著者

岡田 勇

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_173-181_176, 2015

著者

庄司 潤一郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.139, pp.125-143,L14, 2004-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

66

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In a Japan that was becoming increasingly isolated as a result of the Manchurian Incident and its withdrawal from the League of Nations, two noteworthy positions were unfolding, with the goal of seeking a new diplomacy in the mid-1930s. These consisted of the “argument of colonial readjustment”, which was directed at the global community, and the “controversy concerning the propriety of unifying China”, which was directed at China.The “argument of colonial readjustment” reflected the state of global politics at a time when Germany had rearmed itself and occupied the Rhineland while Italy had invaded Ethiopia, and was primarily advocated by the likes of E. House and other politicians and intellectuals in have-nations. This was later submitted by S. Hoare, the British foreign minister, to the League of Nations in 1936 and translated into reality through the establishment of the League of Nations' Committee for the Study of the Problem of Raw Materials in 1937.Thus, this thesis aims to identify the unique elements of the Japanese position relative to those of the West by sifting through the “argument of colonial readjustment” as it had been embraced in the West and analyzing the given position as it had taken root in Japan, where the influence of the argument had been felt. In this connection, the Japanese position was distinct from the positions of Germany and Italy, as well as those of various other western countries, in that the fundamental rule of freedom of commerce was maintained, a new world order was pursued, and the principle behind independence from colonialism was respected. Advocates who had taken up this position in Japan included Fumimaro Konoe, Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Masamichi Royama, and Tadao Yanaihara.The fact that Japan sought various breakthroughs after withdrawing from the League of Nations has been revealed in recent research findings. This research also takes that position and will analysis the contents of the reconfiguration of the international order according to the “argument of colonial readjustment”.

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.122, pp.54-68,L9, 1999

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The general evaluation of the Beijing government's treaty revision diplomacy is not high because the Beijing Special Tariff Conference from 1925 to 1926 resulted in a barren result. However, the fact is that the Beijing government built an important cornerstone towards the revision of unequal treaties. It was not accidental that political estrangement was caused between Japan, America, and Britain; and that a better environment for Chinese treaty revision was created.<br>What has been emphasized on this point conventionally was the materialization of the Kellogg-Johnson line as a pro-Chinese line. This should be, at least partly, interpreted as the result of Chinese treaty revision diplomacy. In particular, the formation of the pro-Chinese line in the Department of State was, to a large extent, the response to the plan which the Beijing government instigated. Chinese Foreign Minister Shen Ruilin esteemed relationships with America to ensure diplomatic support from Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, while the activity of Chinese Minister to America Alfred Sze satisfied the expectation of the Beijing government Foreign Ministry. Considering the political process of the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference, that situation was rather an exceptional success in Chinese diplomacy history.<br>British diplomacy, whose mediation between America and Japan had been effective in the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference in the past, did not work this time. This, again, was the result of what the Beijing government had planned. The Chinese side differentiated their attitude towards Britain from their policy towards America and Japan, because of the fact that Britain had shown the severest attitude at the beginning. When British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs J. Austen Chamberlain approached America in order to convert his previous policy, Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro's stiffened economism was revealed. In this sense, the isolation of Shidehara diplomacy could be understood in context as a result of Chinese treaty revision diplomacy towards America and Britain.

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.36, pp.142-146, 1968

著者

木畑 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.122, pp.1-7, 1999

著者

木畑 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.151, pp.180-183, 2008

著者

若林 千代

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.10-27,L5, 1999

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In contemporary Okinawan history studies, attention has largely focused on events in the political process of the reversion to Japan in 1972 and thus presenting the image that Okinawan postwar history can be neatly divided into two distinct eras. Recently, however, this premise has been questioned in light of the rape incident of 1995 and recent political issues, which show that pre-1972 problems remain almost three decades later. The U. S. -Japan military security regime has consistently been the main factor that fetters democracy and self-reliance in Okinawa throughout both periods.<br>This thesis proceeds from the premise above, and the author maintain that the basic foundation of relations and issues in postwar Okinawa until the present day originates after the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The U. S. Forces inherited, occupied and developed the military air bases on Ie Island, central and south west coast of Okinawa Island (where U. S. Forces are based now) which the Japanese Army had constructed in the early 1940's. The surviving Okinawans interned in camps in the Northern area were not permitted to return to their homes and rebuild their villages.<br>On 15 August, the U. S. military government established the Advisory Council of Okinawa to rebuild government functions, a body composed of fifteen Okinawan representatives chosen by the Okinawan leaders and the American authorities. Although the Council was an organization hand-picked by the U. S. military government from above and no more than a sup-port group for the occupation, the debates in the Council went beyond the implementation of administrative policies. According to the records, the Council sought &ldquo;self-government&rdquo; institutions including the separation of police powers, war reparation from the Japanese government, freedom of speech. and press, popular elections for the democratic governmental body, and the proposition of a constitution for Okinawa. These debates were primarily focused on the situation inherited from Japanese rule, in which the Okinawans became enmeshed in the modern Japanese state system not as a colony, yet as a marginalized group within an imperialist power.<br>The demands for political change, however, did not last long. The events in the weeks after the surrender of Japan between August and October 1945 shuttered them. From late September to early October, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the military bases in Okinawa as a &ldquo;primary base, &rdquo; for possible air base sites in the American overseas base system, and examined the possibility of exclusive rule. The U. S. Military Government in Okinawa changed the orientation of its &ldquo;self-government&rdquo; program and ignored the debates formerly discussed by the Advisory Council. Moreover, the military government suppressed freedom of speech and press, the Okinawans' demands to be allowed to return to their villages, and a general election for the governor and gubernatorial elections. The military government regarded the Okinawans as having no experience of living in a &ldquo;democracy&rdquo; and therefore the most appropriate form of government in Okinawa was the &ldquo;prewar political institutions&rdquo; with its strict controls from above. This, of course, reflected U. S. military strategy as it sought to use Okinawa as a &ldquo;primary base&rdquo; and develop a governing structure that would facilitate &ldquo;exclusive rule&rdquo; by U. S. Forces.<br>The Okinawan political leaders in the Advisory Council reacted cautiously to the military government and attempted to avoid conflicts with its new ruler. In spite of pressure from the Okinawans for the return of their villages and agricultural land, the Council ignored the petition protests from the leaders of local districts. The Advisory Council finally recognized that the &ldquo;Nimitz Proclamation&rdquo;

著者

平良 好利

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_122-136, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)

参考文献数

50

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By Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, the U.S. could continue to rule over Okinawa and have the exclusive right to maintain military bases there. After the ratification of the treaty in April 1952, people of Okinawa voiced opposition in regard to the use of land by the U.S. military. In June 1956, the U.S. authorities in Okinawa released a Report of the Price Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (hereinafter called the Price Report) that supported the land policy proposed by the U.S. military. The Price Report recommended lump sum payments for fee title and accepted to the planned acquisition of additional land. However, the release of the report inflamed the opposition movement of the people of Okinawa.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political process over the Price Report in 1956 by focusing on the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State.After the release of the Price Report, Okinawans requested that the Japanese Foreign Office negotiate with the U.S. government to solve the land dispute. During June and July of 1956, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu requested the U.S. Ambassador John Allison to abandon lump sum payments and to reduce the acquisition of additional land.Following the recommendation of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, the U.S. State Department carefully reexamined the Price Report in regard to the possibility of abandoning lump sum payments in order to improve U.S.-Japan relations. However, shortly before the State Department was due to hold a conference with the Department of Defense (which supported the Price Report), the issue of abandoning lump sum payments was dropped, because the U.S. Consul General in Okinawa strongly recommended that the State Department not retreat from the Price Report. However, the State Department did ask the Pentagon to make some modifications, such as abandoning the acquisition of the fee title, in view of possible damage to U.S.-Japan relations.After this political process revealed the importance of taking into consideration the involvement of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department, it was clear that the U.S. military was not capable of ruling Okinawa on its own. Thereafter, U.S. military control over Okinawa was always considered in the context of Japan-U.S. relations. Therefore, the political process over the Price Report in 1956 marked the start of Japanese Foreign Office and U.S. State Department involvement in U.S. military control of Okinawa. Concomitantly, it also was the starting point of recognizing that the role of the U.S. military in Okinawa was an issue affecting Japan-U.S. relations.

著者

河野 康子

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.140, pp.136-145, 2005-03-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

10

著者

須田 祐子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.161, pp.161_161-164, 2010

著者

鶴田 綾

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_43-180_54, 2015

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Shared histories are one of the most crucial factors in constructing ethnicity and nationhood. Redefining what to remember in new socio-political contexts is important for nation-building and reconciliation, especially after mass violence including genocide. However, this redefinition poses some problems. First of all, a country's official history has been rewritten and exploited by power; historians have warned that governments exploit history in order to justify their rules and to silence dissenting voices. Secondly, it is not easy to deconstruct a previous version of historical narratives associated with past ethnic violence and replace it with a new one. Rather, the content of the new narratives can be problematic since there is a danger that it may aggravate existing ethnic conflicts. If so, what kind of historical narratives are needed in post-conflict circumstances in order to avoid further violence?For 20 years since the genocide took place in Rwanda in 1994, a vast amount of literature has been published to explore the background and process of the genocide. Recently, scholarly attention has gradually been shifting to post-genocide issues including transitional justice, national reconciliation and state-building. However, we cannot fully understand post-genocide Rwanda without putting it into a historical context and paying attention to the continuity of historical narratives.This article examines the historical narratives in colonial, post-colonial and post-genocide Rwanda. First, the assumption of the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' that the Hamitic Tutsi were superior to the Bantu Hutu and that Rwanda was a centralised kingdom of the Tutsi affected the European policy of indirect rule. Based on the hypothesis, the Tutsi leaders in late colonial Rwanda claimed that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa had lived peacefully as Rwandans and that the Europeans had divided Rwandans into ethnic groups. The first Hutu administration in the post-colonial period claimed that the Tutsi were foreigners and not authentic Rwandans and that, since the Hutu had been so oppressed by the Tutsi, they needed to liberate themselves by means of revolution. President Juvénal Habyarimana, who overthrew Kayibanda and established the Second Republic in 1973, also claimed the Hutu authenticity and the legitimacy of 1959 Revolution. The ideology of the 1959 Revolution was widely publicised and contributed to ethnic division, which together with other political, economic and social factors, led to the genocide in 1994. After the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front regime has returned to the narratives of the previous Tutsi leaders and emphasised pre-colonial 'national unity' and the 'invention' of ethnicity under Europeans during the colonial period and the European manipulation of the Hutu Revolution. Compared with research previously conducted by researchers, all of these historical narratives that powers in Rwanda have had from the colonial era to the present have emphasised certain aspects of the past and neglected the others, partly contributing to the escalation of the ethnic conflict. Thus, in order not to rekindle the ethnic conflict but to avoid future violence, the new historical narrative should be more nuanced and comprehensive.

著者

松嵜 英也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_83-180_97, 2015

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The de facto states in the former Soviet Union established the effective rules of the territories throughout warfare. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Transnistria in Moldova claimed independence from each republic. The republics have not reigned these regions to this day. These divided areas have claimed independence, but have failed to gain international recognition. As a result these regions have become the de facto states. Transnistria is of special interest in these entities. Although Transnistria did not become the autonomous republic in the Soviet Union, this region was able to establish "state". How Transnistria did build the de facto state during the disintegration of the Soviet Union?The purpose of this article is to analyze the political process of the state building in Transnistria. I especially focus on the United Council of Work Collectives, known by its Russian acronym OSTK (Ob'edinennyi Soyuz Trudovykh Kollektivov). OSTK took the initiative to separate from Moldova. Previous studies have analyzed diplomatic and military assistance from Russia to Transnistria, autonomous systems in Soviet Union and so forth. However previous literatures have paid little attention to internal political process and the agency which led to Transnistria's de facto separation. In this article, I examine the movement of OSTK about the session from Moldova under the condition that Moldova also separated from the Soviet Union.This article first analyzes the formation of OSTK and the protest against the laws of the language. OSTK was composed of work collectives and established in Tiraspol. Then I conduct process tracing about the state building in Transnistria with a focus on the idea of OSTK. This plan became clearer in connection with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and separation of Moldova from the Soviet Union. Especially after the referendum to remain within the Soviet Union in Transnistria, the idea of OSTK was decided on the formation of the new republic within the Soviet Union.However this was different position from Moldova. Moldova decided independence from the Soviet Union. The gap between Transnistria and Moldova did not fill even after the Transnistria conflict broke out. I also point out that the idea of OSTK justified military intervention from Russia during Transnistria conflict. In this conflict Moldova could not sovereign Transnistria and signed the cease fire agreement. As a result this gap has been frozen. The Conflict has not unresolved and Transnistria survived to this day as the de facto state.

著者

黒田 友哉

出版者

日本国際政治学会 ; 1957-

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.182, pp.85-97, 2015-11

著者

黒田 友哉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_85-182_97, 2015

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<p>Today, it seems that the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Asia is at a turning point. During the Cold War era, the status gap between the European Community (EC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was quite large. In fact, the EC was considered to be highly institutionalised and the most developed region, while ASEAN was considered as an association of developing countries. However, in the post-Cold War era, the status of Asia as compared to that of Europe has significantly risen. The establishment of Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 among heads of states as 'equal partners' is a striking example. In addition, ASEAN will have a community in place by the end of 2015, while Europe has struggled from its sovereign debt crisis to such an extent that it showed its eagerness to learn even from Asian countries. Finally, the EU is now expected to play a role as a 'soft power'ally with ASEAN.</p><p>Based on multiple archives (French, German, and EC archives), this article retraces the course of EC/EU–ASEAN relations, from the origins of ASEAN until the establishment of the Joint Study Group (JSG) of 1975, considered as a formal institutionalisation of EC–ASEAN relations. It aims to clarify why and how this formal institutionalisation occurred. Actually, in 1972, an informal dialogue between the EC and ASEAN began. Thereafter, in June 1975 the regional organisations established JSG between the European Commission and the ASEAN member states. It can be interpreted as a precursor to the EEC-ASEAN cooperation agreement signed in 1980, in that this event is in certain times considered as a 'turning point'.</p><p>EC/EU–ASEAN relations have been widely discussed. The existing research derives mainly from political scientists. Most early research has stressed ASEAN as a 'stepping stone' to the 'Asia-Pacific' region, in other words, an economic valuation of ASEAN as the reason why the EC deepened its relationship with ASEAN. Other studies have underlined ASEAN's value as a reliable partner to break an impasse in the North-South negotiations. However, existing literature ignores a strategic aspect. This article establishes the decisive strategic reason for the EC to have chosen a formal relation with ASEAN: to have a substantial presence in a region where US presence declined after the Vietnam War. This viewpoint is especially supported by Sir Christopher Soames, British Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for External Relations. Focusing on this strategic aspect, based on the method of diplomatic history, this article also tries to analyse the impact of international contexts such as the Asian Cold War and North–South affairs on the EC's decision-making process.</p>

著者

中谷 直司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_111-180_125, 2015

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What was it that eventually put a period to the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the beginning of the interwar years, a treaty that had been the most successful treaty in East Asia to that moment, through two victories in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the First World War of 1914–1918? As many previous works have claimed, was the strong pressure from the United States decisive in terminating the alliance? Or else,as some British works in relatively recent years have argued, was the opposition of the United States no more than the last push to bring down the curtain on the arrangement, if discarding the alliance had already become all but a foregone course in London by the time Washington made clear its opposition?This study will challenge both accounts. First, it will show that the American opposition alone was not and could have not been enough to put an end to the alliance, even though this opposition did indeed create the international dispute itself over whether or not the alliance should be continued. At the same time, the study will deny that London was almost independently decided on the matter. The British government did need something external to help it with its decision; however, that was not the increase of American pressure but the restoration of the credibility of America's commitment to a new international order-building program, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. To this point, American diplomacy had had trouble displaying this commitment, due to the country's failure to join the League of Nations that the US itself had conceived.Therefore, secondly, this work will emphasize the serious dilemma that the British alone confronted in the international politics that led to the lapse of the alliance. That dilemma can be well understood as a variety of the "security dilemma in alliance politics" very well known to IR students. Major previous works,especially in British research, believe that Japan consistently held the alliance to be more significant than Britain did until the last day of the treaty, because the former gained greater advantages through an alliance with the leading power in world politics. However, this study will largely revise this view by describing both Britain's international political dilemma and Japan's diplomatic changeover in the aftermath of the Great War.

著者

藤山 一樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_30-180_42, 2015

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This article explores how the British government agreed in the summer of 1922 to fund their debts owed to the American government during the First World War. Since the U.S. entered the war on the Allied side in April 1917 until June 1919, British debts to the U.S. subsequently swelled to approximately $4.3 billion. After the war, the American government firmly insisted on swift repayment by the Allies of their war debts; and they suggested that U.S. economic assistance for European reconstruction was not to come until the debtor countries settled their debt questions with the U.S.Nevertheless, the British government continued to avoid funding their debts since 1920. Claiming on a general cancellation of all the inter-Allied debts, the Lloyd George government declined even to acknowledge their financial obligations. Chief Cabinet members such as the Prime Minister David Lloyd George and the War Secretary Winston Churchill were concerned with the impact on the domestic economy (and public opinion) of expending a vast sum of money; they also wished the Americans to take a more lenient position over the war debts.A sea change in the British policy of the war debt question came in 1922, when European relations reached its nadir in regard to German reparations. The French sought to enforce on Germany the strict execution of the reparations obligations of the Treaty of Versailles; meanwhile, the Germans, undergoing hyperinflation, persistently demanded a moratorium due to its chaotic economic condition at home. Then, from May to June 1922, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Robert Horne and the British Ambassador at Washington Sir Auckland Geddes convinced the Cabinet that such deadlock in the Continent did require some external assistance from the U.S., the largest creditor nation, and they pressed for an early Anglo-American war debt settlement in anticipation of some U.S. commitment to the European problem. Around the same time, the U.S. Ambassador at London George Harvey assured Lloyd George and Churchill that a debt settlement would lead to Anglo-American cooperation to tackle problems in Europe. In July 1922, the Lloyd George government finally consented to dispatch a British delegation to Washington for starting negotiations on conditions of repaying their debt to the U.S. After the British determined to fund their debts to the Americans, Anglo-American relations again stood on a sound footing, which could be a stimulus to their joint effort over German reparations toward the subsequent Dawes Plan of 1924.

著者

帶谷 俊輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_68-180_82, 2015

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This article examines how Japan, Britain and China considered the intervention of the League of Nations into disputes between the Powers and China from 1920 to 1931, focusing on the problem of Chinese governmental representation in the League.In 1920, in order to avoid becoming involved in a boycott against Japan, Britain decided to deal with the Shantung Question in the League if this was submitted by China. Britain also considered the intervention of the League as an option after the Washington Conference, because it did not expected much from cooperation with the other Powers.Japan initially left room for dealing with the China Question, excluding the Shantung Question, in the League if the Powers agreed. However, after the Corfu Incident in 1923, in which Japan had been involved as the president of the Council, Japan came to fear being criticized by small Powers in the Assembly of the League in case of a dispute with China. On the other hand, China came to recognize the importance of the Assembly in appealing to world opinion.Thus, there were major differences in the position of these three states. However, the political situation in China altered British attitudes toward this problem. In 1926, the Kuomintang government started the Northern Expedition to overthrow the Beiyang government, the internationally recognized central government of China at that time. While the Kuomintang government expanded its territories and clashed with the Powers, the Beiyang government represented China in the League until its collapse in 1928. Because of this, the League was temporarily paralyzed in dealing with the China Question. Britain, therefore, regarded appeals to the League as useless, so it bypassed the League in sending troops to Shanghai in 1927. When the Kuomintang government submitted the Jinan Incident to the League in 1928, Japan tried to reject the case for the same reasons as those raised by Britain. Japan, securing consent from Britain and the Secretary-General of the League, succeeded in preventing the League from intervening in the dispute.After overthrowing the Beiyang government, the Kuomintang government assumed the right to represent China in the League. Therefore, Britain returned to its former attitude of accepting the discussion of the China Question in the League. In 1931, Japan tried to prevent the League from intervening in the Manchurian Incident. However, the Council accepted the case of China and decided to discuss the matter. This is mainly because the problem of Chinese representation, which had until then blocked the intervention of the League in China, had already been dissolved.

著者

都丸 潤子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_1-173_14, 2013-06-30 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

44

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This special issue is an attempt to analise transformation and features of postwar British foreign policy in various decades and to review the role it played in postwar international relations, taking perspectives of global history into account. The 11 articles deal with a broad range of topics covering British policies towards Africa, Middle East, Europe, Asia including Japan, the US, the Eastern side of the Cold War, and the UN. They also focus on various fields of policies including decolonisation and cold war; trade, currency and aid policies; conflict resolution; propaganda and cultural relations; opium control; nationality and immigration control; and role of the queen. All these contributions are solid empirical studies based on multi-archival research. The main objective of the postwar British foreign policy can be summarised as maintenance of her influence and prestige as a world power, despite her declining military and economic power of which the government was well aware. For this goal, the British government is observed to have pursued multi-layered pluralisation of its foreign policy as follows. In terms of regional focus, Britain not only tried to balance her relations with ‘the three circles’ which Churchill had called, namely, Empire/Commonwealth, the English-speaking world (especially the US),and united Europe, but also grew to attach importance to further two circles, namely, wider Asia including non-Commonwealth countries, and the United Nations, with all of the five ‘circles’ having overlaps. The field of policy expanded to include keener development assistance, publicity and cultural relations, what can be named as ‘normative diplomacy’, and royal family’s foreign relations, with some utilisation of the experiences before and during WWII. The policy styles also diversified with more emphasis on multilateral relations, coordinating/guiding role as a third power with restraining influence on the US, informality and ‘personal approach’ to promote understanding, and ‘power-by-proxy’ policy not only with the US but also with other third actors such as the UN and Japan. These new approaches seem to have enabled the British government to take a calmer and wider-angled position towards issues in the postwar global society. In addition, due to the history of accepting migrants from former colonies and having interests spread abroad, the British foreign policy has been ‘reflexive’ with domestic repercussions or pressures. In addition, the lasting ‘imperial mentality’ with closed perception of Britishness might prevent Britain from maintaining her global role. As an editor, I hope this special issue sheds a new light on the role of Britain in the global society and will help to attract even more scholarly attention to limitations and possibilities of the British foreign policy.

著者

武田 康裕

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.125, pp.162-179,L20, 2000

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The purpose of this paper is twofold: to make a frame of reference for understanding the causal mechanisms that regime transitions tend to associate with external use of force, and to examine within this framework the military operations of China after reforms and opening-up.<br>Conflict initiation is a product of interaction between motivational factors in the state level and opportunity-related factors in the systemic level. In order to explore mutual relationship between the domestic dynamics and the international environment, this paper adopted the analytic approach of comparative politics and international politics combined. By focusing upon the political struggle within the ruling bloc, it approaches to the knotting points between the systemic level and the state level.<br>The key theoretical argument consists of two points: (1) The modality of divisions within the ruling bloc are motivational factors in determining whether the transitional regime succumbs to the temptation of a diversionary use of force; (2) The structural uncertainties of international system are opportunity-related factors which convert a potential for diversionary use of force into reality. Then the proposition is stated as follows: the probability of a transitional regime engaging in a hostile military action increases in two following conditions: (1) The ruling bloc is vertically divided between conservatives and reformers who are roughly equal in power; (2) The level of regional order is low in the multipolar system of relatively equal states.<br>China embarked on military operations in the Spratly Islands and Taiwan Straits in 1988, 1992, and 1995 while holding up <i>independent peace diplomacy</i> toward neighboring countries. Neither rational choice model nor organizational process model has successfully explained the reasons for a discrepancy between conflict behavior and cooperative diplomacy. While the former overestimates internal cohesion within the party leadership in the period of regime transition, the later underestimates party control over the military in the Leninist state. This paper concludes that Chinese military operations were diversionary actions for the state leaders to restore party unity.<br>In 1988 and 1992, Deng Xioping initiated naval operations over the Spratly Islands claimed by Vietnam to win the military's support, and then to beat off conservatives' challenge to the reform policy. In 1995, Jiang Zemin stood firm with the Philippines and Taiwan to let the military stay away from the intraparty struggle for leadership succession. The difference in subjectivity between two leaders was derived from changing nature of party-army relations associated with professionalism in the military. While Deng could maneuver potential rivalries between the professional officers and political commissars, Jiang had to be responsive to demands by the professional military. Both state leaders were risk-acceptant in that they recognized the structural uncertainties of regional system as an opportunity of provoking militarized actions.

著者

古城 佳子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.115, pp.94-109,L13, 1997

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The purpose of this article is to examine what kind of logic was behind the demand of defense burden-sharing toward Japan by the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s. This article presents the following viewpoints. First, US demand of defense burden-sharing was colsely related to the problem of US balance of payments deficit from the late 1950s. Second, in order to better understand the problem of US-Japan defense burden-sharing in the late 1950s and 1960s, it should be analyzed in the context of US policy towards the allied nations, rather than just in the context of bilateral relations.<br>In the late 1950s, in the face of gold outflow the Eisenhower administration began to realize that the balance of payment deficit would impose serious problem on the United States. This administration created the scheme of burden-sharing among the allied nations. This scheme was reinforced by Kennedy administration, which claimed that the US balance of payments deficit would restrain US policy of protecting "the Free World, " thus harm not only the United States but also the allied nations.<br>In this context, the US administrations tried to defend dollar position by focusing on two points expanding US export to increase trade surplus, and reducing external spending, in particular, foreign aid and military expenditure. The US administrations asked the allied nations to share the cost of US foreign aid and military spending. This is the origin of the burdensharing scheme. In other words, since the late 1950s the allied nations were asked to increase foreign aid and military spending. For evaluating which country should share the burden, the US applied two economic measurements; balance of payments surplus and sufficent foreign exchange reserves.<br>West Germany was the main target of the US demand of defense burdensharing because of the large US military presence in West Germany and its rapid recovery of economy in terms of balance of payment surplus and large foreign exchange reserves. The United States started to ask West Germany to share the defense cost as early as in the late 1950s. The negotiation of offset payment agreement between Germany and the US shows the US tough policy towards West Germany.<br>In contrast, the US did not put much pressure on Japan to share the defense cost until the mid-1960s. This US lenient attitude toward Japan compared to policy towands West Germany was partly because of Japan's domestic political instability relating to the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and partly because of Japan's economic indices which were short of US criteria; balance of payment deficit and small foreign exchange reserves.<br>However, in the mid-1960s, the US demand of defense burden-sharing toward Japan increased because Japan's economic situation had improved. The demand was intensified by the US increased involvement in the Vietnam War. Japan, as well as West Germany, was asked to buy US arms and US Treasury bill to contribute to improve US balance of payment. Since this period, the US claim that the United States provided "public goods" for "the Free World" became problematic for the allied nations.