著者

田付 茉莉子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.3, pp.1-21,i, 1982-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In the Meiji period, Japan began to manufacture various products of modern industries such as cotton yarn, paper, or refined suger which had formerly been imported from abroad. In the fields of trade and shipping as well, Japanese enterprises started to replace foreign companies. We may call the phenomena the replacement by Japanese national enterprises.The case was different with the field of life insurance, where foreign companies entered into the Japanese market already cultivated by Japanese companies. The first Japanese life insurence company was established in 1871, followed by many others until about 1890. The foreign companies of those days had agents in Japan and did business mainly for foreign residents. Two American and two Canadian companies, authorized to enter the Japanese market about 1900, expanded their amount of insurance in force rapidly by selling insurance with tontine allottment. Since tontine offered high-rate allottment at maturity instead of annual allottment, it became popular among wealthy people. Foreign companies occupied for more than 10% of the Japanese market in 1904-06. They gradually reduced their activities thereafter, because American companies were prohibited from allotting tontine by the Insurance Law of New York State. On the other hand, some Japanese companies adopted the method as it was not prohibited by the Japanese Insurance Law, causing a considerable damage to American companies. In the 1910's an American company withdrew from the field and the share of other foreign companies decreased yearly.We intended here to find out the foreign companies which had agents in Japan since 1870, the exact date when five companies started their business for the Japanese, the reason for their success and their eventual withdrawal from Japan.

著者

中瀬 寿一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.3, pp.22-52,ii, 1982-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to trace the historical formation process of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu around 1837 and 1845 with the objective of discovering how the reform of not only the house precepts, shop rules and miner's rules etc. but also the house system were done by Genbee Takawara, the head-clerk of the Izumiya-Sumitomo and how characteristics the reform of these feudalistic house system had as compared with the reform of Mitsui and Konoike in the Tokugawa Period (1600-1868).The 1830's brought Tokugawa Japan to the edge of another period of crisis compounded of financial insolvency at the top and reaction to conditions of poverty at the bottom. The country was seething with displaced peasants and the cities choked with peasants and wanderers. The poor were in a desperate mood. Outbreaks of violence and rice warehouse smashings became frequent.In 1837 there was a uprising led by Heihachiro Oshio (17921837), a scholar and a leading O-Yomei philosopher, who had already sold his books to help the hungry poor. The rebels attacked Osaka, and tried to kill the heartless Bakufu's officials and to set fire to the city centre where luxury-living merchants and usury capitalists had been living and to release its wealth to the poor. But they were put down in a day by the Bakufu's troops and Oshio took his own life.His revolt, while quickly put down, shocked greatly the Bakufu, the country and luxury-living merchants who profited while the poor starved.Thus, G. Takawara who became the leader of the Sumitomo Tempo reform, had repeatedly memorialized Tomohiro Sumitomo, the family head, on the need for reform in 1837-1844, following the Oshio rebellion. In this paper I will focus on the role of G. Takawara, the head-clerk of the Sumitomo, the most representative big business, mine-manufacturer and usury of Edo period and analyze the characteristics of the reform for the “modernization” and “rationalization” of the Sumitomo house.

著者

藤村 大時郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.4, pp.1-30,i, 1983-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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One of the results acquired through investigation of the Rules of the Schneider and Co., which were instituted in 1913 to establish principles of its management organization, is a discovery of the fact that, in France before the First World War, there was another type of business organization different from what Professor Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. explained eloquently in his book, “The Visible Hand”. The difference is found in the function performed by the middle management of the Schneider and Co., which are divided into five Divisions according to its products, such as coal and steel, various engines and electric motors, artillery and armour plates, ships, and bridges. As well as almost all of its products are order-made, each Division is organized to perform efficiently functions necessary for order production. According to the Rules of 1913, each Division is composed of Sales, Technical, Production, Test and Accounting Departments, and main functions are fulfilled by the first three Departments; respectively negociation with clients, design for contract and production management (of job shop type). The most remarkable thing is that, in there Rules, heavy emphasis is placed on co-ordination among these functions, not only between negotiation and design but also negotiation and production management, so as to acquire orders profitably and quickly. It would appear that this co-ordination is not the “Administrative Co-ordination” which replace the “Invisible Hand”, though very suitable for the big business of order production type. These Rules also prescribe centralization of the functions of these Departments in Paris headquators in order to realize its better relationship, although this principle is not fully applied to all Divisions owing to its industrial characters.In this article, I have examined such middle management organization and the business strategy of the Schneider and Co., which form clear contrast to what Professor Chandler, Jr. elucidated; those of mass production, so that we can find out another aspect of the French entrepreneurship and big business.

著者

猿渡 啓子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.4, pp.31-54,ii, 1983-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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This paper analyzes the growth of a British-owned trading company, Guthrie Corporation, with emphasis on its strategic and structural responses to changing business environment.During the 19th century, Guthrie's major activity was general trading between Singapore and the United Kingdom, although the company gradually expanded its businesses into such related areas as finance for provincial ventures and local agencies of British firms. Reflecting the simplicity of operations, Guthrie's organization remained primitive. The general office in Singapore and its branch and agent in London carried their duties without clear functional divisions and close coordination.Facing the depression in trading in the late 19th century, Guthrie's strategic interest turned to then rising rubber production. By utilizing its financial and personal ties in trading, Guthrie played an intermediary role between the British capital market and Malayan agriculture. While the company acted as a London promoter of newly-established and converted public companies for rubbergrowing, Guthrie took the charge of managing rubber estates in Malaya and marketing products overseas. Responding to this integration, Guthrie's organization became functional. For instance, the London office now had the companies department which concentrated on promotional and secretarial functions of the rubber companies.Changes in world markets for agricultural products and Malaya's independence in the 1950's forced Guthrie to adopt another strategy of integration and diversification into manufacturing in Malaysia and industrialized countries. Following the forward integration into such rubber-consuming industries as carpet-weaving, Guthrie's management agressively took over manufacturing enterprises in related and unrelated fields in Western Europe, Canada, and the U.S. In the 1970's, Guthrie thus became a multinational company with multi-divisional structure organized by region and product.This strategy of multinationalization and the relative retreat from Malaysian interests, however, inevitably resulted in consecutive conflicts with Malaysia's economic policy which sought indigenous ownership and control of foreign firms. In 1981, the Malaysian government took the final move of publicly taking over Guthrie at the London stock market and easily succeeded by overcoming desperate defense by Guthrie's management, by which a long history of this trading company was eventually terminated.

著者

楊 天溢

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.4, pp.55-65, 1983-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

米山 高生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.4, pp.50-68, 1982-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

鳥羽 欽一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.1-21,i, 1982-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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It was believed for long years that distribution system in Japan was traditional and far retarded from that of the western societies. However, Japanese manufacturers and retailers has made efforts in modernizing themselves by learning and introducing modern marketing theory and know-how mainly from the United States. And now they are actively engaging in selling Japanese products to Europe and the United States for which economic frictions arise. This article try to make clear how distribution system and marketing technique has been modernized from the Meiji period to present. In this connection, two aspects which is believed to characterize the modernization process of distribution system and marketing in Japan are pointed out. In considering the market for manufacturers and distributors in pre-war Japan, two completely different type of markets had been developed : they were 'international market' and 'domestic market'. The former was newly opened market for Japan and was mainly carried out by such big zaibatsu enterprises as Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji. The latter was traditional one and was dealt by traditional distributers in traditional way. Modernization had occured in both markets. In international market, it was sogo-shosha which led the modernization and, in domestic market, they were such retailors as Mitsukoshi and Takashimaya and also such manufacturers as Shiseido, Morinaga, Ajinomoto and Matsushita which started the production of new products. In both cases, influence of western knowledge and technique was very strong. However, as a whole, traditional character of the distribution system was remained. It was only after the War that retailing revolution and modern marketing by manufacturers gave big influence on the whole system of distribution in Japan. But such dual charachter of market still exists even today and it is the reason why European and American claim Japan's domestic market as of non-tariff barrior. This article makes clear this dual character of Japan's distribution system in its historical perspectives.

著者

後藤 伸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.22-46,iii, 1982-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In the international maritime history, the International Mercantile Marine (IMM) Co., established as an American concern in 1902, had an unique beginning as follows : firstly, J.P. Morgan & Co., a famous investment banking, played an important role in forming the IMM; secondly, Morgan & Co. combined several important liner companies engaged in a single operating route, the North Atlantic; and lastly, the IMM was composed of shipping firms whose nationalities were different, but mainly American and British. So far, many books and articles have treated of the IMM, usually, from a viewpoint of regarding the IMM as Morgan's Trust in the shipping industry. They analyse the financial aspects of the IMM, with pointing out failure as Trust because of poor financial performance. They are, however, little explanation of 'Americanization' policy that the IMM disposed of its foreign subsidaries and became an American shipping enterprise after the First World War. In order to inquire into the reason for and meaning of adopting Americanization policy, it should be required to analyse the IMM's strategy and structure rather than financial results up to the period of pre-War, and that is my task of the article. In conclusion, it is the reason for adopting Americanization policy that the IMM failed to formulate definite corporate strategy because of differences in managerial environment between constituent companies in the U.S.A. and U.K., and to create administrative control as a whole because of different approaches to organizational design between the top management in the U.S.A. and U.K. While, thus, Americanization policy taken by the IMM after the war was seen as a result of managerial failure of an earlier transnational enterprise in the maritime history, its policy was valid in the sense that it aimed to reconstruct effective organization for control and operation of fleets through unification of strategy by disposing of foreign flags under nominal control.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.47, 1982-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

田村 祐一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.1-22,i, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Mutually organized enterprise have had a long and snccessful history in American life insurance business. In theory, mutuals, without capital item in its balance-sheet, are owned by and operated for the benefit of the policyowners, and their boards of directors or “trustees” are elected by them, typically exemplified by the original Charter and By-Laws of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, the first mutual in the United States. But in practice, officers and directors of mutuals, although claiming democracy of their companies, have completely ignored the sovereignty of policyowners, who have consequently been silent majority for nearly one and a half century.The third president of the Mutual Life usurped the control through proxy contests and established his autocracy, so-called “Winston regime”. He and his vice-president held so many proxies, compared to “Children of Israel, ” that no one succeded in defeating his rule. Management control were dramatically disclosed by the Armstrong Committee of the New York Legislature in 1905, saying “Notwithstanding their theoretical rights, policyholders have had little or no voice in the management. Entrenched behind proxies, easily collected by subservient agents and running for long periods, unless expressly revoked, the officers of these companies have occupied unassailable positions and have been able to exercise despotic power”. With all the drastic revision of the New York Insurance laws, nothing happened in the elections of mutuals except temporary excitement, and management control continued at no stands for more than thirty years later the Temporary National Economic Committee disclosed the fact. “Life Insurance executives and directors constitute a small group that is self-appointing and self-perpetuating”. Another thirty years-plus have passed since TNEC, and the situation remains the same. All the while mutual managements have been criticized and refuted in the courts, legislatures of the stastes and journals, it has been desparately impossible to find out an effective means to bring indifferent policyowners to annual elections.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.23-46,ii, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The purpose of this paper is to compare the relation between the Mitsui Bank and Tokyo Electric Light Co. with the relation between the Mitsui Bank and Toho Electric Power Co..In the 1920's and the 1930's the Mitsui Bank had been positively financing both of the two electric power companies. Nevertheless, the Mitsui Bank intervened in Tokyo Electric Light Co. alone. On the other hand Toho Electric Power Co. was its own master.This contrast was due to the difference in point of administrative ability of managers of the two electric power companies. Owing to loose-spending management by Shohachi Wakao, the president from 1926 to 1930, Tokyo Electric Light Co. was in financial difficulties. Therefore Tokyo Electric Light Co. could not pay back debts from the Mitsui Bank sufficiently during the latter half of 1920's. Shigeaki Ikeda, the head of the managing directors of the Mitsui Bank interfered in human affairs concerning directors of Tokyo Electric Light Co.. Firstly he dispatched Seinosuke Go and Ichizo Kobayashi in 1927. Secondly he changed the president from Wakao to Go in 1930. Under capable management by Go and Kobayashi Tokyo Electric Light Co. recovered itself in the 1930's. The Mitsui Bank had never intervened in Tokyo Electric Light Co. directly after 1930.The intervening in Tokyo Electric Light Co. by the Mitsui Bank was a temporary phenomenon in order to preserve credits. The Mitsui Bank had never intervened in Toho Electric Power Co. which could pay back debts sufficiently under excellent management by the president Yasuzaemon Matsunaga. Therefore the commonly accepted theory is not adequate, which asserts that electric power capital was put under the control of Zaibatsu.

著者

斎藤 憲

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.47-75, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

渡辺 喜七

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.76-88, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

西川 登

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.64-76, 1981-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

ブラックフォード マンセル G

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.77-81, 1981-07-30 (Released:2010-05-07)

著者

四宮 俊之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.3, pp.1-24,i, 1981-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Japan Paper Association was established in 1880, as a trade association by the Japanese papar-manufacturing companies, for the purpose of controlling price. However, in a short time, it found the price cartel difficult to maintain in the period, and transformed the purpose to promote friendship among members.But with the tariff reforms in 1899, 1906, and 1910, the Japanese paper-manufacturing industry fell into a difficult situation owing to the tax reduction of imported paper. So the association strived to reinforce its organization and operations by degrees. As a result, it laid a foundation that was able to manage cartels for the limitation of output after World War I.The object of this article is to trace the development of Japan Paper Association and analyze its organization and, operations before World War I.

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.3, pp.25-47,i, 1981-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Admittedly, there are two sharply contrasted views on the late Victorian entrepreneurial performance at the present time. One traditional opinion, for instance, maintained by D.L. Burn (1939) is that the British entrepreneurs performed badly from the 1870's and if they had done better, the decline of the British steel industry compared with the German and American steel industry could have been avoided.Another opinion, recently asserted by D.N. McCloskey (1973) is that the relative decline was inevitable and from whatever perspective they are viewed, the British steel makers did well and their behavior was rational. According to him, the relative decline, i. e., slowing down of British steel production growth, was merely caused by maturity of the British economy.By taking a biggest iron and steel company in Britain over that period, that is, the Bolckow Vaughan & Co., this study tries to give an important example to this controversy.Bolckow Vaughan's were formed as a partnership in 1839 at Middlesbrough in the North-East of England and in 1865 they were transformed into a limited company. Throughout the late Victorian and Edwardian age they were a largest pig-iron producer. As a steelmaking company, they had four steel-making processes: acid converter, basic converter, acid open-hearth furnace, and basic open-hearth furnace. Although they were willing to adopt acid converter and basic converter processes in the 1870's and early 1880's respectively, they did not show a prompt response to basic open-hearth furnace process in the late 1880's and for the next 20 years. The basic open-hearth furnace process, from the technical point of view, became the most important steel-making process from that time on.Consequently, they lagged in adoption of basic open-hearth for the reason that they were not innovative in research and development of technology by contemporary standards. Primary sources such as Directors Minutes, Annual Reports and so on of the company bear out the above conclusion. In spite of the fact that this is only one case, considering the influential position of Bolckow Vaughan's, this study throws doubt on the view of, so to speak, “rational school” regarding the British entrepreneurial performance during the late Victorian and Edwardian Age.

著者

武内 達子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.3, pp.48-76,iii, 1981-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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A principal problem in the management of an industrial enterprise is the judgement in the combination between possible technologies and goods. In iron industry, the amount of pig iron produced in Britain in the industrial revolution was almost doubled in decade, and more than half of the goods were castings for various uses.In the present paper, the goods of Newton Chambers, iron works specialized to foundry, were analysed based upon Day Books between 1793-1833 at an interval of ten years. The goods were classified into seven groups: (1) goods sold to merchants, mainly domestic uses, (2) tools and machine components, (3) rails and wheels for mines, (4) pig iron, (5) ballasts, (6) water pipes, and (7) gas pipes and components of gas works plants. The company did not produce guns and components of steam engines. The constitution of goods and its variation over the period revealed the trace of the activity of entrepreneur.The goods which characterize Newton Chambers were cast-iron pipes. Their high quality and low price stimulated new social needs. The great demands for iron pipes had started from 1807 in London for water works and for gas light companies after 1814. The percentage of pipes in the annual sale in 1813 was 20%, in 1823 30%, and 1833 49%. Newton Chambers could survive in serious depressions after Napoleonic War by the great demands for iron pipes.It is concluded that the success of Newton Chambers is the judgement of adoption and improvement of the production technology for mass production of standardized castings, which combined successfully with the newly developed public works for the improvement of city environments.

著者

チャンドラー Jr. A・D

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.4, pp.1-25, 1982-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

2

著者

川辺 信雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.4, pp.26-49,i, 1982-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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Recently Japanese sogo shosha has begun attracting the interest of scholars. Sogo Shosha is a very unique economic organization which has developed fully only in Japan. It handles wide variety of product lines, operate all over the world, and performs various kinds of functions.So far a lot of studies of sogo shosha has been done, and they have stressed the importance of its overseas operations. In spite of the importance of its world-wide operations based upon branch activities, there is no systematic study of activities of foreign branches. There appear several questions, related with activities of overseas branches of sogo shosha. Why and how does headquarters open a particular branch? What is the relationship between the opening of overseas branches and the other strategies of sogo shosha including diversification of product lines and integration of functions. How are they controlled? What kinds of managerial problems does they have, and how are these problems solved? These questions have remained unanswered.This study aims to answer these questions on sogo shosha's overseas operations, as well as its development as a whole. For this objective this study traced the development and activities of the San Francisco and Seattle Branches of Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha in the period between 1918 when the Seattle branch opened and the outbreak of World War II, which ended the operations of both branches, using the company's original records, which were confiscated by the United States government just after Pearl Harbor.