著者

野家 啓一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.33-47, 1985-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

戸田山 和久

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.1-19, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

17

被引用文献数

1

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There seems to be a consensus among philosophers who are interested in Russell's early philosophy of mathematics. They hold that we can best understand the process of its development on the assumption that Russell kept trying to reconcile a type-theoretical solution to the paradoxes with the doctrine of univocality of being. This assumption have worked well in so far as to reconstruct the history of Russell's endearvor from Principles of Mathematics (1903) through the invention of substitutional theory (1905-7). Taking Principia Mathematica (1910) into consideration, however, this assumption seems to fail. There are many questions left unanswerable concerning the relation between PM and his former position. In this paper, I will survey some of the recent findings in the Russell Archives and Gregory Landini's works based on these findings, and clarify the relevance they could have to the "unanswered questions" mentioned above.

著者

松阪 陽一

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.85-106, 2017-12-20 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

21

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A new way of interpreting or approaching Wittgenstein’s remarks on following rules in Philosophical Investigations will be introduced. The notion of “family resemblance” will be claimed to play a central role in Wittgenstein’s views on what our concepts are, and therefore on what it is to employ them. By way of illustrating his views on concepts, I will appeal to certain models of concept and classification from psychology and machine learning. Wittgenstein’s fundamental remarks on following rules will be presented as natural consequences of his views on the nature of our concepts.

著者

川野 洋

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.15-25, 1974-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

3

著者

佐藤 雅彦

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.67-84, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)

参考文献数

16

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“The Full Picture of Frege’s Philosophy” (Keiso Shobo, 2012) by Kazuyuki Nomoto gives a detailed account of Gottlob Frege’s life devoted to a failed attempt to develop mathematics formally and entirely from scratch based upon his logicism and his semantical understanding of mathematical entities. In the present paper, I review the book and recommend it as a challenging and inspiring book to anyone who wishes to understand the modern meaning of Frege’s philosophy.

著者

永井 均

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

no.21, pp.43-55, 1988

著者

三浦 俊彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.69-81, 2002

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The question "How can I be a?" ("a" being a proper name) has been recently referred to as "The Harder Problem of Consciousness", which would remain mysterious even after "The Hard Problem" about how subjective experiences arise is solved. Since both the indexical "I" and an exemplifying name "a" are ambiguous in their references, a formal analysis is required. Then, it turns out that any disambiguated version of "Harder Problem" is logically reduced to "The Hard Problem" or its special case "How can there be a?". There is no "Harder Problem" with its additional philosophical value. This is simply a matter of logic, independent of any ontology on whether metaphysical self exists or not.

著者

浪岡 淳

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.43-55, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

19

---

Is the concept of "person" a substance-concept (i.e. a sortal which determines the primitive mode of being for the entities falling under it), or a phased-sortal (a sortal such that its instance need not fall under it throughout its existence)? Recently some philosophers opposing to the traditional view maintain that we are not always persons and that what determines our identity-criterion fundamentally is the biological concept of "human animal". In this paper I argue that this "Animalist" conception is unsound and that the primitiveness of our animal nature should not exclude the concept of "person" as our substance-concept. I suggest, however, that "person" as a genuine substance-concept requires a fresh understanding, foreign to the traditional definition in terms of a set of certain psychological attributes.

著者

東 克明

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.81-94, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

6

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This paper deals with van Fraassen's 'no-collapse' interpretation, or 'modal interpretation'. In this interpretation he avoids 'collapse' by supposing that quantum mechanical states, unlike classical states, specify possibilities rather than actualities. But my argument will show that van Fraassen's interpretation is confronted with some difficulties concerning values of observables.

著者

藤村 龍雄

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.111-125, 1972-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

19

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.113-125, 2019

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In this paper, I aim to clarify and vindicate Anscombe's concept of practical knowledge by way of suggesting that some intentional actions are artifacts - i.e. artificial events. Like other artifacts, actions are ontologically dependent upon agents' intention and hence agents can know what they are intentionally doing without any evidence. However, this view comes under attack from skepticism about the reality of artifacts themselves. If artifact kinds are mind-dependent, doesn't it follow that they are nothing but nominal, arbitrary groupings? In reply, I shall argue that artifacts, including actions, are still real in the world we live in because they have characteristic built-in normativity.</p>

著者

信原 幸弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.1-14, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

---

Classical computationalism sees cognition as manipulation of syntactically structured representations while connectionism sees it as transformation of syntactically unstructured representations, namely, activation patterns of neurons. J. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn argue that connectionism fails because every cognitive ability is systematic so that representations in any cognitive domain are syntactically structured. But I argue that some cognitive abilities are not systematic. Classical computationalism holds only for some cognitive domains. But I do not think that our brain is a hybrid of a classical model and a connectionist one. It is wholly connectionist. Syntactically structured representations exist not in our brain but in our environment as external representations. Consequently, eliminativism is right in that propositional attitudes such as belief and desire do not exist in our brain.

著者

渡辺 博

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.63-76, 1982-11-13 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

藤川 吉美

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.25-36, 1971-12-01 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

17

被引用文献数

1

著者

大出 晁

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.1-6, 2001-05-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

藤本 隆志

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.19-30, 1975-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

北村 直彰 森田 紘平

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.1-22, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)

参考文献数

27

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Ontic structural realism (hereafter OSR) is one of the most significant ontological attitudes toward modern physics. On close examination, OSR can be classified into several versions in terms of the relative ontological status of objects and relations. Previous studies have not carefully dealt with the differences among the several versions of OSR, mainly because the meanings of some metaphysical concepts are ambiguous. Among them, one way to formulate OSR is to appeal to the idea of identity. However, “identity” can be regarded as either numerical identity or essence. In this article, the derivations of OSR’s minimal statements from the cases in quantum theory give a clear-cut explanation about relationships between metaphysical and scientific statements and show that the formulation of OSR should be based on essence.

著者

河野 哲也

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.1-19, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)

参考文献数

38

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the essential features of psychological categories used in the mind sciences such as psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience from the perspective of theoretical psychology. I shall focus especially on the category of “emotion”. Firstly, I shall examine how psychology and philosophy have categorized emotions in referring to the history of philosophy and psychology and demonstrate that psychological categorization in general is laden with practical and social meanings. I shall proceed to highlight the problems regarding psychological methodology and basic theoretical assumptions, assumptions that are modeled on physical science, resulting in a de-contextualization and de-temporalization. In conclusion, I shall propose some possible solutions to overcome these problems in the mind sciences.

著者

松王 政浩

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.71-84, 2017-12-20 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

24

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Recent arguments in philosophy of science concerning artificial intelligence seem to heavily concentrate on social or ethical issues, such as ‘Singularity' problem or harmonious coexistence with AI. But the meaningful relationship between philosophy of science and AI is not limited to that of this kind. The Bayesian network (BN) is one of the central issues in the research of AI, and this has a lot to do with traditional arguments in philosophy of science, since finding the single best definition of causality has been one of main themes in philosophy of science. In this paper, I will consider possible ways for philosophers to be deeply in touch with AI regarding ‘the methodology of BN', ‘the definition of causation', and ‘the elimination of causation'.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.1-17, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

26

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The aim of this paper is twofold. The one is to make intelligible identity-relativism (IR) and its accompanying theory of proper names by making amendments to Peter Geach's corresponding theories. I argue that his IR can be reconstructed as a hidden variable theory of ‘identical' and that a kind of ontological deflationism is needed to make his semantics of proper names compatible with IR. The other aim is to show that even IR with the seemingly refined semantics and ontology bears a serious problem of the requirement for an absolute identity. I argue that IR cannot by itself solve the problem.