著者

井原 伸浩

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_115-128, 2011

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Many previous studies on the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) argue that regional countries tried to draw Indonesia into regional affairs in a friendly and constructive manner, since Indonesia had been regarded as a potential great power in Southeast Asia. In reality, however, Indonesia took the initiative in the process of forming ASEAN, and thus other member countries changed their opinions regarding Indonesia's participation in regional cooperation. They began by viewing such participation as negative. The Indonesian government, especially its army, believed that it had a natural right to play a leadership role in regional affairs due to Indonesia's potential power, and regarded the regional cooperative body as one of the vehicles to expand Indonesia's influence. Other regional countries, especially Malaysia, had vague but realistic concerns regarding Indonesia's initiative. They were concerned that Indonesia would play a dominant role in regional cooperation and, in the longer term, utilise the forthcoming regional organisation as a diplomatic tool to gain regional hegemony. There has not been adequate discussion of the way in which Indonesia's initiative in the process of establishing ASEAN caused concerns among the members about Indonesia's motives and preferences. Moreover, even the researches that refer to ASEAN countries' mistrust of Indonesia do not clarify the impact of these concerns on the process of establishing the association and, in particular, how the mistrust was mitigated during the negotiation process.<br>This research hypothesises that as a means of gaining sufficient trust to achieve regional cooperation, Indonesia sought to reassure the other states of its intentions by forming an institution in which unilateral acts by Indonesia were constrained. More specifically, Indonesia sought to reassure other future members of ASEAN by rejecting cooperation which would cause tensions with communist countries who regarded the new organization as anti-communist and a pro-Western defence alliance. Moreover, the proposed organization was reassuring to other future members of ASEAN because it was also structurally difficult for Indonesia to gain a dominant or leading role in it. Moreover, through regional cooperation, Indonesia refrained from using its power to inflame tensions among other countries, blocs and specific peoples inside and outside the region. Further, Indonesia's delegation to the founding meeting of ASEAN in August 1967 told other delegates that Indonesia would allow the maintenance of foreign bases in the region, even after the advent of the new organization. This was welcomed by other members not only because their defence depended on external powers such as the US and UK but also because this military presence would likely keep the expansion of Indonesia's regional influence in check.

著者

大山 梓

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1966, no.31, pp.52-66, 1966-10-16 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

20

著者

加藤 陽子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.110-125,L12, 1995

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At the end of the Pacific War, there were more than 6 million Japanese (this figure includes not only military and naval personnel but olso civilians) scattered in overseas theaters; Korea, Manchuria, China, the Philippine islands, and the islands of the Western Pacific. At that moment, there was no one who dared imagine that Japanese nationals overseas could get back home safely and smoothly.<br>But in fact, 90 percent of them were repatriated by the end of 1949. In particular, 80 percent of the Japanese in former Japanese occupied territory in China, could return by May 1946.<br>This paper focuses on how the disarmament and repatriation policies for the Japanese overseas were made, and why they could be repatriated so quickly.<br>Who had the supreme responsibility to accomplish the disarmament of Japanese nationals and to provide for their repatriation? The Chinese National government troops under Chiang Kai-shek's rule could not carry out this mission. During the anti-Japanese War, the Nationalist government moved into the western regions, far from the coastal araes, so it took time for them to reach Japanese occupied territory.<br>Only the United States had the power and will to govern all the processes of repatriation. But at the same time, she had to solve other problems. First, she was supposed to maintain the pace of her own demobilization. There was strong pressure to bring Americans out of China. Second, she had to consider Manchurian problems. Generalissimo Chiang asked United States to transfer his army to the northern part of China, as quickly as possible, or the Soviet and Chinese Communist Party would have enterd into the vacuum.<br>In short, the repatriation of Japanese, demobilization of Americans, and transportation of Chinese were absolutely necessary for Washington. In order to carry out all these programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff mapped out detailed plans for navigating large numbers of LST and Liberty vessels in December 1945.

著者

松岡 智之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_117-184_131, 2016-03-30 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

59

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With the ending of the Cold War, the U.S. has failed in coercing far weaker states – such as Serbia,Afghanistan and Iraq – to comply with its demands, despite its overwhelming military superiority. Conventional wisdom holds that a stronger state’s superiority ensures the credibility of its threat, and that the weaker state will accept the demands because the ex-ante uncertainty of any conflict’s outcome (namely,the target’s defeat) almost does not exist. In reality, however, weaker states frequently resist stronger states’ threats, sometimes fighting hopeless wars instead of complying with their demands peacefully. This paper explores this puzzle of asymmetric compellence failure and asymmetric war.Commonly, asymmetric compellence failures are explained by focusing on other states’ interventions or the domestic factors which reduce or extinguish asymmetry. Alternatively, they are regarded as reassurance failures, in which commitments to future self-restraint are deemed incredible. The weaker state resists the threat to defend its reputation for resolve. In contrast, this paper argues that power asymmetry undermines the credibility of the threat itself.Why do such counter-intuitive phenomena occur? This paper argues that an asymmetry in relative capability necessarily implies an asymmetry in mutual threat perception. When power is symmetrical,each state’s power represents a serious threat to the other. If conflict occurs, the threat is automatically prioritized by both states. Therefore, in securing their existence (and as the vital interests of both are at stake), they will symmetrically display the maximum levels of resolve and willingness. In the instance of power asymmetry, however, the stronger state’s existence is unquestioned, with lesser conflicts not receiving priority. Contrastingly, the weaker state’s resolve will be stronger, as its existence is at stake. This asymmetry undermines the stronger state’s compellent threat, constructing it as incredible, precisely because the coercer’s resolve is in doubt.In instances of power symmetry, it is not a balance of resolve but capabilities that affects the conflict’s outcome – the balance of resolve remains symmetrical. Ex-ante uncertainty is chiefly concerned with the competitor’s relative capability, not resolve. However, in instances of power asymmetry, the balance of resolve is uncertain. Ex-ante uncertainty is here principally concerned with relative resolve – capability is materially objective, while resolve is psycho-subjective, and thus less measurable. This variability/flexibility and invisibility leads to mutual misperceptions, which contribute to the failure of negotiations in cases of power asymmetry.For example, while a stronger state’s increase in resolve – which originates from changes in its perception of the threat presented by a weaker target – may be clear to itself, this may remain unclear to the opponent. Consequently, the coercer may overestimate its own credibility (because it knows its true resolve) while the target underestimates its credibility (because it sees the coercer’s resolve as weak). These differences in credibility perception lead to asymmetric compellence failures. This logic is illustrated with reference to the 2003 Iraq War.

著者

黄 昭堂

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.84, pp.62-79,L9, 1987-02-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

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Taiwan has a population of 19 million, ranking in the top one-third among the 168 countries of the world. Taiwan enjoys economic prosperity symbolized by outstanding world trade which was 17th among the nations of the world in 1985. In reality, the name of the nation which exists on Taiwan is the “Republic of China”; however, this government refuses to consider the island of Taiwan as its only territory and has been struggling with the Peoples' Republic of China, both claiming the opposite side's territory as its own. The war in search of legitimacy still seems to be underway; but the will of the Taiwanese, who comprise 85% of the population of Taiwan, has been ignored for a long time. This article, which is a prelude to a forthcoming article, “The People and the Nation of Taiwan-Trends After the Second World War, ” gives the historical background of Taiwan; furthermore, it describes what the Taiwanese think about the people and the nation to which they belong.Taiwan was ruled by the Dutch, the Spanish, the Koxinga Dynasty and the Manchurian Ching Dynasty of the seventeenth century. The latest governing power lasted until 1895, when Taiwan was ceded to Japan. The native inhabitants of Taiwan were Malayo-Polynesians; they were joined by the Han immigrants from the Chinese mainland. At the end of the Dutch era, these two populations were balanced at about 40, 000 each. However, at the end of the Ching era, because the Hans continued to immigrate to Taiwan, the natives were out-numbered. Relations between the two groups were very poor, and even the Hans themselves failed to establish an identity as “Taiwanese” until the Japanese occupation in 1895.A Taiwanese consciousness was established among the Han inhabitants during the early period of Japanese occupation, perhaps because of the following: (1) resistance by force from 1895 to 1915 helped the Hans to create a “weconsciousness, ” (2) economic construction by the Japanese Taiwan Governor-General government brought communication infra-structures to the inhabitants (i. e., telephones, lengthened and widened roads and railways), (3) Japanese language instruction offered the inhabitants a mutual language; before this time, even the Hans in Taiwan were divided into two language groups.In the second decade of the 20th century, the Taiwanese political movement took over the position of resistance by force against Japanese rule. It was then that the idea of nationalism was introduced to Taiwan through the Chinese Nationalist Revolution in China in 1911. Thereafter, Han political leaders considered the Taiwanese to be a branch of the Chinese people; however, the native aborigines were still excluded. Although Han political leaders consider the Taiwanese to be a branch of the Chinese people, their idea has failed to gain support from the Taiwanese masses who consider themselves to be “Taiwanese.” The Taiwanese Communist Party established in 1928 also failed to appeal to the masses. Their slogan “Taiwanese nationalism” was not accepted. Since all of the political movements in Taiwan were oppressed by the Japanese authorities around the time of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Taiwanese consciousness failed to grow to form a “Taiwanese people.” The forced Japanization was accelerated until the Japanese surrender to the Allied Powers in 1945. The emergence of Taiwanese nationalism, in other words the formation of the “Taiwanese people, ” did not come about until their confrontation with the newly arrived ruler, the government of the Republic of China.

著者

西澤 泰彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.146, pp.39-53,L7, 2006-11-17 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

33

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This article considers some relationship between the home country and some colonies of the Empire of Japan with the viewpoint of the flow of Portland cement, Japanese architects and architectural information within the territory ruled by Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. I have mainly two reasons why I focus on the flow of them. The first one is that all of buildings by Japanese on any cities ruled or occupied by the Empire of Japan had been necessary for colonization. The second one is that I have already recognized a lot of Japanese architects to move into Japanese colonies and to work in the first half of twentieth century.On chapter 1 I try to analyze two matters, the one is to research some history of Portland cement factories in Japan and the Japanese colonies. In the Japanese colonies the first Portland cement factory is the Dairen branch factory of Onoda Portland Cement Co. Ltd., established in 1909 in Dalny, in the Kwantung Leased Territory, in the Manchuria. Not only it had supplied any Portland cement to the Kwantung Government General and the South Manchuria Railway Company, but also it had shipped to the Japanese colony Chosen until 1916 and exported to China. The other is to make analysis some statistics of output of Portland cement, to make it clear that a lot of Portland cement made in Japan and the Japanese colonies had been exported to China, Hong Kong, Java, Philippine, Malaya, Indo-China, Thailand and India, etc.On chapter 2 I research each transfer of some Japanese colonial architects who were the first chief architect of each architectural office on colonial government or the South Manchuria Railway Company Limited. All of them had experienced building activity on the Japanese colony before becoming a chief architect of architectural office. Then transfers of them were not via Japan, but they moved directly one colony to another.On chapter 3, I try to analyze some architectural magazines published in the Japanese colonies from 1920's to 1930's. I find out that all of them had carried any information on new buildings not on each Japanese colony, but on other territory in the East Asia or whole of the world. By reading them, Japanese architects on the Japanese colonial territory had gained latest design and theory of architecture in the world, and they had put the information to their building activity.In conclusion, the territory ruled by the Empire of Japan was the place where Japanese architects had experience to get some new information and to product new works.

著者

都丸 潤子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.124, pp.209-226,L20, 2000

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This paper examines how and why the rapprochement of Malaya and Japan after WWII occurred relatively swiftly, despite the legacies of Japan's wartime occupation. The rapprochement began in trade, and developed through Japanese participation in Malayan iron mining and Japan's accession to international organizations such as ECAFE, Colombo Plan and the GATT. It eventually reached the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations following Malayan decolonization. Most of the existing literature on postwar Japan's relations with South-East Asia focuses on the American cold war strategy to keep Japan anti-communist. By looking at Malaya that had been under the British imperial control until the end of the 1950s, this paper attempts to shed a new light on the role of Britain and her Asian policy in facilitating the Japanese return to South-East Asia.<br>Though having helped the early resumption of Malayo-Japanese trade, the British, especially the Board of Trade officials and Lancashire industrialists, came to oppose the rapprochement in almost every form, out of fear of Japanese competition in their South-East Asian stronghold. However, by the autumn of 1954, their opposition was gradually overcome by recognition that Britain was unable to assist Malayan development entirely on its own, with her tight manpower and finances stretched worldwide. The British authorities also recognised the urgency of Malayan development as a part of their programme of smooth decolonization which would preserve as much British influence as possible. Here, the British officials in Malaya and Japan played an important role in persuading their metropolitan colleagues to admit Japan's participation in Malayan development to shoulder British imperial obligations.<br>Meanwhile, Japanese premiers such as Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke saw closer relations with Malaya as one means of breaking free from the deference to the United States in economic reconstruction and regional foreign policies which dated from the Allied Occupation. They also wanted Japan to be welcomed back to international society by the Asians without being seen as an American pawn. They thus embarked on a new South-East Asian policy in closer cooperation with Britain.<br>The Malayan leaders, gaining authority as decolonization proceeded, saw Japan as a new Asian partner and model in their efforts to secure complete independence from Britain. Especially, the Federation of Malaya's first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Kishi played important roles in completing bilateral diplomatic rapprochement by 1961. However, not all outstanding issues between Malaya and Japan were settled in the rapprochement process as the so-called &lsquo;blood debt&rsquo; issue arising from Japan's wartime occupation reveals thereafter. The continuity in prewar and, postwar Japanese involvement in Malaya in terms of personnel and their interests also seemed to leave Malayans suspicious about Japanese intentions.

著者

都丸 潤子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.146, pp.120-139,L13, 2006

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This paper analyses how British cultural policies in South-East Asia changed its scope and nature from 1942 to 1960 as her rivals shifted in the turbulent postwar international environment. The paper looks at both short-term information campaigns and long-term policies aiming at acculturation or changes in perception conducted by various government offices including Foreign Office and Colonial Office, and by more independent organisations such as the British Council and the BBC.<br>Throughout the period, as with the cases of British political and military policies, the primary objective of British cultural policies in South-East Asia was to retain her informal empire in the region despite the tide of decolonisation and Britain's reliance on American economic and military power.<br>From 1942 to 1947, when the main cultural rivals for Britain in the region were the effect of Japan's Pan-Asianism and American influence, Britain made efforts in &lsquo;projecting&rsquo; her traditional political and artistic culture to Japan and areas which had come under the Japanese military administration. As the Malayan Emergency unfolded and through the establishment of the Communist China, Britain placed weight on defending her empire in and around Malaya by short-term propaganda against communist infiltration from China. She also competed with the expansion of American influence and anti-colonial campaign in the region. The biggest challenge to British influence in the region came between 1954 and 1956 as Afro-Asian anti-colonialism, through the Bandung Conference and the Suez War. This challenge made Britain embark on &lsquo;A New Look for Asia&rsquo; and expand its scope of cultural policies with the idea of cooperation with America, Australia and New Zealand. Britain also stepped forward to &lsquo;project&rsquo; modern Britain rather than &lsquo;a country of cathedrals&rsquo;. She went further beyond &lsquo;projection&rsquo; by helping cultural transfer of British cultural elements such as technology and English as universal language and by focusing policy targets to prospective opinion-leaders.<br>In addition, through the interdepartmental discussion of possible withdrawal from the UNESCO soon after the Suez War, British cultural policy-makers recognized the shortcomings of unilateral propaganda and bilateral cultural cooperation, and realized the necessity to pursue multilateral cultural cooperation through international organization such as the UNESCO in order to retain cultural influence in Asia and Africa.<br>The choice of local elites as the main target, encompassing of Japan within the scope of South-East Asia, and social-engineering efforts for multicultural integration within her colonies are also the outstanding and continuous features of British cultural policies towards South-East Asia during the postwar period until the 1950s.

著者

松岡 完

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.130, pp.160-174,L15, 2002

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The Vietnam War had hardly ended when intensive efforts to &ldquo;correct&rdquo; the war narratives were commenced within the United States. The challenge to the once seemingly established fact that the United States had suffered a humiliating defeat came to its peak in the middle of the 1980s. Revisionists such as the former and incumbent Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan aimed to cure the Americans of the Vietnam syndrome, and to help them regain their self-confidence and a sense of national integrity.<br>The withdrawal of American troops, the revisionists insisted, should never be portrayed as a surrender, instead merely as an American unilateral decision to leave Vietnam. The defeated, if any, were the South Vietnamese, not the Americans. The United States was actually a winner there, for it helped the anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam survive for two decades so that other nations in Southeast Asia could develop their economic and political strength. Moreover, American soldiers were always victorious in any encounter with the Communist guerrilla or regular forces.<br>The revisionists believed that the United States could have won at an earlier stage if only it had used its military power in an overwhelming way. The United States was on the verge of triumph by the end of 1972, almost forcing the leaders in Hanoi to accept American terms in peace talks through its massive bombing attacks in central North Vietnam. Then, suddenly, the revisionists argue, the U. S. Congress, intimidated by an unjustified fear of United States inability to win the war, threw in the towel.<br>Political leaders in Washington came under the attack of the revisionists. The United States lost this war for several reasons, namely because the government was unable to offer the American people a definite war objective, placed exceedingly unnecessary restrictions upon the military, failed to demonstrate sufficient will to win, and was unsuccessful in fully mobilizing the public behind the war effort.<br>American mass media, including television, was another target. The correspondents were criticized for being too young and too inexperienced to grasp the reality of battleground and sometimes too naive to shelter themselves from the influence of the Communists' propaganda. Hence, their reporting across the Pacific contributed to serious increases in anti-war sentiment back home, which in turn caused extreme damage to the American war strategy.<br>The majority of the American people were, however, far from being persuaded by such revisionist arguments. They knew that they had never fulfilled their objective of building a strong and viable anti-Communist regime in Vietnam, that they had been responsible for the South Vietnamese deficiencies, that winning in a shooting war had been irrelevant to the political future of the country, that the results of truce negotiations could hardly have been American triumph, and that blaming politicians and reporters merely was a means to protect the military from further criticism. That is why, to the regret of the revisionists, the memory of defeat in Vietnam still haunts the American people.

著者

鹿 錫俊

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_62-187_79, 2017

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<p>China's transition process in its manner of approaching the Anti-Japan War history (known as the Second Sino–Japanese War in China) in different stages is characterized by the following features. (1) From 1949 to 1978, "history" was understood to be Revolutionary history; the Anti-Japan War history was not accorded much importance and addressing historical facts was determined by political considerations. (2) From 1978 to 1989, even though the Anti-Japan War history received greater emphasis, it was mainly necessary to counter historical revisionist currents in Japan and work toward unification with Taiwan; further, all this while, China was committed to maintaining friendly relations with Japan. (3) The era of rocketing patriotism that began in 1989 witnessed a steady increase in the Chinese emphasis on the history of the Anti-Japan War; thus, currently, along with countering historical revisionism from Japan's viewpoint, domestic political considerations, modifications to foreign policy, and a revised perception regarding the two countries' relationship in the wake of China's rise as a major world power are the main driving forces.</p><p>China's approach to the history of the Anti-Japan War is not a simple historiographical problem; the fact that it is a general problem with a high degree of political sensitivity suggests that, for the reasons provided below, it is one that is fraught with side effects for the Chinese authorities. First, the close relation of the Anti-Japan War's history to a more multifaceted history implies that the rise of interest in the former will not stop with the China–Japan relations but will highlight the Communist Party of China's (CPC) history and its relations with the Kuomintang (KMT). On the other hand, the diversification and increased availability of sources of information indicates that information with a bearing on history can no longer be controlled as in the past. Thus, the expanding interest into historical problems associated with the anti-Japan war's history suggests that the Chinese populace is gaining awareness regarding some historical facts avoided by the ruling authorities until now. Second, applying a "proper view of history," which China had demanded from Japan, is certainly also being demanded from China. Thus, how China recognizes and responds to its own history has been questioned inside and outside the country.</p><p>Manifestation of these side effects is palpable in the China–Taiwan dispute regarding claims to leadership in the anti-Japanese war and the internal Chinese controversy about the authenticity of its "historical nihilism." Considering the China–Japan interactions, China's demand to take a "direct view of history" has not only spurred improvements in Japan's historical awareness but also served to promote improvement in China's own historical awareness.</p>

著者

向山 直佑

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_30-187_45, 2017

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<p>Since the end of the Cold War, two significant political phenomena have attracted a considerable amount of attention of researchers in political science and related fields: the politicization of history and third-party intervention in domestic jurisdiction matters or bilateral issues. Particularly interesting is the fact that these two not only coexist but are also intertwined in the form of third-party intervention in historical issues.</p><p>Previous studies on historical issues have presupposed that historical issues are bilateral conflicts, leaving studies on the third-party practically nonexistent, and the literature on third-party intervention has largely ignored the motives for it and its effects on the relationship between the intervener and the intervened. This study fills these gaps.</p><p>The case explored in this paper is the issue of genocide recognition of the Armenian Massacre. The predecessor of the Republic of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire, allegedly deported and killed hundreds of thousands of Armenians residing in its territory during World War I. The Armenian government and the Armenian diaspora demand that Turkey admit it was genocide and apologize. However, the Turkish government has not offered an apology to date. Consequently, the Armenian side requests foreign governments to officially recognize the atrocities as genocide, while Turkey threatens them with potential deterioration of bilateral ties. This case is the most notable example of historical issues involving third-party intervention and, therefore, the best case for this research.</p><p>The results of this study can be summarized as follows. As for the causes, cross-national and time-series qualitative analyses reveal that the genocide is mainly recognized by countries with a Christian majority and large Armenian communities. International norms of human rights also play an important role.</p><p>Regarding the effects, two aspects of bilateral relationships are examined. First, simple observations of official diplomatic relations show that the Turkish government usually recalls its ambassadors from recognizing countries immediately after recognition, but it sends him/her back after several months, preventing further damage to the relationship. Second, panel data analyses on the amount of bilateral trade and the number of foreign visitors illustrate that there are statistically significant negative effects of genocide recognition, but these effects only last for a few years at most. To summarize, genocide recognition imposes a negative impact on bilateral relations between Turkey and the recognizer in the short run, but the deterioration is only temporary.</p>

著者

小阪 裕城

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_43-176_56, 2014-03-31 (Released:2015-10-20)

参考文献数

53

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This article examines the American Jewish Committee (AJC)’s postwar planning based on “international human rights”. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Zionist movements had struggled to establish a Jewish state in Palestine as a solution for the so-called “Jewish question”. However, every Jew was not Zionist. There were non-Zionist groups in the United States, which had criticized Zionism. Focusing on the AJC, which was one of the most prominent and influential non-Zionist groups in the United States, this paper tries to answer the question of what the AJC aimed to do in the postwar international arena and why their plan did not work as an alternative to the Zionist solution. While Zionist had sought to establish a Jewish state, the AJC had tried to build an international human rights system as another solution for the Jewish question. They thought their plan could contribute to protection of rights of Jews all over the world. The AJC criticized Zionist because creation of a Jewish state was likely to be utilized by anti-Semitism movements and accelerate exclusion of Jews from each country. Therefore, the AJC sought to build an international system based on international human rights as a solution of the Jewish question. However, the AJC’s postwar plan and activities turned out to be infeasible when the relief of Jewish displaced persons (DPs) in the postwar Europe emerged as an urgent task before the AJC. The AJC lobbied Britain to admit those Jewish DPs into Palestine; at the same time they insisted that every country including the United States should reform their immigration law system to accept the DPs. It was necessary for the AJC to let those DPs acquire citizenship of any country under the aegis of international human rights system. In reality, such idea was difficult. First of all, the U.S. immigration law system stood in the way of the AJC’s activities. Having been dominated by the conservative GOP, it seemed that it was not easy for the U.S. Congress to allow the Jewish DPs to immigrate into the United States. In addition, because the severe situation in the DP camps in Europe became worse and worse, and because the extreme revisionist Zionists armed forces such as Irgun had escalated its terrorism in Palestine, the AJC could not help but cooperate with more moderate Zionists group, Jewish Agency. As a result, they supported partition of Palestine and creation of the Jewish state in order to relieve the DPs in Europe as soon as possible. Here we can see the transformation of the AJC’s postwar plan and activities.

著者

東野 篤子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.144, pp.163-166, 2006-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

臼井 久和

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.41, pp.162-168, 1970

著者

芝井 清久

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_98-180_110, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

42

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This article explores the mutual interaction of nuclear nonproliferation negotiations in Europe and nuclear nonproliferation negotiations in East Asia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Previous studies separately surveyed European nuclear proliferation and East Asian nuclear proliferation. These studies,however, focusing on one specific area respectively cannot completely answer the question as to why the Soviet Union and the United States changed their nuclear policies as well as to why the results of the nuclear nonproliferation negotiations in Europe and East Asia became symmetric. This is because there is a clear fact that the Soviet Union supported Chinese nuclear development and the United States planned NATO nuclear sharing and the MLF, which partly allowed West Germany to “possess” nuclear weapons at first. In order to answer these questions adequately, I treat both areas’ nonproliferation negotiations as a series of negotiation and show a new hypothesis that the Chinese nuclear issue was dealt promptly to settle the West German nuclear issues. The Soviet Union, which greatly feared that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons, indicated that it would discourage Chinese nuclear development in return for the United States to do the same regarding West Germany’s nuclear policy. The Soviet Union promoted building trust with the United States and succeeded with the result of West Germany ratifying the PTBT and the NPT. In contrast to Europe, East Asia failed in achieving nuclear nonproliferation. What are the causes of such a symmetric outcome? West Germany and China both needed nuclear deterrence for their national security, especially against threat from the Soviet Union and/or United States. The United States offered West Germany security assurance and kept mutual confidence, but the Soviet Union unilaterally demanded that China abandoned its nuclear development in order to promote nuclear nonproliferation negotitations with the United States without any compensation. This act resulted in losing China’s trust because the Soviet Union’s top priority was to stop West Germany, and thus treated China’s nuclear issues as one of the means to achieve this goal. Does settling West Germany’s nuclear issue in the form of mutual cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union indicate that their negotiations were excellent? If we turn our eyes towards the correlation between European negotiations and East Asian negotiations, we can understand that they are not necessarily superior negotiations like non-cooperative games which all countries gain profit, but rather,unequal negotiations that the cost for the agreement in Europe was passed to negotiations in East Asia, and the European negotiation became one of the causes of the failure of nonproliferation in East Asia.

著者

臼井 陽一郞

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_16-182_29, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

参考文献数

37

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The paper revisits multi-level governance (hereinafter: MLG) in the EU in both theoretical and empirical terms. For theoretical reconsiderations, it examines some reasons why MLG has been so attractive to many scholars working on EU politics during almost the past quarter century. Two points are noted:first, MLG studies posit that the transformation of a national sovereignty has emerged in the EU; second, we have found the so-called “a governance turn” in EU studies around the year 2000, which leads our concerns to investigate the EU day-to-day institutional practices. These MLG studies have drawn our attention to the following relative transformations of power: from a state to a societal organization; from a central government to a local/regional government; and from a national government to an international organization. The paper argues that this type of a polity image, in which a national sovereignty has been transformed, is hard to be found in EU’s political practices of MLG.For its empirical survey, the paper analyses the conceptualization of MLG in the EU, drawing on the 2014 Multi-level Governance Charter of the Committee of the Regions and the 2014 Conclusions of the Council of Ministers on Macro-Region Strategies, and then investigates two typical multi-level governance practices of cross-border cooperations: the Macro-Region Strategies (MRS) and the European Neighbourhood Policy Cross-Border Cooperation (ENP CBC). From these examinations of policy documents, the paper suggests an over-interpretation of multi-level governance studies that regards the EU as a multi-level polity. What has been found in the EU is not a legally established multi-level institutional complex, but just only a political slogan that tries to instigates voluntally cooperative practices among various levels of governments.On the basis of these theoretical and empirical considerations, the paper finally pays attention to two critical viewpoints of preceding studies against MLG. The first points out that MLG damages European democracy in terms of both representativeness and accountability; and the second suggests that MLG studies posit a political harmony in horizontal and vertical governmental interrelations and thus underestimates power politics in which an ideology, such as neo-liberalism, becomes prevalent.In concluding remarks, the paper suggests one notable point in MLG, which is an opening of a political field for mutual learning of practitioners going beyond national borders. This multi-level practices are exactly what Ian Manners suggests as a source of normative power Europe in his paper of 2002. What we need to see in MLG is not institutional complexes for vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations, but a sustainable training system for learning a partnership among practioners trying to make European policies.

著者

湯川 拓

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_126-176_139, 2014-03-31 (Released:2015-10-20)

参考文献数

49

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The balance of power has always been conceived as being closely connected with realism, in the conventional International Relations literature. In particular, realists believe that the balance of power is the result of alliances being formed within the international system, by nations in their pursuit of self-interest. In contrast to the conventional literature, this paper emphasizes the role of the balance of power as a behavioral norm, within the international society. To be more specific, it sheds light on the fact that the balance of power provides moral and obligatory standards for the members of international society to adhere to. At the same time, it has also contributed to public interest within international society. Although the normative balance of power first made its appearance in the 18th century, the current balance of power (observed in contemporary international society) does not bear the role of a behavioral standard. Two relevant questions which we should consider then, is (1) at what point in time exactly, and (2) in what way exactly, the balance of power norm waned in terms of influence. This paper aims to answer these two questions. Its main finding is as follows. This paper stresses on the legitimacy of the balance of power norm (within international society) as being key to answering the two research questions above. In the 18th century the balance of power referred to the need to maintain an equal distribution of physical military power, as a norm that was necessary for ensuring stability in the international society. Some necessary conditions for the balance of power to exist as a norm in the 18th century were the absence of disputes over legitimacy, and the recognition (or achievement) of a certain degree of homogeneity amongst the members of international society. When the balance of power came to be established as a norm in the earlier half of the 19th century, it was perceived as contributing to homogeneity in international society. It referred to the maintenance of equilibrium in the international society, vis-a-vis the sustenance of a particular regime, rather than the balancing of physical power. It finally lost its appeal as a norm during the latter half of the 19th century and after the First World War, when new principles of legitimacy such as nationalism and democracy appeared. The various different meanings implied by the term ‘balance of power’ tell us multitudes about the type of world order which was deemed desirable by the international society, under different situations.

著者

池内 恵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.186, pp.186_169-186_172, 2017-01-30 (Released:2017-04-07)

著者

山本 元

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.147, pp.132-148,L14, 2007-01-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

43

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After the end of the Cold war era, domestic conflicts became a key issue facing international society. However, there exist cases actually left untouched for several years. Theorists of international politics also have not paid much attention to such cases as the subject of their research, with the result that we have not accumulated knowledge about “pretermitted conflicts” and the dynamics of the peace negotiation.The purpose of this paper is to explain the sudden change in the behavior of a government in a peace negotiation even though international society sits still and watches. As Gurr points out, however, domestic conflicts have also occurred in quasi-states. This institutional character makes international intervention difficult and justifies the non-intervention of international society.Making a point of being a quasi-state, the author characterizes the government as a player that tries to maximize public support. Inside the government organization, however, the army, which keeps the capability to overturn the peace agreement between the government and the proindependence militant, exists and opposes a move to the peace agreement. People not directly concerned with the domestic conflict determine support (or nonsupport) for their government after observing the will for peace and the ability to control the armed forces (civil-military relations). But the reality of civil-military relations is the private information of the government. Based upon this setting, the model on a peace negotiation was formulated as an incomplete information game.After analyzing this model, the author derives two kinds of equilibrium paths to reach a peace agreement. One is a separating equilibrium, in which the government H aving control over the national military (H) proposes the peace plan, but the government Lacking control over it (L) does not when the militant's belief that the government is H is high, and the militant will accept it. The other is a pooling equilibrium that both H and L propose when the belief is low and the militants will reject it. The first is a trivial outcome. However, L can propose it because L can appeal to the people's will for peace without exposing the low ascendancy of L on the separating equilibrium.Finally, the author explains the dynamics of peace negotiations in Indonesia and the Philippines and points out that civil-military relations could be a useful explanatory variable. And as they are also policy implications for avoiding further humanitarian crisis, international society should not castigate L for a passive stance on the separating equilibrium, and it should notcastigate separates for it in regards to the pooling equilibrium. In this way, by seeing the effect of civil-military relations on the dynamics of a peace process, the optimal reply of international society to the government's and the militant's behavior must be changed to effect a prompt and appropriate response to avoid further massacre or the violation of human rights.

著者

中村 文子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.152, pp.132-152,L15, 2008

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This paper attempts to develop a new model for analyzing the reasons behind trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons in the form of sexual exploitation therefore is caused by differentials in power between sex, the rich and the poor, and citizen and non-citizen. From power differentials evolves discrimination, and discrimination is justified by power. Moreover, the paper suggests possibilities for constructing a social structure that is able to address the problem of discrimination.<br>By analyzing the trafficking of victims' throughout the world, based on the information provided by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), we recognize specific geographic aspects of human trafficking. Mostly, victims come from developing countries such as those in Eastern Europe or Asia, and their final destinations are developed countries such as Japan, the USA, or Italy. By scrutinizing the conditions for human trafficking based on the modern world-system theory we learn that "core" areas exploit "semi-periphery" areas. This finding applied to the problem of trafficking in persons then means that the "core" exploits the "periphery" <i>physically.</i>.<br>However, modern world-system theory's explanation for the causes of this crime is insufficient. The existing deep discrimination between men and women or the rich, the poor, and citizen and non-citizen brings to light the relation of power between those who discriminate and those discriminated. In this sense, sex discrimination is caused by "nation states" politics, which is strongly patriarchal. Therefore, this politics forces women to be "peripheral", i. e. to serve as assistants for men in society. Further, discrimination against foreigners is also strongly related with "nation states'" politics, which excludes "others". Carrying this explanation further, we can argue that economic discrimination promotes people with power while discriminating "others". The modern world-system structure ties agents' action, thus it is hard to solve the problem of discrimination. On the other hand, there are certain possibilities that agents' action can influence the structure of this world system.<br>The victims of trafficking in persons are forced to the bottom of the hierarchy structured by power differentials with discrimination and thus to fate of being the slave, whose human dignity is ravished by sexual exploitation. Thus it is essential to remove the consciousness of discrimination, which justifies power differentials between sex, the rich and the poor, and citizen and non-citizen. It is here, where cooperation with international organizations and NGOs serves our purpose.<br>Firstly, it is necessary to raise consciousness among those who 'buy' women, that their action is a "crime". Secondly, it is important to enhance women's consciousness of being a victim. And finally, it is essential to bring the issue of trafficking in persons to the consciousness of the ordinary people, and encourage them to help the victims.