著者
松永 泰行 Colak Vakkas 貫井 万里 横田 貴之 鈴木 啓之
出版者
東京外国語大学
雑誌
国際共同研究加速基金(国際共同研究強化(B))
巻号頁・発行日
2021-10-07

本研究計画は、国家・政治と宗教的ナショナリズムの研究で未開拓な分野といえる、多民族多宗教国家下で競合するナショナリズム運動間の共存の様態と、その様態において文化ナショナリズムが果たしうる役割を、現地調査を通じた実証研究で明らかにする。本研究を通じ、主に政治的ナショナリズムの諸相に焦点を当てる既存研究の限界を克服し、そこで不問とされている前提を実証的に検証する。
著者
松永 泰行
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_42-56, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)
参考文献数
35

Why has Iran been refusing to comply with the binding U.N. Security Council resolutions and to halt its uranium enrichment program? Why has the apparent cost that it incurs by defying the international community not deterred Iran from furthering its nuclear program? Why has postrevolutionary Iran been opposing the U.S.-led peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians and made it a rule to counter any U.S. influence in the region?In this article, I posit that postrevolutionary Iran's principled opposition to the U.S. is not just rhetoric or an ideologically-driven self-image, but that it may well be considered its self-constructed strategic cultural proclivity. While mindful not to fall into the trap of essentialist or cultural determinist arguments, I find the concept of strategic culture as a context useful. Following scholars such as Stuart Poore, I posit that decision makers perceive and interpret their strategic environment culturally, while what may be considered their constituted strategic culture give meaning to material factors.As a first step toward identifying postrevolutionary Iran's strategic culture, I examine the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the first head of the postrevolutionary Islamist state, as regards contemporary international relations and the roles of the superpowers therein. Convinced that part of the mission of the Islamic revelation was about providing salvation against oppression and fighting injustice, Khomeini went on to construct postrevolutionary Iran's dominant strategic discourse anchored in the perceived obligation to avoid and counter earthly hegemony or domination. Khomeini preached that Iran must resist the “satanic” moves of the both superpowers and find only sanctuary under the banner of Islam. While finding it logical and necessary to build and maintain good neighborly and mutually respectful relations among states, Khomeini ruled out submitting to any international hegemon.Iran in its post-Khomeini period continued to maintain its counterhegemonic stance. Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as the head of the Islamic state of Iran, cultivated its counter-hegemonic strategic culture in part to secure his own authority and build his power base. The strategic alliance constructed between Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved to perpetuate post-Khomeini-era Iran's anti-American strategic culture.In conclusion, I argue that Iran may be best regarded as a counterhegemon, not an aspiring hegemon and that the kind of power that postrevolutionary Iran has found necessary to possess is not the power for hegemony and domination, but the power to resist and persevere. This proclivity helps explain why Iran has continued its nuclear program despite the cost it incurs by defying the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also helps explain why it has maintained its principled anti-U.S. stance for the last three decades. It does not, however, seem logical to conclude that Iran's apparent pursuit of the deterrent capabilities through its nuclear or other programs is directly influenced by its counter-hegemonic strategic culture. The argument, nonetheless, supports a view that Iran's strategic posture is almost exclusively defensive and that its apparent pursuit of the means of deterrence should not necessarily be considered posing a threat to the region or the international community.
著者
松永 泰行
出版者
一般社団法人 日本オリエント学会
雑誌
オリエント (ISSN:00305219)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.2, pp.61-79, 1999 (Released:2010-03-12)

Wilayat-i Faqih (henceforth, WF) as a doctrine justifying the rulership of a faqih was developed almost single-handedly by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) during his exile in Najaf. This doctrine constituted the core of his revolutionary call for the establishment of an Islamic polity by the clerics. After the victory of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the adoption of a constitution incorporating the doctrine of WF, the claim that a faqih as “wali-yi amr” has the God-given right to rule the society and that the people must give obedience to him became a matter of real-world significance. This led not only to the heightened efforts to promote the doctrine but also to further theorization and the resultant different interpretations.The key question then became: by whose sanction is the faqih entitled to such commanding authority? On this question (which is technically called the issue of mansha'-i mashru'iyat-i WF), two opposing views were developed among the disciple-followers of Imam Khomeini. They were the intisabi (or mashru'iyat-i ilahi-yi bila-wasitah) view on the one hand, and the intikhabi (or mashru'iyat-i ilahi-mardumi) one on the other, and it was the former that has prevailed.The purpose of this article is two-fold: first to examine the original doctrine of WF as advocated by Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf in the early years of the 1970s; then to examine the two opposing views —-intisabi and intikhabi— on the source of the legitimacy of WF which were developed in Iran after the establishment of the Islamic Republic there. The article ends with some comparison and critical analysis of the two views.
著者
酒井 啓子 松永 泰行 石戸 光 五十嵐 誠一 末近 浩太 山尾 大 高垣 美智子 落合 雄彦 鈴木 絢女 帯谷 知可
出版者
千葉大学
雑誌
新学術領域研究(研究領域提案型)
巻号頁・発行日
2016-06-30

総括班はグローバル関係学を新学術領域として確立することを目的とし、分担者や公募研究者、領域外の若手研究者にグローバル関係学の視座を理解しその分析枠組みをもとに研究を展開するよう推進することに力点をおいて活動を行っている。H29年度には、領域代表の酒井、計画研究A01代表の松永、計画研究B02分担者の久保が全体研究会や国内の研究シンポジウムなどでそれぞれがグローバル関係学の試論を報告、各界からコメントを受けて学理のブラッシュアップに努めた。そこでは1)グローバル関係学が、関係/関係性に焦点を絞り、その関係/関係性の静態的・固定的特徴を見るのではなく、なんらかの出来事や変化、表出する現象をとりあげ、そこで交錯するさまざまな関係性を分析すること、2)グローバル関係学がとらえる関係が単なる主体と主体の間の単線的/一方方向的関係ではなく、さまざまな側面で複合的・複層的な関係性を分析すること、を共通合意とすることが確認された。それを踏まえて9月以降、領域内の分担者に対して、いかなる出来事を観察対象とするか、主体間の単線的ではない関係性をいかに解明するか、そしていかなる分析手法を用いてそれを行うかを課題として、個別の研究を進めるよう促した。多様な関係性が交錯する出来事にはさまざまな事例が考えられるが、その一つに難民問題がある。計画研究ごとに閉じられた研究ではなく領域として横断的研究を推進するため、計画研究横断プロジェクトとして移民難民研究プロジェクトを立ち上げた。また、総括班主導で確立したグローバル関係学の学理を国際的にも発信していくため、国際活動支援班と協働しながら、海外での国際会議を積極的に実施している。H29年度はシンガポール国立大学中東研究所と共催で同大学にて国際シンポGlobal Refugee Crisesを実施、グローバル関係学の骨子を提示して海外の研究者への発信とした。
著者
松永 泰行
出版者
学術雑誌目次速報データベース由来
雑誌
オリエント (ISSN:00305219)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.2, pp.87-103, 2001

Within the various theoretical perspectives of Islam, the issue of legitimacy of rule has traditionally been dealt with most notably as that of legitimate ruler. This apparently holds true in the both cases of the theory of the Sunni caliphate, and that of the Shi'ite infallible Imamate. The contemporary debate in the Islamic Republic of Iran over the differing perspectives on the sources of legitimacy of the rule of the jurist (<i>wilayat-i faqih</i>), on which I have previously published an article in this journal, was no exception.<br>In this article, I will further consider the question of legitimacy in Islamic rule by examining the contemporary debate in the Islamic Republic of Iran with the following steps. First, I will start the examination with bearing the following question in mind, that is, is it still convincingly arguable that the issue of legitimacy of rule in an Islamic regime can be adequately dealt with by considering who is the legitimate ruler, even after the establishment of an regime called &ldquo;Islamic republic&rdquo; in Iran? Second, I will attempt to enlarge the scope of the investigation by examining two articles written by Sa'id Hajjarian (b. 1954), a leading non-clerical theoretician of Iran today.<br>After carefully reading the two articles published in <i>Rahbord</i> and '<i>Asr-e Ma</i>, respectively, I will preliminarily conclude that with the establishment of the Islamic Republic, a new perspective on the issue of legitimacy of rule in Islam, that is, the issue of the legitimacy of the <i>regime</i> has been successfully brought into the debate, and that very interestingly, this normative concept concerning the nature of the regime takes a logical precedence over the legitimacy of the ruler in the argument of Sa'id Hajjarian. The article ends with a note that in a future examination, I intend to further critically examine the so-called <i>intikhabi</i> perspective of the legitimacy of the <i>wilayat-i faqih</i> system in light of the expanded debate on the issue.
著者
松永 泰行
出版者
一般社団法人 日本オリエント学会
雑誌
オリエント (ISSN:00305219)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.2, pp.61-79, 1999

<i>Wilayat-i Faqih</i> (henceforth, <i>WF</i>) as a doctrine justifying the rulership of a <i>faqih</i> was developed almost single-handedly by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) during his exile in Najaf. This doctrine constituted the core of his revolutionary call for the establishment of an Islamic polity by the clerics. After the victory of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the adoption of a constitution incorporating the doctrine of <i>WF</i>, the claim that a <i>faqih</i> as &ldquo;<i>wali-yi amr</i>&rdquo; has the God-given right to rule the society and that the people must give obedience to him became a matter of real-world significance. This led not only to the heightened efforts to promote the doctrine but also to further theorization and the resultant different interpretations.<br>The key question then became: by whose sanction is the <i>faqih</i> entitled to such commanding authority? On this question (which is technically called the issue of <i>mansha'-i mashru'iyat-i WF</i>), two opposing views were developed among the disciple-followers of Imam Khomeini. They were the <i>intisabi</i> (or <i>mashru'iyat-i ilahi-yi bila-wasitah</i>) view on the one hand, and the <i>intikhabi</i> (or <i>mashru'iyat-i ilahi-mardumi</i>) one on the other, and it was the former that has prevailed.<br>The purpose of this article is two-fold: first to examine the original doctrine of <i>WF</i> as advocated by Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf in the early years of the 1970s; then to examine the two opposing views &mdash;-<i>intisabi</i> and <i>intikhabi</i>&mdash; on the source of the legitimacy of <i>WF</i> which were developed in Iran after the establishment of the Islamic Republic there. The article ends with some comparison and critical analysis of the two views.
著者
松永 泰行
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.141, pp.1-9,L5, 2005

This issue, comprising of eight research articles and one review article, is focused on &ldquo;the Middle East in International Relations&rdquo; and comes in the midst of another structural change in the international environment of the Middle East. The previous change resulted from the collapse of the Cold War structure on the global level. Although the change affected globally, the Middle East was one of the first to experience its impact through the way the transregional actors reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The current structural change, however, is more specific to the region and relates to the latter's relationship with the only remaining superpower, the United States. This time, the change followed the 9/11 attack, which is said to have forced the U. S. policy-makers to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the U. S. and the Middle Eastern states and societies. How this change in international relations will affect the Middle East as a whole and a multitude of state and subnational actors in the region remains to be seen. Yet the transformative processes apparently have already been under way.<br>The articles assembled here differ from one another in their perspective on the Middle East. Some examine recent developments; others focus on historical relations. For the purpose of this introduction, three different perspectives can be identified.<br>The first perspective concerns the relations between the only superpower and actors in the Middle East. The United States, as a transregional actor, stands out in its resources and capacity and is capable of entering into relations with a host of state and subnational actors in the region. Sakai's article adopts this perspective and examines the mutually collaborative relationships between the U. S. Government and a number of anti-Hussein Iraqi groups before and after the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.<br>The second perspective concerns some types of intra-regional dynamics and developments. Tateyama examines the post-Oslo Accord Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Matsumoto assesses the state of democratization in the region by comparing the party systems in ten Arab states. Yamamoto examines nine Arab states in terms of their policies on controlling internet connections. Kashima's review article examines four theoretically-informed monographs on regional intra-state relations.<br>The third perspective concerns the Middle East as a foreign policy issue. Three articles by Hanzawa, Takayasu, and Okuda, examine British foreign policy historically during separate time periods. All, however, focus on England's dealings with another foreign power of the time on the matters relating to the greater Middle East.
著者
松永 泰行
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_42-56, 2012

Why has Iran been refusing to comply with the binding U.N. Security Council resolutions and to halt its uranium enrichment program? Why has the apparent cost that it incurs by defying the international community not deterred Iran from furthering its nuclear program? Why has postrevolutionary Iran been opposing the U.S.-led peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians and made it a rule to counter any U.S. influence in the region?<br>In this article, I posit that postrevolutionary Iran's principled opposition to the U.S. is not just rhetoric or an ideologically-driven self-image, but that it may well be considered its self-constructed strategic cultural proclivity. While mindful not to fall into the trap of essentialist or cultural determinist arguments, I find the concept of strategic culture as a context useful. Following scholars such as Stuart Poore, I posit that decision makers perceive and interpret their strategic environment culturally, while what may be considered their constituted strategic culture give meaning to material factors.<br>As a first step toward identifying postrevolutionary Iran's strategic culture, I examine the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the first head of the postrevolutionary Islamist state, as regards contemporary international relations and the roles of the superpowers therein. Convinced that part of the mission of the Islamic revelation was about providing salvation against oppression and fighting injustice, Khomeini went on to construct postrevolutionary Iran's dominant strategic discourse anchored in the perceived obligation to avoid and counter earthly hegemony or domination. Khomeini preached that Iran must resist the &ldquo;satanic&rdquo; moves of the both superpowers and find only sanctuary under the banner of Islam. While finding it logical and necessary to build and maintain good neighborly and mutually respectful relations among states, Khomeini ruled out submitting to any international hegemon.<br>Iran in its post-Khomeini period continued to maintain its counterhegemonic stance. Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as the head of the Islamic state of Iran, cultivated its counter-hegemonic strategic culture in part to secure his own authority and build his power base. The strategic alliance constructed between Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved to perpetuate post-Khomeini-era Iran's anti-American strategic culture.<br>In conclusion, I argue that Iran may be best regarded as a counterhegemon, not an aspiring hegemon and that the kind of power that postrevolutionary Iran has found necessary to possess is not the power for hegemony and domination, but the power to resist and persevere. This proclivity helps explain why Iran has continued its nuclear program despite the cost it incurs by defying the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also helps explain why it has maintained its principled anti-U.S. stance for the last three decades. It does not, however, seem logical to conclude that Iran's apparent pursuit of the deterrent capabilities through its nuclear or other programs is directly influenced by its counter-hegemonic strategic culture. The argument, nonetheless, supports a view that Iran's strategic posture is almost exclusively defensive and that its apparent pursuit of the means of deterrence should not necessarily be considered posing a threat to the region or the international community.
著者
松永 泰行
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.141, pp.1-9,L5, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
10

This issue, comprising of eight research articles and one review article, is focused on “the Middle East in International Relations” and comes in the midst of another structural change in the international environment of the Middle East. The previous change resulted from the collapse of the Cold War structure on the global level. Although the change affected globally, the Middle East was one of the first to experience its impact through the way the transregional actors reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The current structural change, however, is more specific to the region and relates to the latter's relationship with the only remaining superpower, the United States. This time, the change followed the 9/11 attack, which is said to have forced the U. S. policy-makers to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the U. S. and the Middle Eastern states and societies. How this change in international relations will affect the Middle East as a whole and a multitude of state and subnational actors in the region remains to be seen. Yet the transformative processes apparently have already been under way.The articles assembled here differ from one another in their perspective on the Middle East. Some examine recent developments; others focus on historical relations. For the purpose of this introduction, three different perspectives can be identified.The first perspective concerns the relations between the only superpower and actors in the Middle East. The United States, as a transregional actor, stands out in its resources and capacity and is capable of entering into relations with a host of state and subnational actors in the region. Sakai's article adopts this perspective and examines the mutually collaborative relationships between the U. S. Government and a number of anti-Hussein Iraqi groups before and after the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.The second perspective concerns some types of intra-regional dynamics and developments. Tateyama examines the post-Oslo Accord Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Matsumoto assesses the state of democratization in the region by comparing the party systems in ten Arab states. Yamamoto examines nine Arab states in terms of their policies on controlling internet connections. Kashima's review article examines four theoretically-informed monographs on regional intra-state relations.The third perspective concerns the Middle East as a foreign policy issue. Three articles by Hanzawa, Takayasu, and Okuda, examine British foreign policy historically during separate time periods. All, however, focus on England's dealings with another foreign power of the time on the matters relating to the greater Middle East.
著者
酒井 啓子 飯塚 正人 保坂 修司 松本 弘 井上 あえか 河野 毅 末近 浩太 廣瀬 陽子 横田 貴之 松永 泰行 青山 弘之 落合 雄彦 廣瀬 陽子 横田 貴之
出版者
東京外国語大学
雑誌
基盤研究(A)
巻号頁・発行日
2006

9-11事件以降、(1) 米国の中東支配に対する反米意識の高まり、(2) イスラエルのパレスチナ攻撃に対するアラブ、イスラーム社会での連帯意識、(3) 国家機能の破綻に伴う代替的社会サービス提供母体の必要性、を背景として、トランスナショナルなイスラーム運動が出現した。それはインターネット、衛星放送の大衆的普及によりヴァーチャルな領域意識を生んだ。また国家と社会運動の相互暴力化の結果、運動が地場社会から遊離し、トランスナショナルな暴力的運動に化す場合がある。