著者

岡山 礼子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.107-110, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.1-33,i, 1981-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The historical side of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu has yet to be studied deeper. The writer has attempted to get the whole perspective of the Group, based on his 5 previous theses.The object of this study is to analyse the fund raising mechanism of the Group, in the 1921-1943 period. This is because the analysis of the flow of funds inside the Group is a short cut to grasping the structure of the Zaibatsu.In this study, the writer utilized documentary materials from the Honsha (the holding company of the Group named Sumitomo Goshikaisha) and annual reports from its member companies. Some notable results of the analysis follow;(1) Within the Sumitomo Zaibatsu the Honsha functioned as the financial control organ for the companies of the Group. Whenever the Honsha was short of funds, the necessary amounts were furnished to it by the Sumitomo Bank. There were no example of fund raising from outside the Group. Even when an enterprise directly managed by the Honsha became an independent affiliated company, the financial control by the Honsha over the company was strictly maintained.(2) In substance the fund raising of the Group depended largely on its own accumulated capital and comparatively on little on bank loans.Thus, the Sumitomo Bank had rather little business within the Group both in loans and in deposits. This is partly because the Group had not such giant enterprises as Mitsui & Co., Ltd. or Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd. of the Mitsui Zaibatsu.(3) During World War II, however, the scale of manufacturing companies of the Group expanded rapidly and they were forced to raise necessary funds outside the Group also. As a result the fund raising function of the Honsha weakened. In turn, the role of the Sumitomo Bank increased and the share of funds from outside the Group became more important.

著者

山田 徹雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.1-28, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper will make clear how and in what extent the railway policy of the Prussian government exercised its influence on private railways in Rhine-Westphalia. The Berg-Mark Railway with some local lines, founded by bankers and manufacturers in Wuppertal, expanded its network of lines to be one of the greatest railways in Germany within a half century. It was so closely linked with the State that the Minister of Commerce, August v.d. Heydt, initiating the policy of railway nationalization, had been a main member of the board of directors. In 1850 when the Berg-Mark Railway could not raise the capital to build a new line, the State made a financial support with a conditional contract that the former should hand its administration over to the latter. Though this measure robbed private shareholders of control over the running of the company, they were rather willing to accept it, because they were of opinion that skillfull managers and engineers were merely obtainable under the name of officials.This type of railway enterprise, owned by shareholders and managed by the State, might be, in a sense, a suitable form in Germany. The State intervention was made, in some extent, by military needs to facilitate the defence of the west but also in view of the economic significance of the Ruhr with coal fields and the Western industries. Both the State and the Western had the common interest that their economic activities were hampered by economic-geographic standing-points of the Rhine-Westphalia, which was in closer touch with Holland and Belgium than Berlin.

著者

高寺 貞男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.101-106, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

後藤 伸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.29-41, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

湯沢 威 原 輝史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.88-94, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

山口 一臣

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.95-100, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

畠山 秀樹

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.2, pp.57-83,iii, 1980-08-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The object of this paper is to trace the formative process of business organization in coal mining of the Sumitomo family and analyze its business results during the period.It is a well-known fact that the Sumitomo family invested in other undertakings as well, a large amount of profits derived from operating the Besshi Copper Mine and thereby diversified its business into coal mining, banking, rolled copper industry and warehousing business in the 1890's.In such a case, the high level of strategic decision-making shown by the Sumitomo family is worthy of consideration, since it extended its business to coal mining with the intention of not only providing for itself a great deal of coal which was consumed in the Besshi Copper Mine, but also obtaining a profitable investment.In 1893, the Sumitomo family bought the Shoshi Coal Mine and, for the first time participated in coal mining. Further, the next year the Sumitomo family succeeded in purchasing the Tadakuma Coal Mine which was regarded as very promising in the Chikuho Coalfield, and then opened a place of business in Wakamatsu (coal trading center).Business results at these three places were very favorable because the years 1894 and 1895 were the boom years due to the Sino-Japanese War. In a few years after starting its business, the business organization of coal mining was arranged in order, and at this point the Sumitomo family acquired a position as one of the leading coal-mine owners in the chikuho district. But, afterwards coal mining business of the Sumitomo family couldn't show a substantial development because of its failure to get other promising coal mines from the latter half of 1890's to the first decade of the 20th century, in addition to the Tadakuma Coal Mine.As mentioned above, in this paper we made an attempt to observe the managerial characteristics of the formative process in coal mining business of the Sumitomo family.

著者

老川 慶喜

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.2, pp.84-103, 1980-08-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

石垣 信浩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.3, pp.1-23,i, 1980-12-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The Miners' Gild (Knappschaft) in the Ruhr district was set up by Frederick the Great at the end of the eighteenth century. The members of the Gild were given many privileges such as an exemption of military services by the prussian government. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ruhr miners lost these privileges, but they got the qualification for membership of the newly-organized miners' Gild, which could give them priority for employment opportunity. In the regulation of the miners' Gild of 1824, the government specified the punishment clauses. It also trained the miners on the basis of the regulation and prohibited the unskilled to join the miners' Gild. At the same time the government controlled the miners' private life and then the miners were under the tutlage of government officials, especially of the local mining inspectors. As the results, the miners' Gild built up a community which isolated the members from other industrial workers. The miners' community was supported financially with the funds of miners' Gild which gave the miners free medical care. In the 1830's and the 1840's, however, the miners' community gradually lost its effectiveness to organize the miners due to the development of the Ruhr coal-mining industry, an increase in the number of labors, especially of the daily hired labors, and the growing influence of the mineowners (Gewerke) over the miners.

著者

済藤 友明

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.3, pp.24-47,ii, 1980-12-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Three major questions faced the American Petroleum Industry on the eve of the twentieth century. The first involved the vast new sources of supply of crude oil. After 1900 the Gulf Coast, Mid-Continent, and California oil fields were simultaneously opened up. The second related to the changing composition of consumer demand for petroleum products. The spread of electricity for light was rapidly reducing the demand for kerosene. On the other hand, the new demand for fuel oil and gasoline was sharply expanding. The third was associated with the dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911 by the Supreme Court. As A.D. Chandler, Jr. pointed out, Standard Oil had become a fully integrated enterprise by the early 1890's. In the next two decades challenges to Standard's dominance came from the other integrated enterprises such as the Texas Company, Gulf Oil Corporation organizing after the turn of the century. They had already become large integrated enterprises operating in all basic functions of the oil industry befor 1911. The general incorporation laws of the Texas state did not authorise incorporation for two distinct business purposes. The Texas Company had failed to gain sanction for producing and pipeline activities under one charter, then was organized as a pipeline company. But the Texas Company engaged in integrated operations through control of separetely incorporated producing companies. Within a decade it decided to construct its own refinery, and then moved into marketing. Despite the threat of strictly enforced state incorporation and antitrust laws which might have restricted that relationship, the Texas Company, in a practical sense, was capable of integrated petroleum operations from its inception. In 1917, the state legislature passed the so-called Texas Company Bill, which permitted fully integrated operations.

著者

中村 青志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.3, pp.48-74,iii, 1980-12-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Founded by Okura Kihachiro in the early Meiji period, the Okura zaibatsu did business with the government and the military during the period, and accumulated wealth through its foreign trade activities. From late Meiji through the Taisho period, it carried out a vigorous policy of diversification. One area into which it moved was mining, it ran coal and metal mining operation both at home and overseas. It also invested in numerous activities in China, beginning with mining and forestry, and also lent funds to political authorities there. As, a result, the zaibatsu saw tremendous expansion in the Taisho period, particularly in its three major fields-trade, construction and mining. But with the recession in the early Showa period and with the chaotic political situation in China, Okura run up substantial losses. Faced with meager profits and a lack of investment capital, the zaibatsu was unable to invest in any new areas, including heavy industry. Growth for Okura was severely restricted and the gap between it and Mitsui and Mitsubishi widened considerably.

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.3, pp.75-88, 1980-12-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

廣山 謙介

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.3, pp.89-99, 1980-12-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

大東 英祐

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.111-120, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

森川 英正 湯沢 威

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.121-130, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

柴 孝夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.28-53,ii, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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From the second half of Taisho Era to the beginning of Showa Era, many firms loosely carried out strategies for expansion and for that reason they collapsed. Kawasaki Dockyard Co., Ltd. was a typical case of them.The company had acquired huge profit during the First World War. But its management became worse in the second half of Taisho Era, because the company excessively carried out strategies for expansion in the depression. Moreover, in the process, the company excessively depended on its main bank. This bank was Jugo Bank. Therefore, when Jugo Bank had collapsed in the Monetary Crisis in 1927, Kawasaki Shipkyard Co., Ltd. collapsed too. The process of this collapse of the company was a typical case of many management collapses in this age. However, the process of settlement of the company differed from those of other collapsed firms. Because the company had an important position in the Japanese national defense program, and Jugo Bank, the main bank of the company, too had special position in the Japanese financial circles.This article traces this process of the collapse and settlement in Kawasaki Shipyard Co., Ltd..

著者

宮本 又郎 廣山 謙介

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.54-80,iii, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The House of Konoike is known as one of the most powerful merchant houses of Tokugawa Japan. The history of the Konoike in the course of Japan's industrialization has been often compared with that of the Mitsui : the former as an unsuccessful case, and the latter as a successful one.This paper is an attempt to shed more light on the modern history of the Konoike, with special reference to the following questions. In what branch of economic activity was the accumlated capital of the Konoike invested, in response to changing scene of national economy during the Meiji-Showa Eras? What kinds of business policy were pursued during the period? What kinds of result did the investment and the policy bring on the Konoike and the Konoike Bank? How were the traditional House system and the managerial organization altered to adjust new environment? What kinds of role did the employed manager, such as Michio Doi, Hisashi Shimamura and Jiro Harada, play in the modernization of the Konoike? By examining these questions, the writers intend to make clear the causes of the Konoike's failure to be brought up as a first class zaibatsu.In conclusion, the business activities of the Konoike since the beginning of Meiji era can be divided into three phases. The first phase (1868-1896) can be explained as the periodd of diversification. The second (1897-1919) can be characterized as the period of specialization in banking. During this period, the Konoike Bank, which was established in 1900 in the form of unlimited parthership and wad reorganized in the form of corporation in 1919, became the only enterprise that the Konoike controlled directly. Conservative behavior under the leadership of Jiro Harada, an employed manager, was another characteristic feature in this period. In the third phase (1920-1933), a holding company, the Konoike Gomei, was established in 1921 and the Konoike Bank was separated from the Konoike family. The Konoike Gomei was more eager about diversification and about holding stocks of various companies in this period than in the preceding period. In this sense, one might reckon the establishment of the Konoike Gomei as an indicator which shows the formation of the Konoike zaibatsu. This is, however, an outward look. The timing of the shift from specialization policy to diversification one was too late and each share of stock held by the Konoike Gomei was generally too small to control the management of each company. Consequently, the Konoike failed to grow up as a first class zaibatsu and remained to be a mere wealthy family.

著者

千田 稔

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.81-110,iv, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of “Hansai-shobun” (藩債処分, the adoption and rejection of feudal debts) upon the Osadas (長田家, a big merchant in Osaka), and to take a general view of the reasons why many big merchants in Osaka declined after the Meiji Restoration and why the Finance Ministry decreed “Kawasegata” (為替方, the semi official organ having charge of revenue and expenditure of the Government) to place mortgage equal to the Government money on deposit in the 7th year of Meiji. The author begins this analysis by considering the influence upon them of “Ginme-haishi” (銀目廃止, the abolition of the silver standard in Osaka), for it was the first policy overtaking the Osaka merchants.In spite of being many studies about the merchants who tided over the upheaval of the Meiji Restoration and afterward became “Zaibatsu” (財閥, the big financial combine), there have been so far few studies about the merchants who couldn't do so.The conclusions of this article are following.First. Some causes that made the Osadas decline are (1) “Ginme-haishi”, (2) “Haihan-chiken” (廃藩置県, the abolition of feudal clans and the establishment of prefectures), (3) the decree to repay the Government the money of pre- “Hans, ” (4) the decree to repay the Government its money on deposit, and (5) “Hansai-shobun” ((イ) freezing of credits, (ロ) rejection of feudal debts, and (ハ) the current price of “Shin-Kyu Kosai” [新旧公債, new and old national bonds] being below face value). It is sure that the Osadas succeeded in tiding over (1), (2), (3), and (イ) of (5), but the Osadas couldn't obtain the new base of profit by managing jointly “Horaisha” (蓬莱社, a kind of bank), not only because, of the way of tiding over them but because of (4) and (ロ), (ハ) of (5). As a result the Osadas were compelled to decline.Among them the greatest causes are (ロ), (ハ) of (5), for the Osadas, who had a great amount of “Hansai” and nearly the half of whose “Hansai” were rejected, had overcome the monetary stringency, looking forward to the delivery of all “Hansai”.From this analysis, the author would like to take the general view as to the big merchants in Osaka that they were at first divided into the declining group and enduring group because of (1), but the latter were divided again into such two groups according to the influence of (4) and (ロ), (ハ) of (5) upon them in proportion to the degree of holding and embezzling the Government money, the degree of borrowed money in “Hansai”, and the degree of the other borrowed money.Secondly. The policy of the Finance Ministry to do with the Osadas after (4) was remarkably generous notwithstanding the embezzlement of the Government money. The Finance Ministry gave the Osadas convenience to maintain the family name.This is not only owing to the sympathy for the old illustrious family, but also owing to the inevitable circumstance for the Government to require big merchants such as the Osadas as “Kawasegata”. The Government was also to blame for that embezzlement. And the great amount of the loss of the Government money embezzled by Yamashiroya (山城屋), the Mitanis (三谷家), and the Takagis (高木家) as well as the Osadas made the Finance Ministry decide the reformation of the loose connection between the Government finance and “Kawasegata”. Thus the Finance Ministry decreed to place mortgage equal to the Government money on deposit in the 7th year of Meiji.

著者

藤田 貞一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.2, pp.1-29,i, 1980-08-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This article describes the rise and fall of what might be termed a local zaibatsu which was founded by Terada Jinyomo (1853-1931). During the Tokugawa era, the Terada family manufactured sake just south of Osaka in the Kishiwada district of Senshu, where cotton spinning had long been practical as a subsidiary industry in agricultural households.During the Meiji period, Terada Jinyomo invested profits from sake manufacture in many new industries, such as spinning, banking, and railroad construction. In 1894, he established Kishiwada Cotton Spinning Co. Ltd., which was to become the most successful of his new ventures, especially in the rapidly expanding China market.Terada Jinyomo was born into a large family. He had six brothers and a sister, but all but one of these brothers, Motokichi, were step brothers born after Jinyomo's mother remarried following the death of the first husband. Significantly, Jinyomo excluded not only his step-brothers and their families but also his very talented and fullblooded brother, Motokichi, from the Terada Holding Company established in December 1920 after the spinning company had reaped unprecedented profits during world war One. Jinyomo allowed only members of his own nuclear family, that is himself, his wife, and their children, to become stockholders in the newly founded holding company. His brother, Motokichi, followed his lead by setting up his own holding company, the Sano Cotton Spinning Company, with his own nuclear family members as stockholders in the same month and year.Jinyomo's decision to separate himself from his more distant relatives and to not rely on lineage ties proved to be a fatal errors because although he had bought property in Shanghai in 1923 in the hope of establishing there, this plan was never realized. At home, he failed to make the switch to manufacturing newer products like rayon.Perhaps Jinyomo was more narrow-minded and conservative than he himself believed or understood.