著者
高橋 泰隆
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.2, pp.23-50,i, 1979-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

Formosa Railway in occupation by Japan (1895) was under the control of military forces and the railway construction plan was based on militarism first of all. From this point of view, Formosa Railway in early stage of Japanese occupation can be said militaristic one.When the Railway Bureau of the Government-General of Formosa managed Formosa Railway, the militaristic aim of railway was made a large revision. Thus constructed Formosa Railway became not only militaristic line but also industrial one greatly.In other words, goods transport was most important in Formosa Railway. Goods transport by train putting Formosa economy into a group of Japanese Capitalism, Formosa colonization was completed. On this stage, Taiwan Seito & Co., Ltd. being in a strong position over many companys of sugar industry and Mitsui Bussan, a trading corporation, established the transport route of raw materials and goods. These companys in Formosa under Japanese occupation made the Government-General of Formosa construct the railway and the seaports throughout the whole. After the construction of them, they linked their private lines to Formosa Railway and the seaports, shortened the transport time, increased the safety of transport and saved the transport-cost. As a result of it they got much profit.
著者
作道 洋太郎
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.1, pp.1-4, 1978-10-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

One of the major topics in the recent studies of Japanese business history has been the investigation of “zaibatsu” and since the common topic of the thirteenth national conference of the Business History Society was decided to be “Comparative Historical Study of the Zaibatsus”, the organization committee has tried to arrange the papers to be read to examine the basic characteristics of the Japanese zaibatsu in comparison with the Western big business and also to make clear the organizational and functional differences between the Japanese zaibatsus.The first paper by Yotaro Sakudo, Osaka University, “Comparative Historical Study of the Zaibatsus” presented the several problems to be discussed in the present day study on “zaibatsus” such as the zaibatsu investment strategies and their management organizations.The second paper by Professor Shigeaki Yasuoka, Doshisha University, “Characteristic Features of the Zaibatsus Capital in Comparison with the Rothschild and the Dupont”, elucidated why and how the zaibatsu families had excluded the joint-stock capital and employed the professional managers. Further Professor Yasuoka pointed out the several contrasts between the Japanese zaibatsus and the Western family enterprises by examining specific cases. The third reporter, Professor Hidemasa Morikawa of the Hosei University, read on “Business Strategy of the Japanese Zaibatsus”. He examined the process of diversification in the three Japanese zaibatsus, -Mitsui, Sumitomo and Furukawa- in an effort to confirm the differences of business strategies among them and tried to explain the differences by the difference in their decision-making processes.The fourth paper by Professor Hisashi Masaki of the Doshisha University, “Power Structure of the Japanese Zaibatsus” identified some characteristic features of the structure for control in the Japanese zaibatsus by comparing it with that of the 200 large American enterprises.The fifth reporter, Professor Moriaki Tsuchiya of the Tokyo University, read on “Economic Opportunities and Limiting Factors for the Development of Large-Scale Enterprises : Comparative Study of Japan and the United States”, discussed the volume and nature of the economic opportunities and of the human, natural and monetary resources at the different stages of the development of domestic market in the United States and Japan and explained how the Japanese zaibatsus were developed by a unique combination of the economic opportunity and resources which was entirely different from that in the United States.Through the above reports and the following comments and panel discussion, it was confirmed that the big business in Japan possessed various unique features which were derived from the socio-economic as well as cultural structures in Japan although there existed certain similarities between the zaibatsus of Japan and the large scale family enterprises of the Western countries.
著者
森川 英正
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.1, pp.30-51, 1978-10-25 (Released:2009-11-06)
参考文献数
12

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著者
井上 忠勝
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.1, pp.52-57, 1978-10-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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著者
土屋 守章
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.1, pp.85-88, 1978-10-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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著者
新保 博
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.1, pp.26-29, 1978-10-25 (Released:2009-11-06)
著者
原 輝史
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.12, no.2, pp.28-48,ii, 1978-03-15 (Released:2010-11-18)

Shop Management, one of the most important works of F.W. Taylor, was translated into French by Henry Le Chatelier in 1907. The Principles of Scientific Management was also translated into French in 1912.The French business circles were so much interested in this new system of labour management that French scholars wrote many articles on this subject. Charles Fremont, for example, showed in his article of 1913 the origin of chronometry in France. According to him, it was in 1688 that the chronometry was already applied in the military work in France for the first time. He wanted to show French originality in chronometry.On the other hand, trade union leaders protested violently against the application. of this new system to French industries, so that the Taylor System was not easily accepted by French laborers.According to H. Le Chatelier, the application of Taylor System failed in France because the French society lacked the common sense (Le Bons Sens) which prevailed in U.S.A.
著者
山口 一臣
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.12, no.2, pp.49-72,iii, 1978-03-15 (Released:2010-11-18)

Since the 1920s, AT & T followed virtually unchanging policies towards dividends and debt, that is, the company maintained a constant $ 9 per share dividend policy and an average debt ratio of about one third. This conservative financial policy was based on a belief that the best way for a regulated utility such as AT & T to attract and hold the goodwill and faith of a large number of small shareholders was through regular reasonable dividends and the long-run safety capital structure.To understand this belief and the present financial policies of AT & T, we must know its history. Then in this paper I tried to investigate the history of the AT & T's financial policies, in relation to their strategy for the national telephone monopoly and the management thoughts of their leaders.
著者
安部 悦生
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.12, no.3, pp.22-44,ii, 1978-06-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

The Crawshays, a famous iron-maker family in South Wales, became inactive in the management of their iron-works in the middle of the 19th century. On the contrary, Crawshay (William II) rapidly increased his investment in securities such as Consols and domestic and foreign railway bonds, becoming in 1867 the greatest government stock holder in Great Britain. Why happened such a transition from industrial investment to investment in securities since 1850's?The general condition of Crawshay's business was very sound in 1850's. Some unfavourable factors, however, were forecast in the future of their business: first, the decline of production of iron ore in South Wales, a drastic change of the products from wrought iron to steel and the development of labour movement. In addition to these external factors, there was an unfavourable circumstance in Crawshay family itself: the lack of successor's talent for management. The reasons above mentioned seem to have been the key factors for the change from an ironmaster to a rentier.Crawshay thus suffered a great loss in iron-making in 1870's and eventually closed the iron-works. On the other hand, Crawshay's securities which amounted to over one million pounds brought the family tens of thousands pounds return a year. This article compares also Crawshay with the Dowlais Iron Company, and explains the difference in investment activity between the two rivals.
著者
三島 康雄
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.12, no.3, pp.1-21,i, 1978-06-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

S. Kawasaki, a famous ship-builder in Meiji era, founded the Tsukiji Shipyard (Tokyo) in 1827, for which he borrowed 30 thousands yen from the Ministry of finance. Masayoshi Matsukata, a chief officer in the Ministry of Finance, appointed Kawasaki to the privileged dealer of the sugar collected from Ryukyu Islands as tax. He could amass a great amount of commission in this sugar business and poured it to fill the deficit of his Tokyo and Kobe shipyards. He also managed to operate his business diversified into shipping, ships fittings, cotton spinning, machine-works and trading.Kawasaki bought the government shipyard in Kobe, and founded the Kawasaki Shipyard in 1887. But he suffered from heavy illness and retired from the presidency in 1896 when his company was reorganized into joint-stock company. After the retirement, Kawasaki bought a good deal of stocks of other companies, founded Kobe Kawasaki Bank in 1905, and also bought rice fields in Korea and forests in Miyazaki Pref., becoming a great land-owner around 1910. When he died in 1912, he thus left his private properties of about 5 millions yen, on the basis of which Kawasaki Sohonten (a stock-holding company) was founded in 1920, and the Kawasaki could developed as a modern zaibatsu fairly diversified into shipbuilding, shipping and aircraft manufacturing.