著者

浪岡 淳

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.85-99, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

25

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In his posthumous work, The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans persuasively maintained the incoherence of the concept of "quasi-memo-ry", in favor of the famous circularity objection to the Lockean analysis of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity. Evans' argument against quasi-memory illustrates that the so-called "circularity" is an inevitable consequence of the phenomenon of the identification-freedom (or immunity to error through misidentification) of our thoughts. His conception of this phenomenon implies a plausible interpretation of the circularity objection, which is firmly opposed to the prevailing reductionist theories of personal identity and aims at a sort of non-reductionism. However, it does not entail, and indeed is incompatible with, the current "Non-reductionism", i.e. the view that personal identity is a bare fact completely independent from any kind of continuity and that a person is a pure Ego beyond elucidation.

著者

清塚 邦彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.15-28, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

20

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In "Meaning, Truth and Evidence" (1990), Davidson took issue on Quine's empiricist theory of meaning and knowledge. The point at issue was the concept of 'stimulus meaning' which Quine defined in physiological terms. Davidson argued that physiology should not matter much either in the theory of meaning or in epistemology. This criticism was pertinent to Quine's theory of meaning (Quine eventually abandoned the concept of 'stimulus meaning' itself). But, as I shall argue, it had little effect on Quine's epistemology: though it prompted minor changes on Quine's part, Quine's physiological bent in epistemology was retained, and justifiably, in the face of Davidson's criticism.

著者

西脇 与作

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.25-44, 2001-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

19

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The common concept of sex has consisted of many factors, like culture, tradition, scientific fact, and personal experiences and so on. As a result, it includes several prejudices. To explain the true nature of sex, we may have two different types of cause, ultimate and proximate causes, which the variational model of the modern evolutionary theory has and which we cannot find in the usual normal state model. And why-type question is generally answered by using the ultimate causes, and how-type question by using the proximate causes.Using two different types of cause, we explain the development, the structure and the adaptation of sex. In particular, the adaptive explanation of sex, consisting of the explanation of the existence of sex, sexual selection, and the sex ratio, shows not only the mystery of sex but also the emergent meaning of sex.Then we analyze the philosophical meaning of two different types of cause and their relevant problems. Genetic determinism and naturalistic fallacy are interpreted from the ultimate point of view. Lastly the convention, which is introduced as a local law in biology, is clarified naturalistically.

著者

大石 敏広

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.75-87, 2001-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

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The purpose of this paper is to investigate how descriptions relate to proper names. Against what is called the description theory Kripke argues that no description gives the meaning of a proper name and that no description determines the reference of a proper name. I agree with kripke on the former point, but regarding the latter point I will argue that when we use a proper name in order to refer to an object, we must have at least one parasitical description which shows that we use the proper name in accord with the social use of the proper name. In other words, referring to an object with a proper name presupposes referring to the object with the proper name in society. This fact suggests that it is impossible to frame a reductive theory of reference.

著者

川口 由起子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.101-116, 2001-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

被引用文献数

1

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In this paper, I have explicated the logical relation between the Maxims and the Cooperative Principle (CP, hereafter) as stipulated in Grice's theory of conversation. First, by showing the existence of cases where the CP is followed but the relevant maxim is not, I have shown that those maxims are logically independent from the CP. Second, the Maxim of Relation (MR, hereafter) has been misleadingly conceived to provide the basic notion of "relevance" for the theory of conversation. But, when a speaker, while deviating from the MR, or failing to "be relevant" literally, still follow the context in some sense or other, it must be another kind of "relevance" that is highlighted. That kind of "relevance" in conversation is required by the CP. I have called this kind of relevance CONNECTEDNESS as opposed to the RELEVANCE as required by the MR.

著者

岡本 賢吾

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.7-19, 2001-05-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

10

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Frege's well-known thesis that arithmetic is reducible to logic leaves unexplained what is the gain of the reduction and what he means by logic in principle. First, the author contends that the real interest of the reduction consists in a form of conceptual reduction: it frees us from the ordinary naive conception of numbers as forming extremely peculiar genus and replaces it with a very general and basic conception of them. Second, it is pointed out that Frege's concept of logic involves two elements. One is based on the iteratability of the operation of abstraction and naturally leads him to accept a sort of denumerably higher order logical language. The other is based on the so-called comprehension principle. Each of the two elements could be said to be logical in some sense but they are inconsistent with each other. Still, we can learn much from his attempt to search for as extensive and global a conception of logic as possible.

著者

中川 大

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.37-48, 2001-05-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

15

被引用文献数

1 1

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Russell's theory of denoting in Principles (1903) was rejected by his theory of descriptions in "On Denoting" (1905). But the notion of denoting itself was not rejected. It is used even in Principia (1910). In this essay we shall determine what has been removed by the theory in "On Denoting", and what is preserved by it. In order to do so, we must investigate the early Russell's manuscripts, and grasp Russell's view of functions, which was framed out of the principles of dependent and independent variables, and the theory of denoting. Then we can solve the entanglement concerning the notion of denoting.

著者

井上 直昭

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.49-60, 2001-05-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

7

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This paper deals with the so-called Julius Caesar Problem. Crispin Wright has recently shown that it is possible to derive the axioms of second-order arithmetic from a principle which is called Hume's Principle (HP). Depending upon this result, Wright resurrected a version of Fregean logicistic project. But historical Frege suspected HP as not a fundamental law of arithmetic in the face of Caesar Problem in his Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik section 66. He supposed, I think, that this problem was to be solved through axiom V, the basic law in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. But this strategy failed because of the inconsistency of axiom V. And this failure must be seen from a point of view of semantic ill-foundedness, which in general would be included in Fregean abstract principle. This difficulty is an important reason for Russell's Paradox, thus makes it impossible to give any answer to Julius Caesar Problem.

著者

須長 一幸

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.61-74, 2001-05-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

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In this paper, I will try to seek answers to the following questions: (1) Why, in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, did Frege believe that the solution to the Julius Caesar problem must be found ? (2) Why didn't Frege deal with the Julius Caesar problem in Grundgesezte der Arithmetik, in spite of the fact that he was well aware of the difficulties involved with it in the context of Grundgesezte? In exploring these questions, I will investigate the various contexts in which the Julius Caesar problem arises.

著者

内井 惣七

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.1-10, 2001-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

9

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As is well known, Tooby and Cosmides argued that the evolutionary point of view is indispensable in the social sciences; they criticized the standard social science modes (SSSM), and proposed instead the integrated causal model (ICM) based on the evolutionary psychology. Since their proposal adopts the adaptationism, I wish to analyze the structore of the adaptationism, examining some of heir key words: adaptation, function, and module. Since the adaptationism was severely criticized by Gould and Lewontin, I wish also to examine how well it can overcome such criticisms. This review will serve as an introduction to the philosophicalc onsideration on the relevance of the evolutionary theory to the theories of mind and society.

著者

池上 高志

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.93-105, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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Artificial life (AL) provides a new way of understanding what is life itself. AL will not merely mimic the existing life phenomena, but trying to make a theory for life as it could be. AL is strongly based on dynamical systems approach, at least in the beginning. The present article introduces, dynamical systems approach and its perspective view and will discuss some intricated issues in AL are discussed. The key words here are, time, distinction, thermodynamics formalization and forms.

著者

松阪 陽一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.119-132, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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It has been widely assumed, arguably under the influence of Tarski's Convention T, that in giving a truth-theoretic semantics for a language one has to employ a metalanguage that can express whatever is expressible in the object language. In this note I will present some cases against this assumption. The requirement that every expression in the object lan-guage be translatable into the metalanguage should not be considered compulsory, it will be argued, when the object language contains expressions like indexicals, empty singular terms, and vague words. An attempt will be made to draw some philosophical morals from this contention.

著者

福井 謙一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.133-146, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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Whereas Jaegwon Kim's metaphysical theory of events(events as property exenlpl fications)is compatible withDonald Davidson's theory of the nature of events(events asparticulars), the sernantical accounts of event sentences associated with these theories are incompatible with each other. Moreover, no natural modification of Kim's semantics is capable of explaining certain entailment relations between eventsentences in the manner open to the Davidsonian account. thus, given the plausibility of the latter account, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no simple correspondence, of thesort required by Kim's semantics, that obtains between verbphrases of event sentences and the constitutive properties of the events describeci by them.

著者

津留 竜馬

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.163-175, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

7

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Chapter 17 of Michael Dummett's Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics begins with the question: how did the serpent of inconsistency enter Frege's paradise? So the aim of that chapter is to explicate the primary reason for inconsistency of Frege's system (i.e. the origin of Russel's paradox). But what Dummett does in that chapter is to analyze Frege's consistency proof and to explain why his proof fails. Since it is possible that a consistency proof for a system fails but the system is still consistent, Dummett's account of inconsistency seems to be inadequate. Does Dummett succeed in explicating the origin of inconsistency of Frege's system through the analysis of his consistency proof? It is this question that this paper deals with. I shall argue that Dummett's account is inadequate and suggest an alternative explanation of inconsistency of Frege's system.

著者

野村 恭史

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.43-53, 2000-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

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The metaphysics of "simple" objects and the syntactic theory of "expressions (Ausdrücke)" can be seen as theoretical foundations of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logicophilosophicus. I shall show in this paper how these two doctrines result from his struggling with Russell's theory of types, and establish the early Wittgenstein's basic idea that structural (formal) features of language mirror structural (formal) features of the world. In order to do so, I will trace the basic line of Wittgenstein's thought back to the pre-Tractatus period.

著者

渡辺 大地

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.55-68, 2000-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

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In this paper, I will consider the comparison of a proposition to a set of coordinates fixing a point in space in early Wittgenstein's thought. Pears pointed out that there is a tension between this comparison (which leads to holism) and separatist element in the relation between reality and sense. But I think this tension is illusion and a right interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of language will vanish this illusion. For this purpose, I will illuminate the comparison of a proposition to a set of coordinates and the motivation of this comparison.

著者

服部 裕幸

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.15-28, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

16

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In the dispute between classicists and connectionists, classicists assert that connectionists only claim that cognitive architecture is implemented in a certain kind of network model. They also criticize that the connectionist model cannot deal with many important cognitive competences, since they do not acknowledge the combinatorial structure of mental representations. I will argue that connectionists cannot defend themselves from the second criticism without suffering from the first criticism, and that they cannot defend themselves from the first criticism without suffering from the second criticism. Eliminativists often compare folk psychology to phlogiston theory in discussing the relation between connectionist theory and folk psychology. I will argue that the analogy does not hold.

著者

月本 洋

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.29-41, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

3

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This paper briefly describes connectionism and explains that the essence of artificial neural networks is nonlinear regression. The integration of connectionism and symbolicism is studied in order to solve their defects. This paper presents a new paradigm called Embodied AI (EAI) which is an integration of connectionism and symbolicism through imaginations. EAI insists that symbolic processings should consist of artificial neural networks trained for bodily movements. Imaginations need bodies. Robots can realize imaginations, and so can realize EAI. Current computers do not have bodies, and so cannot realize imaginations. Since the main linguistic aspects of imaginations are metaphors, EAI is realized as Metaphor Based AI (MBAI) in the current computers.

著者

美濃 正

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.43-56, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

9

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In this paper I shall critically examine a rather bizarre view which Prof. Nobuhara has recently propounded concerning connectionism. The thrust of his view is this: In the Classicist-Connectionist debate, Classicists are definitely the winner, since Connectionists cannot solve the 'Systematicity of cognitive abilities' problem posed by Fodor and others.; nevertheless, our brain is a wholly connectionist cognitive system, since every cognitive activity that shows the 'Systematicity' in question (typically, thinking activity) needs symbols external to our brain and therefore is performed totally outside it. Against this view, I first point out that Prof. Nobuhara fails to give some Connectionists ('Approximationists') their due in his appraisal of the Classicist-Connectonist debate. Secondly, I argue that he can't be a Connectionist with regard to our brain, while endorsing the Classicist's solution to the 'Systematicity' problem.

著者

美濃 正

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.39-51, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

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The main aim of this paper is to argue for the following two theses: (1) so-called qualia are irreducibly non-physical properties of certain brain states, and (2) in spite of (1), qualia can be legitimately accommodated into a broadly physicalistic framework. On behalf of (1), what might be regarded as a variation of F. Jackson's 'knowledge-argument' is put forward and also a refutation of P. M. Churchland's objection that qualia are but physical properties (of certain brain states) as they are introspectively accessed is attempted. On behalf of thesis (2), the idea of qualia's supervening and nomologically depending upon brain states' physical properties is deployed. A radical criticism of some sceptical arguments concerning qualia is also included.