著者
荒井 悦郎
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.3, pp.295-313,328-32, 1977-09-30 (Released:2017-07-22)

In 1880s, most of the Japanese exports and imports had been handled by foreign trading companies with offices in Yokohama. The Yokohama Union Silk Depository Incident (Yokohama Rengo Kiito Niazukarijo Jiken) between Japanese and foreign silk merchants took place under such circumstances. This article aims at giving an outline of the affair, with special references to direct export movements (jika-yushutsu undo) by the Japanese merchants and the activities of the Japanese silk-trading companies. Established in 1879 by Kenso Hayami, Dohshin-kaisha was a typical Japanese direct export company which had branches both in New York and Lyon. Hayami, as an ex-government official in charge of industrial policy, promoted direct export movements and organized silk producers and local merchants to set up the company. The Meiji Government offered some financial assistance in such a way as giving the loan in the form of documentary bills (nigawase) to promote the expansion of the Japanese direct export. Such facilities induced silk producers and local merchants to subscribe to the company.As a result Japan's direct export of raw silk grew rapidly between 1881 and 1883. In 1882, the Japanese trading companies jointly accounted for 27.6% of the Japanese raw silk export in volume. But despite the fact that the total volume of the Japanese raw silk export expanded substatially, the share of direct exports did not increase satisfactorily in the latter part of 1880s. This was partly caused by the inability of the Japanese trading interests to cope with the fluctuating world markets and their lack of funds to give sufficient loans to producers. Furthermore, the government closed financial aids to the direct export companies in 1889. The Japanese silk producers and local merchants eventually gave up their direct export efforts. The Japanese merchants thus failed to rectify the trading inequality vis'-a-vis the foreign companies. In 1880s the Japanese direct export companies were hardly a worthy opponent for the foreign traders.
著者
堀 經夫
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, no.8, pp.999-1019, 1933-11-30 (Released:2017-09-25)
著者
森下 徹
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.65, no.6, pp.623-643,727, 2000-03-25 (Released:2017-06-23)

In the Inland Sea area in the early-modern period there were many craftsmen who spent their time traveling wherever there was a demand for their expertise. This paper examines the role of traveling stone-masons in the overall framework of the stonedealing business of the period. In the latter half of the early-modern period, a rapid expansion in the land under rice cultivation in the area created a commercial demand for stone. On the supply side, newstyle businesses which combined the processes of excavation and transport took over from traditional traders. On the demand side, newly emerging networks of local stonedealing bosses, smaller local businessmen, and traveling stone-masons were endangering the traditional stone-masons. In other words, the traveling stone-masons did not travel because they enjoyed freedom on the labor market, but because they played a particular role in the social structure of the stone-dealing business. This social structure developed because of the rich stone resources of the area and its geographical role as a major naval transportation route. It therefore represents a division of labor particular to this area in the early-modern period.
著者
北岡 伸一
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.80, no.1, pp.5-13, 2014-05-25 (Released:2017-06-03)

歴史の大きな流れは経済で決まるが,その政策決定の中心にいるのは人間であり,彼らはそれぞれの利害や思想を持っている。経済的に好条件がそろっていても,誤った決定の結果,戦争になることもある。経済と政治は,それぞれ独自のダイナミクスで動き,相互に影響し合う。経済史と政治史もそういう関係にある。たとえば日露戦争後の満州経営においては,軍事的利害を主眼におくべきか否かという対立があったが,後藤新平は文装的武備という概念により,この対立を克服した。より長期的には,石橋湛山や清沢洌が,満州経営に関して根源的に鋭い指摘をしていた。なお満鉄は,アメリカにとってのパナマ運河と似た面があり,比較研究の発展を期待したい。対外政策は,強硬派と柔軟派とを区別するよりも,貿易を主眼とするか,そうでないかという違いが大きい。福沢諭吉や吉田茂は,強硬外交を唱えた人物と捉えられるが,むしろ貿易を主眼としており,その強硬論を領土拡大論者と同一に捉えるべきでない。近年,経済史と政治史の協力はいささか低調であり,今後の発展を期待したい。
著者
宮地 英敏
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.69, no.1, pp.25-45, 2003-05-25 (Released:2017-06-16)

The Meiji (1868〜1912) and Taisho (1912〜1923) eras saw rapid growth in porcelain production in Japan. This was achieved in two ways: through an increase in factory size, and through an increase in the number of small-scale business concerns. It is on the second pattern that this paper will focus. In addition to inheritance, the increase in small-scale concerns was mainly caused by skilled workers' becoming independent. These skilled workers tended to come from areas around porcelain-producing districts, and to have started work at a relatively young age. However, there is no clear link with the type of factory where they had been employed. Conditions in the porcelain industry in the Tono area helped such workers. First, it was possible to obtain an advance of money from wholesale merchants. This has been seen as a form of extortion in previous research, but in this paper a more positive assessment will be made. Second, it was possible to postpone complete independence, and start with involvement in subcontracting or peripheral industries. Third, a worker of superior skills might be able to marry the daughter of his employer and set up a branch business, as a sub-type of the succession system.
著者
山形 万里子
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.69, no.3, pp.297-321, 2003-09-25 (Released:2017-06-16)

It has been assumed that the military buildup of Saga domain was made possible by income from foreign trade at Nagasaki. However, details of the huge payments for warships show that the main source came from the feudal lord's kakesuzurikata (special account) at Kamigata (Osaka) market. After the Tempo Reform of the 1830s, Saga reduced its vast debt to ryogae-sho (moneylenders) in Osaka that had been accumulating since the previous century through annual installments over many years and through debt repudiation. In 1856 the domain issued hansatsu (its own notes) based on Saga assets and funds raised from rich merchants within the domain, in other words, without depending on Osaka moneylenders. In a sense it had achieved economic autonomy from Osaka and Hyogo moneylenders. After 1849, Saga worked for the reconstruction of its finances through strengthening the kakesuzurikata and encouraging domain production through the establishment of monopolies in porcelain and wax. From 1859, the domain involved Osaka and Hyogo moneylenders in the sale of monopoly products and the management of the proceeds. This enabled Saga to reinforce its relationship with the moneylenders so that it could raise vast funds on the Kamigata market. These were the funds which they used in the modernization of their armaments.

1 0 0 0 OA 壹岐産牛史

著者
山口 麻太郎
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, no.11, pp.1255-1291, 1938-02-15 (Released:2017-09-25)
著者
矢島 桂
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社会経済史学 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.78, no.1, pp.25-47, 2012-05-25 (Released:2017-06-10)

日本の社債市場が大きく発展した1920年代には,朝鮮の植民地企業も鉄道業を中心に相次いで社債を発行する。こうした社債発行は鉄道金融の展開と新たな植民地投資を示していると言えよう。そこで本稿は,朝鮮鉄道会社を対象に,戦間期朝鮮における鉄道金融の展開過程とその意義を考察するとともに,この植民地投資の実態の一端を解明していく。朝鮮鉄道会社債(朝鉄債)の発行は,その引受機関である植民地銀行からの借入金を返済するものであった。これは,朝鮮銀行にとっては債権整理の一環であり,朝鮮殖産銀行にとっては「産米増殖計画」関連融資の強化を結果する。1920年代後半には本国証券業者が朝鉄債の引受に進出するが,これは植民地銀行の鉄道金融からの後退と表裏をなすものであったと言える。このうち山一証券は発行企業との人的・資本的関係をもとに進出していく。また山一証券による第5回・第6回朝鉄債(28,29年発行)の売捌き先から,その投資実態は,財閥系金融機関及び広範な地域の地方金融機関と特徴付けられ,生損保と大都市の個人投資家がこれに加えられる。