著者

松原 日出人

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.3, pp.3_3-3_27, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

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During the 1970s and 1980s, most of the Satsuma mandarin-producing regions of Japan faced a crisis owing to excessive supply. However, around this time, the town of Mikkabi in Shizuoka Prefecture, whose key industry is the production of mandarin oranges, recorded remarkable market growth. This study examines the competitiveness acquired by the mandarin producers in Mikkabi that helped them survive the crisis that crippled the rest of the industry.Among the various fruit industries in Japan, the Satsuma mandarin industry experienced the most dramatic vicissitudes of fortune. The industry grew remarkably in the 1950s and 1960s, but began to decline during the 1970s and 1980s due to oversupply. During this period of crisis, the mandarin producers in Mikkabi not only survived but actually prospered. However, Mikkabi's success in overcoming the decline remains incompletely understood. This study describes how the Mikkabi mandarin-producing region overcame the difficulties plaguing the rest of the industry and succeeded by actively building competitiveness in the volume retailer market.Based on the analysis, we conclude that Mikkabi transformed itself in response to changes in the market and established core competitiveness in the newly growing market—the volume retailer market. Specifically, while entering the volume retailer market, mandarin producers in the Mikkabi region switched to the more competitive Aoshima variety to increase the competitiveness of their large lot produce. Thus, Mikkabi built new competitiveness in the growing volume retailer market, not in the existing small retailer market that was on the decline.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.3, pp.38-76, 2019 (Released:2021-12-30)

著者

今城 光英

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, no.2, pp.51-66, 1979-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

鄭 安基

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.3, pp.25-54, 1997-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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Kanebo was one of the major textile companies in prewar Japan. This paper analyzes Kanebo's industrial structure and organization. In 1941 when the Pacific War broke out the economy turnd more clearly into wartime economy. At the end of 1938, the Kanebo group already established a new company “Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo” (hereafter Kanejitsu) to cope with wartime regulations. This was one of the steps of a deeper reorganization of the group. The Kanebo group whose main business was textiles turned into an industry organized as two main businesses, the old Kanebo and the new war-oriented Kanejitsu. Later, in 1944 these two companies were integrated into one called “Kanegafuchi Kogyo” (hereafter Kaneko). During the wartime economy and the subsequent expansion of munition industries, why was it necessary for the group to merge and form one new company?The conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows.1. As the War advanced the wartime controls became more and more strict. These controls forced Kanebo's factories and equipments to be put to other uses. But, Kanebo was able to deal with these controls in the framework of its own group through its core subsidiary, Kanejitsu.2. The wartime economy forced Kanebo's textile industry to shrink in Japan, though in the colonies there was a continuous expansion of the industry. As the textile industry became more militarized the group had to make major efforts to obtain various raw materials.3. Kanejitsu was involved in mining, machinery, chemicals, and steel industries so on and had diversified so rapidly to supply the necessities of the military that the new company had become larger than Kanebo, its parentat the end of 1943.4. With the application of the wartime regulations the framework of the administration of industries changed and the government controls increased. This forced the Kanebo group to move its center of administration from Kanebo to Kanejitsu, and at last these two merged to form a new company, Kaneko.5. The textile companies at the time followed two patterns in dealing with diversification to meet the needs of the military. One, exemplified by Toyobo, used investment and indirect administration and the other, exemplified by Kanebo, used a reorganization of the group companies and direct administration.

著者

金子 良事

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.3, pp.5-34, 2007-12-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

195

著者

田付 茉莉子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.1-24, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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After World War I, Japanese shipping suffered for a long time from an excess of tonnage and severe competition. How could Japanese shipping companies cope with the depression when they were mostly latecomers with less cargo and with small company size? The smaller trampers and owners were disadvantaged by these circumstances because they could not keep sufficient volumes of cargo to operate their ships. Many of them, of course, went bankrupt. But a considerably large number of small companies survived, changing their strategies; some of them found cargo in Near Seas, and others specialised in ownership. It was the growing demands of in the chartering market that offered them new business opportunities.S. Tsutsui and Kaiyo Steamship Co., which he established later, were also small owners. Although a very small owner, he became acquainted with G. Hori, a broker in Yamashita and achieved steady growth, chartering out his ship mainly to Yamashita. Kaiyo Steamship took advantage of the government's “scrap and build policy” and acquired bigger ships, which brought good performance to its business. Kaiyo Steamship grew steadily even under the wartime economic controls and built new ships. They chartered them out to the shipping authority and lost most of them in Japan's defeat in World War II.The growth of small owners was, undoubtedly, a consequence of the development of Japanese shipping. I would like to put emphasis, however, on their contribution. Operators could not have extended their business rapidly and widely without chartering significant tonnage at greatly reduced fees, because they had to play second fiddle in the world shipping market. From this point of view, the activities of small owners are one characteristic of Japanese shipping, though it was evident not only in shipping but also in most manufacturing industries.

著者

長島 修

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.1-26, 1997-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Japan's iron and steel supply depended upon the import from European countries. Japanese traders could hardly deal with the imported goods because foreign traders almost occupied the iron and steel import dealing. Hikitorisyo (Japanese import trader) intermediated between Japanese distributors and foreign traders. Tsuda Katsugoro who came from Hikitorisyo was one of the most famous distrbutors at Osaka. At first when he worked for Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co., he was headhunted by H.E. Reynell who lived at Kobe and imported wine, spirits and so on. He worked for Reynell and Co. After he was independent of Reynell's financial help because of his bankrupt, Mitui Bank, one of the biggest Japanese bank, gave him the financial help so that Tsuda, though he could refuse foreign trader's financial dependence, deeply had to depend upon Mitsui's finance. He started as the dealer, chiefly sold to government office and Navy, and built his local branches in order to sell foreign goods. He sold ship equipments, steel machines, steel goods and so on, which he imported through foreign merchants and big home traders, to home small traders and iron makers. After his independence from Reynell, he changed his business strategy, firmly dealt with the imported iron and steel and distributed them to local merchants, because he also experienced the risk of Hikitorisyo business in spite of the fact that he made a profit during Japan China War (1894-95). In the Meiji era extending business chance, he was one of the innovative successful merchants in a short period. The small merchant such as Tsuda played an important part in the industrialization in Meiji era.

著者

パトリック フリーデンソン

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.3, pp.55-65, 1993-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

20

著者

老川 慶喜

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.3, pp.48-61, 1988-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

三島 康雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.2, pp.23-51,ii, 1983-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The origin of Yamaguchi Zaibatsu was opened by Kichirobei Yamaguchi (first) as a draper at Osaka in 1824. Kichirobei (second) changed his business to money-changer in 1863. After the Meiji Restoration, Yamaguchi family established 148th National Bank in 1879, and this bank changed to private. Yamaguchi Bank in 1898. Thereafter, Yamaguchi family invested to Nihon Seimei (life insurance), Osaka Chochiku Ginko (savings bank), Kansai Shintaku (trust company), Kyodo Kasai Kaijo (fire and marin insurance) and so on. Yamaguchi family established Yamaguchi Limited Partnership (¥10, 000, 000) as holding company in 1920 and formed Yamaguchi Zaibatsu. It had developed as a middle-scale financial Zaibatsu untill the end of second World War. The reasons of development were : 1. delegations of management power to able managers, 2. good selections of investments to stable financial and insurance companies, 3. effective utilizing of capitals by reducing the percentage of investment to 10-50% in all capitals of these companies. After the second World War, Yamaguchi Zaibatsu was not designated to Zaibatsu holding company by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, but it was going way of dissolution by the huge property tax, and the decreasing of values of holding stocks. Yamaguchi Limited Partnership closed its 30 years history in 1950.

著者

中瀬 寿一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, no.3, pp.28-55,i, 1966-12-20 (Released:2009-11-11)

被引用文献数

10

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No previous analysis has been made of Japanese advertising (advertising industry and capital) from a social scientific point of view. The study of the history of advertising has also been limited to discussions of custom and fashion.This paper outlines the history of Japanese advertising in relation to the growth, development and crises of Japanese capitalism, by considering the functions of advertising in several periods of history. It also shows how and when the advertising agency came about and has continued to develop in Japan.

著者

佐藤 達男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015

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<p>This study aims to investigate Nakajima Aircraft Company's airframe business and its production efficiency during WW II in comparison with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.</p><p>During the Pacific War, Japanese aircraft production was essentially based on job shop system for parts fabrication and sub-assembly. Nakajima Aircraft Company the largest aircraft manufacturer of war-time Japan and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries the second largest utilized both job shop and production line systems for their airframe final assembly lines depending on each plant situations. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports evaluated that Nakajima's airframe production system was more developed than that of Mitsubishi, which adhered to original, old-fashioned job shop system. This was substantiated from the fact that Nakajima expanded its production by 1944 to more than eight times of its 1941 production, and Mitsubishi produced only three times for the same period.</p><p>However, in production efficiency measured by airframe weight produced per month per employee, Mitsubishi was predominant until August to October 1944. A positive correlation was observed between production efficiency and monthly number of airframe production. Mitsubishi's improvement degree of production efficiency agreed well with the estimation by learning curve theory, but Nakajima's improvement of production efficiency far exceeded the estimation. This is considered to be the effect that Nakajima's labor utilization rate, which was approximately half of that of Mitsubishi in September 1943, might have increased rapidly as the monthly airframe production increased. The difference of the final assembly line did not have decisive influence on the production efficiency, but the increase in the number of monthly airframe production was influential.</p><p>The production efficiency continuously increased as the monthly airframe production increased, and then dropped sharply from the end of 1944 and after due to the rapid decline of monthly production, which was caused by shortages of essential materials and engines, US air raids from November 1944 and after, factory evacuation, and labor shortage.</p>

著者

中林 真幸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.1-29, 2000-06-25 (Released:2010-02-19)

参考文献数

48

被引用文献数

1 1

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Until the beginning of the 1880s, most Japanese silk exports were to France. The French silk market, however, shrank after the French Panic of 1882, while the U.S. market expanded during the 1880s. In the United States, power looms were widely used in the silk industry, so the demand for even-quality silk was rising. Japanese manufacturers had to produce uniform filatures (machine-reeled silk) for export to the United States. Kaimeisha, which was the leading association of silk manufacturers in Suwa district, Nagano prefecture, had been producing silk for the French market and had relied on wholesale merchants in Yokohama for quality control. After the French Panic, Kaimeisha introduced the production system which offered incentives for the re-reeling and inspection of silk, thus succeeding in the production of uniform filatures, which it labeled with its own Kaimeisha trademark. In order to expand business, Kaimeisha obtained financing from wholesale merchants and local banks, which were relatively modern financial institutions.Another silk manufacturers association, Kairyosha, followed suit and introduced a production system similar to Kaimeisha's. This second organization, however, was financed by traditional financial institutions and was managed by a rural moneylender. The moneylender's participation in management was detrimental to meeting the rising level of quality control required in the U.S. market. The moneylender demanded an increase in deliveries of silk by hiring new association members as he profited by lending them money to purchase cocoons and receiving discounts on members' deliveries. The situation was particularly disfavorable to quality control because membership to the association was not steady.

著者

前田 和利

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.1, pp.52-66, 1988-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

栂井 義雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.72-105, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

井澤 龍

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.3-24, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The aim of this study is to clarify the historical premises of the establishment of the tax treaty between the UK and the US in 1945. Particularly, the UK-US treaty to prevent the international double taxation made an economic and political impact on the UK multinationals and the government. It was the first time that the UK government concluded a general tax treaty with elsewhere in the British Empire.The problem of international double taxation on business income between UK and US occurred since the First World War. However, the UK government did not introduce a foreign tax relief for foreign investment to the US until 1945 because the government persisted to abhor reduction of the tax revenue. Thus, the tax issue became one of the causes that the British investment to the US had been sluggish. In addition, not a few UK multinationals were forced to change their organization alongside the tax environment during the period, raising cries of protest through some employer's associations such as the Federation of British Industries. The organizational changes like Phelps Dodge or Courtaulds sometimes influenced corporate long term investment strategy. Finally, the introduction of the American dividend tax in 1936 and the outbreak of the Second World War pushed the UK multinationals into further tax planning to alleviate the tax burden. The corporate behaviors and complaints of those firms made the UK government reconsider the tax regime of the interwar period. As a result, the general tax treaty between the UK and the US was concluded in 1945, a prototype of tax treaty of not only both countries but many countries in the Post Second World War.

著者

鈴木 敦子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.2, pp.27-56, 1994-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Researches on honai-shonin have been made on the assumption that they were za-shonin living in villages (sonraku-za-shonin). One of the issues that these researches have pointed out is that their assertion about monopoly changed in the sixteenth century from the monopoly of transaction (ichi-za-ken) to that of trade routes. In this paper we have inquired into this change from the viewpoint that this was the change of their organization and creed of business. The main points we have clarified are as follows : First, they asserted their monopoly of trade routes upon being recognized as a corporation. We have reached this conclusion as a result of the elucidation of the process of their getting out of the control of shoen-ryoshu (sanmon), and of the above-mentioned recognized by shugo-Rokkaku-shi.Secondly, the reason of their assertion is that the goods they dealt in increased in amount. They no longer were able to assert the monopoly with the sales method relying upon za. So they were forced to assert the monopoly of trade routes connecting suppliers and retailers. This change in the form of business was in correspondence with the emergence of a local economy on the eastern coast of Lake Biwa in Omi-no-kuni.Thirdly, the reason why they could change the form of business is that their policy was in accordance with that of shugo-Rokkaku-shiFinally, having passed through the process mentioned above, honai-shonin transformed themselves from medieval za-shonin to a new type of merchants which adapted themselves to the local economy in the sixteenth century, namely, shingi-shonin.

著者

市原 博

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.4, pp.3-26, 2007-03-25 (Released:2010-02-25)

参考文献数

54

著者

中西 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.3, pp.26-37, 2019 (Released:2021-12-30)

著者

工藤 章

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, no.1, pp.1-29,I, 1987-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper aims at clarifying reasons why IG Farben failed in selling the lisence of the IG method for synthetic oil through an analysis of documents held BASF Archive and other documents. In the middle of 1930 es IG Farben changed its starategy and decided to sell the lisence of the IG method for synthetic oil abroad as well as in Germany. Its first target was Japanese market. In those years it dominated in Japan a boom for synthetic oil industry. IG Farben made every effort and approached to South Manchurian Railway Company, Mitsubishi Mining Co., Ogura petroleum Co. and other 10 companies or projects. It could not, however, succeed in concluding any contract with them. There can be three hypotheses to explain IG's failure : (1) The International Hydrogeneration Engineering and Chemical Co., which was established by four big enterprises incuding IG and held the hydrogeneration patent, restrained IG's effort; (2) Strict conditions presented by IG Farben discouraged Japanese companies which intended to introduce the IG method; (3) Japanese Navy, which was trying to develop socalled Navy method for itself, opposed against introducing the IG method strongly. My analysis reveals : (1) In spite of IHEC's negative attitude IG had chances to conclude contracts with some Japanese companies till 1939; (2) There were some cases where Japanese side did not take presented conditions too strict; and (3) The Navy hindered effectively projects of some companies such as South Manchurian Railway Company and Ogura Petroleum Co. Results of my analysis abandon former two hypotheses, but do not abandon the last one.