著者

山中 仁美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_14-175_26, 2014

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This article explores how the theories and concepts of 'nationalism' were incorporated into the newly introduced study of International Relations (IR) in Britain, arguing that scholars' theoretical attempts to limit the 'hostility of nationalism' eventually gave way to the empirical reality of international politics during the inter-war period. It will focus on a report by a research group at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), whose official aim was to provide a 'scientific examination' of the contemporary developments of nationalism that had dominated Europe since the end of the nineteenth century and were believed to 'threaten the very future of civilisation'.<br>During the inter-war years, nationalism was heavily criticised as being a regressive political ideology deemed to be a decisive factor of war. Its dramatic growth became a major issue for the IR academics who were studying the bankruptcy of internationalism. They decided to initiate a collective, comprehensive, and scientific study of nationalism within the newly established London think tank. The debate adopted an early modernist and functionalist approach to the concept of nation and national identity with a historical perspective on the stages of nationalism as an account of the economic and social developments of the nation and nationality. At first, the members of the research group sought to provide a theoretical perspective on the limitation of nationalism. As the international situation became increasingly tense, however, they came to accept the concept of nation and nationalism as a fact, no longer assuming that nation states would disappear nor that nationalism should be condemned as the sole cause of discontent and instability.<br>The group's theoretical studies were highly responsive to the challenges of a deteriorating international environment and theory was gradually reconciled with the empirical reality of international politics. This will defend a historically sensitive approach to the classification of international theories during this period of crisis, avoiding reducing a broader political and social debate to the ahistorical utopian-realism dichotomy of the 'First Great Debate'. Special attention needs to be paid to a wide variety of institutional settings and collective studies that gave rise to the substantive debates on international affairs in inter-war Britain marking a sharp contrast with the situation in the US where IR debates mainly took place in the academic circles of Political Science.

著者

山中 仁美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_14-175_26, 2014

---

This article explores how the theories and concepts of 'nationalism' were incorporated into the newly introduced study of International Relations (IR) in Britain, arguing that scholars' theoretical attempts to limit the 'hostility of nationalism' eventually gave way to the empirical reality of international politics during the inter-war period. It will focus on a report by a research group at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), whose official aim was to provide a 'scientific examination' of the contemporary developments of nationalism that had dominated Europe since the end of the nineteenth century and were believed to 'threaten the very future of civilisation'.<br>During the inter-war years, nationalism was heavily criticised as being a regressive political ideology deemed to be a decisive factor of war. Its dramatic growth became a major issue for the IR academics who were studying the bankruptcy of internationalism. They decided to initiate a collective, comprehensive, and scientific study of nationalism within the newly established London think tank. The debate adopted an early modernist and functionalist approach to the concept of nation and national identity with a historical perspective on the stages of nationalism as an account of the economic and social developments of the nation and nationality. At first, the members of the research group sought to provide a theoretical perspective on the limitation of nationalism. As the international situation became increasingly tense, however, they came to accept the concept of nation and nationalism as a fact, no longer assuming that nation states would disappear nor that nationalism should be condemned as the sole cause of discontent and instability.<br>The group's theoretical studies were highly responsive to the challenges of a deteriorating international environment and theory was gradually reconciled with the empirical reality of international politics. This will defend a historically sensitive approach to the classification of international theories during this period of crisis, avoiding reducing a broader political and social debate to the ahistorical utopian-realism dichotomy of the 'First Great Debate'. Special attention needs to be paid to a wide variety of institutional settings and collective studies that gave rise to the substantive debates on international affairs in inter-war Britain marking a sharp contrast with the situation in the US where IR debates mainly took place in the academic circles of Political Science.

著者

西村 邦行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_41-175_55, 2014

---

Scholars of international studies in Japan have repeatedly reflected on their excessive susceptibility to the Western academia; they have rigorously "imported" theories from America and Britain whereas they have failed to develop their own. However, few researchers have exemplified how this "importation" has actually been played out. Given that the Japanese recipients of Western theories have not shared academic and other contexts with their original bearers, it is possible that the "importation" have led to idiosyncratic interpretations of these theories.<br>This article examines in which context and in what way Japanese scholars in the middle-war and the early post-war periods read the works of E. H. Carr, the oft-claimed pioneer of Western international relations theory. In the Anglophone international studies academia, scholars have usually labeled Carr realist who had rejected interwar liberal internationalism. His first readers in Japan did not embrace such view. They, in fact, did not read Carr exclusively as international theorist. Carr, for early Japanese scholars, was an empiricist social thinker who attempted to transcend the modern ways of (both domestic and international) politics.<br>Among Carr's writings, the one that first won the heart of Japanese scholars was not<i> The Twenty Years' Crisis</i>, the now acclaimed classic of international relations theory, but <i>Conditions of Peace</i>, its more utopian-oriented sequel. They, in addition, virtually ignored the book's second part, in which Carr provided his prescriptions for the new world order; they rather focused on the first part, in which he discussed the limits of modern political thought. Finishing <i>Conditions of Peace</i>, furthermore, they moved on to <i>The Soviet Impact on the Western World</i>, yet another book on the crisis of the modern European political system. Only after this series of reception, <i>The Twenty Years' Crisis</i> caught a spotlight. As a result, Japanese scholars read the book not so much as an advocacy of power politics as a stepping stone for the future governance of the still antagonistic relationship among states.<br>Thusly, early Japanese recipients of Carr read his works against the backdrop of their own concern about the deadlock of modernity. This insight provides us an alternative way to approaching the history of Japanese international studies.

著者

西村 邦行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_41-175_55, 2014

---

Scholars of international studies in Japan have repeatedly reflected on their excessive susceptibility to the Western academia; they have rigorously "imported" theories from America and Britain whereas they have failed to develop their own. However, few researchers have exemplified how this "importation" has actually been played out. Given that the Japanese recipients of Western theories have not shared academic and other contexts with their original bearers, it is possible that the "importation" have led to idiosyncratic interpretations of these theories.<br>This article examines in which context and in what way Japanese scholars in the middle-war and the early post-war periods read the works of E. H. Carr, the oft-claimed pioneer of Western international relations theory. In the Anglophone international studies academia, scholars have usually labeled Carr realist who had rejected interwar liberal internationalism. His first readers in Japan did not embrace such view. They, in fact, did not read Carr exclusively as international theorist. Carr, for early Japanese scholars, was an empiricist social thinker who attempted to transcend the modern ways of (both domestic and international) politics.<br>Among Carr's writings, the one that first won the heart of Japanese scholars was not<i> The Twenty Years' Crisis</i>, the now acclaimed classic of international relations theory, but <i>Conditions of Peace</i>, its more utopian-oriented sequel. They, in addition, virtually ignored the book's second part, in which Carr provided his prescriptions for the new world order; they rather focused on the first part, in which he discussed the limits of modern political thought. Finishing <i>Conditions of Peace</i>, furthermore, they moved on to <i>The Soviet Impact on the Western World</i>, yet another book on the crisis of the modern European political system. Only after this series of reception, <i>The Twenty Years' Crisis</i> caught a spotlight. As a result, Japanese scholars read the book not so much as an advocacy of power politics as a stepping stone for the future governance of the still antagonistic relationship among states.<br>Thusly, early Japanese recipients of Carr read his works against the backdrop of their own concern about the deadlock of modernity. This insight provides us an alternative way to approaching the history of Japanese international studies.

著者

君塚 直隆

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_155-173_169, 2013-06-25 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

44

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Queen Elizabeth II has played an important part in British foreign policy after the Second World War during her extreme long reign of sixty years. The Queen has undertaken 92 State visits and gone around Commonwealth countries all over the world. Moreover, she has hosted more than hundred Heads of States at the Buckingham Palace or Windsor Castle since her accession of 1952. Elizabeth has supported twelve Prime Ministers from Winston Churchill to David Cameron when they promoted their own foreign policies among the ‘Three Circles’: United States, Europe and Commonwealth for sixty years. However, the Queen also has promoted her own diplomacy towards foreign royal sovereigns during the same period, in particular when she determined to confer them the highest order of the United Kingdom, the Most Noble Order of the Garter. Since the establishment of the Order of the Garter in 1348, it had only been given to Christian monarchs except for a few Sultans and Shahs from the later Nineteenth Century to the beginning of Twentieth Century. After 1906, the British monarchs have conferred this honour only upon Japanese Emperors as their valuable partners of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but the honour of Emperor Hirohito was withdrawn when Japan entered the Second World War in December 1941. Since then, there was no Non-Christian extra Knight of the Garter in the world. Thirty years after, in October 1971, Hirohito visited Britain, and the Queen instructed that the name of the Emperor be formally restored to the list of members of the Garter Knights. It was possible to imagine that she desired the Anglo-Japanese reconciliation and also she has respected a precedent of former British monarchs who created only Japanese Emperors as extra Knights of that Order from 1906. It also means that she has no mind to confer this honour upon any other Non-Christian sovereigns even though their own power and positions in international politics have been strengthened during the Cold War. Actually the Queen never created the Shah of Iran or the King of Thailand as extra Knights of the Garter although they earnestly desired to become knights, because there was no precedent. Elizabeth II has given support to successive UK governments in order to protect British national interests on the one hand, but has gone her own way against policies of governments on the other. It is also a fine example of originality and diversity of British foreign policy after the Second World War.

著者

野添 文彬

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_1-172_14, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

79

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This article aims to examine the US-Japan negotiation process over the reversion of Okinawa in the context of US strategy in East Asia. In November, 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and US President Richard M. Nixon reached an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. This was a highly significant agreement because it settled a war-related issue between Japan and the United States, and thus contributed to the stabilization of the US-Japan alliance. The existing literature has focused on the US-Japan bilateral negotiation process and has tended to emphasize that the US government had achieved a greater level of burden-sharing with Japan thorough the negotiations. Recently, due to the declassification of numerous documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, researchers have begun to explore the policy-making process in the Government of Japan. The reversion of Okinawa was not only a US-Japan bilateral issue, but also had implications for the region due to the fact that the US bases in Okinawa have played important roles in both the defense of Japan and regional security in East Asia. Furthermore, during that period, the Nixon administration reviewed the global strategy of the United States due to various international difficulties such as the ongoing war in Vietnam, Soviet military expansion, and the rapid economic rise of Japan. Therefore, the Nixon administration sought the détente with the Soviet Union, the rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the application of the Nixon Doctrine. Despite these facts suggesting the significance of paying attention to the international context, previous works have not analyzed how the process of the reversion of Okinawa was related to the US strategy in East Asia. This article reexamines the reversion of Okinawa by focusing on the US strategy in East Asia during the period from the Johnson administration to the Nixon administration, particularly the policies toward the PRC and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Analyzing documents on US policies toward PRC and ROK as well Japan, this article extends the scope of its analysis from the US-Japan bilateral relations to the international relations in East Asia. This article argues that the US government regarded the agreement of the reversion of Okinawa as an essential step toward reconstruction of her strategy in East Asia, such as the rapprochement with PRC and the reduction of the US military presence in ROK. The US government sought to readjust the US-Japan alliance by settling the reversion of Okinawa since the US placed great value on the US-Japan alliance and also wanted to prevent Japan from pursuing more independent policies such as the development of her own nuclear weapon and to promote Japan’s burden-sharing. In addition to that, the US government succeeded in maintaining her credibility toward her allies by preserving bases in Okinawa. In other words, for the US government, maintaining the US-Japan alliance and preserving bases in Okinawa was an essential prerequisite for her strategy in East Asia. Therefore, the reversion of Okinawa not only settled a war-related issue among the US and Japan, but can also be interpreted as the beginning of the transformation of the international order in East Asia initiated by the US government.

著者

阿部 悠貴

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_73-172_86, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

44

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Constructivist scholarship has contended that social norms constitute appropriate state policy. Given this premise, nevertheless, because there are various norms within a society, it is conceivable that some of them are mutually incompatible and hence will clash with each other on occasions. How do state decision makers react when they are confronted simultaneously by contrasting norms? This paper investigates this question through analysis of Germany’s involvement in the war in Bosnia, wherein policy was influenced by three different normative claims: to address the humanitarian tragedy in the Balkans; to refrain from the use of force; and to maintain international cooperation with its European partners in their joint military operations. In other words, it was exposed to a “clash of norms” emanating from humanitarianism, anti-militarism and multilateralism. This paper argues that the clash of norms propels state leaders to develop international organizations as the existence of well-developed international mechanisms for effective crisis management enables contingencies to be dealt with swiftly: before the situation deteriorates and before norms clash each other. Specifically, this argument is examined by analyzing why the German decision makers, in the light of their experience with Bosnia, came to argue for the reinvigoration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the purpose of addressing “foreign” contingencies, despite the neorealist prediction of its dissolution after the demise of the Soviet Union. The theoretical implications of this paper are discussed against the backdrop of the constructivist studies. The conventional knowledge of constructivism tells us that a new state preference, as well as a new appropriate posture of an international organization, is formed as a certain norm becomes dominant and diffused among decision makers. Thus, “changes” in state policy hinge on the “changes” in normative contexts. Meanwhile, the paper proffers an alternative perspective that because various norms are working simultaneously, state leaders (re)create international organizations so that they can avoid the conflict of norms and live up to different normative claims. Germany, in its response to the situation in Bosnia, deemed it appropriate not only to halt the violence on humanitarian grounds, but also to maintain its foreign policy stance of anti-militarism and multilateralism. That is to say, because the abiding norms remain “unchanged”, they reconstitute the structures of international organizations, as discussions of reforms to NATO within the German decision making circle were informed by this crisis. This paper is intended to advance constructivist understandings on the development of international institutions.

著者

加藤 陽子

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.110-125,L12, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

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At the end of the Pacific War, there were more than 6 million Japanese (this figure includes not only military and naval personnel but olso civilians) scattered in overseas theaters; Korea, Manchuria, China, the Philippine islands, and the islands of the Western Pacific. At that moment, there was no one who dared imagine that Japanese nationals overseas could get back home safely and smoothly.But in fact, 90 percent of them were repatriated by the end of 1949. In particular, 80 percent of the Japanese in former Japanese occupied territory in China, could return by May 1946.This paper focuses on how the disarmament and repatriation policies for the Japanese overseas were made, and why they could be repatriated so quickly.Who had the supreme responsibility to accomplish the disarmament of Japanese nationals and to provide for their repatriation? The Chinese National government troops under Chiang Kai-shek's rule could not carry out this mission. During the anti-Japanese War, the Nationalist government moved into the western regions, far from the coastal araes, so it took time for them to reach Japanese occupied territory.Only the United States had the power and will to govern all the processes of repatriation. But at the same time, she had to solve other problems. First, she was supposed to maintain the pace of her own demobilization. There was strong pressure to bring Americans out of China. Second, she had to consider Manchurian problems. Generalissimo Chiang asked United States to transfer his army to the northern part of China, as quickly as possible, or the Soviet and Chinese Communist Party would have enterd into the vacuum.In short, the repatriation of Japanese, demobilization of Americans, and transportation of Chinese were absolutely necessary for Washington. In order to carry out all these programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff mapped out detailed plans for navigating large numbers of LST and Liberty vessels in December 1945.

著者

渡辺 昭夫 星野 俊也

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.114, pp.57-71,L9, 1997-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

20

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What about regional solutions to regional security questions? After the United Nations has experienced both successes and setbacks in dealing with a series of post-Cold War regional crises, the inter-relationship (or the appropriate balance) between global (i. e. the UN) and regional mechanisms to manage and to help resolve these conficts has become a recurring subject for discussion. And it is especially so in the Asia Pacific region. The rather anomalous security environment of which is exemplified in the duality of “hub-and-spokes”-type bilaterals alliances (à la the US-Japan alliance) and multilateral security frameworks (like the ASEAN regional forum, or ARF).In fact, the tension between global and regional mechanisms, and the applicability thereof, was evidenced from the very beginning of the drafting of the UN Charter. They are both “collective” measures which can involve military options. But they are distinct in that the former can be called, in its ideal form, a system of “collective security” based on the principle of universality and inclusiveness while tha latter, being naturally limited in its membership, can be characterized as that of “collective self-defense.” Conceptually these two logics are supposed to be mutually exclusive, but in reality the function of regional security mechanisms can be found somewhere in the middle ground between collective security and collective self-defense. For example, the post-Cold War NATO has changed the nature of its functions and so has the bilateral alliance between the US and Japan, both of which are assuming the stabilizing role as “public goods” beyond collective self-defense.In the Asia Pacific region, the anomaly of the security environment has not permitted us to envision a region-wide collective security mechanism encompassing all the relevant countries that is firm enough to capture especially commitment from the four regional major powers—the US, China, Russia and Japan. On the other hand, a series of efforts toward what might be called “cooperative security” undertaken regionally which are not predicated on military enforcement do contribute positively to enhance confidence-building. In this period of transition, security in the region will entail a complex of security mechanisms composed of “hub-and-spokes”-type alliances with growing “public goods” role and informal multilateral “cooperative security” dialogue rather than building a hard security regime in the Asia Pacific. Coupled with these developments, however, it would be most productive to pursue concerted diplomacy among the three major powers (the US, China and Japan). It is certainly a long way to draw political contours that fits the Concert of Pacific Asia, but that seems the most plausible option available to these three countries in the twenty-first century.

著者

浪岡 新太郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.149, pp.93-110,L12, 2007-11-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

41

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This article examines the relationship between citizenship and the public recognition of Islam in France. Secularization is a cultural norm in Western Europe. In this circumstance, the settlement of the Muslim population with the claim for the public recognition of Islam has often been regarded as a threat against the idea of citizenship. In particular, ‘French citizenship’ appears antagonistic towards the public recognition of religious belonging. This is due to the fact that religion as a matter in the private space should be separated from the public space according to the model of republicanism deeply embedded in the French political culture based on the principle of separation of the public space from the private, or more specifically, the principle of laïcité (separation of religion from politics). This citizenship appreciates the public space as the space of universal values, in which the citizens discuss issues they have in common. In this framework, all individuals are entitled to have citizenship regardless of their origins or social backgrounds.But in reality the majority of French Muslims, who are mainly of Maghrebin origin, are discriminated against and excluded socially and economically. The social right, which is part of citizenship, in particular, is not effectively assured for them. Given this, the social and economic conditions on which Muslims could participate in the public space are not fully developed, and hence citizenship for those people lacks substance. Since the 1990's, the number of the new generation of Maghrebin immigrants who have started to claim for the public recognition of Islam has increased. These Muslims organize and run associations whose purposes are to encourage and educate young French Muslims in order to restore their dignity, the dignity eroded by the experience of being the target of racism. These associations are normally open to anybody, and are based on universal values such as social justice rather than ethnic origins.In 1996, some of these associations organized a network called “Collectif des associations Musulmanes du Grand Lyon”, in the east suburb of Lyon. CAMGL is considered as representative of the trend of these associations. CAMGL regards Tariq RAMADAN whose grandfather is Hassan Al Banna, a founding member of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, as the ideologue of the network. Since it teaches Islamic faith as a basis of ‘citizenship’, CAMGL is perceived as a threat against the republican model of citizenship.In this article, the author argue that the recent trend observed in CAMGL offers some potential to propose the new form of republican model of citizenship based on universal values, but constructed through a different sense of belongings.

著者

杉之原 真子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_144-171_155, 2013-01-30 (Released:2014-12-13)

参考文献数

21

著者

福田 円

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.163, pp.139-153, 2011-01

著者

石井 修

出版者

学術雑誌目次速報データベース由来

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.100, pp.35-53,8, 1992

著者

小出 輝章

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_79-154_94, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

38

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In the cold war era, Japanese political leaders decided most of defense policies without providing the military expert advice, so they seldom met with the military officers. The Internal Bureau supervised the Self-Defense Force (SDF) that consists of the Ground Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Force Self-Defense Force (ASDF). The Internal Bureau was responsible for defense policies with the SDF. In other words, the Internal Bureau's main role was not operation of the SDF but management of it, such as the defense build up plan and the administration of personnel affairs. Political leaders formally controlled the military.In the post cold war, the security environment surrounding Japan has changed defense policy considerably. The SDF missions and roles has expanded. Thus, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) has reviewed “Positioning of Missions”. Defense of Japan 2007 says, “Among those operations historically positioned as Supplementary missions, the following were stipulated as primary missions.1) Activities that contribute to maintaining the peace and security of the international community including Japan, including international disasters relief operations, international peace cooperation operations, operations based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and operations based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.2) Activities conductive to ensuring the peace and security of Japan in situations arising in areas surrounding Japan, such as rear area support and other activities based on the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and ship inspection operations based on the Ship Inspection Operations Law.3) Activities to ensure the safety of the livesand property pf the Japanese People, such as minesweeping and the evacuation of Japanese nationals abroad.”Organization of the MOD/SDF has changed to coupe with various missions. The MOD has reconstructed its internal bureaus in order to make various policies. It goes without saying that the SDF has been reconstructed.It is clear that political leaders, such as the Minister of Defense can't decide defense policies without the military expert advices. The Chief of Joint Staff Office and the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF are military expert advisors to the Minister. So, Civil- Military relations has been changing in Japan.

著者

木村 昌人

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.92, pp.116-131,L13, 1989-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

38

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The purpose of this paper is to describe clearly the Nippon Zaikai (Business Circles) 's role in the normalization of Japan-South Korean diplomatic relations during 1960-1965. In particular, I focused on the Kansai Zaikai which showed their zeal for this long-pending question. There have been few studies about this topic, but I believe this analysis will illustrate the Japanese non-governmental economic diplomacy towards South Korea after the World War II.The Kansai Zaikai's strong interest in Korea was generated by the Kansai area's geographical proximity to Korea and the traditional trade ties linking the two. This led the Kansai Zaikai to play a major role in the rebirth of economic ties between Japan and South Korea. The large number of Koreans living in the Kansai area led to the formation of the Zainichi Kankoku Shokokai (Korean Chamber of Commerce in Japan). This group took a vested interest in restimulating both cultural and economic exchange between Japan and South Korea. The normalization of Japan-South Korean diplomatic relations was viewed by the Kansai Zaikai as means of revitalizing the Kansai economy in the aftermath of World War II.When the Ikeda Cabinet appeared in 1960, Kansai Zaikai formed the Japan-Korea Economic Association with the Keizai Dantai Rengokai and Japanese Chamber of Commerce. The Korean Chamber of Commerce in Osaka also took part in this association and played an important role in linking the Japanese and South Korean economic circles.Subsequently, Michisuke Sugi, ex-president of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and one of the leaders of the Kansai Zaikai, was appointed as one of the chief-representatives in the Japan-South Korean talks held during 1961-64.In conclusion, an evaluation of the Zaikai's Activities during 1960-1965 as follows:(1) One of the most notable changes brought about by the Zaikai's efforts to normalize relations was the improvement in the Zaikai's image of South Korea.(2) As a result of the Zaikai's efforts, the establishment of a direct channel between the Pak Cabinet and Japan was established.(3) While the Kansai Zaikai took an interest in the reestablishment of economic and political ties because of its historically close ties with Korea, their interest in restoring economic activity to the Kansai area, and their pronounced rivalry of Tokyo sparked them into taking a leading role in the normalization efforts.

著者

石川 誠人

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.148, pp.118-132,L15, 2007-03-08 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

83

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The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, it examines Nationalist's attempts to implement the 1962 “Returning to the Mainland” plan. Secondly, it considers the Kennedy administration's response to this plan.After having retreated to Taiwan, Nationalist China placed the highest priority of the national policy on “Returning to the Mainland”. But the United States, the major benefactor of the Nationalists, tried to avoid an armed clash developed between Taipei and Beijing, and consistently restrained the Nationalists from invading mainland China. Following the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the U. S. and the Nationalist China exchanged notes in which Taipei, under Washington's pressure, agreed to withhold military action without holding prior consultation. Furthermore, at the time of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Washington urged Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his “Returning to the Mainland” ambition. As a result, in an October 1958 joint communiqué' Chiang promised that the “principal means” of regaining the mainland would “not (be) the use of force”. Yet, the Nationalists still continued to pursue the policy of reconquering the mainland.The Nationalists envisioned themselves accomplishing its mission through provoking a “revolution” in the mainland before initiating the invasion. In 1961, Chiang, judging that the post-“Great Leap Forward”-chaos in China, along with the Sino-Soviet dispute, had generated widespread anti-communist sentiments, ordered the military to prepare for an offensive campaign. In the following year, he requested Kennedy's blessing for this plan.While the Kennedy administration had no intention of consenting to Chiang's demands, it could not afford to let their already strained relations deteriorate further. Therefore, rather than offering a clear reply, the administration partially satisfied Taipei's desire by allowing the Taipei government to carry out small scale “probing operations”. At the same time, Washington monitored Taipei's preparation for an invasion through taking an active part in the operation planning; it also pressed Taipei to reduce its military budget. Taipei yielded to the U. S. position because the two nations had agreed in 1960 to set a ceiling on the Nationalists' military spending. These measures kept the Nationalists from starting an offensive operation without impairing the relationship with the U. S.. Only after their enthusiasm for “Returning to the Mainland” faded, did the Kennedy administration inform Taipei of its opposition to conducting an invasion under the current circumstances.Still the Kennedy administration's attitude toward the Nationalist's aspirations for “Returning to the Mainland” remained ambiguous. Kennedy never announced that such an operation would not be accepted in the future. It was not until Lyndon B. Johnson took office that a clear statement denying U. S. support for regaining the mainland was finally issued.

著者

上杉 勇司 昇 亜美子

出版者

学術雑誌目次速報データベース由来

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.120, pp.170-194,*17-18, 1999

著者

野口 和彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.153, pp.175-185, 2008

著者

宇野 重昭

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1972, no.45, pp.1-35, 1972-04-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

110

著者

畑田 重夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1972, no.45, pp.36-54, 1972-04-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

59