著者

細谷 千博

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.58, pp.69-85,L4, 1978-03-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

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The essay is aimed at exploring, on the basis of the British archives at Public Record Office, as well as of the Japanese Foreign Office archives, an attempt for improving Anglo-Japanese relations in 1934 in the form of the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact.Whereas the development of talks concerning the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact is examined, an emphasis is placed upon an analysis of domestic political processes in both countries in which their foreign policies of restoring old friendly ties were pursued.The essay finds its another feature in employing an analytical framework of looking into interaction processes of three countries-Japan, Britain and the U. S. —at that time.

著者

戸部 良一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.71, pp.124-140,L11, 1982

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The aim of this paper is to examine SHIRATORI Toshio's views and thoughts on Japan's foreign relations, as one of the typical advocates of Kodo Diplomacy in the 1930's. The main reason why his diplomatic thought should be the subject of careful study lies in the fact that he was regarded as a "philosopher" of Japanese diplomacy by the younger bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and he influenced their thoughts and behaviors.<br>With the impact of the Manchurian Incident, SHIRATORI began to declare that Japan should return to Asia. He attacked the evils of Western Civilization and denounced the Washington Treaty System as an international order in the Far East which symbolized the interests of the Occidental (especially Anglo-Saxon) powers, though he had not challenged it in the 1920's. Then he sought an ideological basis to guide Japanese diplomacy, and tried to construct a conceptual framework of a New World Order based upon Japanese morals and interests.<br>At first he looked upon Soviet Russia as the arch enemy whose influences had to be driven out of the Far East. But, as Japan had been bogged down in a war of attrition with China since 1937, he refrained from saying that Russia was the enemy of Japan and the other peoples of Asia. He stressed the global confrontation between the "have" countries, which championed the Popular Front, and the "have not" countries, whose ideological basis was totalitarianism. His search for a new moral world order was joined with Nazi Germany's world view. He began to advocate the tripartite alliance among Germany, Italy and Japan, and then a quadruple one between these three powers and Russia. Britain, which he had regarded earlier as a partner of Japan in driving out Russia from the Far East, became his (and Japan's, in his view) arch enemy. At last he emphasized the wickedness of Jewish financial capitalism which ruled the Anglo-Saxon powers, and in the spring of 1941 he predicted that a war between Japan and the United States would be inevitable, though he was suffering from mental ill health at that time.<br>Did his attempt and effort to seek an ideological or moral basis for Japanese diplomacy achieve satisfactory results? This question is answered in the conclusion of this paper.

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.139, pp.144-158,L15, 2004-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

63

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In the midst of the Pacific War, SHINOBU Junpei, international lawyer and diplomatic historian, provided a bold speech at the general assembly of the Japan Association of International Law. Reflecting his experiences in studying and teaching international law of war for more than thirty years, Shinobu cautioned the audience about the rapid decline of obedience to international law after the Sino-Japanese War amongst Japanese. Although making the least reservation for fear of censorship during the wartime, Shinobu undeniably had presented his keen anxiety about the decreasing effectiveness of international law of war as restrainer to the total war. Did practices and norms of the classical diplomacy including international law of war remain relevant to international order during the interwar years? If they still had relevance, how could they be applied to Japanese diplomacy in the different situation from the pre-W. W. I era? This article intends to shed lights on the ambivalent attitude of Japanese intellectuals toward international order during the interwar years who had still believed in the classical diplomacy even after W. W. I with special reference to the case of Shinobu Junpei.In the historiography of Japanese studies of international politics, Shinobu is known for his pioneering works, “International Politics” published in the mid-1920's. Investigating those works, the first chapter analyzes how Shinobu perceived the trend of the “New Diplomacy.” While skeptical about the Wilsonian idealism, Shinobu regarded the “democratization of diplomacy” as the trend of “national diplomacy” which had increasingly gained currency in Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. In this sense, like H. Nicolson's classical work on diplomacy, Shinobu's works tried to tame the “New Diplomacy.”Given those perceptions, Shinobu had published a series of essays arguing how Japanese foreign policies were and should be. The second chapter therefore tries to delineate Shinobu's diagnosis of Japanese foreign policies around the Manchurian Incident and evaluate the significance and limits of his legalist approach toward the Manchurian problems with comparison to the cases of ROYAMA Masamichi and KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu, younger political scientists emerging after W. W. I.The third chapter surveys the trend of Japanese studies on international law of war after the Manchurian Incident. Shinobu's persistence in international law of war will be discussed here with comparison to the case of TAOKA Ryoichi who had shared the realist sentiments to international politics in the 1930's. Finally, on the basis of the post-W. W. II recollections, this article depicts how Shinobu viewed the Pacific War manly focusing on his understanding of the relationship between the Renunciation of War Treaty and the Pacific War.

著者

石川 一雄 大芝 亮

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.100, pp.270-285,L20, 1992-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

3

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The objectives of this paper are to figure out what substantive issues and theoretical approaches are receiving scholars' attention in Japan and to present proposals to build a viable transnational community of students of international relations.To avoid writers' personal conceptions of these problems, the following methods were used; first, a questionnaire was addressed to the members of the Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) to bring together JAIR members' perceptions of the problems in 1988. The rate of return was about 27 percent; 329 out of about 1, 200 JAIR members answered the questionnaire. The results of the questionnaire were suggestive.Second, to avoid a gap between perception and behavior, the academic works done by JAIR members were also examined to understand what substantive issues were actively studied and which theoretical approaches were frequently used in research. Third, a research team was organized to examine the result of the questionnaire and the characteristics of international studies made by JAIR members.The result of this research was presented to the Third World Assembly of International Studies held in Williamsburg, Virginia, August 1988. This article is a Japanese version of a summary of the original paper.The first section of this paper explains the objectives and methodology. The second section briefly reviews international studies of Japan before the 1980s. The third section figures out JAIR members' primary fields of research. The fourth section investigates JAIR members' perceptions of the important substantial issues and their works in regard with these issues.The fifth and six sections are devoted to the examination of JAIR members' perceptions on theoreticl approaches, the theoretical characteristics of the works done by JAIR members, and major analytic weakness of research. The seventh section argues the principal users of scholarly research on international questions. The eighth section discusses the way in which Japanese scholars contribute to building a viable transnational community of scholars.

著者

石川 一雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.67, pp.102-124,L5, 1981-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

77

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The American study of international relations since the '60s has been in confusion and disorder. There is no agreement on the future of scientific International Relations, no semblance of a theory nor hope of its development, no agreement about the accumulation of knowledge nor paradigm takeoff, no reliability in the methods nor the data, no credibility in the public domain nor relevance for the foreign policy practitioners.This is another “twenty years crisis” of confidence in the scientific study of International Relations. The crisis is not merely the result of methodological immaturity, but reflects something fundamental about the human world: it concerns the nature of scientific investigation itself.In the first part of this article, the state of the field, in confusion and disorder, is reviewed and described, and A. Lijphart's and J. Rosenau's arguments on the scientific revolution in IR are taken for criticism as a starting point for developing an alternative viewpoint, the focus of which is the intersubjective and common meanings of human behavior.In the latter part, the author looks from an interpretive angle at the study of international relations, refocusing attention on the concrete varieties of cultural meanings in their particularities and complex texture.The main thrust of the whole argument is, somehow, on the American mainstream of thought in International Relations which is pecuriarly scientistic and ethnocentric in its own way.

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.102-118, 1962-04-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

著者

武者小路 公秀

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.42, pp.138-139, 1970-11-01 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

若林 千代

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.10-27,L5, 1999-02-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

73

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In contemporary Okinawan history studies, attention has largely focused on events in the political process of the reversion to Japan in 1972 and thus presenting the image that Okinawan postwar history can be neatly divided into two distinct eras. Recently, however, this premise has been questioned in light of the rape incident of 1995 and recent political issues, which show that pre-1972 problems remain almost three decades later. The U. S. -Japan military security regime has consistently been the main factor that fetters democracy and self-reliance in Okinawa throughout both periods.This thesis proceeds from the premise above, and the author maintain that the basic foundation of relations and issues in postwar Okinawa until the present day originates after the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The U. S. Forces inherited, occupied and developed the military air bases on Ie Island, central and south west coast of Okinawa Island (where U. S. Forces are based now) which the Japanese Army had constructed in the early 1940's. The surviving Okinawans interned in camps in the Northern area were not permitted to return to their homes and rebuild their villages.On 15 August, the U. S. military government established the Advisory Council of Okinawa to rebuild government functions, a body composed of fifteen Okinawan representatives chosen by the Okinawan leaders and the American authorities. Although the Council was an organization hand-picked by the U. S. military government from above and no more than a sup-port group for the occupation, the debates in the Council went beyond the implementation of administrative policies. According to the records, the Council sought “self-government” institutions including the separation of police powers, war reparation from the Japanese government, freedom of speech. and press, popular elections for the democratic governmental body, and the proposition of a constitution for Okinawa. These debates were primarily focused on the situation inherited from Japanese rule, in which the Okinawans became enmeshed in the modern Japanese state system not as a colony, yet as a marginalized group within an imperialist power.The demands for political change, however, did not last long. The events in the weeks after the surrender of Japan between August and October 1945 shuttered them. From late September to early October, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the military bases in Okinawa as a “primary base, ” for possible air base sites in the American overseas base system, and examined the possibility of exclusive rule. The U. S. Military Government in Okinawa changed the orientation of its “self-government” program and ignored the debates formerly discussed by the Advisory Council. Moreover, the military government suppressed freedom of speech and press, the Okinawans' demands to be allowed to return to their villages, and a general election for the governor and gubernatorial elections. The military government regarded the Okinawans as having no experience of living in a “democracy” and therefore the most appropriate form of government in Okinawa was the “prewar political institutions” with its strict controls from above. This, of course, reflected U. S. military strategy as it sought to use Okinawa as a “primary base” and develop a governing structure that would facilitate “exclusive rule” by U. S. Forces.The Okinawan political leaders in the Advisory Council reacted cautiously to the military government and attempted to avoid conflicts with its new ruler. In spite of pressure from the Okinawans for the return of their villages and agricultural land, the Council ignored the petition protests from the leaders of local districts. The Advisory Council finally recognized that the “Nimitz Proclamation”

著者

古田 元夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.99, pp.69-85,L10, 1992-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

28

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The 7th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party held in June 1991 declared that Vietnam would steadily maintain “the road to socialism” in the ongoing crisis of the socialist countries. The Congress emphasized that the Vietnamese should follow this road because this is the road already chosen in the recent history of Vietnam.In the modern history of international poltics, Vietnam has been always left out in the cold. This history of alienation urged the Vietnamese to choose socialism as the “dream” of a better tomorrow. In the era of the cold war, they fought as actual war for this choice. Therefore there is good reason for the Vietnamese not to accept any other road than that of socialism so long as this “memory of history” has not faded away.This view of socialism, however, had become a foundation of the “socialism of sharing poverty”, which broadly equated socialism with people's perseverance in today's poverty for the “dream” of a better tomorrow. Social crises in Vietnam after the Vietnam war resulted in the Vietnamese Communists clear depature from this type of sccialism, which manifested itself in the 6th congress of the Party in 1986 under the slogan of “doi moi”.After the 6th Congress the Vietnamese Communists seemed to sidetrack the problem of the yet-to-be “dream” for the time being and began to concentrate their efforts on reform in the real lives of the people. But this situation did not last long, because the collapse of the socialist regimes, in Eastern Europe has irritated the problem of “dream” among the Vietnamese and has revitalized their “memory of history”.The Vietnamese insistence on the road to socialism, however, seems to be based on much more realistic calculation. The most important task for the Vietnamese is to boost the economy through promoting foreign investment and this task requires political stability. Some of the Vietnamese reformists argue that there is no way other than maintaining the “leading role” of the Communist Party to keep political stability so that the Vietnamese should follow the road to socialism. According to them, maintaining the road to socialism is the most realistic way for the Vietnamese to participate in the capitalist world economy.Other radical reformists are afraid that this opinion equated socialism with the domination of the Communist Party. They advocate the introduction of a pluralistic political system and a much more humanistic type of socialism.

著者

楠 綾子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.174, pp.174_171-174_174, 2015-09-15 (Released:2015-07-28)

著者

進藤 榮一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.85, pp.55-72,L9, 1987

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The recent conservative trend in political science has been accompanied by the emergence of conservative interpretations of the occupation period. Among these revised views, the most conspicuous one is the high appraisal of Yoshida Shigeru, which elucidates Yoshida's politics as mainstream within the postwar Japanese conservative party. Yoshida is now seen as a main figure who contributed to the postwar political stability and economic prosperity of Japan.<br>My close examinations of the first-hand historical materials of the postwar occupation period, such as the diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, however, have led me to question the validity of this conservative interpretation. Moreover, that interpretation contains the following theoretical defects. First, it has somewhat ignored the systemic approach of history. That is to say, this interpretation has underestimated the significance of discontinuity between prewar and postwar Japanese society. Consequently, feudalistic aspects of prewar Japanese society as well as the significance of the democratization of postwar Japanese society have been neglected. Naturally enough, this has led to the neglect of Yoshida's feudalistic values and a tendency to evaluate Yoshida as a liberal-conservative. The conservative interpretation has ignored the fact that Yoshida regarded the USSR as an expansionist state and his anti-communist stance has been somehow ignored.<br>These interpretations have brought about, on the other hand, an oversimplified appraisal of Ashida as an "ultra-nationalist." Accordingly, the importance of the Katayama-Ashida coalition government between the Japanese Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party has not been emphasized adequately in these evaluations of the occupation period. The objective of this article is to attempt a reappraisal of the occupation period, particularly in the period of the coalition government as well as the politics and diplomacy of Ashida. This article is closely based upon the diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, which I recenty co-edited in seven volumes.<br>The article contains the following major points:<br>1. The conservative trend in interpretations of postwar history<br>2. Continuity and discontinuity: the meaning of democratization in the postwar period<br>3. Historian's interpretations of the "Konoye Memorial"<br>4. Ashida's views on world affairs prior to the surrender of Japan<br>5. The complexities of the Japanese constitution-making process<br>6. The rise and fall of the coalition government<br>7. The unknown battle over reform of the Imperial Household<br>8. The partisan struggle for national control of the coal industry<br>9. Economic recovery and the democratization of Japanese society<br>10. A gap in Japanese historiography: A dilemma within Japanese liberalism

著者

浜中 新吾

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.148, pp.43-58,L8, 2007

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A lot of dictatorship have collapsed and made a transition to democratic regimes late the Cold War. However, Middle Eastern states were never experienced with democratization wave. So that, there are scarcely any comparative democratization studies dealt with them. Today, we can understand some peculiar topics or indigenous logic of the Arab politics, because of being recently made advances in area studies of the Middle East. But we tend to think that comparative political research methods are not effective in understanding politics in the Middle East and do not help us to become familiar with it.<br>Lipset's thesis is revaluated and the most popular one that goes with relationship between economic development and democracy after Huntington's democratic third wave. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators tried to renew a modernization theory, then their works help restore confidence of general and comparative theory. However, there is still a paradox that even rich countries do not catch on the path of democratic transition in the Middle East.<br>The rentier state theory is used to explain this paradox why were not Middle Eastern countries democratized. This theory pays attention how much rent, natural resources like oil, natural gas, minerals with which states are able to ensure financial well being, gets support from many political economists. The rent also contains worker's remittance as well as official development assistance from foreign countries. So, a regime without resources may be categorized as a rentier state. A government with affluent rent does not have an incentive to liberalize own politics and societies because it needs not to impose a tax on its people, so the regime is easy to repress dissidents.<br>In this study, I formalize a model of the rentier state theory from Boix-Stokes Modernization model, and then attempt quantitative analyses. My formalized rentier model has a scope of rent seeking activity of governments with fertile natural resources. So the purpose of this research is to shed light on a general effectiveness of the theory as well as to deal with democratic transitions as time passed or not, the Large N Studies is adopt as my research design. The method of quantitative analysis is the Dynamic Probit Model, which Adam Przeworski developed.<br>The result of my study shows that enormous fuel rent tends to suppress democratic transition and promote stability of a dictatorship. But other natural resources and remittance rent have little to do with political transformation. The official development assistance dose not play a role of rent, seems to have a same effect of economic growth for democratization.

著者

菅原 健志

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_44-57, 2012

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After the Great War broke out, Japan's naval and military assistance was an important concern for the British government. Arthur Balfour was the only politician involved in this matter from the beginning to the end of the war. Until he became Foreign Secretary he had little expectation of Japan's assistance. However, the difficult circumstances of the war forced him to review his opinion about the value of Japan's help, as Britain was suffering badly from a shortage of manpower and munitions. As Foreign Secretary he had high hopes of Japan's assistance and did not hesitate to launch negotiations to secure her aid.<br>Balfour sought Japan's naval assistance and eventually succeeded in inducing her to despatch her destroyers to the Mediterranean. The price for this, namely guaranteeing Japanese rights in Shantung and the Pacific islands, was regarded as a permissible concession. The Japanese government, however, expressed disapproval at his request that they sell battle-cruisers to Britain. Balfour promptly put forward a new proposal to borrow the battlecruisers instead, based on his assumption that lending them would be more agreeable to Japan than selling them. He could not conceal his disappointment and dissatisfaction with the Japanese government's refusal to fulfil this modified request. He was not convinced by the reasons the Japanese government presented and criticised Japan's reluctance to help Britain.<br>In seeking Japan's military assistance, Balfour faced two obstacles. One was the difficulty of transporting Japanese troops to the European field. Many troopships would be needed to carry a large number of Japanese soldiers to the western or Salonica front. Britain and the Allied Powers, however, could not afford to allocate so many ships as they had a severe deficit of tonnage. The other obstacle was the need to harmonise the Japanese military campaign with the political interests of Britain and the Allied Powers. Russia did not want to receive Japanese soldiers on the eastern front due to her fear of massive territorial concessions to Japan. Although Balfour considered that Mesopotamia was the most promising theatre from which to deploy Japanese troops, he was obliged to renounce this idea due to strong opposition from the India Office and the Government of India. He continued to seek a location where transportation difficulties could be overcome and which was compatible with the interests of the other powers, and saw Siberia as the most favourable field. Henceforth Japan's military assistance was regarded as the Siberian Intervention, and Balfour continued to tackle this subject.

著者

池本 大輔

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_84-173_97, 2013

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This article argues that we cannot explain the UK's changing stance on European integration without reference to the international monetary strategies pursued by successive British governments. The UK's European policy after the Second World War can be divided into three distinct phases. Immediately after the War, the UK stood aside when the ECSC and EEC were established in 1952 and in 1958 respectively, since maintenance of both the British Empire and the 'special relationship' with the US was regarded as the priority. In the second phase, by making a formal application to the EEC in 1961, the UK turned away from the Empire and drew closer to Europe; by the 1970s, the special relationship appeared to have disappeared. The UK's entry into the EEC in 1973, however, did not lead to her policy being aligned with that of the other member-states. To this day, the UK remains an awkward partner in the integration project, a fact most clearly evidenced by her opt-out from the single currency, the euro. Moreover, the special relationship with the US appeared to revive once Margaret Thatcher took office in 1979; and all recent British governments, regardless of their political composition, have claimed to serve as a bridge between the US and Europe.<br>These twists and turns in the UK's European policy can be at least partly explained by her changing strategy in international monetary affairs. After the War, the British government set out initially to restore the international status of the pound sterling worldwide, a policy that precluded participation in a scheme like the EEC, whose main purpose was trade liberalisation within Europe. Once this strategy ended in failure with the devaluation of the pound in 1967, the<b> </b>British government was faced with a choice. It could, within the framework of European monetary integration, end the reserve currency status of the pound, which was hampering the UK's economic growth and leaving her financially dependent on the US. If successful, this strategy would have obviated both the legacy of Empire and financial dependence on the US at one go, and made the UK very much a 'part of Europe'. The alternative was to sustain the international status of the US dollar and American hegemony in international finance by encouraging the development of the so-called Euro-dollar market in London. Both the Heath and Callaghan governments pursued the first strategy in the 1970s, but to no avail, due to a lack of domestic support. The Thatcher government subsequently chose the second route and restored a close partnership with the US; this strategy, however, precluded the UK's participation in the process of European monetary integration.

著者

大嶋 えり子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_103-184_116, 2016

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<p>Recognising memories of past perpetrations or not is often an issue connected with responsibility and reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This has been for a long time an issue vexing French authorities.</p><p>In the 1990's, French government and parliament began to recognise memories related to the colonisation and the independence war of Algeria. Although French authorities had kept silent on those dark events to which many fell victim on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, they started to recognise memories related to Algeria by erecting memorials, opening museums and making laws.</p><p>This article aims at elucidating why the French parliament made laws recognising memories related to Algeria. Making memory-related laws, called "memory laws (lois mémorielles)", is a particular way to France to recognise certain perceptions of the past, and is different from other memory recognitions as it has a binding force.</p><p>I thus considered two laws, made in respectively 1999 and 2005. The law passed in 1999, that I will call the "Algerian war law", replaces the term "the operations in North Africa" with "the Algerian war or the battles in Tunisia and Morocco" in the French legislative lexicon. It officially recognises that the conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 was a war, whereas it has been long reckoned to be a domestic operation aiming at maintaining order. The law enacted in 2005, that I will call the "repatriate law", pays homage to former French settlers in Algeria for their achievements and emphasises the "positive role of the French presence abroad".</p><p>This study shows that those two laws were made in order to reinforce national cohesion among French people, instead of fostering dialogue between Algerians and French. By examining the wording and the law making processes of the two acts in question, especially the debates conducted at the National Assembly, it sheds light on how French elected representatives tried not to acknowledge France's responsibility for the damages caused during the colonisation and the independence war and how they attached little importance to reconciliation with Algeria. Both laws indeed do not contain memories of Algerian people harmed under French rule, except some parts of the memory of Harkis, who fought with the French army during the war.</p><p>The recognition of memories by official authorities of former perpetrators has significant repercussions and can encourage reconciliation between antagonists. It however tends to avert eyes from victims'memories in France when the past related to Algeria is in question. Issues connected with memory do not only concern relations between France and Algeria, but also involve the larger question of how to remember perpetrations caused by discriminatory policies and how to overcome them to accede to reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.</p>

著者

南山 淳

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.155-169,L16, 1999-02-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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“The Okinawa problem” has always been treated as a dependent variable of the U. S. -Japan alliance under the Cold War structure. This bilateral alliance being intended to enhance Japan's national security, has caused various problems dne to the concentration of U. S. bases in Okinawa which are accepted as a “security cost.” In the field of security studies, the base problem in Okinawa has been considered exclusively a domestic problem which is confined in the context of domestic politics.After the end of the Cold War, however, the rape incident by U. S. soldiers in 1995, triggered, a burst of anti-base sentiment of the Okinawa people dramatically. It was the biggest protest held by the local people whose lives had been threatend in the name of “national security.” For the Okinawa people, the existence of the U. S. bases has been security threat to their lives.This essay is intended to examine, based on the development of security studies after the Cold War, a strained and conflicting relationship of the U. S. -Japan alliance between national security concept and individual/human security concept concerning Okinawa. The first Perspective is to clarify theoretically a strained relationship between national security and individual/human security by examining the debate on “Redefining Security.” The latter Perspective is to discuss “Critical Security Studies” which recently has been developed as a human-centred security studies interms of the correlation between subject and object.Consequently, from the view point of “Critical Security Studies, ” a theoretical framework in which security issues such as the Okinawa problem are disscussed will be presented. The central question is how “security as essentially contested concepts” should be grasped in the post-Cold war era.

著者

西村 邦行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_34-47, 2012

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Political scientists have usually considered E. H. Carr as a pioneer of the academic field of International Relations (IR). Given this understanding is tenable, in which historical context did he establish a new discipline?<br>In the early twentieth century, Max Weber discerned in the emergence of bureaucratic institutions an idiosyncratic phase of modern instrumental rationalism. The currently acknowledged form of academic divisions was at best contestable when Carr wrote his monumental <i>The Twenty Years' Crisis</i> (1939). Indeed, Carr was a multifaceted scholar: sometimes, he was an advocate of political realism; other times, he was the author of the controversial historical studies on Soviet Russia; yet other times, he was a biographer of nineteenth century thinkers. It is a grave mistake to recognize Carr exclusively either as historian, political scientist, or biographer.<br>The chief objective of the present article is to situate Carr in the context of the emergence of professional intellectuals, and thus clarify the meaning of the popular understanding that he was one of the pioneering figures of IR. This author focuses on his early works: <i>Dostoevsky</i> (1931), <i>The Romantic Exiles</i> (1933), <i>Karl Marx</i> (1934) and <i>Michael Bakunin</i> (1937). Compared with his texts in the two decades around the middle of the twentieth century, these works have not occasioned much scholarly interest among IR researchers. One of the main reasons of this ignorance is probably their apparent irrelevance to the study of international relations. As I see it, however, Carr's inquiry into international relations was a continuation of his project he advanced in his biographical works. Through his exposure to the untraditional thoughts of nineteenth-century Russian (and Russia-related) intellectuals, Carr obtained a historical view that the modern western world was in radical transformation. On the other hand, Carr discerned various European elements within the apparently unfamiliar Russian thoughts. Carr's project was ultimately a remedial self-critique of Europe. Carr's search for alternative cultural value ended up reattaching him to his familiar liberal world.<br>By suggesting these points, the present article aims to add another contribution to the recent reinterpretations of Carr. It also directs our attentions to the issue of contexts in general for further advancing our knowledge about the history of international studies as well as Carr's relevance to the contemporary world.

著者

油井 大三郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.104, pp.183-186, 1993-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

稲生 典太郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.26, pp.72-87, 1964

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.166, pp.166_156-159, 2011