著者
原田 淑人
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.4, no.3, pp.413-422, 1914-10

1 0 0 0 太祖

著者
滿文老檔研究会譯註
出版者
東洋文庫
巻号頁・発行日
1955
著者
中田 美絵
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.89, no.3, pp.293-325, 2007-12

In the aftermath of the An Lüshan 安禄山 rebellion (755-763), Bukong 不空 was able to rise to a position of influence within the Buddhist circles of Chang’an 長安 through the support of the eunuchs, the imperial army they command and Sogdians who had connection with them. A group which played most important role among Sogdians were military commanders stationed in Liangzhou 涼州. Before the rebellion, they were under Hexi Longyou jiedushi 河西・隴右節度使 Geshu Han 哥舒翰’s command. Geshu han invited Bukong to Liangzhou to preside over a ceremony baptizing of the commanders in the name of Buddha; then, after the rebellion broke out, they left Liangzhou, and proceeded to ally themselves with a group of eunuch-led imperial regiments in Chang’an, where they lent support to Bukong’s religious activities.One reason for the alliance lay in the ambitions of the eunuchs to gain the military ascendancy and establish their political influence at the Tang Dynasty court. One part of this effort included the enlistment of accomplished cavalrymen, including Sogdians, in pacifying the rebellion. Meanwhile Bukong ordained several Sogdians and organized them into a Buddhist circle under his tutelage, while maintaining his connections with the eunuch-led imperial army forces One of Bukong’s disciples, Shi Yuancong 史元琮, a commander who was based in Liangzhou, was appointed to the office of gongdeshi 功徳使, which gave him command of both the imperial army and the Buddhist temples. Luo Fumo 羅伏磨, a general in the imperial army from Liangzhou, was also ordained by Bukong, showing that his entourage moved freely between military service and monastic life.In this way, both eunuch-led imperial army forces and Bukong’s circle of monks Came to embrace many members of Sogdian descent The both groups were strongly connected with each other through Sogdian military commanders from Lianzhou. Putting in another way, the eunuchs and the Bukong’s circle of monks constituted a tightly knit organization composed of both groups which formed the springboard which enabled Bukong to soar to a position of great influence in Chang’an Buddhism, and golden age for Buddhism in general during the reign of Emperor Daizong 代宗.

1 0 0 0 OA VI 役職員名簿

出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋文庫年報 = Toyo Bunko nenpō (ISSN:1344476X)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, pp.167-180, 2022-03-16
著者
山口 瑞鳳
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.66, no.1~4, pp.481-513, 1985-03

The utilization of Chinese historical sources by Tibetan historians in their accounts of early Tibetan history has resulted in no little confusion and error. Buddhist historians made no attempt to rectify these errors; rather, they give the impression of having devoted their efforts to producing tales thought useful for the propagation of Buddhism on the basis of these erroneous accounts.For example, the Hu-lan-beb-ther, the first work in which Chinese materials are utilized, states that the Chinese army occupied Lhasa around 670. In the rGyal-rabs-gSal-ba’i-me-long the Chinese invasion is described as if it had been undertaken for the purpose of carrying off to China the gilt bronze image of Śākyamuni enshrined in ‘Phrul-snang Temple. Yet in Bu-ston’s History of Buddhism, composed a little earlier than the above two works but dating from the same 14th century and uninfluenced by Chinese materials, there is no reference whatsoever to this important event.A re-examination of the Chinese materials, corroborated by the T’ufan Chronicles 吐番編年紀 from Tun-huang, reveals that the T’u-fan army defeated the Chinese forces at the Ta-fei River 大非川, and that the Chinese had in this same year given up all hopes for a restoration of T’u-yü-hun 吐谷輝. Thus, there is no evidence whatsoever of the Chinese having invaded Lhasa. There is also, of course, no reason why they should have mobilized a large army simply for the sake of acquiring a single Buddhist image.It seems probable that Princess Wên-ch’êng 文成 had brought this gilt bronze image of Śākyamuni from China in 646 and had enshrined it in Ra-mo-che Temple, from where it was later transferred to ‘Phrul-snang Temple. Princess Wên-ch’êng remarried the father of her deceased husband, and by the 14th century this historical fact was already being mistakenly linked with Princess Ching-ch’êng. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that Princess Wên-ch’êng’s request for a Buddhist image from China in memory of her deceased husband should have been distorted in an unexpected manner, resulting in the assertion that this image had been hidden in the ‘Phrul-snang Temple in order to protect it from the depredations of the Chinese army and that Princess Chin-ch’êng later rediscovered it.In order to justify this story, it was maintained that the hidden image had been presented to Princess Wên-ch’êng by the Chinese emperor T’ai.tsung 太宗 upon her departure for Tibet, and that it had been the emperor’s most highly prized Buddhist image. This latter point was further substantiated by the claim that this image had reached China from India and dated from the time of Śākyamuni, having been consecrated by the Buddha himself.In summing up, it would appear that the explanation of the origins of this image represents a fusion of the historical account of the arrival of a margosa Buddhist image from India during the reign of Emperor Wu of Liang and the legends relating to the production of the first image of Śākyamuni by the king of Udayana and the invitation of Kumārajīva to China.
著者
山内 正博
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.38, no.3, pp.292-323, 1955-12

At the time when the Southern Sung dynasty was founded, the government was faced with the defense against the invasion of the Chin army from outside and with the suppression of rebels inside. In order to provide against such a crisis they were obliged to rely upon the activity of generals so that the power of these generals was enlarged. Such military power was represented by four men, namely Chang Chün 張俊, Han Hsi-ch’ung 韓世忠, Liu Kuang-hsi 劉光世, and Yüeh Fei 岳飛. All of these people were born of humble parents and fought for the reconstruction of the Sung dynasty. They distinguished themselves in defending the Chin army and subdued rioters whose followers they made their subordinates. Thus in 1133 each of them became a great power, possessing fourteen or fifteen thousand soldiers. Since 1129 when many Chên-fu-shih 鎭撫使 were appointed in the areas north of the Yangtzŭ river, they were invested with full powers of administering each district. The four generals gradually took their places and ruled over wide districts as Hsüan-fu-shih 宣撫使. As a result they occupied important political positions. The real power supporting the Southern Sung dynasty was nothing but a synthesis of power of those four generals. But the development of their influence threatened the government as a centrifugal and dangerous factor. Thus the dynasty encountered with a great contradiction in the process of founding the country. It was Ch’in Kuei 秦檜 who dealt with the solution of the problem. He is notorious as he was responsible for the death of Yüeh Fei
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋文庫年報 = Toyo Bunko nenpō (ISSN:1344476X)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, pp.142-146, 2022-03-16
著者
林 英樹
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.79, no.1, pp.39-73, 1997-06

Up to the present, many scholars have dealt with Shang-gu-zhi-lu (商買之律), laws of traders, in connection with the study of social rank system in the Qin (秦) and Han (漢) Dynasties. In this paper. the methods to control the northern area of the Han Empire in the early Han era, where laws which intertwine with political issues will be discussed by the author.Gao-zu of Han (漢高祖) attempted to firmly rule the northern area. In the late Qin era, the influence of Xiong-nu (匈奴) became stronger as they expanded southward. Under these circumstances, traders from Bai-tu (白土) conducted commerce between China and Xiong-nu, which had steadily developed. After taking over Guan-zhong (関中), Gao-zu fortified the Han-Xiong-nu frontier against possible Xiong-nu attacks, and abolished the traders commerce. Upon conquering Dai (代) and Zhao (趙) districts, Gao-zu sent Zhang Cang (張蒼) from the central government, in order to rule the frontier region. This measure infringes upon the principle of local rule in the Han dynasty, that as a regulation, the frontier shall be within the jurisdiction of the local government. Therefore, this measure illustrates an active interest of the central government in this region.But Gao-zu had Han Wang Xin (韓王信) command this region as a king, and later Zhang Cang was transferred back to the central government. Immediately thereafter Han Wan Xin and the traders became closely allied with Xiong-nu and revolted against the Han Empire.Gao-zu sent Chen xi (陳稀) from the central government to reconstruct the frontier rule. After putting down this insurrection, he enacted the laws of traders. The objective was to rule the traders who were closely related to the Xiong-nu.This policy, however, due to Chen xi reveling with the traders, Han Wang Xin, and the Xiong-nu had failed. It was a conflict between the Han Empire’s rule system and the local community in the early Han era. Therefore, Gao-zu endeavored to grasp public feeling in the area, and made the traders surrender in exchange for providing them with rewards. By tolerating the trader’s values, Gao-zu intended to incorporate them into the Han Empire’s sphere of rule. Thus, methods to control the traders became ever more skillful.
著者
趙 浩衍
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.103, no.4, pp.63-94, 2022-03-17

This article attempts to show that the social and political characteristics of Vietnamese fengshui 風水 are truly informed by genealogical sources, which were written by same Confucian scholars as the theoretical texts of fengshui for promoting their ancestors to gain their favor, thus reflecting socio-political reality. The Doan Family (Đoàn tộc 段族) from Huu Thanh Oai 右淸威 commune, which differs from the widely researched aristocratic elite founders of state politics and rural communities, in that its influence stemmed from its relationship to the Court of Trinh Lords (Trịnh vương phủ 鄭王府) during the 18th century and became the first elite to establish itself through the 19th century state examination system. The Doan family’s genealogy, Đoàn tộc phả 段族譜, was written by a member who had passed the local examination; and for that reason contains no reference to imperial edicts (letters of appointment) or legends regarding the family as pioneering actors in state or village origins. Instead, the Doan family genealogy is designed to strengthen family bonds through fengshui practices, the rich description of which traces the appearance of fengshui in Vietnam at that time. Đoàn tộc phả informs us of three characteristic features of early modern Vietnamese fengshui, the first of which is that while the original fengshui masters were Chinese “Northern people” (bắc nhân 北人), native Vietnamese fengshui masters gradually appeared, indicating the penetration of fengshui into rural society. It is clear that the work’s author, a Confucian scholarbureaucrat with a rich knowledge of fengshui, desired to use fengshui ideas rooted in his country’s history, not in China’s. Secondly, each fengshui episode in Đoàn tộc phả is connected to fengshui theory in order to legitimate the history of the Doan family in each era. And finally, Vietnamese fengshui purports that family descendants can gain favor from matrilineal ancestors. Sons-in-law in fact become interested not only in the funeral and memorial services of their wives’ families, but also in the relocation of their mausolea, which shows incorporation of the Southeast Asian custom of bilateral descent in fengshui practices.
著者
野口 舞子
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.96, no.4, pp.01-026, 2015-03

The Almoravid Dynasty (c. a. 1061-1147) ruled over a vast territory, stretching from the Maghrib to the Ebro Valley. Since the dynasty originated from the Sanhaja Berbers of the western Sahara, its rulers were alien to the people in the Maghrib as well as those in al-Andalus. Therefore, the issue of legitimacy was of significant importance for the Almoravids in their claim to rule over these territories. This paper focuses on the bayʻa, oath of allegiance, as playing a crucial role in extending the influence of the Almoravids and providing them with legitimacy.The author’s examination of a series of bayʻa cases under the Almoravids reveals several features related to the Almoravid power structure and its political beliefs. Originally, these oaths were conducted at the time of the military conquests marking the early stages of their rule. However, further into their reign, the bayʻa was exacted at coronations and designations of heirs to the throne. Another feature of the bayʻa is that a new ruler or newly declared heir would have to be first approved by the ruler’s kin and the chiefs of the Berber tribes who had been appointed military governors of each local district. This indicates that Berber tribal soldiers were of the greatest importance to the Almoravid dynasty, and maintenance of ties with them was essential for the dynasty’s power. On the other hand, in al-Andalus, ʻulamā’ such as fuqahā (jurists) and qāḍīs (judges) took the lead in the bayʻa for approving the ruler, which suggests that Andalusian ʻulamā’ were representatives of the people in al-Andalus.Along with the expansion of their territory, the Almoravids also adopted a “written missive form” of the bayʻa in addition to the original “in-person” bayʻa ceremony, in order to gain approval from all power of the realm. Consequently, the bayʻa came to involve larger and larger numbers of participants. Several texts of the “missive form” remain, which contain early Islamic traditions and Arabic rhetorical style, which were also meant to legitimize the rulers’ authority. In summary, the Almoravids developed and established the procedure of bayʻa according to the preceding tradition to legitimize their rule.
著者
三王 昌代
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.91, no.1, pp.104-130, 2009-06

According to such Chinese sources as Da Ming Shi Lu and Da Qing Li Chao Shi Lu, several diplomatic missions were sent from Sulu to China during the years 1417-24 and 1726-63, during the Ming and the Qing Periods respectively. The present article deals with a Malay document written in Arabic script, called Jawi, which consists of a diplomatic message dispatched by Sultan Muhammad Azim al-Din of the Sulu Sultanate to China in the ninth month of the hijra year 1198 (1784 AD), some twenty years after the aforementioned missions. This diplomatic message was submitted to Emperor Qianlong through the hands of many officials, including the tongzhi 同知 of Xiamen (Amoy), the xunfu 巡撫 of Fujian, and the zongdu 総督 of Fujian and Zhejiang.After describing the circumstances that led to an exchange of documents between Sulu and China, the author deciphers this Jawi document and conducts a detailed analysis of its contents, including a comparison with a public letter addressed to Sulu in 1782 and with the Chinese translation of the document, which was included in a Qing official’s memorial to Emperor Qianlong in 1784.The results of the comparison show that both countries shared a common view of a villain who, engaged in foreign trade, and embezzled the takings, and of the quantity of silver and other merchandise that must be returned to Sulu. On the other hand, there are differences in expression or in recognition as to whether the Emperor’s instructions had been widely transmitted throughout the Sulu Sultanate. Moreover, the honorific expression for the Sultan himself in the opening sentence of the original was replaced in the corresponding part of the translation by some words that express deference to the Chinese Emperor. Also added is a tribute of respect and gratitude to the Emperor, which was nonexistent in the original. It may be reasonably concluded that the translation was not so much a literal rendering of the original as something close to the expressions in the 1782 public letter addressed to Sulu.Although Jawi documents in general have rarely been used in historical study, this particular source seems to be of great value in understanding diplomatic as well as economic relations between the two countries.
著者
根無 新太郎
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.99, no.4, pp.1-27, 2018-03

There were two types of military force used to suppress rebellions during the late Qing period: bing (兵), or regular troops consisting of the Green Standard Army and the Eight Banners, and yong (勇), or temporary volunteer troops organized into Yongying (勇營), mainly under governors-general and governors, in addition to tuanlian (團練) units on the village level. In Zhili (直隸) Province during the outbreak of the White Lotus Rebellion of the 1860s, bing, yong and tuanlian forces were deployed together to quell the insurrection, but the lack of discipline on the part of the bing-yong troops during the operation merely added to the civil unrest caused by the Rebellion. The Qing Court, in consideration of the effects of the worsening law and order on the capital of Beijing, reorganized the Green Army at the hands of the governor-general of Zhili in order to strengthen the government's control, thus leading to the formation of Zhili Lianjun (直隸練軍).However, after the outbreak of the Nian Rebellion led to the further deterioration of law and order in Zhili Province, and as it became necessary to reinforce Zhili Lianjun with Yongying, the Court designed a new capital defense plan under which Yongying were deployed to limited areas, including southern and coastal areas of Zhili, either far away from Beijing or at the spot of the actual fighting, while Zhili Lianjun was stationed around Peking. This new capital defense plan was partly based on the Court's, especially its Board of War's (Bingbu 兵部), suspicion of Yongying, which included former rebels who had surrendered, and were thus deemed untrustworthy to serve around the Capital. This suspicion was further deepened due to the fact that Yongying also served as the governors-generals' militia. As well, the Board of War had intervened several times during the establishment of Zhili Lianjun, owing to its concern over its close relationship with the governor-general of Zhili. The author takes up the Board as an excellent example of how the center's attitudes toward the periphery began to change during the late Qing period.