core ideas from the synchronic model and the diachronic model which are related to the real self, and are common to both perspectives in the controversy over each model. These core ideas of the synchronic and the diachronic model are expressed as ”the coherence of mental states through the connection among their semantic contents” and ”the inflexibility of the thematic continuity” respectively. Given this, I examine whether implicit attitudes constitute the real self from the perspective of each model. And, based on my examination, I argue that they do not constitute the real self in either one. If my argument thus far is correct, it follows from one perspective of moral responsibility that we are not responsible for behavior caused by our implicit attitudes. However, I point out that the lack of such moral responsibility might be contrary to our intuition or practice related to our ordinary attribution of moral responsibility. Therefore, perhaps it might be the conception of the real self itself that should be reconsidered, which is an issue that I raise for future research

著者

佐々木 拓

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.231-245, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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T. Scanlon showed his “interpretation” of blame in his book Moral Dimensions in 2008. It gave a tremendous boost to debates on blame and many philosophers are getting to theorize their own account by criticizing and comparing to his theory. A preferable reason for that is that it has good explanatory force. It can explain many aspects which phenomena of blame have and give excellent normative foundation to regulate blaming. On the other side, there is an unpreferable reason. It is that his conception of blame seems strange to other philosophers. He denies the emotional aspect, ex. resentment or indignation, as the main element of blame. He instead makes blame depend on relation(ex. friends, families or fellows in business)and argues that to blame is to revise the relationship between blamer and the blamed. In this paper, I aim to introduce his theory, to analyze various critiques of it, and to defend it. There are three kinds of problems in his theory. The first is about his conception of the blame. According to critics, his interpretation includes wrong phenomena as blame and excludes genuine phenomena from blame. The second problem is about his conception of relation. Some opponents argue that relation defined by him seems to be so vulnerable that just one blame could break the relation. They insist that relation should be stronger because blaming is very common and usual to us. The last one is about his conception of morality. He presupposes “moral relation” correspond to moral blame. However, there seems no relation such a thing, to critics. They criticize that it is difficult for him to explain morality between strangers who do not have relational mutuality. I resolve some problems by correcting misunderstandings about his main conceptions. To other problems, I respond by reconsidering our assumption of priority of morality to non-moral value. I finally seek the successful interpretation of Scanlon’s theory in terms of non-moral, personal or individual relation.

著者

鈴木 康則

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.247-260, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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Nous avons pour objectif d’éclaircir la signification du dialogue chez Weil dans sa Logique de la philosophie. Il suggère sa propre logique, dans laquelle le dialogue est un moment essentiel: en effet, selon lui c’est le dialogue qui constitue le discours. Le discours lui-même implique la contradiction, et il essaie de s’orienter vers la cohérence à travers la négation qu’il subit. Pourtant, la cohérence ne s’achève jamais, elle continue d’exister comme Idée au sens kantien. Le dialogue se maintient par les discours contradictoires, qu’il nomme violence: ainsi la violence se rapporte à la logique. C’est la vérité et la violence qui s’opposent, non pas la vérité et la fausseté. Le philosophe a peur de la violence au sens weilien; il ouvre le dialogue dans le but de créer un discours cohérent. Le dialogue que Weil suppose donne de l’importance à sa cohérence pour qu’il choisisse l’accord ou le silence, c’est-à-dire l’abstention de toute communication. Cela ne signifie pas l’incapacité du dialogue, mais indique que la tâche de la philosophie, en délimitant le domaine du dialogue, se pose en tant que confrontation à la violence. Ainsi, le dialogue chez Weil montre que la logique appartient intrinsèquement à une communauté donnée.

著者

河合 一樹

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.277-291, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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“Imina,” the custom that prohibited people from addressing each other by their personal names, was prevalent in pre-modern East Asia, including Japan. Today, most researchers accept this opinion, which was given in a famous study by Hozumi Nobushige. However, Motoori Norinaga, one of the most prestigious scholars in Kokugaku, had a different idea. He argued that “Imina” was only a Chinese custom, and that it did not exist in ancient Japan. Previous research contradicted him, but did not discuss the reason for his insistence. Thus, there is a problem with regard to understanding the meaning of “Imina” in his thought. From this point of view, this study firstly focuses on how he described “Imina” in accordance with “Kojikiden” and “Tamakatsuma.” In these texts, he animadverted on it strongly as “Karagokoro”, the word that he usually use for attacking Confucians. Therefore, “Imina” has a particular meaning in his thought. Second, we examine the history of the idea of “Imina” in the Edo period. We refer to several scholars, including Suzuki Teisai, Dazai Shundai, Arai Hakuseki, Murata Harumi, and Mencius, and disclose that the belief at that time was that “Imina” was based on the emotion of sorrow for the dead. In other words, sorrow for the dead prohibits the use of a person’s name. Finally, we consider why Norinaga attacked “Imina.” In an annotation in “Kojikiden,” he stated that sorrow for the dead should give rise to the impulse to call a person by name, according to a Japanese poem by Kakinomoto Hitomaro. Moreover, he explained that we should express our feelings without protesting with one of his the most important ideas, “Magokoro.” Based on these thoughts, “Imina” was a bad custom that covered “Magokoro” and had to be criticized as “Karagokoro” by him.

著者

高井 寛

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.143, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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This study elucidates the argument which Martin Heidegger developed in his Being and Time(Sein und Zeit)about responsibility. His interest is focused on how far we have to take responsibility for our actions. To forecast this problem, one might think that, rationality or rational deliberation defines its scope. But Heidegger didn’t think that “rationality” provides us a final solution to the problem about responsibility. Heidegger’s evaluation is concerned with the famous distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, so this study interprets Heidegger’s argument about this distinction as one about responsibility. Heidegger identifies inauthenticity with “the They”(das Man)as our everyday mode of being and analyses our concept of responsibility and our judgments about our actions in terms of this concept. Heidegger introduces the concept of “the They” as “the-one”, who nobody is but everyone is. And according to Heidegger, “the They” defines what we have to do and what we must not do. So we can say that this concept represents the rationality in a society. Actually, we can blame someone, saying “one ordinarily doesn’t do so” or “rational agent should do this.” In doing so, we resort to “the They” or anonymous ratio nality. But following this way of thinking, one cannot blame the other’s action which even unintentionally hurt someone heavily, if only he/she deliberates rationally as a mature agent would do. Heidegger considers this conclusion odd. In contrast to an inauthentic person, authentic person is an agent who is very responsible, Heidegger says. To be become authentic, one must become aware of one’s own weaknesses. These weaknesses which he refers to as our “lacking” concern our omissions. We can never do something unless at the same time we forgo something else. Heidegger’s responsible agent is aware of his/her own weakness, and doing so, he/she is prepared for regretting own actions and for thinking that he/she should have taken the other action he/she never knew. Most importantly, this regret should go beyond the scope of rational deliberation. Responsible agent is prepared to take responsibility which “the They” rationally doesn’t require. This is Heidegger’s conclusion.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.189, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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In his essay “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”, John McDowell argues that the extensions and applications of such thick terms and concepts as courageous or selfish cannot be determined without the understanding of a particular perspective based on such noncognitive states as evaluative attitudes or emotions. This distinctive feature of thick terms─it is called ‘shapelessness’─is often thought as a challenge to moral noncognitivism, according to which moral values or judgments can be explained by noncognitive states of mind with regard to their corresponding natural properties. The reason is that it seems follow from the shapelessness of thick terms that the two components of their concepts, i.e. descriptive and evaluative components, are ‘entangling’, but noncognitivists, including Simon Blackburn as their representative, try to disentangle them. My aim in this essay is twofold. First, I organize and reconstruct McDowell’s ‘anti-disentangling argument’ and Blackburn’s response to it for simplicity’s sake. I then argue that McDowell fails in refuting noncognitivism in general because his argument restricts it unduly, while Blackburn’s pragmatic or semantics- free explanation of the shapelessness is also insufficient because it cannot ensure the default evaluative component of thick terms. Second, I argue that the feature of shapelessness can be explained as a semantic phenomenon in term of the nonindexical context-sensitivity of thick terms, in virtue of which such evaluative terms have the same content in any contexts, while their extensions are sensitive with regard to moral standards from ethical sensibilities of the context. By the use of this interpretation of shapelessness, noncognitivists can successfully disentangle the components of thick concepts into two entirely separate ones fulfilling different semantic roles. Thus the nonindexical contextualism I advocate not only makes clear the nature of thick terms and concepts but also offers a new and different semantic ground for noncognitivism from the traditional model.

著者

川島 彬

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.91-104, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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At 475d1─476d6 in Plato’s Republic, Socrates and Glaucon speak about “sightlovers”(philotheamones), people who are eager to see any theatrical performancebut not interested in Forms. Socrates says that sight-lovers do not possess “knowledge”(epistēmē)but only “belief” (doxa). Glaucon imagines that they would be offended to hear this and would object. So Socrates presents an argument to persuade the sight-lovers that his description of them is correct (476e4─480a13). Interpreters have seldom addressed the question of whether the sight-lovers would have been persuaded by Socrates’ argument. The aim of this paper is to show that they would have been persuaded. The challenge is to show how the sight-lovers, who do not subscribe to the theory of Forms, could accept the argument that rests on that theory(on any interpretation). For this purpose, I first present an interpretation of the argument, according to which, “what(perfectly)is” means what is perfectly f(say, beautiful)and refers, for Socrates, to Forms collectively. For Socrates, knowledge concerned with f is acquaintance with Form F, and at the same time, the sufficient understanding of what f is; while belief is acquaintance with f sensibles and an insufficient understanding of what f -ness is. The key to understanding how the sight-lovers would have been persuaded is to notice that initially they would probably take “what is perfectly beautiful” as referring to exemplarily beautiful sensibles, such as theatrical performances. Without accepting the theory of Forms, they could accept the premise stated at 477a3─4 about the correlation between the degrees of F-ness and the degrees of intelligibility. It is at 479a5-b7 that Socrates makes the sight-lovers accept that no sensible can qualify as “what perfectly is.” They might accept this, since they know from experience, say, that the same theatrical piece once found most beautiful may turn out to be awful depending on the circumstances of performance. By the end of the argument, the sight-lovers are such as neither determinately to reject nor clearly to recognize the existence of Forms. To conclude, I address the following question: If Socrates could have persuaded the sight-lovers that they lack knowledge, as I have argued, then, what does this fact mean for the broader context in the Republic, in particular Socrates’conception of the ideal city?

著者

芝元 航平

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.105-117, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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This paper proposes to elucidate the volitional basis of deontology in Aquinas’s ethics. We analyze the concept of commanding(imperare)as a clue to this purpose. In the Summa Theologiae I-II, Question 17, Article 1, Aquinas says that to command is essentially an act of reason, based on an act of will because reason’s role is to order another to do something by way of intimation. Although the will can be commanded by reason, the mutual series between will and reason cannot proceed ad infinitum. Aquinas says that the first act of will comes not from reason, but from an “instinct” of a higher cause, i.e., God. Aquinas believes that the first act of will is necessarily to intend the ultimate end, which means perfect good. Human beings can freely select any other end and any other means than the ultimate end, in comparison with what perfect good means. In the Summa Theologiae I-II, Question 94, Article 2, Aquinas suggests the first precept of natural law is unconditional duty, saying “good ought to be done and pursued and evil ought to be avoided.” We can interpret this precept in greater detail by saying that because the will necessarily intend the ultimate end, human good, which is ordered to the ultimate end by reason, ought to be done. Moreover, the characteristic of duty remains in the virtuous act, even that of charity(caritas), a theological virtue infused by God’s grace. This is because it is necessary for human beings to intend the ultimate end until attaining it by seeing God’s essence directly, something impossible in this life. In conclusion, we can say that the first act of will, i.e., necessarily intending the ultimate end, is the volitional basis of deontology in Aquinas’s ethics.

著者

飯泉 佑介

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.135-147, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the referent of the “we” that appears in G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit(1807)and its intended significance for “we”. This attempt is accomplished by the immanent analysis of the relationship between “we” and the consciousness, whose path to “absolute knowing” is the focus of Phenomenology. Consequently, it is revealed that “we” refers to the public who are contemporary with Hegel, and Phenomenology must be planned as an educational project(das Bildung)for the public or a kind of public selfenlightenment. In contrast to Hegel’s later work, Science of Logic(1812─13/16/32), whose subject is the “speculative thinking” abstracted from the empirical world, the subject of Phenomenology seems to be obscure. Phenomenology describes the developmental path of consciousness headed for “absolute knowing,” but according to Hegel, “we” contemplates(zusehen)its path without any interruption. Since Hegel’s explanation for the methodological role of “we” is not sufficient and he lacks an account of its referent, there has been controversy on this subject. Some interpret the “we” as a philosopher or Hegel himself who has already attained “absolute knowing.” Others interpret the “we” as the reader of Phenomenology, who only reflects upon consciousness in each stage of its development. Then, first, this paper shows that both interpretations do not correspond to Hegel’s description of “we.” Second, it presents the real figure of “we” based on the analysis of the first shape of consciousness, “sense-certainty.” Besides, by comparison with the “we” in J. G. Fichte’s early philosophy(the Science of Knowledge), the distinctive feature of the phenomenological “we” becomes clear: the referent of “we” is indefinite and open. Therefore, “we” should be considered as the public, including the scholars and citizens of various philosophical or even non-philosophical positions. From this perspective, accordingly, the significance of Hegelian philosophy is interpreted as a radical self-examination of the public and the self-transformation of its knowledge.

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.85, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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This paper investigates Rawls’s program of socializing Kant’s ethics developed in his theory of justice and ascertains the limitations of its will-oriented approach to freedom by focusing on the difference between Rawls’s and Sen’s interpretation of freedom. In addition, this paper thereby evaluates the significance of Sen’s critique of Rawls’s theory of justice. Rawls socializes Kant’s ethics by transforming Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative into intersubjective procedures in the original position. However, he inherits Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom without making any changes to it; in other words, the “inner freedom” that solely determines a rational being’s will and has no commitment to the physical process to achieve the will. Sen criticizes this interpretation of freedom as being based on a fetishism of goods, introducing the idea of capability to compensate for this lacuna in Rawls’s theory of justice. One feature of Sen’s interpretation of freedom is found in the theoretical accent that he places on the practical aspect of freedom; in other words, the freedom to achieve, which varies according to the diversity of people’s “utilization functions” converting goods into effective functions. Despite this criticism of the Kantian concept of freedom, Sen’s idea can also be seen as being based on Kant’s philosophy. In his Critique of Judgement, Kant attempts to bridge the gulf between freedom and nature(the physical world)derived from his own transcendental conception. We direct our attention particularly to Kant’s argument about rational being’s aptitude(Tauglichkeit)to have a purpose and achieve it because the argument shows a possible correspondence between Kant’s concept of culture and Sen’s concept of development concerning the practical aspect of freedom. On the basis of these arguments, we can understand the limitations of the will-oriented approach to freedom indicated in Rawls’s theory of justice and the significance of Sen’s critique, which not only clarifies such limitations but also proposes another possible way to inherit Kant’s philosophy of freedom.

著者

鈴木 崇志

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.113, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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Edmund Husserl(1859─1938)conceived a theory of communication in Logical Investigations(1900/01). According to his conception, to initiate communication, one must express his/her wish to communicate, and another must receive this expression. Husserl calls such a function to express mental acts ‘indication(Kundgabe)’. Therefore, the main topics of his theory of communication should be ‘indication’ and ‘reception of indication(Kundnahme)’. Because of his interest in logic, however, this theory was scarcely dealt with in Logical Investigations. However, Husserl began to re-examine it when he planned his new systematic and comprehensive book in 1921. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explain how Husserl’s theory of communication was developed since 1921. Because his plan for the new book was only partially realized, we use mainly manuscripts which were included in Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity II and III. We will clarify the process of this development as follows. First, we will explore Husserl’s manuscripts from 1921 and show that he regarded the ‘body’ and the ‘open world’ as the conditions of possibility to experience others. Second, we will examine further his manuscripts from 1924 and present his view that the experience of others can be classified into ‘empathy’ and ‘communication’. In empathy, the mental acts of another are indicated without his/her intention, while they are indicated intentionally in communication. Husserl tried to characterize communication by intentional indication and the reception thereof. Finally, we will deal with the theory of community in Cartesian Meditations(1931)and manuscripts written in the 1930s. According to this theory, the community of empathy can proceed to the community of communication if members thereof indicate their wish to communicate intentionally and receive it from each other. Then, they satisfy the conditions of possibility to experience others in a higher order; they regard other bodies as bodies for intentional indication and live in the cultural and social world, which is open to the community of communication. We can therefore present this theory of community from the 1930s as a developed form of the theory of communication of Logical Investigations.

著者

濵田 洋輔

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.145-159, 2020

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Although Ernst Cassirer's concern is primarily focused on epistemology, hewrote several texts on the history of ethics(especially classical German ethics).He also emphasizes that ethics plays a central role in Immanuel Kant's philosophy,a philosopher whom he greatly respected. Furthermore, the later Cassirer─as a Jew in exile from Nazi Germany─came to assert that a new construction ofethics that can be effective against real social problems is an inevitable philosophicaltask for his day. However, he did not produce any work explicating hisown system of ethics. Why? Beginning with this question, I demonstrate thatCassirer, nevertheless, laid the fundamental foundation of his(unwritten)ethicsby widening the application field of Kantian "moral freedom" and that thisfoundation can be formulated as follows: in order to combat mythical consciousness(symbolic form), which is the only ethical(and social)danger in humanlife, man must use and promote other kinds of consciousness(symbolic form),such as religious, artistic, linguistic, or scientific consciousness. I then point outsome possible problems with this ethical foundation such as the inconsistentvariation in his explanations of mythical consciousness in order to directly andexclusively relate the danger of this consciousness to the problems of Nazi Germany;the optimistic view that all types of human consciousness, except formythical, are morally good; and the lack of serious consideration for actual andconcrete social problems or biological and animal elements in human life. Finally,I indicate that what we could learn from these(possible)problems and Cassirer'sattitude toward ethics is, broadly speaking, as follows: we should remindourselves that one of philosophy's key tasks is to construct ethics that is effectiveagainst real social problems; furthermore, it would not be easy to satisfactorilyfulfill this task if one is not prepared in advance or does not take intoconsideration the real and concrete lives and tangible problems of human existenceseriously.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, pp.155-169, 2012

著者

池松 辰男

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.149-162, 2018

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Die Abhandlung erklärt den Dynamismus in Hegels Philosophie des objektiven Geistes aus der Unterscheidung zwischen dem Begriff der ,Leidenschaft' in seiner Geschichtsphilosophie und demjenigen des ,Bedürfnisses' in seiner Rechtsphilosophie. Hegels Schema der ,welthistorischen Individuen', mittels deren Leidenschaften und der hieraus resultierenden Handlungen sich die Idee in der Weltgeschichte verwirkliche, wurde bisher meist vor dem Hintergrund des ,Systems der Bedürfnisse' in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft interpretiert. Diese Interpretation scheint aus heutiger Sicht jedoch ungenügend, da sie bestimmte Im plikationen der Hegelschen Geistphilosophie übersieht. Der adequate Nachvollzug dieser Implikationen ‒ der hier hinsichtlich der Unterscheidung der Begriffe ,Leidenschaft' und ,Bedürfnis' unter Berücksichtigung ihres jeweiligen Kontextes geleistet werden soll ‒ scheint aber auch erst vor dem Hintergrund einiger Ergebnisse rezenter Forschung zu den Vorlesungsnachschriften überhaupt möglich.<br> (1)Beim Begriff des Bedürfnisses kommt es auf die Anerkennung des Selbstbewusstseins an. Im System der Bedürfnisse handeln diejenigen selbstbewussten, autonomen und denkenden Subjekte, die durch die Bildung der(leiblichen)Gewohnheit, der Arbeit(bzw. der aus ihr resultierenden Geschicklichkeit)sowie der Sprache verwirklicht worden sind.(2)Der Begriff der Leidenschaft hingegen ist im Kontext der Philosophie des Geistes mit dem Begriff der ,Verrücktheit' verwandt. In der Verrücktheit wird die Totalität des Geistes in einer besonderen Bestimmung fixiert und die Struktur des Bewusstseins desselben erschüttert. Demgemäß darf das von einer Leidenschaft getriebene Individuum nicht mit dem gebildeten Subjekt der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft verwechselt werden. Ersteres vermag anders als letzteres sowohl die ganze Struktur des Bewusstseins, als auch die gegebene sittliche Ordnung zu revolutionieren, indem der Geist durch es die noch unbewussten Inhalte aus dem Reich des bewusstlos Aufbewahrten(,Schacht')zu Tage fördert.<br> Zwar lassen sich daraus natürlich keine unmittelbar praktischen Grundsätze ziehen. Sehr wohl aber dürfte auf diese Weise ersichtlich werden, dass und wie sich der Geist Hegel zufolge zum Subjekt nicht nur bildet, sondern immer auch umbildet, gar revolutioniert.

著者

松元 雅和

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, pp.145-159, 2011

著者

柴田 健志

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, pp.55-69, 2000

著者

柴田 健志

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.33-46, 2003

著者

中橋 誠

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.163-174, 2018

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Heidegger's term <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> is generally translated into <i>authenticity</i>. This translation often leads us to the assumption that there is something authentic. But Heidegger uses this term to express human <i>Dasein</i>'s modus. He says <i>Dasein</i> is to be grasped through <i>how Dasein</i> is, contrasted with other entities which are grasped through <i>what</i> they are. This means that <i>Dasein</i> is always variable and has no regular modus, including an authentic one. This being taken into consideration, the conclusion is drawn that <i>authenticity</i> is inappropriate to express <i>Eigentlichkeit</i>.<br> The term <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> in the thought of Heidegger is chosen "in a strict sense". The sense of this term lies in <i>eigen</i>, which is <i>own</i> in the primary meaning. Following this, we should translate <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> into <i>own-ness</i> or <i>ownedness</i>(<i>eigen</i>, i. e. <i>own</i> is the past participle in its origin). This translation matches with the way <i>Dasein</i> exists; <i>Dasein</i> exists in a modus in each case, which means that <i>Dasein owns</I> his or her temporary modus in each case. <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> is <i>owned</i> by <i>Dasein</i> in each case. Therefore, Dasein can lose <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> in each case, <i>Dasein</i> can be in its negation(<i>Uneigentlichkeit</i>) in each case.<br> The above matches also with the definition of <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> and <i>Uneigentlichkeit</i>. They are both based on the fact that <i>Dasein</i> is in general determined by <i>mineness-in-each-case</i>(<i>Jemeinigkeit</i>). <i>Dasein</i> is always concerned about whether <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> is <i>owned</i> or not.<br> Heidegger regards the business of philosophy as the preservation of the power of the most elemental words. Otherwise, the words would be flattened by the common understanding and levelled off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of illusory problems. This is true specifically of the term <i>Eigentlichkeit</i>.

著者

木村 史人

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.175-188, 2018

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In <i>Being and Time</i>(<i>Sein und Zeit</i>), Martin Heidegger points out that the personality of a person who is aware of their mortality is individualistic, and they seem not to have relationships with others. By contrast, in <i>The Human Condition</i>(<i>Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben</i>), Hanna Arendt emphasizes the relations between others as "action"(Handeln).<br> In this article, I first of all endeavor to compare the "being-with"(<i>Mitsein</i>)in <i>Being and Time</i> with the "action" in <i>The Human Condition</i>, and from there attempt to reinterpret the <i>Dasein</i> as a performer of the action. This argument indicates that we are "with" others precisely in actions involved in unpredictable possibilities.<br> Secondly, I focus on authenticity, which is disclosed when the <i>Dasein</i> is anticipating death and the existential structure of our "who" is revealed. It would appear that "individualization" and "no relation" negate being with others in the world, but this existential metamorphosis into authenticity is our transformation into <i>Dasein</i> as a performer of action in the world with others through our becoming aware that we are each a unique "who" who cannot be defined in the world.<br> Death as the most extreme possibility is neither a predictable possibility nor an unpredictable possibility on the line that extends from the present into the future, but it shows that we ourselves are beings with potential in the sense of making these possibilities.<br> By clearly showing the relationship between authenticity and the performer of the "action", I endeavor to point out that the thoughts of Heidegger and Arendt are not opposing, but rather complement each other. Finally, this article shows that it is precisely because plural "whos" who are the most unique "beings with potential" when anticipating death face each other that actions have the characteristics of newness and initiative as if they were a "second birth."

著者

佐々木 正寿

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.189-202, 2018

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In der heutigen Zeit der Wissenschaft und Technologie bewegen wir uns überall und vor allem mit dem Prinzip der Nützlichkeit. Heideggers Betrachtung in seinem Vortrag „Die Frage nach der Technik" zufolge wird der Mensch in der Struktur der modernen Technik ausschließlich dazu herausgefordert, das Wirkliche als „Bestand", d. h. Nützliches, zu bestellen. In der Struktur der modernen Technik wird das Wirkliche immer bloß als „Bestand" entborgen. Demgemäß hat der Mensch in der Struktur der modernen Technik keine andere Möglichkeit der Entbergung mehr, und er würde dann die Möglichkeit verlieren, sein eigenes Wesen zu erkennen, wonach er eigentlich zum Entbergen gehört. Darin hat Heidegger die Gefahr der modernen Technik aufgezeigt, und gerade dort hat er aber in der Kunst, vor allem im Dichterischen, eine Möglichkeit des „Rettenden" angedeutet.<br> Der heideggerschen Erläuterung der Dichtung Hölderlins zufolge wird das Seiende in der Dichtung durch die dichterische Nennung mit dem wesentlichen Wort erst zu dem ernannt, was es ist. Mit anderen Worten: In der Dichtung wird das Seiende mit dem wesentlichen Wort als das Seiende enthüllt. Dieses Wesen der Dichtung hat, meiner Interpretation nach, der Haiku-Dichter Matsuo Basho schon früher verstanden und selber in solcher Weise Haiku-Gedichte verfaßt. Auch bei ihm zeigt sich die Dichtung qua poiēsis, wie Heidegger gesprochen hat, als die Entbergung, d. h. die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit der Natur.<br> In diesem Sinne könnte die Dichtung gerade im Zeitalter der modernen Technik zur Rehabilitierung der vielfältigen Möglichkeiten der Entbergung beitra gen. Vom heideggerschen Gesichtspunkt her würde die Dichtung also uns den Menschen dazu erwecken, die „Unverborgenheit" des Seienden zu hüten. Demnach dürfte man in der Dichtung eine Möglichkeit des „Rettenden" im Zeitalter der modernen Technik anerkennen.