著者

石田 勇治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.96, pp.51-68,L9, 1991

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The election of an avowed monarchist, seventy-seven-years old Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as the president of the Weimar Republic in April 1925 symbolizes the remarkable continuity in political attitude of the Germans from the time of empire to the republic. Many of them were uncritically attached to the old "Kaiserreich".<br>In spite of the total defeat and the revolution 1918-19 the aims and roles of imperial German policy in the outbreak of the World War had not yet been clarified. Every government during the Weimar period blocked full disclosure of the empire's war aims and engaged in a political cover up.<br>It was the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner, head of the revolutionary government in Munich, who released special reports in November 1918 showing the responsibility of the German Empire for the beginning of the World War. Eisner wished to discredit the old regime and persisted in purging the representatives of the "Kaiserreich".<br>Threatened by Eisner's revelation the foreign ministry insisted that such a free debate about the war guilt question would make the peace negotiations unfavorable to Germany. The new foreign minister Urlich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to take the lead and refute any charges that Germany had made preparations for the war in 1914 and was responsible for it. He was determined to exonerate the imperial German policy.<br>After the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919 the foreign ministry planned an antiwar-guilt campaign. With the purpose of revising the treaty the foreign ministry mobilized the Germans beyond all classes and parties and lead a national movement ("Volksbewegung") against the Allies' verdict on Germany's war guilt. A War Guilt Section ("Schuldreferat") was established in the ministry which should direct research and discussion about this question at home and abroad in favour of German foreign policy.<br>The purpose of this paper is firstly to describe how the war guilt question was dealt with in the German foreign ministry at the first stage of the Weimar Republic. It will show the process how the antiwar-guilt campaign was formed and developed.<br>The second purpose is to analyze the meaning of this campaign for the Weimar political culture. Its influence on the radical-right thoughts and movements such as Nazism will be also discussed.

著者

金 栄鎬

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.132, pp.153-175,L14, 2003-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

84

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North Korea's foreign policy and its policy toward South Korea obviously wavered after the Cold War. Why did North Korea's policy toward the South seesaw between cooperation and conflict? The purpose of this article is to examine under what conditions North Korea cooperates with South Korea.Firstly, although during the Cold War North Korea had shown conflictive behavior toward the South, the U. S. and Japan, after the Cold War its policy distinctively shifted to cooperation. For balance of power on Korean peninsula in this period, South Korea was remarkably superior to the North. Was balance of power the causal element of North Korea's cooperation? An investigation of the article demonstrates that objective balance of power did not draw on the North's cooperative behavior. Change of South Korea's policy toward the North and cleavage in the South's domestic politics affected the North's policy, while the North reviewed its definition of “nation” and “nationalism” which could be seen as subjective element of the North's behavior toward the South.Secondly, North Korea's policy, in turn, shifted to conflict after its declaration of withdrawal from NPT. Strictly speaking, around its declaration of withdrawal North Korea explored cooperation with the South in contrast to confrontation against the U. S., but, as soon as the U. S. -North talk launched, the North intensified cooperation with the U. S. in reverse to conflict against the South. How can such a distortion of North Korea's policy be coherent? An examination of the article shows that South Korea's policy was reversed to a hard-line in terms of “legitimacy” of state, subsequently the North's policy also returned to conflictive and exclusive one. And here also balance of power did not necessarily affect the North's policy into cooperation as well as above-observation. Rather, above-mentioned subjective element produced the North's exclusive behavior against the South, which was regarded, according to a North Korean peculiar view, as “treacherous” or “a puppet of the American Imperialism”.Thirdly, there have been talks and agreements between North and South Korea, such as the North-South Joint Statement in July 1972, mutual visit of divided families in the mid 1980's, the basic Agreements between the South and the North in December 1991, and the North-South Summit Meeting in June 2000. A comparative analysis indicates the following: North Korea's policy and behavior in 1970's and the mid-1980's could not be seen cooperative in spite of some talks and agreements, because there had been prevailing view of “legitimacy” of state and “liberation of The South” with North Korea. After the Cold War, it was verified that North Korea's behavior and policy changed with the South's policy and their domestic politics, and more than anything-else, the North' cooperation with the South was conditioned under whether of appeasing “legitimacy” of state.

著者

神川 彦松

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1957, no.1, pp.1-18, 1957-04-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

17

著者

川村 陶子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_74-87, 2012

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In Germany it is often said that cultural policy is the third pillar of foreign policy. That means culture, together with security and trade, constitutes an essential part of international relations. This concept was formulated during the Cold War period, mainly by Dieter Sattler, director of the Cultural Department of the Foreign Office (1959–66), and Willy Brandt, foreign minister of the Kiesinger administration (1966–69).<br>When the Federal Republic was founded, its government was reluctant of pursuing international cultural policy on its own. It was in the latter half of the 1950s that foreign policymakers, in the face of cultural offensive by the Eastern Bloc, thought they need a systematic cultural policy. Some cultural attachés, such as Sattler in Rome and Bruno E. Werner in Washington D.C., insisted that cultural policy must indeed be placed at the core of West German diplomacy.<br>Sattler regarded cultural policy as a tool of managing transnational relations in the contemporary world of interdependence. As a head of the Cultural Department in Bonn, he insisted that culture is the "third stage" of foreign policy, and strived to establish the organizational, financial, and conceptual bases of foreign cultural policy.<br>The thesis "culture is the third pillar of foreign policy" was formulated by Brandt, who headed the Foreign Office under the grand coalition. When the Cold War was locked in a stalemate, he thought that cultural policy was a suitable means to maintain the unity of German nation without legally admitting the existence of two German states. Though his plan of "all-German foreign cultural policy" was not realized, Brandt repeatedly stated in public that culture is one of the main pillars of foreign policy. The popular foreign minister regarded cultural policy as essential for making Germany a peacepursuing nation.<br>Sattler's "third-stage" argument and Brandt's "third-pillar" argument both see culture as an important field of international relations. The two theses differ, however, in time scope and worldview. While the "third-stage" argument is based on rather liberal vision focusing on interdependence and long-time, structural transformation of the nation-state system, the "thirdpillar" argument is more realistic, stressing the integrity and prosperity of the nation.<br>While the "third-pillar" argument became a cliché, German foreign policymakers could neither establish a firm principle nor execute consistent policy in the field of culture. Rather, foreign cultural policy got increasingly negative attention from politicians and the media, who thought that tax was not used in a proper form. The "third-pillar" argument could actually have created complications, since it did not clarify the content of "culture" while placing cultural policy as a priority.

著者

松岡 智之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_117-184_131, 2016

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<p>With the ending of the Cold War, the U.S. has failed in coercing far weaker states – such as Serbia,Afghanistan and Iraq – to comply with its demands, despite its overwhelming military superiority. Conventional wisdom holds that a stronger state's superiority ensures the credibility of its threat, and that the weaker state will accept the demands because the <i>ex-ante</i> uncertainty of any conflict's outcome (namely,the target's defeat) almost does not exist. In reality, however, weaker states frequently resist stronger states' threats, sometimes fighting hopeless wars instead of complying with their demands peacefully. This paper explores this puzzle of asymmetric compellence failure and asymmetric war.</p><p>Commonly, asymmetric compellence failures are explained by focusing on other states' interventions or the domestic factors which reduce or extinguish asymmetry. Alternatively, they are regarded as reassurance failures, in which commitments to future self-restraint are deemed incredible. The weaker state resists the threat to defend its reputation for resolve. In contrast, this paper argues that <i>power asymmetry undermines the credibility of the threat itself</i>.</p><p>Why do such counter-intuitive phenomena occur? This paper argues that an asymmetry in relative capability necessarily implies an asymmetry in mutual threat perception. When power is symmetrical,each state's power represents a serious threat to the other. If conflict occurs, the threat is automatically prioritized by both states. Therefore, in securing their existence (and as the vital interests of both are at stake), they will symmetrically display the maximum levels of resolve and willingness. In the instance of power asymmetry, however, the stronger state's existence is unquestioned, with lesser conflicts not receiving priority. Contrastingly, the weaker state's resolve will be stronger, as its existence is at stake. This asymmetry undermines the stronger state's compellent threat, constructing it as incredible, precisely because the coercer's resolve is in doubt.</p><p>In instances of power symmetry, it is not a balance of resolve but capabilities that affects the conflict's outcome – the balance of resolve remains symmetrical. <i>Ex-ante</i> uncertainty is chiefly concerned with the competitor's relative capability, not resolve. However, in instances of power asymmetry, the balance of resolve is uncertain. <i>Ex-ante</i> uncertainty is here principally concerned with relative resolve – capability is materially objective, while resolve is psycho-subjective, and thus less measurable. This variability/flexibility and invisibility leads to mutual misperceptions, which contribute to the failure of negotiations in cases of power asymmetry.</p><p>For example, while a stronger state's increase in resolve – which originates from changes in its perception of the threat presented by a weaker target – may be clear to itself, this may remain unclear to the opponent. Consequently, the coercer may overestimate its own credibility (because it knows its true resolve) while the target underestimates its credibility (because it sees the coercer's resolve as weak). These differences in credibility perception lead to asymmetric compellence failures. This logic is illustrated with reference to the 2003 Iraq War.</p>

著者

岩間 陽子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.174, pp.174_125-174_138, 2013

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The central role NATO played by ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan was exceptional in its scope and intensity. The first steps of NATO into peacebuilding operations were in post Cold War Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In these two cases, NATO remained in the role of keeping the secure environment and did not step in to the administrative and reformative roles. These were done mainly by the UN and EU.<br>NATO took up its role in Afghanistan, partly in order to save the alliance from its biggest crisis. Initially, ISAF's area of responsibility was limited to Kabul and its surroundings and its task was understood to be providing security. It soon had to take up reconstruction as local governments proved unable to provide basic services.<br>The Taliban reassembled itself within Pakistani northern territory and started to fight back from late 2005, causing severe damage. This led to the geographical and functional extension of ISAF operations. It expanded to cover the whole of Afghanistan in four stages, and its functions expanded. From the beginning,the PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) contained inherent contradictions in that it brought together soldiers, diplomats and development specialists together, who had never before worked as a team. In many cases, soldiers and development specialists had different priorities and different time planning. The soldiers tended to opt for short term concrete projects which could "win the hearts and minds" of local people, whereas the development specialists preferred more long term sustainable projects which may not yield quick returns.<br>As the Tallibans regained control of southern Afghanistan, the security missions of ISAF started to include high-intensity fighting with insurgency. This led to a severe crisis of alliance relationships in that some countries were very reluctant to take up the fighting roles and even those who did, had to work under intense pressure of domestic politics in their home country. Canada and the Netherlands both tried to reconcile domestic politics and what it perceived to be alliance and international responsibilities. In the end they both had to bring back combat forces home earlier than the end of ISAF mission. What remained in the end for NATO were relatively low-intensity police and military personnel training mission.<br>The ISAF experience gives important lessons for future cases where international community will be asked to reconstruct states in the absence of general stability. We need to develop better insight into who can do which job best, and to respect each others' logic and make room for different actors.

著者

稲生 典太郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.180-182, 1962

著者

森井 裕一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_88-101, 2012

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Germany ceased conscription for its military, the Bundeswehr, in July 2011. Ever since the establishment of the Bundeswehr, the system of conscription had played a key role in connecting the Bundeswehr and German society. The concept of "Staatsbürger in Uniform" (citizen in uniform) was a guarantee to keep the Bundeswehr as a military for peace. This paper discusses why Germany stopped conscription, even though it had long been regarded as a vital component of Germany's postwar security culture.<br>In the first section of this paper, historical developments in the German security culture and the role of the Bundeswehr are discussed. During the process of German rearmament in the 1950s, a new military was established in a way that would prevent it from being able to become an independent and undemocratic institution outside society—as it did in the days leading up to World War II. The Bundeswehr gained respect from society and became one of the most successful institutions in postwar Germany.<br>In the second section, the changing role and the military transformation of the Bundeswehr after the end of the Cold War are examined. The changing international security environment forced Germany to reconsider the role of its military. During the period up until the end of the Cold War, the use of Germany's military was restricted to the defense of its own and its allies' territories. However, this previously respected self-imposed restriction became an obstacle in the new international environment. The 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) made the deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO areas legally possible, although the FCC at the same time gave more power to the Bundestag, the German parliament, to control the deployment of the Bundeswehr. In the 1990s, the new military role for international crisis management demanded the military transformation of the Bundeswehr. Since the mid-1990s, many proposals were made to reform and reorganize the Bundeswehr, but they were not totally successful, because the domestic political discourse did not change as rapidly as the technical needs had changed. In addition, constraints upon the state budget made the reform even more difficult. After more than ten years of discussion, conscription was finally suspended under the strong leadership of the politically popular defense minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. According to zu Guttenberg's reform, the Bundeswehr would be an effective, efficient and flexible military for international crisis management.<br>The final section analyzes the implications of the reform of the Bundeswehr on Germany's security culture and foreign policy. Germany's security policy defined in multilateralism, i.e. within NATO and the EU, would stay unchanged. However, the new security environment might change the domestic understanding of Germany's military, and thus Germany's security culture in the future.

著者

井関 正久

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.157, pp.157_70-84, 2009-09-30 (Released:2011-11-30)

参考文献数

41

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The year 1968 was not only a time of student movements and Cultural Revolution in many Western countries, but also the year of the “Prague Spring” and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The people of Eastern Germany were influenced by those political and cultural events in Western and Eastern Europe.In spite of suppression by the state there were protest activities in the 1960s in Eastern Germany. Under the influence of subculture and student movements in Western Germany the postwar generation opposed the cultural policies of the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED). During the “Prague Spring” in 1968, hopes of “socialism with a human face” (democratization of socialism) rose in Eastern Germany.The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 brought about different protest activities everywhere in Eastern Germany. According to Stasi files, more than thousand people in Eastern Germany were investigated for painting graffiti, distributing pamphlets or even just public criticism of the invasion. Such protest activities took place spontaneously without political leaders, and were put down by the police immediately.The “Sixty-Eighters” in Eastern Germany organized political alternative movements under the protection of the Evangelical Church through the 1970s and 1980s. Western subculture played a big part in such dissident movements. The Eastern “Sixty-Eighters” also formed civic groups in autumn 1989, demanded democratization of socialism once again and played a main role in “peaceful revolution”. However, the younger generations contributed to “peaceful revolution” by participating in demonstrations or by leaving their country. In fact the generation of “Eight-Nine” includes different age groups.Thus, a legacy of 1968 and 1989 could be the combination of political movements and subculture, which made it possible for dissidents to form a counter public sphere and network in a society of authoritarianism or totalitarianism.

著者

堀江 湛

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.41, pp.77-97, 1970-04-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

阿部 悠貴

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_73-172_86, 2013

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Constructivist scholarship has contended that social norms constitute appropriate state policy. Given this premise, nevertheless, because there are various norms within a society, it is conceivable that some of them are mutually incompatible and hence will clash with each other on occasions. How do state decision makers react when they are confronted simultaneously by contrasting norms? This paper investigates this question through analysis of Germany's involvement in the war in Bosnia, wherein policy was influenced by three different normative claims: to address the humanitarian tragedy in the Balkans; to refrain from the use of force; and to maintain international cooperation with its European partners in their joint military operations. In other words, it was exposed to a "clash of norms" emanating from humanitarianism, anti-militarism and multilateralism.<br>This paper argues that the clash of norms propels state leaders to develop international organizations as the existence of well-developed international mechanisms for effective crisis management enables contingencies to be dealt with swiftly: before the situation deteriorates and before norms clash each other. Specifically, this argument is examined by analyzing why the German decision makers, in the light of their experience with Bosnia, came to argue for the reinvigoration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the purpose of addressing "foreign" contingencies, despite the neorealist prediction of its dissolution after the demise of the Soviet Union.<br>The theoretical implications of this paper are discussed against the backdrop of the constructivist studies. The conventional knowledge of constructivism tells us that a new state preference, as well as a new appropriate posture of an international organization, is formed as a certain norm becomes dominant and diffused among decision makers. Thus, "changes" in state policy hinge on the "changes" in normative contexts. Meanwhile, the paper proffers an alternative perspective that because various norms are working simultaneously, state leaders (re)create international organizations so that they can avoid the conflict of norms and live up to different normative claims. Germany, in its response to the situation in Bosnia, deemed it appropriate not only to halt the violence on humanitarian grounds, but also to maintain its foreign policy stance of anti-militarism and multilateralism. That is to say, because the abiding norms remain "unchanged", they reconstitute the structures of international organizations, as discussions of reforms to NATO within the German decision making circle were informed by this crisis. This paper is intended to advance constructivist understandings on the development of international institutions.

著者

長岡 新次郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.6, pp.26-38, 1958-07-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

44

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1965, no.28, pp.72-86, 1965-04-27 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

著者

陶山 宣明

出版者

日本国際政治学会 ; 1957-

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.177, pp.70-83, 2014-10

著者

浅野 亮

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.123, pp.195-204, 2000-01-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

11

著者

植村 秀樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_172-172_175, 2013

著者

島崎 貞彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.28, pp.101-116, 1965

著者

神川 彦松

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.2, pp.1-20, 1957

著者

五月女 律子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.128, pp.100-114,L12, 2001

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In studies of international politics, foreign policy decision-making has been one of the important research areas. However, domestic politics in which policy decision-making is done has not received much attention in traditional studies, even though foreign policy is a point of contact between international relations and domestic politics. With the progress of international economic interdependence, theories that focus on a decision-making process in domestic politics have become important to investigate a foreign policy. In this article, theories of foreign policy decision-making are reexamined.<br>There are several approaches to theorize foreign policy decision-making. Traditional and orthodox analysis of foreign policy in studies of international politics saw domestic politics as a "black box" and explained nation's policy at the level of international system. Next attempt of theorization was to grasp a whole foreign policy-making process as a system. Then Allison's second and third model, which analyzed decision-making process in domestic politics, got attention by many scholars in the 1970s. After that, cognition of policy-maker was focused on in the academic circle of international politics. In the 1980s, importance of "idea" in foreign policy decision-making was pointed out in several studies and the "two-level games" model was proposed as another framework.<br>In the study of international political economy, domestic politics attracted scholars' attention as an important factor to analyze decision-making of foreign economic policy in the late 1980s. There are two types of studies. One focuses on preference or power resource distribution of societal actors in domestic politics. The other sees socioeconomic and/or political institutions as an important factor in policy decision-making.<br>There is another approach that makes models of decision-making and applies them to foreign policies of developed democratic countries in various issue areas. Goldmann's study investigates Sweden's foreign policies and tries to find relations between democracy and foreign policy. It examines and compares foreign policy decision-making in four issue areas (defense, internationalist, foreign economic, diplomatic security) using three criteria (representation, participation, information). Other study by Goldmann presents nine models of decision-making and applies them to Swedish foreign policies in several issue areas. These studies indicate that the analysis of domestic politics is important for foreign policy study and that plural models based on policy areas will be useful.<br>For better understanding on foreign policy decision-making, it is not sufficient to analyze foreign policy only at the level of international system or of individual decision-maker in domestic politics. We need to investigate domestic political process with the consideration to the influence of international relation on domestic politics. Therefore, approaches and methods of the study of international relations and comparative politics should be utilized and merged for analysis of foreign policy.

著者

荒 哲

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.210-229,L19, 1999-02-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

88

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General Artemio Ricarte, “Vibora, ” is said to be one of the most stubborn Filipino heroes in Philippine history. He never swore allegiance to the United States after he was arrested by the American authorities in February 1899 during the Philippine-American War. Most Filipino historians have not paid much attention to his role in Philippine history because some of them are still suspicious of his nationalistic heroism. His collaboration with the Japanese Army during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines still causes doubt as to whether he was nationalistic or not. This paper is trying to discover if his anti-Americanism was still based on his hopes for Philippine independence by examining the time period between 1915 when he made his personal exile to Japan and 1945 when he died in the Philippines.Having read his correspondences written in Tagalog (one of the Filipino languages) with his friend in the Philippines, Jose P. Santos, the distinguished Filipino historian, and having examined his political statements regarding the issue of Philippine independence from 1915 to 1941, the author finds that the “stubborness” in his nationalism against the United States changed noticeably over time. It is observed that it changed with times of persons to whom he talked and met. For example, in 1917 when the Jones Act (Philippine Independence Act) was approved by the US Congress, he became sympathetic to the political scene in the United States and praised the political elites of the Philippines such as Manuel I. Quezon of Sergio Osmeña. However, he again became anti-American when he talked to Japanese officials or Japanese police authorities in Yokohama where he lived at that time. Indeed, he supported the anti-American movement in Luzon led by Benigno Ramos, the so-called “Sakdal Movement” in the nineteen thirties. But, even though Ricarte and Ramos held the same position for “immediate, absolute, and complete” independence of the Philippines, he was nevertheless ultimately a “Quzonista” in the sense that he was never opposed the way in which the independence movement led by the Filipino elites such as Quezon was waged. That is, even though he was originally opposed to the ten-year probational independence term, the so-called Commonwealth, he finally came to accept the Commonwealth idea, and government, led by Quezon.During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, he again became anti-American. He was not satisfied with a principle policy of the Japanese authorities in which most members of the former Philippine Commonwealth government were again put in important positions in the Philippine Executive Commission governed directly by the Japanese Military Administration. This situation awakened his political aspiration of becoming a dictator. With some Filipino collaborators led by Benigno Ramos and Ganap, Ricarte tried to make a coup attempt against the Laurel government in 1943. But he realized that the government was so stable that they could not do anything against its authority.Unlike Benigno Ramos, Ricarte was not aggressive in the movement for Philippine independence, where Ramos still had political aspirations to become the new leader. To the end of the war, he was still not satisfied with the political situation where many, so-called, “pro-American” cabinet memebers occupied the Laurel government. But Ricarte did not like to cooperate with Ramos in, for example, the Makapili movement in 1944. Instead, Ricarte organized his own army, the “Peace Army”, for the defense of the Philippine government against the United States.