著者

満薗 勇

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.76-78, 2012-09

著者

安 秉〓

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, no.1, pp.75-107, 1976-07-20 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

佐藤 達男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

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This study aims to investigate Nakajima Aircraft Company's airframe business and its production efficiency during WW II in comparison with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.During the Pacific War, Japanese aircraft production was essentially based on job shop system for parts fabrication and sub-assembly. Nakajima Aircraft Company the largest aircraft manufacturer of war-time Japan and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries the second largest utilized both job shop and production line systems for their airframe final assembly lines depending on each plant situations. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports evaluated that Nakajima's airframe production system was more developed than that of Mitsubishi, which adhered to original, old-fashioned job shop system. This was substantiated from the fact that Nakajima expanded its production by 1944 to more than eight times of its 1941 production, and Mitsubishi produced only three times for the same period.However, in production efficiency measured by airframe weight produced per month per employee, Mitsubishi was predominant until August to October 1944. A positive correlation was observed between production efficiency and monthly number of airframe production. Mitsubishi's improvement degree of production efficiency agreed well with the estimation by learning curve theory, but Nakajima's improvement of production efficiency far exceeded the estimation. This is considered to be the effect that Nakajima's labor utilization rate, which was approximately half of that of Mitsubishi in September 1943, might have increased rapidly as the monthly airframe production increased. The difference of the final assembly line did not have decisive influence on the production efficiency, but the increase in the number of monthly airframe production was influential.The production efficiency continuously increased as the monthly airframe production increased, and then dropped sharply from the end of 1944 and after due to the rapid decline of monthly production, which was caused by shortages of essential materials and engines, US air raids from November 1944 and after, factory evacuation, and labor shortage.

著者

千本 暁子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.65-87, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

大久保 いづみ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.4, pp.4_25-4_51, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

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This paper examines the influence of foreign alliances on competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry prior to World War Ⅱ. In pre-war Japan, the main industry competitors were Nihon Chikuonki Shokai (NCS), Nihon Victor Chikuonki (NVC), Nihon Polidor Chikuonki (NPC), King Record (King), Teikoku Chikuonki (Teikoku), and Dainihon Chikuonki (Dainihon). NCS and NVC had alliances with companies in the United Kingdom and the United States, while NPC and King partnered with German record companies. In contrast, Teikoku and Dainihon remained purely Japanese companies, without foreign affiliations.What benefits did the record companies receive from their foreign partnerships? And, how did the alliances influence the strategies of their counterparts?As concerns Western music recordings, the companies with foreign alliances maintained a formidable competitive advantage throughout the pre-war period. On the other hand, for recordings of Japanese music, technological disparity between firms with foreign alliances and solely Japanese firms were essntially erased, and the latter rose to competiveness with the former, especially in the so-called “ryukoka” (Japanese popular songs) market. Thus, the foreign-allied-companies were forced to focus on Japanese music more than ever, this in turn accelerated the expansion of the Japanese music records market. In this context, foreign-partnered companies, such as NCS and NVC, made important contributions to “the golden age of ryukoka”.Until the beginning of the 1930s, the keys to competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry involved the introduction of new technologies and the sale of Western music records, based on alliances with foreign companies. After the mid-1930s, however, the capability to produce and sell records of Japanese music played a larger role in determining competitive advantage within the industry.

著者

田中 智晃

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.1_49-1_74, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of technical innovation on marketing channels and the Yamaha Music School under the mature Japanese piano market since the 1980s. The dilemma of the piano industry (e.g., the low diffusion rate, about 25%) drastically changed due to digital technology. In this new competitive environment, Yamaha carried out the three strategic changes: releasing low cost digital instruments, recasting sales channels, and reconsidering the Yamaha Music School's management policy.In the early 1980s, newcomer Casio began producing and selling the Casiotone, a low cost digital instrument. Although Yamaha did not want to release cheap keyboard instruments which might decrease the demand for their leading products (the piano and electronic organ), in the late 1980s they launched Portasound (a Yamaha-made cheap keyboard) to compete against the Casio product. Moreover, Yamaha distributed this new product through the same mass retailers which dealt in Casiotones. Recasting their sales channel this way caused the old channel, the traditional exclusive distributor system, to struggle. However, it was important for Yamaha to maintain the traditional system, because exclusive distributors were skillful at selling expensive goods (pianos etc.) through consulting sales. Therefore, Yamaha reinforced the exclusive distributors by changing their form of profit-earning music schools from one in which the schools supported Yamaha through sales, to one in which Yamaha supported the schools through licensing. These schools became an important source of income in the face of reduced piano demand from 1980.Yamaha maintained their position as market leader through these three strategic changes in spite of the technological paradigm shift in which they lost the first mover advantage. Although the double structure of their sales channel (comprising exclusive distributors and mass retailers) resulted in lower sales capacity for their exclusive distributors, the exclusive distributors were able to change their primary focus to the music education business. Yamaha's unique sales channel, with educational facilities, continues to transform while developing new keyboard instrument businesses.

著者

長谷部 弘道

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.4, pp.3-27, 2017 (Released:2019-03-30)

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In 1981, Sony announced the “Compact Disc” with co-development partner Philips. In the former studies, the strategic process of the CD was described as the great achievement of Norio Ohga (Sony's vice-president at the time), who seemed to have been the leader taking the initiative with the development of this product. However, in some publications written by certain engineers who actually developed Sony's digital recording technology, it is claimed that they had actually led the strategic process.According to the analysis of various engineers' interviews, articles of audio industry magazines, and such engineer's publications, this paper found that the main strategic leader of this process was Heitaro Nakajima, who provided the motivation for this project as middle manager.In fact, the very first digital recording equipment for consumer use (PCM-1) was gradually developed, promoted and approved by Heitaro Nakajima and his Sony Audio Technology Center (Sony Giken). Besides, from 1978, Sony Giken started technical sales and negotiations for approval of their digital recording format as a world standard by AES (Audio Engineering Society), which is the largest audio society in the USA. Through these activities, Sony Giken's engineers also identified new needs for a total digital editing support system. As a result, these activities prepared Sony's technological competence, which was especially welcomed by Philips.Notably, these activities were not led by top management, but by the middle management. When engineers in enterprises plan to develop new technology using the company's resources, it is required that they provide proof of its legitimacy. The actors in this case study were also required to do this over and over, and they made great efforts to find the best answer each time. They do not only handle solutions of their engineering problems, but also actually seek proper proof of the legitimacy of their technology in various ways, among others they also have to persuade top managers, promote their technology overseas, and so forth. Taking these factors into consideration, it can be concluded that this strategic process is a process led by engineers.

著者

西澤 佑介

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.2_3-2_27, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

被引用文献数

1

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This article explores the history of liquid crystal display (LCD) TV industry from its beginning stage of late 1980s to its popularizing stage of 2000s. Our purpose to consider the industry is examining following phenomena empirically. Although Japanese electronics firms had innovated on an electronic product, their market share fall behind as the product's market become expanding globally. Track of Japanese LCD TV industry is one of the typical cases of this pattern.Previous research has explained these phenomena stem mainly from the change of circumstances surrounding structure of electronic products and business model of electronic industry after 2000s.On the other hand, based on both primary and secondary sources, we emphasize on enterprises' organizational capabilities which was proposed by Alfred D. Chandler between Japanese firms and Korean and Chinese firms. This article shows Korean and Chinese electronics firms rapidly improve their organizational capabilities and had come to catch up with these of the Japanese firms during the 1990s, which became the omen to bring Japanese firms about decline in 2000s.Organizational capabilities of Japanese firms, which was once appreciated by researchers, certainly connected with its competitive advantage even in “the Japan's lost decade” 1990s, and made LCD TV commercialize fastest in the world. But especially in terms of Development, Marketing, and Branding capabilities, Korean firms were catching up with Japanese firms. And in terms of Production capabilities, Chinese firms came to catch up with Japanese firms. Finally, it is in the mid-2000s that they got ahead of Japanese enterprise's capabilities.

著者

由井 常彦 ヨハネス ヒルシュマイア

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, no.1, pp.34-51, 1975-08-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

三島 康雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.1-26, 2003-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Kyodo Gyogyo Fisheries Company developed into the biggest fishing company in Japan, owning 71.6% of trawlers in the 1930s. It decided to expand into shrimp trawling off the west coast of Mexico in 1934. Since 1929, the soga shosha Mitsui Bussan had imported Galveston shrimp, caught in the Gulf of Mexico, in the United States. Shrimps were a profitable business, and Mitsui expanded its business to the Gulf of California and bought large quantities of shrimp from Mexican cooperatives at Guaymas. Kyodo's trawlers also used Guaymas as a fishing base and came into conflict with Mitsui. But in February 1937, the two companies launched a US$19, 000 joint venture called the Guaymas Project. The venture failed after half a year when Mitsui withdrew, fearing no future in the importing of shrimp because of strict foreign exchange controls by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.In September 1937, Nippon Suisan's Mexican office asked the San Francisco office of the soga shosha Mitsubishi Shoji to sell its shrimp and provide financial assistance. Their relationship was good, but with increased sales in the United States, Kyodo, renamed Nippon Suisan in 1937, depended more and more on Mitsubishi for both sales and finances. Mitsubishi gradually left the sales business in the hands of American brokers, while taking a 5% commission but providing insufficient financial support. In July 1940, Nippon Suisan sought to restructure its Los Angeles office to sell directly to American brokers on the West Coast and dismantle the sales system dependent on Mitsubishi. But until September 1940, Mitsubishi continued to control 100% of sales of two fisheries companies, Nippon Suisan and the late-coming Hayashikane Shoten. The trawling of shrimp was prohibited by the Mexican government in September 1940, a move supported by popular nationalist sentiment in Mexico.

著者

前田 裕子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.23-49_1, 1998-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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During the decade finishing in 1944, a drastic change of production method occurred in aircraft industry in Japan, as in the U. S.Japan had joined late in the field of modern high-technological industry, then paid a great energy in catching up to develop world-level aircraft engines. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries played a big role for this. After developing some kind of excellent engines, Mitsubishi met a more difficult issue. It was the so-called mass production method (if not used in an accurate terminology), which they had not experienced in the field of such products that consist of so many parts, need long and precise mechanical operation processes.Under a strong leadership of J. Fukao, who was the key man of the engine department of the company, Mitsubishi strove for building a new method. First, they tried to imitate the system of the U.S. aircraft engine factories, and succeeded only a part. The industrial circumstances of Japan were not matured for a company to realize the same system. Mitsubishi ought to seek another way and their method might show the limits of the industrial abilities of a late-coming country. The most outstanding feature of the method could be expressed as the simultaneous capacity building in the total area of the production processes, including those of casting, forging, making special parts or machine tools as well as mechanical operation and assembly.The result was awful. However, this cumulative and self-generating experience formed the basis of production engineering of the next generation.

著者

清水 洋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.75-94, 2000-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The main object of this article is to analyze the strategy of Chisso Corporation when Minamata Disease became a social issue and to explain the paradox of the strategy. I scrutinize the decision-making process of Chisso, which was one of the leading firms in Japanese chemical industry and which caused Minamata disease, one of the worst pollution incidents in Japan. This article focuses on why Chisso increased production despite the knowledge that this would intensify the suffering as well as increase the number of victims.On the basis of this analysis, it can be concluded that increasing production, which only served to spread the suffering, was the means Chisso used to avoid the further expansion of Minamata disease. The backdrop of this paradox was a complex situation in which the policies of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's (MITI) and the local government, the strategies of rival firms, and technological change were intertwined.

著者

黒澤 隆文 久野 愛

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.27-49, 2018 (Released:2020-09-30)

著者

河 明生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, no.4, pp.59-78, 1996-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

四宮 正親

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.3, pp.35-72, 1994-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to examine how the foreign affiliated companies contributed to the Japanese modernization of management system in production, marketing and employment mechanism in the pre-war period. In production, the Japanese companies studied production technology, mass production system and Taylor system. In marketing, the Japanese companies studied franchise system and sales in installment system. In employment mechanism, the Japanese companies did away with subcontract system and introduced the direct employment. In conclusion, the Japanese modernization of business management has been done throughout the transfer of business system that the foreign affiliated companies had introduced. At the same time, both the Japanese companies and the foreign affiliated companies have taken a positive attitude to R & D.

著者

小早川 洋一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.42-64, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

佐藤 達男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015-12

著者

中島 裕喜

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.3, pp.1-27, 1998-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper focuses on Electronic Components makers (of mainly capacitors, resistors, transformers, speakers) from 1945 to 1960. Though most of them were small and medium firms, they established a high volume of production with many new components that large scale firms were unable to make. They also achieved a high growth in their scale of operations from less than 10 workers to more than 300, sometimes 1000 workers within only a 15 year time period. These firms will be referred to as Specialty Components Makers. Here I study how they achieved such progress. In doing so, this period will be divided into two eras of Reconstruction (1945-52) and Growth (1953-60).During the Reconstruction era, many electronic components makers were founded. The founders didn't require expensive capital equipment because electronic components were labor intensive. They sold their products through merchants mainly located in Tokyo and Osaka. The merchants established a wide marketing network and components makers could increase their sales through these networks. To increase production without much investment they formed many cooperative associations. Furthermore, they needed to acquire much electronic technology and founders pursued various cooperative investigation by the support of public research institutes.During the growth era, the radio and television industries began developing quickly. Main customers of component makers switched to radio and television assembling makers. To catch up with increasing demand, components makers had to expand their product line. Much of investment was put into building factories and firm scale expanded. They also needed to produce high quality components. However such a huge investment created a lack of funds for research. So they were still strongly dependent on cooperative investigations. As a result, many components makers became specialized components makers, accumulated high technology within the firm, and achieved high volume production by the end of 1950s.

著者

黒澤 隆文 久野 愛

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.29-45, 2018 (Released:2020-12-30)

著者

片岡 豊 平野 隆 松本 貴典

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.66-83, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)