著者

市井 三郎他

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.141-149, 1982-11-13 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

中村 秀吉他

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.133-142, 1983-11-26 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

藤川 吉美

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, pp.139-140, 1978-10-20 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

並木 美喜雄

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

no.27, pp.1-16, 1994

著者

金杉 武司

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.47-63, 2012

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Self-deception has traditionally been conceived as a phenomenon in which one is motivated by a desire that P to deceive oneself intentionally to form a belief that P despite his/her possession of a belief that not P. It has been argued, however, that this traditional conception is confronted with two paradoxes precisely because it construes self-deception in such a manner. Consequently, in recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have come to abandon the traditional conception of self-deception to deny that a self-deceiving subject owns a belief that not P and/or that self-deception is intentional. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that some of phenomena called "self-deception" should nonetheless be conceived under the traditional framework and, further, explores a possibility for avoiding the paradoxes under the traditional conception.

著者

古田 徹也

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.53-66, 2014

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This review concerns Professor Hitoshi Nagai's recent book, <i>Wittgenstein no Goshin (Wittgenstein's Misdiagnosis)</i>. In this book, Professor Nagai makes his understanding of the latter part of Wittgenstein's "Blue Book". He argues that Wittgenstein set up an epoch-making solipsism, which Professor Nagai calls "Wittgenstein's solipsism" or "linguistic solipsism", but he adds that Wittgenstein himself misunderstood the meaning and significance of this solipsism. In this review, I consider the validity of Professor Nagai's arguments.

著者

日本科学哲学会 [編]

出版者

日本科学哲学会

巻号頁・発行日

1946

著者

鈴木 貴之

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.93-96, 2007

著者

鈴木 貴之

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.151-167, 2021

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Artificial intelligence research has made impressive progress in the last ten years with the development of new methodologies such as deep learning. There are several implications of the progress both for philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of artificial intelligence, but none are conclusive. Though its success seems to support connectionism in cognitive science, there are several features of human cognition that remain to be explained. Also, though it is often said that deep learning is the key to build artificial general intelligence, deep neural networks we now have are specialized ones and it's not clear how we can build a general artificial intelligence from such specialized networks.</p>

著者

木下 頌子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.127-141, 2019

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In series of her works, Amie Thomasson has claimed that the revisionary ontology about works of arts is methodologically untenable. Interestingly, her conclusion is drawn from the reflection on the theory of reference of art kind terms. She argues that the "qua problem," which is known as a problem for the causal theory of reference, undermine the possibility of revisionary ontology. The aim of this paper is to critically examine her argument. I argue that even if Thomassonʼs view about the reference of our art kind terms is correct, revisionary metaphysics is still possible.</p>

著者

峯島 宏次

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.321-323, 2021

著者

横路 佳幸 高谷 遼平

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.61-83, 2020

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In his "Demonstratives", David Kaplan discussed certain nonintensional operators called monsters. The operators, unlike ordinary ones, change the reference of indexicals by shifting the parameter of context. Although Kaplan denied monsters at least in English on the ground of both the doctrine of direct reference and the principle of compositionality, many monstrous phenomena of singular terms have been confirmed by some semanticists lately, which seems to urge Kaplanian semantics to be revised. In this survey article, we offer a survey of recent developments in the semantics of indexicals, variables, and proper names by focusing on monsters, and give some suggestions about direct reference, monsters, and compositionality.</p>

著者

水本 正晴

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.79-95, 2006

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In this review I comment on the papers in Shiriizu Kokoro No Tetsuhaku, or Philosophy of Mind Series (2004), edited by Y. Nobuhara. This series consists of three volumes, Human Part (vol. 1), Robot Part (vol. 2), and Translation Part (vol. 3). I shall comment on each paper in the first two volumes, since the last one consists of translations of classic papers of philosophy of mind in English-speaking countries.

著者

井頭 昌彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.59-73, 2009-10

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Although physicalism is usually understood as an ontological thesis, it is not clear that what implications this position has on the matter of ontology expressed by the question "What there is?" In this paper, I begin with Quine's "indispensability argument," and abstract from it a framework for sorting ontological positions. Then, I try to locate supervenience thesis, which is an important part of physicalism, within the framework above. One conclusion of this paper is that supervenience thesis works, neither as a direct assertion on what there is nor as an assertion on the criterion of ontological commitment we should adopt, but as an assertion on the class of the sentences from which we should extract ontology.

著者

宮園 健吾

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_83-2_98, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)

参考文献数

17

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This article explores “Inner Speech Account of Introspection”, according to which inner speech is the source of our introspective self-knowledge. The view hypothesizes that we come to know that we are thinking that p by being aware of the sentence of inner speech “p” accompanying the thought. I argue for Inner Speech Account by showing that it explains six explananda imposed for the philosophical theories of introspection; peculiar access, privileged access, detection condition, the lack of phenomenology, occurent/dispositional distinction, and content/attitude distinction.

著者

中山 康雄

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_1-2_16, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)

参考文献数

21

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In this paper, I discuss the relationship between philosophy and reality based on my experiences in an interdisciplinary project which integrates studies in robotics, cognitive science, and brain science. The central topic of this paper is a philosophical analysis of conversations among teleoperated androids and humans. I explain ontological aspects in these conversations from a semantic and pragmatic viewpoint. On the base of these considerations, I offer an explanation regarding the relationship between the self and information.

著者

金野 武司 柴田 正良

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_29-2_45, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)

参考文献数

7

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Human beings can convey their intentions to other people non-verbally, through looks and gestures. It is known that during development, infants acquire this ability before they learn to speak. We have focused on the phenomenon of “joint attention,” wherein infants try to look at objects by following their parent’s gaze. This behavior begins as a reflective one, but then progresses further into the next stage-understanding and sharing other peoples’ intentions. We try to clarify joint attention by constructing a simple robot that visually interacts with human beings. In this paper, we suggest two important mechanisms for understanding and sharing intentions; an association mechanism to produce an intentional gaze following, and an inference mechanism to recursively rectify the robot’s own intentions by understanding the interacting person’s intentions.

著者

四津 雅英

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.1, pp.67-79, 2007-07-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

17

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It is common in any natural language for more than one thing to have phonologically or orthographically the same proper name. There are two different views on this. According to one, in such a case there are distinct names which have the same pronunciation or spelling. According to the other, in such a case there is only one name and its referent can vary from context to context. It seems that when you discuss the latter view (the ambiguity view of proper names), you need to take the ontological problems of words into account.

著者

高村 夏輝

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.1, pp.81-93, 2007-07-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

17

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Representative theory of perception has used the analogy of watching television screens to explain the perception of material objects. To this analogy, there has been a wellknown objection. Contemporary representative theorists, called "New representationalism", claim to have a way out of the objection, and I shall argue that their argument is well-grounded. Seeing things through television screens can be direct perception of those things. Unfortunately, however, this argument has its own drawback, and one of the essential ideas of representative theory would have to be compromised, i.e. that the subject cannot be aware of sensedata.

著者

前田 高弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.41-56, 2007-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

18

被引用文献数

1

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In this paper, I investigate the role of properties for perceptual experience via a critical examination of the view that perceptual experience has properties as its primary objects and also has those properties as the determiner of its phenomenal character. The view in question can take two forms according to whether properties are construed as universals or as tropes. So I divide the view into two types and show that each of them has its own problems. In conclusion I propose an alternative view concerning the role of properties for perceptual experience.