著者

大澤 真生

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.71, pp.145-158, 2022 (Released:2022-07-11)

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The aim of this study is to clarify the essence and meaning of the duality of human existence that Karl Löwith often refers to in his book The Individual in the Role of Fellow Man(1928). Löwith regards the structure of human existence as the equal and fundamental unity of “personality” and “naturality.” First, this dual structure of human existence is superimposed on the duality of rational beings(person as a selfpurpose and thing as a means to an end)in Kant’s practical philosophy; then Löwith attempts to reinterpret Kant’s practical philosophy based on the principle of being-with-others. However, in his theory of being-with-others, Löwith recognizes the positive meaning of human naturality, which does not limit character to a thing of a person in Kant’s practical philosophy. This positive meaning is a potential basis for mutual understanding in dialogue with others. Involuntary communication based on human naturality brings more of human nature into expression than voluntary communication through words. It also builds appropriate dialogical relationships. By defining human personality not merely as self-purposiveness, but also as responsiveness to others, the construction of personality based on dialogical relations becomes essential for human beings. This inevitably leads to the evaluation of human naturality, which is the basis of mutual understanding ─having positive value. In addition, Löwith mentions that the fact that we have a dual structure of existence in itself makes human life possible. In other words, human beings are, by their very nature, conflicted beings with a dual structure; this makes it possible for them to question their own life. Löwith’s theory of being-with-others, which emphasizes the meaning of human naturality in dialogue, is significant as an attempt to overcome modern Western philosophy, which places value only on personality(autonomous ability).

著者

戸谷 洋志

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.71, pp.189-201, 2022 (Released:2022-07-11)

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The subject of this paper is to clarify the meaning of the concept of immortality in the ethical thought of Hans Jonas. Jonas is known for his work, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age( Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation), in which he founds the responsibility for future generations, but his problemsetting is already evident in the mythological thought discussed in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology(Das Prinzip Leben. Ansätze zu einer philosphischen Biologie), where the concept of immortality is discussed as a central issue in such mythological thought. However, in previous studies, the role of immortality in Jonas’s ethical thought has not always been sufficiently discussed. From this point of view, this paper aims to elucidate the conceptual function of immortality in explaining the responsibility to future generations, referring mainly to The Phenomenon of Life, and thereby provide a more systematic interpretation of Jonas’s ethical thought. In this paper, I will review previous studies on the concept of immortality to clarify the problem of this paper, and then confirm the background to the discussion of immortality in The Phenomenon of Life, where immortality is characterized as the temporality of determination. Then, I will reconstruct the mythology presented by Jonas to make such immortality comprehensible and clarify the conceptual link between immortality and responsibility derived from it. In conclusion, based on the above considerations, this paper will be shown that Jonas’s concept of immortality, as presented by his mythological thought, functions as a concept that explains resistance to oblivion in the foundation of responsibility to future generations.

著者

西野 真由美

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.71, pp.203-217, 2022 (Released:2022-07-11)

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The unity of virtue thesis, which states that the various virtues only hold different names for the same concept, has a long history of controversy and is among the most debated issues in contemporary virtue ethics. This idea, and especially when interpreted as implying that an individual cannot possess a virtue without possessing all the other virtues, sounds implausible from common experiences. One dominant interpretation is that various virtues originate from the same state of soul, from a sort of perceptual capacity. McDowell, one of the leading advocates for the traditional Aristotelian formulation of the thesis, holds that each virtue is a form of reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement from situations. This article aims to explore the role of practical wisdom(phronesis)upon the unity of virtue(s)in contemporary discussions. By showing how the unity of virtue is compatible with the plurality and diversity of virtues under the direction of practical wisdom, I intend to clarify the issue surrounding the unity of virtue from a new perspective, thereby paving a way toward re-constructing a new foundation for moral education, focusing on moral virtues as an integrated entity, rather than as discrete dispositions. First, upon more closely examining the conundrums that the unity of virtue thesis poses for virtue ethics, I identify the problems which may put the feasibility of the virtuous person, the central feature of virtue ethics, at stake. Second, I examine the ideas of two main contemporary virtue-ethicists, Russell and Annas, focusing on their views of the nature of practical wisdom and its relation to the virtues as clusters. Third, I indicate the unity as a unified, open whole, involving practical wisdom which integrates the different moral requirements of a concrete context with the agent’s appreciation of the situation’s features. In conclusion, by drawing from the implications that the advocates of the unity of virtue thesis in contemporary virtue ethics agree that the moral virtues are closely connected, it is worthwhile to conceive virtue cultivation as being based upon the developing of practical wisdom, which involves reflection and insight on how to live well.

著者

石橋 賢太

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.233-247, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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Yamaga Soko criticizes the lack of practicality of Neo-Confucianism and is known as a thinker who emphasizes“ daily use ”. However, if you think in detail, there is still a lot of doubt about the position of “daily use” in the philosophy of conduct. Of particular importance is the relationship between “daily use” and “the saint’s way”. To date, no studies have clarified this relationship. Looking at his understanding of the conduct of both, there is a contradiction between “the saint’s way”, which has transcendence that transcends the era, and “daily use” that has individuality depending on the era. As a clue to resolving this contradiction, this paper focused on the discussion about “Taikyoku”. In this context, Soko has criticized Zhou’s interpretation of the time of “Taikyoku”, and has developed the “Taikyoku” theory that all coexist simultaneously. The act says that “Tenchi” is also “Taikyoku”, and “Tenchi” is regarded as non-temporal. And since the saints are based on their “Tenchi”, “the saint’s way” has timeless transcendence. However, ordinary people cannot recognize “Tenchi” as a non-temporal thing, but have to recognize things in the eyes in order. As a result, the idea of time occurs in human recognition. “daily use“ is a phase in the idea of this time. Being committed to such “daily use” means that we believe we have to live in human perception, which is different from the original way of “Tenchi”. We can make such a claim because we believe that individuality and the whole are united. The “Taikyku” theory of the conduct is that all the people exist at the same time, and individual and transcendence exist at the same time as one. Therefore, living the perception of people who are only individual leads to the whole. That is why “saint ’s way” and “daily use”, which have contradictory personalities, are compatible with each other. Background of such thought is criticism of the idea that individuality and transcendence are separated temporally and individuality is only provisional. This is because such a way of thinking ignores the existence of diverse people.

著者

上野 太祐

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.249-262, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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This paper explains how Yamamoto Jōchō interpreted the teaching “I have found the way of the warrior in death” for himself. This teaching is generally interpreted as helping warriors find the determination to die. However, it entailed for Jōchō a self-contradictory situation. Despite his insistence that warriors had to die, Jōchō was, of course, still alive when he pronounced the teaching. In such a situation─espousing a teaching on death yet surviving his master─he arrived at a profound insight into life’s meaning after deep contemplation. Approaching this teaching from this perspective allows for a meaningful reinterpretation of this purportedly “radical”, and “dangerous” teaching. Jōchō could not commit suicide upon his master’s death because his master had forbidden it. He therefore decided upon world-renunciation instead. After his symbolic death through world-renunciation, he anguished over having to continue living without his master. His teaching must therefore be interpreted in this light: Jōchō was suffering through survival. In retrospect, there were two remarkable events in his life. One was the experience of acquiring meaning for his life through a command: his master requested that Jōchō served at his side. Jōchō looked upon himself as a “worthless” retainer but decided to devote his life to his master. The other event was a miracle. Jōchō had a sudden premonition and reached his master to be with him at his death. This demonstrated for Jōchō, his unity, body and soul, with his master. Jōchō realized that he had already become an authentic “Nabeshima retainer” by becoming an authentic retainer to his master. These moments generated an existential conflict between committing suicide and surviving because of his master’s prohibition. Seen from the perspective of this existential problem, Jōchō’s teaching should be understood as a confession of his anguished self-suffering based on this ambivalence rather than a radical enjoinment of the warrior to embrace death.

著者

服部 圭祐

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.263-276, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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The purpose of this paper is to examine Watsuji Teturo’s unpublished draft “Ethics” in order to shed light on developments in his ethical theory. The draft, which is archived in the National Diet Library, is assumed to be a follow-up of his 1931 paper that bears the same title. However, to our best knowledge, the philosophical and historiographical significance of the text has not been studied up to now. Therefore, this study would be the first attempt to analyze the draft’s significance. The draft is composed of three chapters in analogy to the 1937 and 1942 volumes of Watsuji’s magnum opus “Ethics”. The two works are distinct in terms of Watsuji’s definition of ‘ethics’(rinri-gaku): the draft defines ‘ethics’ as ‘the study of human being,’ whereas the book defines as ‘the study of the ethos’(rinri). The difference suggests that in the draft Watsuji had yet to develop his understanding of human beings in relation to ‘ethos’ as their ontological ground. The draft does not go beyond an attempt at grasping the essence of humanity in terms of its social nature, thereby describing actual human beings as social dynamisms. The above suggests that the main characteristics of Watsuji’s magnum opus consists in its purpose to reveal the nature of ‘ethos’, thereby describing human beings as its products. In other words, it reveals the dual nature of humanity by depicting ‘ethos’ as a dialectical relation between individuals and society. Nevertheless, previous studies tend to neglect the updated definition of humanity, thus overemphasizing the social aspect of human beings. This misinterpretation is probably due researchers’ obliviousness of the existence of Watsuji’s unpublished draft, which sheds light on the intellectual development of his ‘ethics.’

著者

井原 健一郎

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.89-103, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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Descartes’s letter of February 9, 1645, presumably addressed to Mesland (“Mesland Letter”),is considered vital because it seems to provide an explanation of freedom that differs from that found in the Meditations. On this basis, some scholars insist that Descartes changed his view of freedom after the Meditations. Did Descartes change his view? Admittedly, it seems that another kind of indifference was introduced in this letter. In the Meditations, indifference was described as the state in which the will is placed when no evident reason inclines it to do anything. Conversely, in the Mesland letter, Descartes introduced another indifference that can be defined as the positive faculty of the will to determine itself. This new version of indifference seems to be the basis of a new concept of freedom. In the Meditations, it is said that when evident reasons entirely incline us to do something, we cannot but do it; for example, we cannot but give assent to something when we perceive it clearly and distinctly. The novel formulation of indifference in the Mesland letter, however, implies that in a given situation we can do nothing or do the opposite; for example, even when we perceive something clearly and distinctly, we can withhold assent to it or suppose it to be false. Did Descartes thus change his view of freedom? It seems questionable. First, indifference appears in the Meditations too as a positive faculty of the will, although it may not be called “indifference.” Moreover, this work also admits that we have the ability to withhold assent to what we perceive clearly and distinctly or to suppose it to be false. Surely, according to the Meditations, it is possible to do so not at the exact moment when evident reasons incline us, but only after we distract ourselves from them. A strict consideration shows, however, that the same thing is said in the Mesland letter. From the above, it cannot be demonstrated from the Mesland letter alone that Descartes changed his view of freedom.

著者

佐藤 真人

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.105-118, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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L’influence stoïcienne sur la philosophie de Descartes est notée chez les plusieurs commentateurs. Elle se borne pourtant dans la plupart de cas, à notre connaissance, à la morale ou à l’unité de sciences; d’où l’interprétation selon laquelle « suivant la nature » équivaut à « obéir à l’ordre des choses », ce qui est la principale sagesse. Mais, malgré un certain nombre de points communs avec la philosophie stoïcienne, le concept cartésien de la nature se limite-t-il à la sphère éthique ou à l’épistémologie ? Les stoïciens étudient, aussi bien que Descartes, la nature au sens physique, bien évidemment. Et l’un des objectifs ultimes de cette recherche est également chez les deux de contempler la grandeur de Dieu. Quoique la recherche stoïcienne de la nature se renferme dans cette contemplation ou dans la réflexion intérieure, la recherche cartésienne de la nature inclut aussi bien le côté actif de l’art humain que le côté passif de la contemplation, de sorte que la technique est une science inséparable, de même que l’éthique qui en provient, de la considération sur la nature. Étant donné les sens multiples de nature chez Descartes, « l’institution de la nature » pourrait donner aussi plusieurs résultats. Cet article a pour but de présenter, en envisageant ce que la nature peut nous instituer, que trois manières de répondre à l’institution de la nature résident dans trois connaissances pratiques, à savoir, la morale envers la nature de l’homme, la médecine envers la nature individuelle du corps et la technique physique envers la nature en général, et que la philosophie naturelle chez Descartes présente bien, au-delà de l’aspect passif de la recherche stoïcienne, la méthode active et pratique, au moyen de notre libre arbitre en tant que cause efficiente visà- vis de la nature, non seulement pour étudier la nature, mais aussi pour la compléter et la changer.

著者

中野 愛理

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.119-132, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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Although Kant repeatedly states that religion is an inevitable consequence of morality, few people take this seriously. Traditionally, it has been maintained that his ethical system and his theory of religion are theoretically disconnected and that the latter is merely an addendum from outside of his critical philosophy. However, if it is shown that the ethical system involves a teleological conception that necessarily presupposes religious notions such as God, church, and grace, the suggested disconnection cannot be accepted any longer. In this paper, I examine the inner connection between the ethical system and religious notions from such a teleological perspective. In the first section, I outline four possible variants of a teleological conception. In order to get a criterion for discussing which conception best fits Kant’s ethical system, I show that the final end of the system is the highest good in section 2. Based on this result, I indicate that for the sake of the realization of the highest good, it is necessary that I have two beliefs whenever I act towards this end in section 3; the first is the belief that no obstacles can fundamentally prevent the realizability of the highest good, and secondly, the belief that it is possible for a person to make progress towards the highest good. Finally, in sections 4 and 5, I give an answer to the title question: a strong teleological conception is required for Kant’s ethical system. Throughout this paper, I shall conclude not only that Kant’s ethical system is internally connected to the theory of religion, but also that an acknowledgement of this inner connection is necessary for our everyday moral behavior.

著者

石井 雅巳

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.147-160, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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Emmanuel Levinas emphatically reiterates his caustic critique of historiography in Totality and Infinity(1961). For Levinas, “[historiography]rests on the usurpation carried out by the conquerors, that is by the survivors,” and to him, it is a violence of totality that ignores the particularities of the individual and reduces them into a narrative convenient to the victors. In this paper, we first take up the text of Totality and Infinity, where Levinas most explicitly declares his critique of history, and lay out why history is the violence of totality. In doing so, we demonstrate that both ethics and fecundity are deployed as resistance to the violence of history. Secondly, we analyze how Levinas addresses the difficulties that the theory of history in Totality and Infinit faced, in his later works including Otherwise than Being and Beyond Essence( 1974). We summarize our engagement with the other found in the dimension of “trace,” focusing especially on discussions of “survival” and “books.” We then analyze the path of change in Levinas’s strict attitude toward history and the other in the past. The outcome of this series of readings that this paper gains is, first, to show that for Levinas, history and its violence were not just an example of totality to be critiqued, but an important concern closely linked to ethics. Secondly, by analyzing his later writings, this paper illustrates that wary of the violence of historiography, Levinas was seeking a positive relationship with the past and history and that he was once again grappling with the difficulties of the debate faced in Totality and Infinity.

著者

安田 将

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.97-111, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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In his dialogue On the Laws(De legibus), Marcus Tullius Cicero(106─43 B. C.)argues that laws should be something which, when adopted by the people, would allow them to live happy, honorable lives. In the first part(‘Part A’)of book 1, Cicero provides the theoretical foundation for this conception, embodied by the Stoic cosmology. In the second part(‘Part B’), Cicero argues for natural justice independently of this cosmology. In both parts, the naturalness of justice means that justice is common to all. Yet, in Part B, this point does not mean that there is a common ideal state which only a few can correctly recognize as justice, as it does in Part A. Rather, in Part B, all people, including bad people, recognize the basic feature of justice: its naturalness. This change in conclusion cannot be accounted for if, as scholars tend to believe, Part B is a mere appendix, i. e., a repetition of Cicero’s conclusion in Part A, achieved by refuting possible alternatives to his view. In order to provide a reasonable explanation for this change, I intend to start by highlighting the fact that Cicero regards the arguments in both parts as necessary for achieving the aim of this work, i. e., the preservation of the mixed constitution, wherein all people judge what is just or not without leaving such judgments to the few aristocratic leaders. On this basis, I will argue that it is necessary for Cicero to suspend the conclusion in Part A and modify it in Part B, because Part A concludes that the naturalness of justice cannot be recognized by all. The skeptical reservation put forward in Part A seems at first sight to be precisely the perplexing and superficial pretense that scholars considered it to be in the past. Yet, in fact it is necessary. Cicero needs to argue for natural justice as he did in Part B, not A, in order to achieve the overall aim of the work and present laws which can preserve the mixed constitution, i. e., the laws whose justness all people can judge and adopt by their own judgment. In this way, Cicero’s skeptical strategy enables him to evade some ideas from Greek philosophers and unfold his political thought philosophically.

著者

秋保 亘

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.113-127, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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En se fondant entièrement sur la détermination principale de l’esprit humain comme « l’idée même, ou connaissance du Corps humain », la deuxième partie de l’Éthique traite de la nature de l’esprit et de ce que peut l’esprit, c’est-à-dire des divers genres de connaissance. Même chez les commentateurs éminents, cependant, se trouvent une incompréhension à l’égard de cette détermination principale et un malentendu sur le mécanisme de la connaissance imaginative qui constitue l’opération élémentaire de l’esprit humain. Cette incompréhension, à notre avis, revient à celle qui concerne la distinction entre l’idée ou la connaissance qui est l’esprit et la connaissance engendrée par l’esprit. Or, cette distinction, ainsi que le mécanisme de la connaissance imaginative, résulte de la manière dont se produit l’esprit humain à partir de Dieu ou de la Nature qui est la cause de toutes choses. Ou, plus précisément, elle résulte de la place occupée par l’esprit à l’intérieur du processus global qui produit toutes choses naturelles, y compris le Corps humain et les autres corps. C’est pourquoi, dans le présent article, saisissant d’abord la place de l’esprit humain dans le processus global de la production de la Nature tout entière, et ensuite, faisant l’analyse du mécanisme de la connaissance imaginative en considérant la distinction entre l’idée qui est l’esprit et la connaissance engendrée par l’esprit, nous examinerons la structure fondamentale de l’esprit humain selon l’Éthique, et mettrons au clair les propriétés que l’esprit et ses opérations doivent avoir inévitablement en raison de la place occupée par l’esprit dans le processus de la production. Ainsi, à travers notre analyse, nous tenterons de montrer que la théorie de l’imagination dans l’Éthique nous fait comprendre, en en montrant les raisons ou les causes, l’état naturel de notre manière de vivre: nous devons vivre en nous plaçant dans la perspective ouverte par notre corps et nous ne pouvons vivre qu’avec l’illusions et les hallucinations inévitables.

著者

濵田 洋輔

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.145-159, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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Although Ernst Cassirer’s concern is primarily focused on epistemology, he wrote several texts on the history of ethics(especially classical German ethics). He also emphasizes that ethics plays a central role in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, a philosopher whom he greatly respected. Furthermore, the later Cassirer─as a Jew in exile from Nazi Germany─came to assert that a new construction of ethics that can be effective against real social problems is an inevitable philosophical task for his day. However, he did not produce any work explicating his own system of ethics. Why? Beginning with this question, I demonstrate that Cassirer, nevertheless, laid the fundamental foundation of his(unwritten)ethics by widening the application field of Kantian “moral freedom” and that this foundation can be formulated as follows: in order to combat mythical consciousness( symbolic form), which is the only ethical(and social)danger in human life, man must use and promote other kinds of consciousness(symbolic form), such as religious, artistic, linguistic, or scientific consciousness. I then point out some possible problems with this ethical foundation such as the inconsistent variation in his explanations of mythical consciousness in order to directly and exclusively relate the danger of this consciousness to the problems of Nazi Germany; the optimistic view that all types of human consciousness, except for mythical, are morally good; and the lack of serious consideration for actual and concrete social problems or biological and animal elements in human life. Finally, I indicate that what we could learn from these(possible)problems and Cassirer’s attitude toward ethics is, broadly speaking, as follows: we should remind ourselves that one of philosophy’s key tasks is to construct ethics that is effective against real social problems; furthermore, it would not be easy to satisfactorily fulfill this task if one is not prepared in advance or does not take into consideration the real and concrete lives and tangible problems of human existence seriously.

著者

入谷 秀一

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.175-189, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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This paper examines Adorno’s ideas about sexuality and the body. While this approach is quite unprecedented in Japan, it is a theme that has been discussed frequently in Europe and the United States. Opinions are divided among modern women philosophers and feminists about Adorno, whose handling is troublesome. This is because he criticized masculinist values, which had led Western rationalism, while also continuing to obsess over the dichotomy of masculine and feminine principles─naturally with reservations ─as one would find in his indifferent stance on homosexuality. In addition, Adorno only made an insufficient compromise on feminine experiences(as he perceived them), be they about Eros or physical pain. This paper attempts to elucidate this contradiction and inconsistency. This paper considers the contradictions in Adorno’s views on sexual love as something he partly expressed intentionally. He performatively and thoroughly acted as a man, as it were, to reveal its impasse and seize the opportunity for a dialectic self-transformation. Specifically, this approach is observed in Adorno’s disclosure on the weakness of feminine men, who should be oriented toward strength, while showing empathy to determined women who stress their weaknesses and troubles of not being able to entirely become men. However, Adorno is resistant about completely dismantling his stance as a man. This is probably because he had a premonition that the opportunity of self-destruction, which is promoted by an open female stance, could lure people into a trap of violence. For Adorno, this in itself is nothing other than masochism, which feminine men, who are latent homosexuals, have fallen into.

著者

冨田 絢矢

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.191-204, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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It could be said that universalizability is an accepted and plausible thesis for moral discourse. It claims that value-judgments are valid only if they are universalizable. One would not fail to notice that it was R. M. Hare who, in line with Kant, built a unique theory upon the idea of universalizability. Hare presented this thesis not as a substantial claim in normative ethics, but as one based on ‘logic,’ which is counted as an innovation in the history of ethics. Nevertheless, Hare’s argument for this thesis is said to contain a difficulty. According to traditional interpretations, Hare’s second major work Freedom and Reason(FR)left a logical leap. Hare in FR, they say, claims value-judgments are universalizable because value-words have descriptive meaning. However, the trivial fact of descriptive meaning does not logically entail such normative requirements which the universalizability thesis implies. This paper will argue that these traditional interpretations overlook the continuity in Hare’s ethics, namely between his first major work Language of Morals( LM)and FR. The argument for normative requirements of value-judgments in FR presupposes the argument for universalizability in LM. In LM, Hare did argue value-judgments are felicitous only if done in a universalizable manner, for making value-judgments is a form of speech act, i. e. ‘decision of principle.’ Given this, one will easily understand why universalizability as felicity necessarily involve the normative requirements of value-judgements. Put in another way, one will not be able to understand the argument in FR without understanding the one in LM. Hare submitted the universalizability thesis as a ‘logical’ thesis, and the word ‘logic’ here has a wider connotation, which includes internal rules of practice in which we all are engaged. And this indicates Hare’s philosophical insight that why and how we should universalize our value-judgements can only be grasped from the point of view which we have as participants of normative practice.

著者

西川 耕平

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.205-217, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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Dans cet article, nous examinerons la pensée de Foucault sur la loi et le droit et celle de Deleuze, faisant constamment référence au diagramme que celui-ci présente dans son oeuvre sur Foucault. On est encline à souligner, dans les études sur la philosophie française contemporaine, des différences entre ces deux philosophes. Mais, il y a des points communs remarquables dans leurs pensées juridiques, même s’il semble qu’on les ait négligés. Cet article a donc pour but d’éclaircir leur orientation commune dans ce domaine. À cette fin, nous commencerons par mettre en évidence l’interprétation que Deleuze donne de Foucault, et constaterons qu’il est possible de retrouver deux types de loi dans la pensée de celui-ci: une loi stable et une loi instable. Celle-ci, caractérisée comme une réponse à « l’autre », joue un rôle important au moment de la genèse d’une loi ou d’un droit. Puis, nous montrerons que cet aspect de la loi peut se rapporter au thème de « rapport à soi » dont s’occupe Foucault dans ses dernières années. Enfin, nous traiterons de la pensée juridique de Deleuze développée par le terme « jurisprudence », et montrerons qu’elle aussi répond à « l’autre » et s’accompagne du devenir. Nous pourrons extraire de ce qui précède deux points communs entre Deleuze et Foucault: d’abord, tous les deux donnent de l’importance aux processus de fabrication de nouveaux lois et droits à travers la réponse donnée aux cas singuliers, plutôt qu’à travers de simples applications des lois stables; ensuite, ils supposent l’un et l’autre que le sujet n’est pas un sujet tout fait et universel, mais un étant qui se change sans cesse, affecté par le singulier. En bref, le processus de création des lois et droits implique l’éthique de la subjectivation en tant que devenir autre.

著者

小原 拓磨

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.219-232, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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Cette étude traite de la discussion du « brûle-tout » dans Glas(1974)par Derrida et vise à l’élucider à partir de la discussion sur la loi et la justice par le dernier Derrida. L’argument du « brûle-tout », développé sur la base de la lecture de « l’être-essence de lumière » dans Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel, est un principal dans Glas et difficile à comprendre. Derrida dit que des recherches déconstructives ont eu jusqu’à maintenant et auront aussi dès maintenant une problématique du droit, de la loi et de la justice comme leur lieu le plus propre. Suivant cette déclaration, on peut lire la discussion du « brûle-tout » par analogie avec celle de la loi et de la justice. D’abord, la justice derridienne dénonce la violence au moment de la fondation du système légale. L’établissement de la loi est toujours un coup de force en tant qu’il se fait à un lieu sans aucune loi et exclut « l’autre ». La déconstruction commence vers cet autre, et à cet égard elle est la justice. Ensuite, dans Glas, cet autre est discuté comme le « brûle-tout », celui est la consumation insignifiante qui brûle tout complètement, ne laisse rien et n’accumule pas d’histoire. Quand le sujet comme un pour-soi y apparaît, le sens naît et la philosophie ouvrit. Avec cette fondation de la philosophie, la consommation inutile antérieure serait forclose et enterrée. Derrida dans Glas recherche ce moment, c’est-à-dire l’apparition du sujet comme la fondation de la philosophie. À partir d’un mot du texte hégélien, « Opfer (sacrifice)», Derrida découvert que le brûle-tout de la lumière se sacrifie pour la naissance du sujet. Pour la fondation de la philosophie, l’autre se sacrifie, se donne. Il s’éclaire ainsi que l’argument du « brûle-tout » décrit non seulement la forclusion de l’autre, mais aussi son intervention(donation de soi)dans la naissance de la philosophie.

著者

加藤 之敬

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.113-126, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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This paper clarifies Nietzsche’s sense of an ideal human by considering his concept of “genius.” Genius is a traditional concept, and Nietzsche uses it uniquely to express his ideal human in his early period. There are two important points. First, he regards classical Greek culture as the ideal environment for producing a group of geniuses, and he contends that the classical Greek philosophers from Tales to Socrates form a group of geniuses. Second, he was influenced by Schopenhauer’s concept of genius and extracts from Schopenhauer’s view on genius in many of his unpublished works. Focusing on these points clarifies the core of Nietzsche’s concept of genius as “freedom.” He perceives a genius as a free person, in which being free means freedom from others that allows a person to be himself or herself. Nietzsche was influenced by Pindar’s maxim and believed throughout his life that it is important to be oneself. Nietzsche understood a genius as a free person in the sense that she or he endeavors to be herself or himself. The idea of “being oneself” does not mean personally discovering what exists, but personally creating new things. In Schopenhauer as educator, Nietzsche indicates that true selfhood is beyond the present sense of self. Individuals who endeavor to be themselves know their orientations through the models they long to emulate and imitate the models to sublimate what the models embody into their unique forms. Through these activities, geniuses create themselves anew and as unique beings. In sum, a genius, who is Nietzsche’s ideal human, should be a free person in the sense that he or she continually endeavors to create himself or herself.

著者

亀崎 健司

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.157-170, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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Der Zweck dieses Papiers ist, den Seinscharakter der Werte von Scheler zu klären. Insbesondere achtet es auf seinen grundlegeden Teil. Er sagt, dass der Wert objektiv ist. Also öffnet der Weg, um den Wert als objektiv zu denken, durch die Erklärung des grundlegenden Teils. Mit dem Konzept achtet das Papier auf seinen Begriff von Fühlen. Durch erneute Prüfung dieses grundlegenden Begriffs von Ergebnissen wichtiger Studien wird der Seinscharakter der Werte gefragt. Duruch den Erfolg dieser Untersuchung verstehen wir, dass seine Werte unsere Antwortsreaktion erfordern. Von ihm ist Die Auffassung der Antwortsreaktion wichtig, um das Sein der Werte zu erfassen.

著者

山下 真

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.171-185, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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Im letzten Teil des Atombombenbuchs von K. Jaspers(1958)erscheint plötzlich der Begriff »Unsterblichkeit«. Jaspers sagt: nur aus der Unsterblichkeit »kann eine Folge sein, daß der Selbstmord der Menschheit abgewehrt wird«. In welchem Sinne überwindet dieser veraltete Begriff die Krise des Atomkriegs, um die Zukunft des Menschen fortzusetzen? In dieser Abhandlung werden die Struktur und die Bedeutung der »Unsterblichkeit« im Zusammenhang mit der Konzeption der Erweiterung des Begriffs »Gemeinschaft« erläutert. Die Grenzsituation des »Todes« in „Philosophie“(1932)wurde nur vom Einzelnen erhellt und auf sich genommen. Dagegen wird die »Vernichtung« der Menschheit durch die Nuklearwaffen für »die neue Grenzsituation« gehalten. Denn sie ist das gemeinsame Problem, für das alle seiende Menschen verantwortlich sind. Es ist die metaphysische Frage »nach Sein oder Nichtsein«. Daher ist die eigentliche Weise der Menschen angesichts der Vernichtung »die Gemeinschaft der Vernünftigen«, zu der alle Existenzen potentiell gehören. Nach der Bestimmung in „Philosophie“ heißt nun die Unsterblichkeit als Gegensatz zum Tod die Weise der Existenz in ihrer Geschichtlichkeit. Die Existenz ist mehr als das bloß sterbliche Dasein, indem sie einen Aufschwung des Seins im »Augenblick« als Einmaligkeit erreicht. Dazu noch sind die Anderen als die Existenzen auch unsterblich. Der Nächste kann trotz seines Todes in der dauernden existentiellen Kommunikation gegenwärtig bleiben. Jaspers weist hiermit auf die Gemeinschaft mit den Nicht-mehr-Seienden hin. Im Atombombenbuch wird die »Unsterblichkeit« aber wieder auf Grund des existentiellen Augenblicks bestimmt. Denn es kommt im Hinblick auf die Vernichtung eben darauf an, daß das Dasein der Menschheit fortbestehen. Also wird die vernünftige universelle Gemeinschaft im doppelten Sinne »unsterblich«. Nur wenn die Existenzen jeweils in der Gegenwart die Kommunikation vollziehen, dann vermag die Menschheit zugleich ihr Dasein in die offene Zukunft d.h. in den Spielraum alles Seinkönnens zu bringen. Der Begriff »Unsterblichkeit « von Jaspers ist hierdurch als ein Ansatz zur existentiellen Zukunftsethik zu verstehen. Die grenzenlose Erweiterung der Kommunikation ist die Realisierung der Gemeinschaft mit den Noch-nicht-Seienden.