著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.116, pp.172-176, 1997

著者

岡本 次郎

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.152, pp.188-191, 2008-03

著者

渡邊 啓貴

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.167, pp.1-13, 2012-01

著者

山田 高敬

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.137, pp.45-65,L9, 2004-06-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

75

被引用文献数

1

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The challenges of global governance in the contemporary world are becoming increasingly complex in that solutions to many global issues ranging from poverty alleviation to environmental protection require the reformulation of the relationships among many competing policy goals. To the extent that such a reformulation of policy goals requires a change in a global public order (GPO), what makes the transformation of a GPO possible? More importantly, what kind of social mechanism is at work in creating a new “common knowledge” which integrates a new policy goal into the previous one? Is the same mechanism in effect for the entire process of GPO transformation?These are precisely the questions that this paper purports to answer. In so doing, it draws on the growing theoretical literature of constructivism with particular emphasis on the process of “socialization.” While “socialization” is generally believed to have two distinct mechanisms, namely “social influence” and “social persuasion, ” this paper argues that it is the combination and sequencing of these mechanisms that holds the key to the transformation of the existing GPO. It hypothesizes that a GPO is transformed in three evolutionary stages; at the first stage, a challenge is posed by a network of NGOs to the existing GPO through social influence; at the second stage, a new, more comprehensive GPO is germinated by stakeholder representatives through social persuasion, and at the final stage, the new GPO becomes propagated to the critical stakeholders through the mechanism of “social elucidation, ” which is a variant of social influence. Moreover, the paper argues that a different set of organizations is either used or created at each stage of development. For instance, at the second stage, a small, but inclusive organization is created to promote social learning among stakeholders' representatives.This evolutionary logic is then illustrated through a case study, which empirically traces the process that led to the formation of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), and to the creation of the Dams and Development Project (DDP) within UNEP. The former set the guidelines for the construction of large dams, and the latter “reinterpreted” them within each national context.The paper concludes with theoretical implications, which point to the fallacy of searching for a single covering law in explaining actors' behavior, often found in rational-choice theories, the fallacy of prescribing only one “optimal” organizational design, and also the myth of international anarchy in the world, which is increasingly characterized by various nongovernmental networks of “complex governance.”

著者

瀬川 高央

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.163, pp.163_81-95, 2011-01-20 (Released:2013-05-10)

参考文献数

55

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This article examines the Japan–U.S. cooperation in the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) reduction negotiation. The first section considers the perception of Japanese Government to INF problem. In March 1983, President Reagan tried to agree to the movement of SS-20 that Secretary-General Andropov had proposed. Andropov was going to reduce SS-20 in front of Europe, and to move this to Siberia. It meant the threat to Japan of SS-20 increased. In May 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone insisted on global zero of the INF in the Williamsburg summit. And, he supported NATO's Pershing II deployment. In addition, he stressed that the security of Japan–U.S.–Euro was inseparability. The purpose of Nakasone's speech was to have discontinued the movement of SS-20 of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was not able to oppose the unity of G7 and abandoned the movement of SS-20. However, a more concrete settlement plan was necessary to remove SS-20 that had already been deployed from the Asia part.The second section explores a Japanese concrete reduction plan of SS-20 in the Asia part. In February 1986, Reagan informed Nakasone of INF reduction plan in the letter. Reagan was going to abolish SS-20 in the Europe part at the first stage. Moreover, Reagan described for it to reduce SS-20 in the Asia part by 50% at the first stage, and to aim at the further reduction at the second stage. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared the alternative proposal for Reagan. The alternative proposal was warned of that Reagan's plan caused the reduction negotiation between Asia part SS-20 and the U.S. forward-deployed force. That is, it meant danger of ruining the basis of the Japan–U.S. alliance. Reagan accepted the Nakasone's alternative proposal and promised Asia part SS-20 abolition.The third section discusses the background to which Nakasone supported INF deployment in Alaska. In June 1987, Western European leaders controverted the problem of denuclearization in Europe. In the Venice summit, Nakasone demanded the re-unity on the western countries to oppose the Soviet Union. And, he supported the deployment of INF with U.S. mainland. Nakasone understood INF of U.S. mainland did the balance to Asia part SS-20. These Nakasone's insistence promoted the re-unity on the western countries. The Secretary-General Gorbachev was confronted with the re-unity on the western countries and the potential pressures of Chinese Government. Consequently, he decided abolition of SS-20.A final section reexamines the cooperation of Japan–U.S. in the nuclear disarmament. INF reduction plan of Japan contributed to the achievement of INF abolition. However, it controlled a real discussion in Japan concerning the extended deterrence of the United States.

著者

井上 正也

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.151, pp.36-53, 2008-03

著者

鈴木 一人

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.162, pp.9-23, 2010-12

著者

今野 茂充

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.157, pp.157_170-182, 2009-09-30 (Released:2011-11-30)

参考文献数

35

著者

福田 茂夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1975, no.53, pp.16-29,L2, 1975-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

25

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The debate on the origins of the cold war which reached a peak in the late 1960s in America had declined with the end of the Vietnam war. Now a new debate on the sources of American foreign policy seems to be discernable.It may be said that the cold war debate diminished under the heavy criticism from the revisionist school. However, why the revisionist school was able to achieve such an eminent position? The answer seems to lie in their determined advocacy of the American retreat from Vietnam. When the American Oligarchy decided to retreat from Vietnam then the position of the revisionist school was vindicated. The Pentagon Papers show that since 1968 this policy option was under discussion in the government. Therefore, the revisionist had been utilized by the government to make the national consensus for the retreat.The end of the cold war debate has not seen the solution to the problems under dispute. But, now there is a prevailing tendency, among the scholars of Establishment, to insist that it was a sterile exercise. And some of them have the opinion that it seems at present more useful to analize international relations since the end of the second world war in the style of professor Kissinger who conceptualized them on the pattern of the congress system after the Napoleonic war.On the other hand, the new Left theorists had also contributed to the end of the cold war debate. Their views insisted that the cold war debate had the unfair effect to justify the Yalta Agreement which was one accomplishment of F. D. Roosevelt's imperialistic diplomacy. Therefore, they avoided the use of the term “cold war” which would justify the Roosevelt position as an imperialist policy maker.We can find a new controversy now in America. The point at issue here seems to be the various possibilities of America's return to “normal diplomacy”. In this context the estimation of President Truman as being a rational politician or not is one focus of the debate.

著者

樋口 敏広

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.163, pp.163_28-40, 2011-01-20 (Released:2013-05-10)

参考文献数

60

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In the 1950s, as the Cold War set in and nuclear arms race accelerated apace, the worldwide contamination by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests triggered a fierce controversy. The Eisenhower administration, whose pursuit of national security through nuclear superiority led to the production of environmental insecurity, sought to contain the latter through environmental monitoring and risk evaluation. Informed by the sociological theory of risk, this article interrogates Cold War America's nexus of scientific knowledge and political power that underpinned this first global environmental crisis of the Cold War.At the heart of the controversy was a much contested “proper perspective” of risk. Critics noted an absolute increase of harm by fallout and warned about the unknowns in its nature and scale. Washington, in contrast, emphasized the knowns, backed them up with its monopoly of monitoring data, and pushed the burden of proof upon the critics. It also adopted a comparative framework that mirrored the double-binding consensus of national security and high modernity, in which the risk from fallout appeared “negligible” compared to natural and artificial radiations, socially accepted risks, and benefits of atomic energy. The Eisenhower administration even pursued a technological solution of “cleaning up” nuclear bombs to justify the continuation of nuclear tests as well as to break an emerging taboo surrounding the use of nuclear explosives for war and peace.Cold War America's leadership in the risk evaluation in and out of the United States, however, proved to be far from absolute or static. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, an all-powerful national security state institution which underwrote the government's safety assurances, suffered much from the growing public mistrust due to the embedded conflict of interests between promotion and regulation. The commission of a risk review to the National Academy of Sciences hardly helped the government when the British counterpart issued a more conservative report. At the United Nations, the Soviet Union became assertive in challenging the logic of America's risk judgment as its scientists were rebuilding the knowledge basis of radiation biology and genetics and absorbing an alternative risk perspective through their transnational communication with Western experts. The resultant shift of consensus toward a more conservative risk assessment, in turn, increasingly narrowed the latitude of test ban policy for the Eisenhower administration, which eventually decided to abandon an option of atmospheric tests in 1959. Beyond the test ban, the transformed consensus also led Washington to reconsider the fundamental promise of “peace through nuclear superiority”, ironically, in a way to reinforce it. In short, the fallout controversy revealed the dynamic co-evolution of risk knowledge and nuclear policy for Cold War America.

著者

ビヤース B・F 入江 昭

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.17, pp.61-72, 1961-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

45

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.166, pp.166_156-159, 2011-08-30 (Released:2013-09-19)

著者

鈴木 宏尚

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.89-104,L11, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

83

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This article explores the foreign policy of the Hayato Ikeda administration toward the “Free World” of the United States and its European allies. In July 1960 in the immediate aftermath of the controversy surrounding revision of the U. S. -Japan security treaty, the Ikeda cabinet found itself in the midst of domestic turmoil and felt the sense of losing credibility from the international liberal camp. Hence it was imperative for the cabinet to stabilize domestic politics and restore Western trust on balance.The Ikeda cabinet sought to unify the nation in the economic sphere by adopting the Doubling National Income Plan. The plan relied on Western markets as exclusively export-oriented destinations for economic growth leading to European powers, such as Britain and France, to invoke the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) Article XXXV to discriminate against Japanese imports. Improvement of relations with Europe was thus imminent for the sake of economic growth.This meant the Ikeda administration's effort to integrate Japan in the liberal camp via the deepening of its relations with the West. Subsequent diplomatic investment resulted in Japan's forging an “equal partnership” with Washington, gaining access to the meetings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and European states' discontinuation of discriminatory measures. Hence Japan established itself to be part of the Free World.One can consider the movement against the U. S. -Japan security treaty as an intensification of “domestic cold war” closely associated with the Japan's position in “international cold war.” Ikeda won the domestic cold war by way of economic growth, which required Japan to be part of the West during the international cold war. In other words, the success of the Ikeda administration in balancing its domestic economic agenda with international situations epitomizes the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy.

著者

鈴木 宏尚

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.140, pp.57-72,L8, 2005-03-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

79

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This article examines the diplomatic process of Japan's joining in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and illustrates that Japan's participating in the OECD should be regarded as its struggle for expanding its diplomatic space in the Free World, searching for both political and economic interests.The OECD, which was reorganized from the Organization European Economic Corporation (OEEC) under the initiative of the United States in 1961, was a forum established with the purpose of coordinating economic, trade and foreign aid policy among its members. Almost all the developed countries in the so called the “Free Word” or the West, including the US, Western European nations and Canada joined the OECD as its original members, but Japan was not one of them. This caused Japan to hold serious concerns about its isolation from the Free World. Japan had already established bilateral relations between the US, through which Japan and the Free World were only linked together. In that situation, Japan had an aspiration for expanding its diplomatic space in the Free World beyond its relations to the US, by participating in the OECD. Moreover, Hayato Ikeda administration, which wanted Japan to be equal footing with the US and European countries, considered that the membership of the OECD was essential to keep its economic growth. Thus it can be said that Japans' aim of joining in the organization was to pursue both economic and political interests.For the part of the US, Japan's participation in the OECD was regarded as its own interest, since it might enhance Japan's cooperation on economic assistance to the developing countries and strengthen its relation to the Free World stronger. Hence Japan was allowed its membership in the Development Assistance Group (DAG) of the OEEC in 1960. After OECD set on, the DAG was reorganized as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which was one of the main committees of the OECD. The biggest obstacle to Japan's joining in the main body of OECD was that European countries, which were the majority of the organization, opposed to it.Japan made diplomatic efforts to gain the support from European countries with the assistance of the US. Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to the European countries including the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and so on paved the way for the membership of the OECD. Through the discussion with Ikeda, the heads of these countries agreed to Japan's joining in the OECD. In March 1963, the OECD ultimately accepted Japan's full membership.

著者

波多野 善大

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1957, no.3, pp.153-182, 1957-10-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

142

著者

西田 敏宏

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_158-168, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

参考文献数

14

著者

川端 正久

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.119, pp.212-214, 1998 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

松浦 正孝

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.146, pp.1-20,L5, 2006-11-17 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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Critics of Orientalism have pointed out that the concept of “Asia” lacks any real substance and that it was invented in opposition to the idea of “Europe.” Consequentially, by speaking of shared characteristics within Asia, one risks being dismissed as simply reproducing the foundations for either Euro-centric notions of “Asian despotism” and “Asiatic modes of production” or the ethnocentrism of modern Japan. Traditionally attempts to employ a politico-cultural approach that analyzes particularistic qualities of political phenomenon and systems different from Europe and America have been critiqued as tautological exercises fostering racism and stereotypes. However, while refraining from arguments based on innate particularities of a region or ethnicity, by looking at the diffusion and formation of shared systems of possible exchange, is it still not possible to historically consider a sort of political culture of the Asian region formed through path dependency? The birth of the EU brought us a greater focus on the leadership of politicians that initiated such a project, and at the same time highlighted the importance of common factors that accumulated in Europe such as the legacies of the Roman empire in the form of law and Christianity, post-medieval political unification, the history of tariff and monetary exchange, the Marshall Plan, and NATO.By employing a framework of broader regional Asian history, it may be possible to conceive of nations and regions in a new manner that corresponds to a globalization not bound by national borders. This trend was begun by pre-modern historians and has continued with recent research employing the notion of intellectual and cultural chains. However, attempts to historically analyze modern political, economic, and social conditions of a wider regional Asia as a whole have remained insufficient. To this end, this Introduction presents an historical model of six world orders that have come to exist in Asia over the course of history and thus hopes to relate events currently taking place in the greater Asian region during this century to earlier developments. The six imperial world orders elaborated include; 1) the imperial Chinese world order, 2) the Western imperial order (represented by the greater British empire), 3) the Japanese imperial order (The Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere), 4) the first American imperial order (from WW I to the end of the Cold War), 5) the Soviet imperial order, 6) and the second American imperial order (post-Cold War).This special issue has brought together both diplomatic historians and other specialists in order to historically analyze several phenomena unfolding on the stage of greater Asia between 1910 and 2000. Their articles all point to new possibilities for an Asian history that analyzes what traditional approaches based on unilateral and bilateral histories could not and, in their substantive quality, take a first step toward deconstructing the image of “Asia.”

著者

James Llewelyn

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.156, pp.156_69-89, 2009-03-30 (Released:2011-09-10)

参考文献数

90

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In the early postwar period as instability across Southeast Asia threatened to engulf the region, Japan and Great Britain frequently took divergent approaches vis-à-vis regional geopolitical developments. Indonesia's belligerent policy of militarily and politically confronting Malaysia from 1963-66 can be seen as a clear case in point where Japan and Britain saw a potentially dangerous crisis in a starkly different light, quickly becoming a point of contention between diplomatic officials in Tokyo and London.While Britain responded forcefully in military terms to the increasingly bellicose Sukarno by massing troops along the Malaysian side of the Borneo border, Japan saw such a hard-line approach as fraught with danger. Diplomatic officials in Tokyo saw this risky approach by Britain as not only risking war in a region strategically vital for Japan, but also as probably hastening Indonesia's leftward drift towards communist China. Moreover, Japanese officials were aware that too much external pressure on Indonesia may cause the nation to politically implode, a scenario seen as bringing the Indonesian communists to power (the PKI) and thus threatening Japan's substantial commercial investments in this country. Due to these high stakes involved for Japan, it decided to pursue a sustained policy of mediation between the key disputants.During this period of Indonesian Confrontation (‘Konfrontasi’), Japan also exasperated Britain by continuing to trade with Indonesia and by providing financial aid and investment. The Commonwealth countries that had come to Malaysia's defence (Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand) all periodically expressed the hope that Japan would use its growing commercial influence to bring pressure to bear on Indonesia to peacefully accept Malaysia. Japan however, seeing its future economic relationship with Indonesia as a key priority resisted these calls to use its aid as leverage to modify Indonesia's belligerent stance towards its smaller neighbour. This led to British officials in particular to criticize Japan over what they perceived as an overly conciliatory approach toward Indonesia.Undoubtedly, their markedly divergent policy approaches towards this Southeast Asian crisis did not help the warming of Anglo-Japanese postwar relations. Fortunately however, both sides saw enough utility in the broader relationship to not allow this issue to adversely affect bilateral relations. This ostensibly led to a grudging mutual acceptance that both Japan and Britain would frequently see the Southeast Asian region in a different light.Therefore, despite their disagreements over how to deal with Sukarno and contain Confrontation, the relationship survived intact with no permanent damage being done. This was graphically shown by the first high-level meeting between Japan and Britain shortly after the conclusion of Confrontation, where both sides had the good grace to barely raise the issue and instead focus on the many commonalities in their respective world views.

著者

半澤 朝彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.81-101,L12, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

66

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This paper reveals the ‘hidden’ United Nations' role in bringing about the ultimate demise of the Britain's formal Empire. The UN from the late 1950s onwards, with a significant increase in African membership, became a stronghold of international critics of colonialism. Contrary to the conventional image that the UN did not play much role in Britain's decolonization, newly-released archival evidence clearly shows that the dramatic downfall of international legitimacy of colonialism and the ever imminent possibility of UN intervention into UK's most sensitive colonial possessions such as Kenya and Central African Federation were constantly a real source of concern for Britain's top policy makers during the early 1960s. Though UK's sensitivity was not admitted openly, the UN anti-colonialism should be considered as one of the most decisive factors that precipitated Britain's sweeping decolonisation after 1960.The article starts with the review of postwar UK-UN relations with particular reference to the British attitude towards the rising anti-colonialism at the UN. Britain's basic policy to keep the UN hands off her colonies did not have to change until the end of the 1950s largely because Article 2 (7) of the UN charter, the domestic jurisdiction clause, effectively barred interference into the affairs of her dependent territories. The static picture changed dramatically in 1960, when the South African racial problem shook the traditional, strict interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction clause and the famous UN Resolution 1514 on colonialism was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The British then recognized the need to seriously cope with the unwelcome development at the UN and tried to secure as much cooperation as possible from her major allies such as the US. However, the prospect of UN intervention into UK's most sensitive colonies was so imminent that the only viable course left to Britain was to inevitably ‘jettison’ her remaining colonies, small or large, as quickly as possible. The episode illustrates how strong Britain's desire was to remain in the mainstream of international politics. The possibility of a break-up of the Commonwealth was a major reason why the British did not want to antagonize the anti-colonial camp at the UN. Fortunately for the British, the pressure for an ever faster decolonization receded when most of the sizable British colonies had attained independence by 1963 (Kenya). Nevertheless, the British continued to be fearful lest the issues such as Aden should be given undue attention in the UN and were no longer able to pursue a policy of an ‘orderly decolonisation’, which had characterised Britain's imperial policy up to the previous decade.