著者
菊池 忠純
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.64, no.1・2, pp.131-176, 1983-01

Past research has not adequately treated the office of muḥtasib, market inspector, in Cairo during the Mamluk Dynasty. In this article, I attempt to consider the subject by analyzing the life histories of the various muḥtasibs both before and after their occupation of that position. I divided the Mamluk Dynasty into the following four periods in accordance with the distinctive features of the muḥtasibs.First period (750/1250-789/1387); The muḥtasibs were appointed from among the ulamāʼ and the ones with an extensive knowledge of law. Although sometimes the powerful amīrs intervened in the appointments and dismissals of muḥtasib which hampered them in the execution of their duties, generally speaking, they fulfilled their function by acting as intermediaries between the rulers and the common people. Second period (789/1387-816/1413); During this period bribes, barṭīl or badhl, were greatly used to take the rank of muḥtasib, and the appointments and dismissals of muḥtasib were repeated frequently. During these 27 years, 81 persons, the number of which was counted 45% of the total number of the muḥtasibs, occupied this office. Most of them were appointed from among the people who attended the Sultans, the powerful amīrs and the civilians. Third period, Reigns of Sulṭān al-Muʼayyad Shaykh and Ṭaṭar; Muḥtasibs were mostly appointed from among the persons who attended the Sultan and were also acquainted with a knowledge of law. The Sultan, using these muḥtasibs, attempted to stabilize the common people’s standard of living. But also in this period the muḥtasibs began to be appointed from among the military class. The reform of the office of muḥtasib was initiated by amīr Ṭaṭar, who paid their salaries from the office of poll-tax. But this policy was abandoned after amīr Ṭaṭar’s death. Fourth period (824/1421- 923/1517); Most of the muḥtasibs were appointed from among the military class—particularly the amīrs of ten and the chief guards. In accordance with the Sultans’ orders, most of them participated in the market speculation. This eventually led to the disorder of the market system in Cairo.
著者
津田 資久
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.84, no.4, pp.393-420, 2003-03

This paper discusses the account of the fall of the Cao Wei 曹魏 imperial family (帝室) in the Weizhi 『魏志』 compiled by Chen Shou 陳寿 as a reflection of his political consciousness towards the Xi Jin 西晋 imperial family during the early part of the Taikang 太康 era of the reign of the Emperor Wu 武.At the time the Weizhi was compiled, it was a period of transition from a government of the imperial in-laws (外戚) under the Han 漢 dynasty to a government (輔政) of imperial clans (宗室) during the times after the Wei-Jin 魏晋. This tendency is reflected in Weizhi, as Chen Shou points out the origins of the fall of the Cao Wei imperial family as follows:1. The struggle over succession between Cao Pi 曹丕 (he was to found the Cao Wei dynasty and reign as Wendi 文帝) and his brother Cao Zhi曹植. 2. Cao Pi's later restraint towards the kin princes (至親諸王, his brothers).3.The government of imperial in-laws, and the installation of the empress from concubines.However, through a detailed examination of the descriptions in the Weizhi, we find emphasis put on the origin of the fall of the Cao Wei imperial family. In fact, it is a falsification of historical fact by Chen Shou. The author believes that Chen Shou's purpose was to emphasize the following lessons to be learned from the fall of the Cao Wei imperial family:I. Restraint towards the government of the kin princes.II. The exclusion of imperial in-laws from politics.III. A refutation of the installation of empresses from concubines who cause trouble for the order of Seraglios.Why Chen Shou dared to write such a description is because it was a mirror of the political situation during the early part of the Taikang era.① Excluding Wudi's brother Qiwang-You 斉王攸, who once struggled with Wudi over succession, from politics.② The rise of the Ynag Family (楊氏) of imperial in-laws, who planned to expel Qiwang-You from the central government.③ The problem of the Hu-guipin 胡貴嬪, an honored concubine, who had gained the favor of Wudi, exerted great influence on the succession.|
著者
辻 大地
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 : 東洋文庫和文紀要 (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.98, no.4, pp.454-430, 2017-03

While it is commonly known that sexual and love relations between men in pre-modern society, including that of the 'Abbāsid Period, were widespread, most of the historical research to date has regarded such relations as synonymous with modern concepts of "homosexuality." In addition, historians tend to be of the opinion that what may be called the "essentialist" concept of "Islamic homosexuality" has been embraced consistently regardless of time or place, when trying to understand male-male sexual relationships of various places and different periods. In recent years more and more research is being done that reexamines these conventional views. In particular, the research on the Ottoman Period has begun to relocate male-male sexual relationships within the context of sexuality as a whole. Unfortunately, the 'Abbāsid period has yet to be so reconsidered, mainly due to a paucity of historical sources regarding sexuality during that time. Given such circumstances, the present article is an attempt to show one facet of sexuality at the time, through a consideration of male-male sexual relationships in the 'Abbāsid period. For this purpose, the author conducts an analysis of the discourse presented in the al-Jāḥiẓ's Kitāb Mufākhara al-Jawārī wa al-Ghilmān (The Book of the Boasting Match between Girls and Boys) which is almost the only historical material written dealing explicitly with the subject of sexuality. The analysis shows that there was a distinction between "adult males" and "non adult-males," including not only females but boys, adolescents and so on, with respect to sexual relationships. Moreover, this distinction seems to correspond to a distinction between active and passive roles in sexual intercourse. The author concludes that sexual relationships at the time were based not on modern binary sexual categories of male and female, but rather on a different category fluctuating between "adult males" and "non adult-males."
著者
濱田 正美
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.55, no.4, pp.437-465, 1973-03

La révolte des ouïghours et des doungans (musulmans chinois) de Xinjiang (le Turkestan chinois) qui, éclata en 1864 est attestée par des sources chinoises, documents officiels surtout, par les rapports des missions européennes qui rendirent visite a Yaʻqūb Bek et par les textes des auteurs ouïghours eux-mêmes.Ces derniers constituent un ensemble d’une vingtaine de documents, écrits on čaġatay eu en persan. La plupart sent inédits, mais parmi eux quatre ou cinq ont déjà été publiés, notamment notre texte Kitāb-i ġazāt dar mulk-i čīn (Le livre de la guerre sainte contre la Chine) en 1880-1881 par N. N. Pantusov. Bien qu’il soit accessible grâce à cette édition, Kitāb-i ġazāt dar mulk-i čīn n’a jamais été l’objet de recherches scientifiques.C’est un récit historique on vers qui a été composé en 1876. L’auteur en est un habitant de la ville de Guldja nommé Mullā Bilāl. C’était un homme assez cultivé. Entre autres il connaissait si bien la littérature et l’historiographie traditionnelles turcopersanes de l’Asie Centrale qu’on lui donna le surnom de Nāẓim (le poète). Quoiqu’il fût musulman pieux, on peut reconnaître des éléments hétéorodoxes et des vestiges, disons, dîu chamanisme dans ses idées religieuses. Cette hétéorodoxie ne lui était pas particulière mais il la partageait avec ses compatriotes—les tarantchis (les ouïghours astreints à cultiver le domaine de l’Etat dans la région d’Ili). Son nationalisme qui prend une forte couleur religieuse lui fait décrire les prélèvements excessifs de la part des autorités locales de la dynastic Qing sur les ouïghours avec beaucoup de commisération. Il relate avec beaucoup de détails sanglants et une satisfaction évidente les révolte et la revanche impitoyable de son peuple contre les mantchous et les chinois. Il est amer mais résigné quand il s’agit des dissensions intestines des rebelles.La description des batailles entre les tarantchis et les russes, celle de l’occupation de la région d’Ili par l’armée russe en 1871 qui se trouvent à la fin de cette oeuvre, méritent une attention spéciale, parce qu'elles sont le seul document connu jusqu’à maintenant écrit par des tarantchis concernant cet événement.
著者
森山 央朗
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.90, no.4, pp.413-440, 2009-03

The many Arabic local histories compiled between the latter part of the 10th and the first half of the 13th century AD throughout the Islamic World mainly consist of “who’s whos” among ‘ulamā’ (specially ḥadīth scholars) associated with the regions concerned. This article calls these histories “biographical local histories.” The research to date has discussed the biographical local histories in the context of the evolution of Muslim biographical writing and historiography or has utilized them to study the social history of the regions in question. However, little attention has been given to the reasons for compiling the histories and the bibliographical character the genre.Given such a gap in the research, the goal of this article is to clarify the characteristic features of the biographical accounts contained in the histories, which should be the starting point for describing the actual condition of the academic activities of ‘ulamā’s who took on the task of popularizing their compilation.As a result of his analysis of the content, the author discovers that the biographical accounts in the biographical local histories do not describe the local activities of the characters depicted, only the usual activities of any ‘ulamāʼ or ḥadīth scholar relating to the learning and transmission of the ḥadīths and other Islamic knowledge.Therefore, the purpose of compiling the biographical local histories was to provide information to ḥadīth scholars of other regions about the academic careers and evaluation of the ḥadīth scholars associated with the region in question. In other words, these histories were compiled for the benefit of, and embedded in ‘ulamā’ academic activity all over the Islamic World. The author concludes that the popularization of compiling these biographical local histories was a phenomenon that occurred as part of the general interregional intellectual activities of ḥadīth scholars of the time.
著者
伴 真一朗
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.97, no.4, pp.01-025, 2016-03

This article examines the relations between Mongols and Tibetans during the first half of the 17th century, focusing on the lords of Zina 西納, a clan of Amdo Tibetans surrounded by the three forces of Ming dynasty, Central Tibetans, and Mongols. From the reign of Altan Qayan ( 1507-82) on, the Right wing of Mongols, which have migrated to the Arndo region in northwestern Tibet, formed monk-patron relations with the Gelukpa Sect of Tibetan Buddhism and contributed to the formation of the Dalai-Lama Administration in Central Tibet. Since Amdo was situated on the border with China, the Ming Dynasty had established there in the 14th century as native officials tusi 土司 by Ming dynasty of indirect rule through local chieftains, including the lords of Zina. The Right wing of Mongols who advanced into Amdo attacked the indigenous Tibetan population and seized their herds. The Lords (tusi) of Zina fended the Mongols off with military assistance from the Ming Dynasty and thus formed China's frontline of defense against the Mongols. On the other hand, once having pledged their patronage to the Gelukpa Sect, the Mongols assumed an attitude of peace towards the lords of Zina, who were also followers of Tibetan Buddhism, and were converted to the Gelukpa Sect. Then the lords of Zina grew closer to the Gelukpa Sect which had religeous influence among the Right wing of Mongols, and lent it economic assistance in its missionary activities in the Amdo region. By maintaining their military alliance with the Ming Dynasty and utilizing the monk-patron relationship between the Mongols and the Gelukpa Sect, the lords of Zina conducted a triangulated policy of diplomacy that guaranteed their survival. Within the Mongols advance into the Amdo region, the activities of the lords of Zina, who formed links with the Gelukpa Sect in Central Tibet, offer the historian an extremely interesting case when considering the origins of the relations between Arndo and central Tibet after the formation of Dalai-Lama Administration.
著者
伊藤 光成
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.102, no.3, pp.1-29, 2020-12-17

The Cao Wei 曹魏 Dynasty was a polity that faced a contradiction between its standing as a bona-fide Chinese dynasty and the reality of the Three Dynasties Period triumvirate. This article examines the idea of an international order envisioned by the Dynasty’s founder Emperor Wen 文帝 (Cao Pi 曹丕) and the background to its conceptualization. To begin with, throughout the Later Han Period the relationship between that Dynasty and the peoples on its periphery had changed. In the north, the decline of the Xiongnu 匈奴 saw the rise of the Wuwan 烏丸 and the Xianbei 鮮卑; in the east, there was the establishment of tributary relations with the “Eastern barbarians” (Dongyi 東夷); and in the west, there was a rupture in relations with the kingdoms of the West (Xiyu 西域). Under such circumstances, newly enthroned Emperor Wen decided to follow the precedents set by the diplomacy practiced by an idealized Han Dynasty, focusing on the eras when that Dynasty was most influential in each of the three peripheral regions. Accordingly, in the north, an equestrian nomadic hierarchical order was established placing the emirs of the Wuwan and Xianbei under the Chanyu 單于 of the Xiongnu, as during the reign of Later Han Emperor Shun 順帝; in the east, a system of receiving tribute was set up by giving special treatment to the Gongsun 公孫 Clan regime in Liaodong, which exerted strong influence on such “Eastern barbarian” tribes as the Fuyu 夫餘, in the tradition of Later Han Emperor Guangwu 光武帝; and in the west, Former Han Emperor Yuan’s 元帝 Wuji Xiaowei 戊己校尉 military order was reinstituted and Han Dynasty accomplishments in the region compiled, together with efforts to stabilize relations with the region through special treatment of the oasis city state of Jushi Houbuguo 車師後部國, which had caused the original break with the region during the Xin and Later Han Periods. It was in this way that Emperor Wen devoted himself to inheriting the “Han Dynasty international order,” although his policies were often at odds with reality. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude that such diplomacy functioned effectively in the midst of uncertainty on all sides of the periphery. That being said, even if not fully in sync with the realities of the situation, there is no doubt that Emperor Wen attempted to gain legitimacy and authority for his Dynasty by assuming a posture of being the successor to the powerful Han Dynasty.
著者
高田 淳
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.1, pp.69-92, 1962-06

So far the Nominalists (ming-chia 名家) have been studied on only through their character as a school of logicians who represented a very special field among many other schools of pre-Ch’in philosophers. This view on their character has been commonly accepted as a statement of plain truth, but it yet needs to be re-examined whether this view has a solid support in our sources. Fortunately, a work by Kung-sun Lung, so-called leader of li-chien-pai 離堅白 school, is still preserved, if not in its whole, in the form that permits us to observe the logic of a discourse, which the present author made use of in an analysis of the thought of Kung-sun Lung who served P’ing-yüan-chün 平原君 of Chao Kingdom as a protégé, in comparison with that of other thinkers. All the five chapters of Kung-sun Lung-tzŭ 公孫竜子 except the chapter Chi-fu 跡府 are analyzed from a consistent viewpoint; and it is examined what kind of reality consciousness of Kung-sun Lung was the basis of the epistemology by finger found in this text, together with the question of how to account for the discrepancy between his thought and the casuistry of the sophist described in the chapter T’ien-hsia 天下 of Chuang-tzŭ. Thus the present author makes an attempt at understanding Kung-sun Lung in connection with other philosophers as well as in his relation to the casuistry of the sophists.
著者
高田 淳
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.240-256, 1962-09

Hui Shih 恵施, also said to be a Nominalist in the same category as Kung-sun Lung, enjoys a high reputation despite the scarcity of information about his thought except for a few fragments quoted in the Chapter T’ien-hsia 天下 of the Chuang-tzu. In the present article, those fragments are interpreted in the light of the activity and thought of him as a prime minister of Wei Kingdom who advocated the anti-Ch’in alliance, as recorded in the Chan-kuo-ts’ê 戦国策, Lü-shih-ch’un-ch’iu 呂氏春秋, etc., and an attempt is made at understanding his thought in relation with that of Chuang-tzŭ, a friend of his with whom he used to have disputations.After all, what Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung themselves called casuistry had in essence nothing too different from the elocution of other itinerant orators of the Warring States period, being an art of persuasion and not having relation with the logic in the proper sense, though it should be pointed out that, between the two, Kung-sun Lung was richer in epistemological elements. There still remains to be analyzed the question of the nature of the elocution of the orators toward the end of the Warring States period which caused our sophists to be tinged with casuistic color.
著者
清水 宏祐
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.76, no.1・2, pp.193-222, 1994-10

In the 11-12th centuries, there were many amīrs in the era of the Great Saljūqs who ruled Iraq and Iran. They were military-commanders, iqṭāʻ holders,and sometimes served in the court of the rulers.Gauhar Ā’īn (meaning Jewel Mirror in Persian)was a mamlūk amīr who served seven rulers. Among them, one was a woman, and four were the Saljuqid rulers. He went to the battle field six times. It was a great success for him that one of his ghulām soldiers captured the Emperor of Byzantine Empire in the battle of Malāzgird.Gauhar Ā’īn was appointed shaḥna, the military governor of Baghdād three times. His mission was to maintain order of the big city. He exercised his power cruelly to oppress riots. The most important duty for him is to negotiate with the ‘Abbāsid Caliph. Whenever he came to Baghdād as shaḥna of Sulṭān, he interfered in the affairs of the Caliph about the dismissal of his wazīrs. He represented the Sulṭān in the diplomatic intercourses, and continued to threaten the Caliph by unusual performances. Gauhar Ā’īn died at the age of over 70 years in the battle of Sefīd-rūd, the battle between Saljuqid rulers in 1100. His body was returned to Baghdād, and buried in the eastern section of the city.In Gauhar Ā’īn life-history, we can see the typical career of a mamlūk amīr of those days. He was trusted by Sulṭāns, acted as a faithful slave commander. He even executed a member of the royal family, and also attended on Alp Arslān when he was killed.FoIlowing up the life of each amīr, we can clarify the characteristics of the Saljuqid ruling system.
著者
渡辺 紘良
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.102, no.2, pp.1-31, 2020-09-17

The annual amount of freight transported on China's inland waterways during the early years of the Song Dynasty has been estimated at about 6 million dan 石, an achievement made possible by the Dynasty's human resource policies. Inheriting the national unification projects of Emperor Shizong 世宗 of the Later Zhou Dynasty, Taizu 太祖, the founder of the Song Dynasty, concentrated efforts on reducing the number of regional military governors (fanzhen 藩鎭) and rebuilding the domestic political regime, thus emphasizing the improvement of regional strongholds rather than fiscal strength; moreover, considering the relocation of the capital to Luoyang 洛陽 or Chang'an 長安, improvements in inland waterway transportation were not prioritized, and the national unification efforts were also left incomplete when he suddenly died. In contrast, in the second year of his reign (977), in order to expand waterway transportation projects, second emperor Taizong 太宗 relaxed restrictions on members of the militias commanded by former Five Dynasties military governors (jiangli yaqian 將吏衙前) illegitimized and reduced by Taizu, an action which provided human resources for private salt traders defying government monopoly and the expansion of candidates for the civil service examination system. On the other hand, after taking over management of waterway transportation and warehousing, this same jiangli yaqian promoted illegal practices among shipping crews and brought about the bankruptcy of local elites (lizheng yaqian 里正衙前) under their jurisdiction who were also involved in waterway transportation. Consequently, the Dynasty was forced to give jiangli yaqian the authority to muster ship crews in the capacity of administrators (zhugangli 主綱吏) over the waterway fleets of the Huainan-Jiangnan region. Moreover, in 983 their authority was extended to the waterway fleets of Hunan, and officially recognized by the Dynasty as managing the waterway transportation in their own right. That same year marked the occurrence of incidents throughout China, in which jiangli yaqian attempted to recover their formerly usurped judiciary authority in the provinces. Fearing that such incidents could extend to waterway transportation administration, the central government, in the wake of the exposure of corruption in the Treasury Bureau, set up departments of inland waterways and overland routes in Kaifeng, thus recognizing an even larger bestowal of authority on jiangli yaqian and ending the stagnation in waterway transportation development. In the background to this newly bestowed authority lay the actions of a group of close advisors to Emperor Taizong, some of whom were well-informed about the operations of the Treasury and Kaifeng agencies, and would be later promoted to Treasury Minister. It was largely due to this group that Taizong had been able to directly control jiangli yaqian. Moreover, the policy of entrusting the management of waterway transp01tation to jiangli yaqian paralleled the free appointment of petty officials, whose effects cannot be ignored.
著者
久保 茉莉子
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.102, no.2, pp.67-74, 2020-09-17
著者
樋口 秀実
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.93, no.1, pp.27-53, 2011-06

The present article discusses the erection in July 1940 of the “National Temple of the Sun Goddess,” dedicated to Amaterasu Okami 天照大神, in order to discover its contribution to the psychological integration of the new state’s citizenry. Some research already exists on the process of the Temple’s erection and its significance, which emphasizes such points as since the Temple was erected to worship the Sun Goddess, it was for all intents and purposes merely an attempt to import Japan’s state Shinto religion into Manchukuo. The discussion then turns to the extent to which Japan was determined to “religiously infiltrate” Manchuria. The author argues on the contrary that the fact of the Temple being erected as a national place of religious worship makes it necessary to raise the question of to what extent it furthered the spiritual integration of the new nation. Manchukuo being a state created almost overnight by the Japanese Guandong Army, it was divided with the memory of political events and trends of the previous Three-Provincial Government regime. Another point is how Manchukuo intended to deal with the state’s multi-ethnic population. Therefore, a plan for psychological integration by raising national identity and consciousness must have been an important issue for stabilizing the governance of the new state. It is in this vein that the author reexamines the process of erecting the Temple and its significance, while asking the questions 1) why a national temple worshipping Japan’s Sun Goddess would be deemed appropriate in the light of ethnic cooperation being cited as the original rationale for state formation, 2) how much success did the Temple have in national psychological integration, and 3) if unsuccessful, what was its significance in terms of church and state issues. The Temple was erected for two reasons. The first stemmed from attempts by the imperial court’s interests in Manchukuo to strengthen the imperial authority of Puyi, and the second from attempts by Japanese bureaucrats in the Manchukuo government to gain a greater say in political affairs vis-à-vis the Guandong Army. These two civil-political forces were interested in subordinating the Army to the authority of the Emperor of Manchukuo and limiting its level of intervention in the state’s political process, by turning the spirit of Japan’s deep military allegiance to the emperor against the Army in making the Sun Goddess, the founding ancestor of Japan’s imperial family, also the founder and guardian spirit of Manchukuo. From his analysis of the political backdrop on which the Temple was erected, the author concludes that the event made no significant contribution to the psychological integration of the Manchukuo nation. The Temple, which was where Puyi placed the sacred mirror which he brought from Japan as the symbol of his imperial authority, was, nevertheless, unable to play the role as Manchukuo’s equivalent of Japan’s Ise Shrine.
著者
梅村 坦
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho
巻号頁・発行日
vol.59, no.1・2, pp.01-031(226~256), 1977-10

The process of the penetration by the Mongols into the Turfan basin, territory under the control of .the Uighur Iduq-qut, has been studied by several scholars. However, since previously unstudied Uighur documents with Forfeiture Clauses have recently been brought to light (by the author in The Toyo Gakuho, 58-3/4, 1977.) and because certain other indispensable but previously neglected Chinese sources require examination, it seems appropriate to reopen the subject.Each of these nine Uighur documents (doc. I-IX) [see Table (1)] contains many titles. For example, the Blessing Clause of doc. VIII, dated 1280 A. D., mentions a number of official ranks in the following order [see Chart (1)]: uluγ suu—the Mongol Emperor; aqa-ini-oγul-lar—the Emperor’s brothers and Emperor’s sons; bägädlär—begs; ančašï-lar (按察使 An-ch’a-shih and his men)—a kind of official and his entourage dispatched from the Emperor’s court; and šaz-ïn (沙津 Sha-chin, skr. Śāsana) ayγučï—a kind of religious leader. This order is not that decided by political authorities, and therefore seems to indicate that a native of the Turfan basin originally arranged it and published this document by himself.Šaz-ïn ayγučï seems to originally have referred to a native Turfan religious leader. However, according to the Forfeiture Clause of the same document and to an Imperial ordinance issued by Shih-tsu 世祖 in 1276 A. D. which is recorded in the T’ung-chih t’iao-ko 通制条格, the šaz-ïn ayγučï were under the direct control of the Mongol Emperor in the latter half of the 13th century.Some Forfeiture Clauses include other titles not listed in the Blessing Clause of doc. VIII [see Tables (2), (3)]. There are two features common to all the Forfeiture Clauses: the higher ranking officials receive higher forfeits than lower ranking ones, and the total sum of the forfeits is too high to be paid by a person wanting to cancel a contract. Thus, the Forfeiture Clause may have been only a general formulation.It should be noted that the title bäg, which ranks rather high in the Blessing Clause of doc. VIII, ranks low in all the Forfeiture Clauses. Concurrent investigation of many Uighur documents and the Chinese sources leads one to the conclusion that the term bäg had two meanings. The high ranking bäg in the document probably referred to the official bäg, and the appearance of low ranking bägs in the Forfeiture Clauses can be explained by reference to influential persons within the native society.The highest political authority changed hands—from the Uighur Iduq-qut to the Mongol Emperor—at about the middle of the 13th century. The person of the Iduq-qut, however, seems to have continued to be respected as a descendant of the fifth son of Chinggis Khan until the latter half of the 13th century. Doc. VIII is especially interesting in that its Forfeiture Clause includes the title of the Iduq-qut, but its Blessing Clause does not. This fact suggests that the Iduq-qut maintained nominal authority as late as 1280 A. D., but that he had lost any actual power to control the Uighur society.Finally, the author presents a diagram which shows the mutual relations of every official title appearing in the documents [see Chart (3)].
著者
中村 圭爾
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.3・4, pp.285-320, 1980-03

The inscription buried in the grave of Liu Tai 劉岱 in Nan-ch’i 南斉 era was excavated in Chiang-su 江蘇 Province in 1969. This inscription gave full detail of the marital relations of Liu Tai. The purpose of this study is to discuss the characteristic features of marriage during the Southern Dynasties through a description of marriage as described in this inscription, and to relate this marital mode to the aristocracy of the Southern Dynasties.The inscription states that the Liu Tai family had marital relations with eight families in all. Moreover, within these eight families several had marital relations with each other, while among them several had been rejected by clans of the highest social status in the Southern Dynasties. Based on this fact, we presume that there existed two groups which had differing ranges of marriage possibility.Up till now it has been recognized that there were two major social statuses, namely shih 士 and shu 庶, and that they differed in the range of marriage possibility. But even within the shih class we can see the existence of two groups which had no marital relations with each other because of their difference in social status. Those are the groups stated in the beginning. Therefore we can confirm the existence of stratified groups classified by marital relationships. The marital relations described in the inscription in the grave of Liu Tai belong to the group which was placed between the highest status clan and shu people.By examining the official position of bureaucrats who came from the family, it became clear that their positions were right between the highest and lowest classes of bureaucrats. Based on this, we can see that the stratum of marriage possibility was almost coincident with bureaucrat position.On the other hand, marriages were carried out according to social status, and the stratum of marriage possibility was coincident with the social status of each clan. Therefore, we can conclude that in the Southern Dynasties the position of bureaucrats corresponded to their social status, and that these groupings formed particular social classes.Finally, the historical character of the Southern Dynasties’ aristocracy is defined by this unity of social status and bureaucratic position. Indeed, it was upon the existence of these particular social classes that the principles of governance by the Imperial authority were based.
著者
鄒 笛
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.101, no.2, pp.01-027, 2019-09

The Jingkang 靖康 Incident marked the end of the Northern Song Dynasty (北宋), which was regarded as the watershed moment of the Song history. It also ushered in the beginning of the southward migration of northern ethnic groups. The Jingkang Incident has been regarded to embody the military weakness of the Song Dynasty. However, before the fall of the Northern Song, state governance was so stable that the Southern Song Dynasty (南宋) could be rebuilt immediately after its demise. This implies that the military power of the Northern Song Dynasty was not that insubstantial as discussed in the previous scholarship. This article defines the era between the Song-Jin war and the fall of the Northern Song as a “military process,” taking the battle of Taiyuan 太原 as a decisive moment. It mainly focuses on the international circumstance that the Northern Song faced, and discuss the complicated reasons of its destruction beyond the simple “military weakness” hypothesis. The Northern Song’s miscalculation of the Jin military strategy resulted in the latter’s occupation of Taiyuan and the entire Shanxi 山西. The Northern Song seems to have vacillated between distinct policies, which led to its endless diplomatic compromises and expedient military strategies. However, beneath the surface, the Northern Song Dynasty was striving to balance the battle lines between Kaifeng 開封 and Taiyuan. During this “military process,” the correlation among decision makers in the central government, the military correspondence between Kaifeng and Taiyuan, and the frontier military operations materialized, with its resultant influence persisting into the Southern Song Era. Having explored the “military process” during the fall of the Northern Song, this article concludes that the reason of its demise is far more complicated than the military weakness hypothesis. The influence of the international relations that the Northern Song faced should not be neglected. On the other hand, with the Jin army marching south, reconstruction of the nation’s defense line plays a vital role in the rebuilding of the Southern Song. Thus, research on the fall of the Northern Song can also prompt us to discuss the characteristic of the Southern Song regime.
著者
岸本 美緒
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.101, no.2, pp.33-34, 2019-09
著者
隋 藝
出版者
東洋文庫
雑誌
東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.101, no.2, pp.029-057, 2019-09

During the early 1950s, the Communist Party of China launched the “Three-Anti Campaign” (“San-fan” Yundong 「三反」運動) against corruption, waste and bureaucratic red tape. This article is an attempt to trace the development process of the Movement, by focusing on the regional and geopolitical situation in northeastern China; then tries to clarify the actual mentalities and behavioral responses of the general public to the Movement, by taking up the case of how the people of northeast China tried to adapt to it. It was in 1949 that there first appeared in northeast China activities intended to combat growing corruption within the CPC; but such direct action was prevented from evolving into a full-blown political movement by the necessity to expand production in response to the outbreak of the Korean War. Then in the summer of 1950, as the Korean War entered a stalemate, a movement to increase production through austerity (Zengchan Jieyue Yundong 增產節約運動) was launched, while political mobilization in the form of a “Two-Anti Campaign” (“Er-fan” Yundong「二反」運動) also was initiated. Later, the two fronts were merged into the “Three-Anti Campaign” and then escalated into the Party practice called “tiger-hunting” (dahu 打虎), involving coercing members of the general public to come forth and inform on corrupt Party officials, forcing confessions from the accused through various forms of torture, in order to meet quotas set for the number of offenders. As the general public became more and more embroiled in such an escalating oppressive political environment, a typical response to the call for austerity would involve people hiding anything that might appear expensive, including coats and shoes, and donning the plainest apparel they could find, to give the appearance of compliance. Others pleaded guilty (even if falsely charged), promising to repent, in order to mitigate the full brunt of the fear and violence perpetrated by the Movement. And then there were the opportunists, who tried to curry favor with the authorities by false accusations and acts of violence directed at their rivals. On the other hand, concerning how officials accused of similar offenses should be dealt with, the opinions of the government agencies employing the accused showed a modicum of leniency. That is to say, the Movement did not become so unruly that it threatened to completely destroy the human bonds supporting local everyday life, for even during the height of the Movement’s vehemence, we can still observe plenty of attempts at mutual protection based on intimate human relationships.