著者

五野井 郁夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_159-187_170, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

参考文献数

16

著者

竹中 千春

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1984, no.76, pp.186-189, 1984-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

松川 克彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.72, pp.71-84,L9, 1982

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The author intended to make clear the reason Poland was defenceless during the years prior to the Second World War.<br>The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck believed that total war would never break out, because he regarded Hitler's territorial and political demands <i>vis &agrave; vis</i> Poland as only a bluff. Beck's policies to settle the disputes with Germany were as follows; 1) to reply to Hitler with the same bluff, 2) to maintain closer contact with Britain in order to restrain Hitler, 3) to control Polish public opinion in order to carry out 1) and 2).<br>But Beck's plan turned out to be ineffective by the end of April, 1939, because his above-mentioned fundamental intentions from 1) to 3) all turned out to be false. Still remaining in office, he stirred up Poland to make better preparation for the War, though it seems that for Poland not many choices remained.

著者

畠山 京子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_115-181_128, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

67

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Japan has been increasing its roles in a security field in the post-Cold War era. For instance, it decided to participate in peacekeeping operations, strengthened the alliance with the US and upgraded the peacekeeping missions to one of the Self Defense Forces’ core mission. In 2011, it mitigated the arms trade ban policy—an alleged hallmark of Japan’s anti-militarist norm. This article draws attention to the factors behind such changes Japan made on the security front by examining the arms trade ban policy announced in 1967. Arguing that Japan’s security policy has been largely constrained by an anti-militarist norm,constructivists have emphasized the significance of non-material factors in explaining a state’s behavior. The accounts seemed persuasive during the Cold War era when Japan shunned playing military roles. However, they failed to retain pertinence when Japan began to expand its military role after the end of the Cold War. In contrast, rationalists argue that a state pursues maximization of national interests; the behavior is determined by cost/benefit calculations. The shortcoming of the rationalist account is, however, that they either ignore or take a normative factor as given, failing to explain whether normative factors had an effect on a state’s behavior. By incorporating power considerations among actors, this article elucidates the factors behind Japan’s preference changes from rationalist point of view. It is argued by constructivists that the announcement of the arms trade ban policy and ensuing compliance were yielded by the internalization of the anti-militarist norm advocated by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had acted as a norm entrepreneur as well as a protector. However, the investigation of the power balance between the successive Liberal Democratic Party governments and the JSP shows that they were driven by cost/benefit calculation. The 2011 mitigation made by the government under the Democratic Party of Japan was also precipitated by the calculation. By then, the power of the Social Democratic Party, a succeeding party of the JSP which once enjoyed certain influence during the Cold War period, had become negligible. As opposed to the constructivist claim, cost/benefit calculations, not the regulative effect of the norm, are the decisive factor operating behind Japan’s decision making process. More importantly, it is the power balance between norm entrepreneur and decision maker that largely influences the process of cost/benefit calculation.

著者

篠崎 正郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_29-42, 2011

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It is widely believed that the United Kingdom had decided to retreat from &ldquo;East of Suez&rdquo; in January 1968. It planned to withdraw all its forces stationed in South-Eastern Asia and Middle East by the end of 1971. However, the next Heath government made a small change in this policy, left some forces in the area and maintained military commitment beyond 1971. These forces were finally withdrawn by Harold Wilson who was back in power in March 1974. Few studies, however, mention the British forces in the &ldquo;East of Suez&rdquo; after 1968. This thesis clarifies the detail and the logic through the policy of retrenchment from 1974 to 1975.<br>The Conservative government decided to maintain military commitment in the &ldquo;East of Suez.&rdquo; First, there were still lots of British bases in South-Eastern Asia, Indian Ocean and Middle East though the force level was reduced. Second, the United Kingdom retained the general capability which would be available to be deployed outside Europe. Finally, there were regional organisations like CENTO or FPDA (Five Power Defence Arrangements) which enabled the United Kingdom to cooperate with the local countries.<br>However, the British economy in the 1970s could not support these commitments. Roy Mason, the Secretary of State for Defence in the Labour government, began the Defence Review as soon as he entered office. The principal object of the Review was to reduce defence budget from 5.5% to 4.5% of GNP in the next 10 years. The non-NATO commitments were preferred to be cut since the British government tried to concentrate its defence efforts in the NATO area. In addition, he also decided to abandon the reinforcement capabilities outside NATO.<br>The Defence Review was so drastic that it needed consultation with allies. However, the negotiations were not easy. Most countries tried to keep the British forces in the &ldquo;East of Suez&rdquo; because they recognised the importance of the British presence. The United States was concerned about the abandonment of intervention capability outside NATO and desired the British presence in the Mediterranean. As a result, the British government compromised with some of these demands and decided to stay in some areas. Apart from this concession, the British government could carry out the withdrawal as it originally planned.<br>This study indicates the British aspect as an &ldquo;Empire detained&rdquo;. British departure was regretted not only by the United States but also by the Commonwealth countries. Britain's retreat from the Commonwealth marks the transformation of British external policy from the world to the Atlantic community.

著者

金 恩貞

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_28-172_43, 2013

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The Japanese claims against South Korea provoked an intense legal debate at the first Japan-South Korea negotiations and have resulted in the most contentious issue during the early phase of the bilateral normalization talks in the 1950s. Some previous studies on the Japan-South Korea talks pointed out that there was a period which could be regarded as a gap between the talks, namely between the 1950s, when the Japanese claims against South Korea escalated tension among two countries and brought the talks to a halt, and the 1960s, when the actual negotiation started moving with regard to what and how much the Japanese were going to claim. Other scholars have discussed what may have been the Japanese hidden purpose for the claims against South Korea whereby they sought to reduce the amount of the compensation payable to South Korea as well as to use it as "material for negations" in order to respond to the claims of the Japanese citizens repatriated from the formerly occupied territories. In addition, these claims of Japan to South Korea have been under severe criticism to defend the opinions that Japan had not sufficiently reflected on its control over the Korean Peninsula before and during the war.<br>These previous studies, however, have not revealed the legal logic which supported the Japanese government's claims against South Korea. In fact,most of the literature pointed out that the Japanese government lacked a logical policy, causing a misconception that the Japanese government was consistently adopting a passive attitude toward the talks. Moreover, the studies tend to conclude that the effect of interference of the US and the Japanese politicians' perception towards South Korea were the causes of Japan's change in its policy leading to the waiver of the right to claim against South Korea during the break period and to its settlement in 1965.<br>This study aims to clarify what was the logic of the Japanese claims against South Korea and how it was formed. For this purpose, it focuses on the report written by Professor Yasuo Yamashita, a Law Professor at Nagoya University and a prominent international jurist, which was made before the Japan-South Korea negotiations at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This report has played a significant role as a basis for the Japanese legal logic. This paper empirically analyses the main issue of Professor Yamashita's logic and the background of his argument in his report. On the basis of this analysis, this study argues that Japan had a concrete vision and strategy with regard to its negotiations with South Korea from the beginning. Contrary to the previous literature, the findings of this paper identify the existence of consistent policy logic on the part of the Japanese government throughout its negotiations with South Korea and this logic had its origin in the formulation of its claim against South Korea.

著者

田中 世紀

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.158, pp.158_165-181, 2009-12-25 (Released:2012-02-20)

参考文献数

58

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Why are economic sanctions initiated? This paper will describe through quantitative analysis the conditions under which a state or states impose economic sanctions against autocratic regimes. Conventional wisdom argues that norms or interests are important factors leading to the initiation mechanism: economic sanctions are likely to be imposed against countries which violate democratic norms or do not have significant trade ties with sender states. Norms or interests, however, can not explain the actual pattern of initiation of economic sanctions.In this article I propose that reputation is a key factor in the pattern of initiation of economic sanctions. Specifically, economic sanctions are imposed when the sender's reputation is about to be questioned. To put it another way, states do not consider initiating economic sanctions for purely coercive diplomatic purposes, but rather for the maintenance of their reputation. When does reputation matter? This paper assumes the higher the international concern, the higher the stakes for a state's reputation. For example, when the international community pays great attention to a situation, states must do something to maintain their reputation; but states need not do great things—simply doing something is enough. It follows that states do not implement strong economic sanctions, but rather use weak economic sanctions because the sanctions themselves are implemented as symbolic gestures. I refer to this as the symbolic hypothesis.I use panel probit analysis to test this symbolic hypothesis. The data include 24 sanctions initiated by the EU against African countries from 1990 to 2001. The results of my analysis show that the EU tends to impose economic sanctions in reaction to coups, grave violations of human rights, and major states' misbehavior, all of which seem to draw a great deal of international attention. In contrast, the EU is likely to ignore the retreat of democracy and/or minor states' misbehavior, which do not draw public attention. Concerning the type of economic sanctions, my analysis finds that the EU prefers to use relatively weak and costless sanctions such as suspensions or reductions of economic aid, rather than choosing strong and costly alternatives such as trade embargos. All of my results confirm the symbolic hypothesis' predictions. Economic sanctions, after all, are initiated when the senders' reputation is at stake.The findings also challenge the central paradox of economic sanctions concerning why such sanctions continue to be imposed despite seemingly having little effect on the target states. States do not coerce other states to do what they desire, but instead they continue to be forced to use weak economic sanctions, which might be ineffective, to maintain their reputation.

著者

岩 志津子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.107, pp.43-56,L8, 1994

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In this article an attempt is made to analyze how the Brezhnev government coped with the Prague Spring, by focusing on the following three points; military pressure on Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's ability to control the situation, bilateral and multilateral negotiations among socialist bloc countries.<br>CPCz April plenum adopted the Action Program as the guideline to reform socialism in Czechoslovakia. Although CPSU April plenum gave an indirect warning that such an activity might be dangerous, the Soviet Politburo sent a letter of &ldquo;good will&rdquo; to Dubcek's government as a conciliatory measure. In May, WTO contries, with the exception of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, discussed the situation in Czechoslovakia and agreed on military exercises there as a temporary measure. After Kosygin's and Grechko's visits, Czechoslovakia also gave its consent to such military exercises in June. Although CPCz May plenum promised not to radicalize the reform, a dicision was reached to hold an Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9.<br>Reacting to the Prague Spring, the Soviet leadership sought negotiations with the USA and FRG. Czechoslovakia also showed an interest in the relations with FRG. As a result of these attempts, Ulbricht attacked the very possibility of such exchanges with FRG and the situation in Czechoslovakia had not changed. Then Brezhnev proposed bilateral talks with the Dubcek government in the middle of June, but Dubcek rejected the offer. This rejection influenced Brezhnev's perception of Dubcek as a leader whose policy was not in line with the orthodox communist tradition.<br>Military maneuvers which started from June 20 were strongly opposed by the Czechoslovak people and the famous &ldquo;Two Thousand Words&rdquo; was published in Prague. This statement proved to be a turning point and the Brezhnev Politburo changed their policies in three main aspects. 1. The Soviets stopped the negotiations with the FRG concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 2. They postponed the end of the military maneuvers. 3. They replaced the bilateral meeting with Dubcek by the multilateral meeting in Warsaw.<br>In the Warsaw meeting, Gomulka, Ulbricht and Zhivkov, who had attacked the Prague Spring from March, once again heavily criticised Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev also showed strong doubt in Dubchek's leadership and decided to secretly seek a puppet government. After the meeting, Soviet and Czechoslovakia had bilateral talks at Cierna nad Tisou and later a multilateral conference at Bratislava. No decisive and concrete agreements were reached, but at the time of the Bratislava conference, a letter to ask &ldquo;brotherly aid&rdquo; was sent to Brezhnev. The political negotiations were over. It depended on Dubcek's leadership whether to take resolute measures or not. Soviet leaders had gone on the summer vacation.<br>Even in the middle of August, the situation in Czechoslovakia had hardly changed, and Chervonenko reported it to Brezhnev at Yalta. Ulbrichit and Shelest, who had strongly opposed the Prague Spring, also conveyed the same information.<br>At last the Soviet Politburo gathered on August 16 in Moscow and decided on a military intervention in Czechoslovakia. There were some indications that Western countries were not likely to react too strongly if such an intervention did take place.<br>In conclusion, it may be said that military intervention did not only result in the consolidation of the Soviet bloc and promoted the creation of the basis of the detente at that time, but also deprived the socialist countries of the reform impetus beyond the Prague Spring for twenty years.

著者

藤田 泰昌

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_108-121, 2012

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What explains the differences in the frequency with which developed democratic countries resort to dispute settlement (DS) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO)? The present paper proposes three hypotheses: 1) Countries with small constituencies frequently use DS in the GATT/WTO, 2) Countries with few veto players measured by the number of government parties use DS frequently, and 3) Countries with a competitive agricultural sector tend to use DS frequently. The purpose of this paper is to show that both of the two domestic political institutional factors, constituency size and number of government parties, are important determinants of GATT/WTO filing.<br>Existing literature have seldom analyzed these two political factors simultaneously. This is because they not only belong to "consensus model" (Lijphardt 1999) but also are highly correlated. As such, they are often considered as two sides of the same coin and it is rendered useless to put them in the same set of analysis simultaneously. However, there are some studies, such as Nielson (2003), that argue that constituency size and number of government parties, may have opposite effects on foreign policies. This latter finding thus urges us to study the impact of these factors more closely in a combinational manner. The present study employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a method to examine combinational effects of the two factors.<br>The result of the analysis shows that either of the following two combinational conditions leads an advanced democracy to become a frequent complainant. First, as "consensus model" indicates, countries with both small constituency and small number of government parties are frequent complainants. Second, countries with competitive agricultural sector and either small constituency or small number of government parties frequently resort to DS. The latter combinational conditions indicate that frequent complainant countries need not have both small constituency and small number of government parties, as in "consensus model".

著者

後藤 健生

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.68, pp.128-145,L7, 1981

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Although trade relations between Japan and Australia have been called &ldquo;mutually dependent, &rdquo; there has been some friction since the so-called oil-shock of 1973. Trade relations can work well only when both the production and the demand of the two countries concerned are balanced. The fall in Japanese consumption is the reason for trade frictions in the 1970s. The beef trade problem is one of these cases.<br>The Australian beef industry developed in the 1960s and half of her production was exported. Japan was the second largest market for them after the United States. In early 1974, as beef consumption, which had increased about eight per cent annually untill 1972, decreased 4.2 per cent in 1973, the Japanese government decided not to import any more until beef prices had recovered. This is the &ldquo;first beef dispute&rdquo;, in which the Australian Labour government did not try to retaliate against the Japanese cutback. After the Japanese resumption of imports in 1975, Australia complained about the piecemeal announcement of the import quota.The Japanese government promised that the announcement would be made twice a year, but it announced only a part of the quota in the fall of 1975. The Australian conservative government warned that the Japanese decision might damage trade relations between the two countries and suggested that as a retaliation it would not extend the Fisheries Agreement. This is the &ldquo;second beef dispute.&rdquo;<br>In Japan, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry attempted to minimize beef imports in order to protect the cattle growers' interests and the beef import policies which were formed under the influence of the farmers' organizations and the LDP leaders who supported them. The most influencial factor to increase the import quota was the pressure from the United States. Briefly speaking, relations with Australia have not been considered in the Japanese policy-making process. On the other hand, the Australian policies were influenced by their own internal politics. The attitude of the Fraser government in the &ldquo;second dispute&rdquo; was tougher than that of the Whitlam government because the Liberal-Country coalition relied on the rural electorate. For instance, Mr. Fraser strongly criticised Japan in the fall of 1977 concerning such a minor problem as the long-term announcement of import quotas as his electoral strategy.<br>The government of both countries must play a more constructive role in trade relations as disputes concerning some commodities can be harmful to the general relations between Japan and Australia.

著者

金 成浩

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_11-195_26, 2019

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<p>This article discusses how South Korea's "cross-recognition" policy influenced the political structure of Northeast Asia during the 1980's. The "cross-recognition" means that China and the Soviet Union would recognize South Korea in exchange for the United States and Japan recognizing North Korea. With the recent release of official documents from South Korea, Japan and Russia, etc., it has become possible to analyze this subject in more details.</p><p>To answer the question stated above, this article especially focuses on the foreign policies that South Korea tried to implement with Japan, China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and the United States from 1983 to 1987 under the Chun Doo-Hwan Administration.</p><p>Many previous studies discussing the transformation of the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia paid to attention to the Northeast Asian history following the Seoul Olympics of 1988. In contrast, this study points out the importance of historical events that occurred from 1983 to 1987. Moreover, after analyzing multilateral relationships among Northeast Asian countries, it highlights that the beginning of the change in the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia can be linked the events in 1986.</p><p>South Korea tried to improve relations with China through the Japanese prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, from 1983 to 1986. South Korea aimed to establish its position in the international society through the 86' Asian Games and the 88' Seoul Olympics. For the success of these athletic meetings, South Korea viewed the participation of China and the Soviet Union necessary. In 1984, therefore, the South Korean government pursued concrete measures towards successful cross-recognition.</p><p>First, Chun Doo-Hwan asked Nakasone to serve as an intermediary vis-a-vis China. China made informal contacts with South Korea. In turn, North Korea was threatened by South Korea's developing relationship with China, thus tried to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union. Two international dynamics emerged in Northeast Asia consequently. One was the trend toward closer relations among South Korea, Japan, China and the United States. The other was the development of a more intimate relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea.</p><p>However, M. Gorbachev, the then Soviet Union leader, began to implement a new form of diplomacy toward China and South Korea starting from the end of 1985 to the middle of 1986. As a result, North Korea's isolation in Northeast Asia became more serious by the end of 1987.</p><p>In general, when considering the transformation of the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia, one tends to emphasize the role of Gorbachev. However, this study points out that the new Chinese diplomacy, which had begun before Gorbachev's new diplomacy, also played a similarly important role in the transformation of the structure.</p>

著者

増田 弘

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.60, pp.132-153,L7, 1978

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The aim of this essay is to examine the political aspects of Japan and United States' economic relations in the 1960's as reflected in the Joint Japan-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which convened nine times during the period from 1961 to 1973.<br>In general, the meetings centered on three themes, (1) the bilateral relations concerning not only trade and economic issues but political issues as well, (2) the multilateral relations concerning these same issues, especially those relations with West European countries and the Communist states such as China and the Soviet Union, and, (3) the cooperation in the development of and aid to Third World countries, especially those of south-east Asia.<br>There was agreement on many points: cooperation in technological and cultural fields, problems involving Western European nations, and the allotment of aid to developing countries. However, practically no agreements were reached on the various problems regarding disequilibrium in trade between them in the latter 1960's In those days, Japanese-U. S. trade, which had previously favoured America, reversed itself so that the United States went into the red and Japan moved into the black. In addition, the Sato Government rejected a proposal for textile export restraints which the Nixon Administration considered vital. And finally, in 1971 came the blow of the so-called &ldquo;Nixon dollar-shock&rdquo;, followed by the surprising announcement of the visit of the President of the United States to the People's Republic of China.<br>Thus, when we consider the origins of the various problems in economic relations between Japan and the U. S., we should go beyond the obvious friction generated by the textile exports issue. Rather we must delve more deeply into two very different to understand the problem fully, perspectives of political reality.

著者

増田 弘

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.71, pp.72-92,L9, 1982

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From the early 1910s, ISHIBASHI Tanzan, a journalist of the &ldquo;<i>Oriental Economist</i>, &rdquo; consistently expressed his sympathy for both the Chinese revolutionary movements and nationalism while criticizing not only the imperialist Japanese foreign policy toward China but also public trends such as the contempt shown toward Chinese people. In addition, he insisted that Japan should abandon all of its colonies including Manchuria, which was said to be a &ldquo;sacred precinct.&rdquo; He argued from various viewpoints including the political, diplomatic, economic, and strategic. The main reasons were as follows. (1) although Japan possessed rights and interests in China, Chinese people continued anti-Japanese movements because their nationalism was deeper and stronger than the Japanese government and people supposed; therefore, ISHIBASHI insisted that Japan abandon those interests in order to trade and co-operate with China; (2) all the colonies such as Manchuria were virtually worthless in economic terms; (3) to hold Manchuria the Japanese government had to over-expand itself militarily; thus, national life became worse and worse; and (4) as a result of Japan acquiring interests from China, Japanese-U. S. foreign relations worsened and Japan was isolated.<br>The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to clarify ISHIBASHI's opinions, the theoretical structure of his arguments, and the controversial declarations he made during the Washington Conference of 1921-22.

著者

張 雲

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_1-184_15, 2016

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<p>No one doubts that mutual mistrust is responsible for the unprecedented dangerous deadlock between China and Japan. There is a wealth of research on Sino–Japanese mutual mistrust. However, the conventional wisdom typically focuses on unique Sino–Japanese relations in shaping mutual mistrust. Over-emphasizing the uniqueness of Sino–Japanese relations has produced an "unproductive intellectual confrontation". In reality, both China and Japan have demonstrated their intentions and efforts for building mutual trust, but the mutual mistrust has deepened. Why has this seemingly abnormal situation happened? The representative case is the failure of the 3.11 disaster diplomacy between China and Japan. Why was such an unprecedented opportunity lost despite the initial relatively high expectations from the both sides? Furthermore, why did disaster diplomacy not contribute much in improving bilateral trust, but rather seems to have enhanced the mistrust between China and Japan? The existing literature seems to be largely insufficient to provide convincing explanations. It is necessary to reconstruct and re-theorize the research on Sino-Japanese mistrust.</p><p>To these ends, this paper introduces, first, the theories of misperception and mistrust in international relations. Then it uses the failure of Sino–Japanese disaster diplomacy around the 3.11 Great East Japan Earthquake as a case study, showing that even the initial gestures of goodwill could be distorted by entrenched biases to produce even more mistrust. Due to the negative mutual perceptions that began to solidify in 2010, even incoming goodwill messages from the other side have been unconsciously filtered or processed to fit with solidifying misperceptions. The fundamental problem originates in the different over-expectations of China and Japan from disaster diplomacy. The lack of timely and efficient communication enhanced the misinterpretation of the other side's intentions, which was followed by frustration and suspicion. When the public and the media have raised frustration and suspicion, political elites have generally lost domestic space to counter mistrust or tensions between states.</p><p>The paper shows that misperception and mistrust can be replicated unconsciously and unnecessarily in many scenarios. There is both theoretical and policy relevance in this project. The project tries to integrate Sino–Japanese relations research with more general international relations studies. In so doing, it would be helpful to provide an alternative intellectual explanation of Sino–Japanese relations with a more universally acceptable understanding. In terms of policy implications, the project will provide insights as to how the process of the formation of misperception and the replication of mistrust between China and Japan have evolved. Lessons can be drawn from this research in order to avoid or minimize unnecessary misperception in the future.</p>

著者

前田 幸男

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_147-187_158, 2017

著者

鈴木 陽一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.132-149,L16, 2001

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The aim of this article is to rethink why the twin nation of Malaysia and Singapore, emerged. Malaysia is a nation that the Malay-Muslims dominate, Singapore is a nation the Chinese make its core part, but both have strong transnational linkages in Maritime Southeast Asia and the global economy. This article reviews the emergence, focusing on transformation of collaborative relationship between the British government, the Federal government (Malaya, later Malaysia) and Singapore government, which made the formal and the informal British Empire in Southeast Asia.<br>Malaysia and Singapore emerged at the end of Empire. What moved the Metropole and the local collaborators to make Greater Malaysia &mdash;Malaysia including Singapore&mdash; was an impulse to restructure the British Empire. Against communism in Southeast Asia, they tried to build a new united nation, which would become a new imperial collaborator. However the attempt to embed the conventional collaborator in a new federation led to conflicts among them. The Federal government and the Singapore government both had similar industrialization plans which competed with each other. However, Britain paid little attention to the old collaborators such as Singaporean, because they put more importance in the stability of a new junior partner. Therefore, Singaporean could do nothing but leave the Federation, and without the non-Muslim Singaporeans, Malaysia became more and more Malay-Muslim- oriented. The old Empire fell and a new order emerged. After the failure of Greater Malaysia, the British lost their will and power to maintain their Empire. The new rising power, the United States, did not make an empire, unlike the former imperial powers. She encouraged an anti-communism regionalism, and tried to organize people into a global economy. The Southeast Asians accepted the new power and became local collaborators of the imperialism without empire<br>Nationalism played little role in the formation of two nations. Rather, the Federal government and Singapore government worked for their preservation of imperial privileges as imperial collaborators. They worked for the colonial grand design for the reorganization of Empire. Singapore left the Federation to defend its economic autonomy rather than their multiethnic policy. The divided Southeast Asians decided to live as different nations in the new order supported by the new power, to utilize regionalism and globalism.<br>Decolonization saw its peak in 1960s. In many cases, empires advanced to decolonize with collaboration between the metroples and the local collaborators. Therefore, it was not necessarily accompanied by nation-building. The collaborators conflicted with each other. Irresponsible imperialists renounced their burden, and invented a situation of so-called quasi-states. those left engaged in nation-building and globalization, which sometimes contradict.

著者

溝渕 正季

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_73-178_87, 2014

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Since 1903, the year when Wright brothers made a success of building the world's first successful airplane and making the first controlled, powered and sustained heavier-than-air human flight, airpower has developed astoundingly as an essential component in modern warfare. Up until today, it has been demonstrated by several modern wars. At the same time, however, this was not always the case. In unconventional warfare (or asymmetric warfare, "Non-Trinitarian Warfare," "Fourth Generation Warfare,"or "War amongst the People"), airpower was not able to play a significant role, and sometimes it even caused a negative impact. In these wars, since the opponents usually disappear among "people," it is always very challenging to find and attack them without causing any collateral damage. Taking up the Israel's airpower in the Second Lebanon War (July/August 2006) and the Gaza War (December 2008/January 2009)—these are the two most recent wars in which airpower was employed on the non-state armed group—as the case studies, this article discusses the following questions: Is airpower really incompetent for unconventional warfare? If not so, what would be the essential role for airpower? What airpower actually can and cannot do?<br>Based on the rigorous analysis of the wars in Lebanon and Gaza, the article leads the following three conclusions: Firstly, the impact which airpower could cause to warfare is limited. As in conventional wisdom, while airpower is an important and powerful arm of military force, airpower alone does not lead victory for modern wars. This is true for at least unconventional warfare, in which the enemy has no specific "center of gravity" and blends into the urban, mountainous or forested terrain, as in cases of Lebanon and Gaza. In addition, if they did not have enough information for the opponents, airpower could rarely give significant damage. Although it is the case, the collateral damage will be ineluctable if the opponent disappears in the crowd. Secondly, however, airpower is not always incompetent in conventional warfare under certain conditions. There are two key factors: (1) interoperability between the air force and the ground force, and (2) intelligence about the enemy. As in case of Gaza, when these two factors were fully established in pre-war period, it is possible to cause heavy damage to the enemy. Ensuring the qualitative military edge over the enemy is also important as well. Thirdly, it is essential to minimize the collateral damage. No matter how the cutting-edge military technology is overwhelming or the joint training exercise and the intelligence about the enemy are adequate, however, it is almost equivalent with losing the game if there was significant collateral damage. In case of Gaza, IDF was successfully bearing down the enemy physically, but too much collateral damage turns such a "victory" into "defeat." In any of these wars, Israel's security environment never been improved in the history.<br>It is certain that airpower will keep playing one of the important roles in war given the technological progress in recent years. At the same time, they will face with a dilemma about the cost effectiveness between "rising war expenditure" and "acceptable level of cost." Just by looking at the current situation in Syria (as of June in 2014), it is clear that unconventional warfare is still happening and will happen in the future. This leads the importance of further research for both direct and indirect role by airpower going forward.

著者

皆川 修吾

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.104, pp.35-49,L7, 1993-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

21

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This paper attempts to find out how the clientelist groups work and what part they play in the process of political institutionalization. First, the paradigm of institutionalization process is tentatively presented in the paper. The paper then locates the political culture in the process of institutionalization. Clientelist behaviour which has been said to be a part of political culture was a key to understanding Soviet politics. Therefore, clientelism associated with Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's leadership was comparatively examined. In conclusion, whether the clientelism is functional or dysfunctional to the political system of transitional period was discussed.A patron-client relationship is an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources, each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself.Under the Soviet regime, clientelist operations were accommodated, if not ideologically, by peculiar institutional set-ups. It was indeed an important aspect of systemic adjusting mechanism in Soviet policy processes.Power politics among contending clientelist groups are in appearance more marked during the transitional period than during Soviet period. That may be so. The paper proves that clientelist politics which are by nature dependable variables, require solid institutional back-ups. Without it, the clientelist groups cannot assert themselves as self-perpetuating elites. It is the latter who can exert a decisive influence upon the course of the Russian political system. One has to admit, however, that the emergence of such an elite cannot be expected unless these groups can pride themselves on the destiny of their own country.

著者

小森 宏美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.113-126,L14, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

37

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This paper deals with Russian-speakers in Narva, a city in the northeast of Estonia. Most of the city population (c. 95%) speaks Russian as a mother tongue, while Russian-speakers are minorities in Estonia as a whole (c. 30%).In this paper I consider whether Russian-speakers are “immigrants” or “national minorities” in the context of Estonia. W. Kymlicka points out that Russians did not see themselves as immigrants in any sense and Estonians rejected the idea that Russians should have the sorts of rights accorded to national minorities in the West. He also argues despite this major gap in perceptions, there is some evidence that the two sides are converging on something like the immigrant model of integration.The paper begins with an overview of the migration process in Narva during the Soviet era, which is divided into three periods. Immediately after WW, an influx of immigrants from other regions of Soviet Union began. Most of the people came to Narva as workers from neighboring areas, enticed by the Soviet central government in the 40's and 50's. In the 60's and 70's many people were recruited by factories and enterprises and there were also family reasons for their immigration to Estonia. Thus, it is difficult to say which factors most influenced the migration processes and to clarify the intention of the Soviet authorities.The second part of paper deals with language rights given by internal laws and international conventions. It is important to point out that the Estonian government ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities with the declaration that only citizens can be national minority members. This means that a part of the Russian-speaking population is not eligible for national minority status. However people actually use Russian not only in the private sphere, but also in the public sphere. In addition, the Estonian authorities do not control the situation so rigidly. They put an emphasis on enhancing knowledge of the Estonian language, while Russian-speakers are positive about learning Estonian.Though it is too early to make any conclusions about the minority issue in Estonia, the differences in perceptions between national minorities and immigrants are decreasing, which means that problems have been solved from pragmatic viewpoints. However there are still plenty of stateless permanent residents, who are not EU citizens.

著者

蓮生 郁代

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_126-185_140, 2016

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<p>This paper aims to deal with the issue of how to limit abuses of power in global politics where there exists no <i>global</i> centralized accountability mechanism. In order to explore recent developments in pragmatic plural accountability mechanisms in global politics, this article examines the demand for accountability of the United Nations Security Council (hereafter, the Council) and its related reform initiatives.</p><p>It attempts to identify the historical transformation of sub-concepts of accountability demanded of the Council through its reform initiatives. In doing so, it will focus on the following two aspects: One is the transformation of actors involved who have demanded accountability of the Council, and the other is the transition of pragmatic plural accountability mechanisms envisaged by each actor to limit abuses of power by the Council.</p><p>The findings of this article are centered on the following three: Firstly, in the theoretical arena, in addition to the seven accountability mechanisms proposed by Robert O. Keohane and Ruth W. Grant in 2005, this article identifies three new pragmatic accountability mechanisms. These operate respectively to limit abuses of power by the Council, <i>that is to say</i>, a "procedural mechanism," a "troop contributing mechanism,"and a "transparency mechanism." Secondly, as far as the delegation model of accountability is concerned, no signs of improvement in accountability have been seen through the supervisory mechanism, although it is the most traditional and mainstream, since 1965 despite repeated reform challenges. On the other hand, in the delegation model of accountability, more innovative approaches such as the procedural mechanism and the troop contributing mechanism have succeeded in contributing to improving accountability since the 1990s. Thirdly, as it concerns the participation model of accountability, introduction of Arria Formula briefing was epoch-making from the point of view of establishing a relationship between the Council and civil society actors (to be classified as the public reputation mechanism). Such relationship has been further tightened by the efforts made by think tanks and NGOs active in disclosing information on Council activities to the wider public (to be named the transparency mechanism). It was even accelerated by a number of lawsuits claiming the unlawfulness of the targeted sanctions related to the 1267 sanction regime (called the law mechanism).</p><p>The author acknowledges that the demand for accountability of the Council is more and more <i>not</i> confined to the composition of the membership of the Council but rather extends to the construction of pragmatic plural accountability mechanisms. This quest is not only identified in the participation model but also even in the delegation model of accountability of the Council.</p>