著者

中村 覚

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_58-178_72, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

56

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This study aims to examine the real goal of the regional policy in Saudi Arabia, particularly whether it is designed to counter external threat (derived from the international system) or internal threat (aiming at regime change). A case study that delves into the Saudi Arabian policy toward the Syrian Crisis after 2011 is used. This research applies omnibalance theory, which explains the pattern by which the regimes of Third World states react to threats that arise both within and outside the state. Saudi Arabian policy is analyzed through a comparison of several security situations faced by the kingdom with the use of a method combining within-case analysis and process tracing. Omnibalance theory serves as the main research framework because it can provide a coherent explanation of the foreign policy and international security strategies adopted by the Saudi Arabian government. This study hypothesizes that the Saudi Arabian policy toward the Syrian crisis is strongly constrained by its primary security goal of countering any sign of linkage between internal and external threats. The Saudi Arabian commitment to the Syrian crisis cannot be explained simply in relation to an external threat: no foreign country has pressured Saudi Arabia to be involved, and the Assad regime is not a threat to Saudi Arabia. Rather, the Saudi Arabian government recognized the signs of a linkage developing between the internal and external threats it confronts. The government responded to the clamor of its people who advocate humanistic support to the oppressed in Syria, as well took precaution against the risk of a coalition by Iran, the Assad regime, and Hizbullah, which the Saudi Arabian government feared would penetrate the Shia activists in the Eastern region of the kingdom. The concern of the Saudi Arabian government over domestic security constrained its Syrian policy in the following ways: (1) prohibition of participation in both the conflict and in charity activities initiated by Saudi citizens, (2) necessity to maintain moral and humanistic legitimacy of Saudi foreign policies, (3) selection of its allies who will maintain non-intervention in Saudi internal affairs, (4) and prohibition on the Saudi government to provide support to terrorist groups. Therefore, omnibalance theory is a more appropriate concept to explain the Saudi Arabian policy toward the Syrian crisis than the theories of balance of power and balance of threat, both of which claim that the international involvement was the main motivation behind the foreign policy applied to the state.

著者

佐藤 丙午

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_14-205_28, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

35

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An economic statecraft is a policy measures utilizing an economic incentives and disincentives to force targeting county to comply with political demand of the sender. It is not a single definable policy measure but multiple measures to attain policy objectives through reflection of the degree and level of economic interaction among states.Economic statecraft is a policy measures by choice. Its political utilities are wide and politically manipulable since it is flexible in imposing and lifting the measures. It is often used to show senders political discontent without harming the formal political relations. It can also be utilized to execute political and tactical pressure by banning the export of the strategic goods and technologies thus deprive access to those items and control the degree of military development of the target. The UN has imposed various forms of economic sanctions under the UN Charter provisions.Despite the multiple utilities of these policy measures, a casual mechanism of the economic statecraft in changing the political decision of target is unknown. It may cause economic pain to the economy of the target and the mounting domestic pressure to concede to the demand of the sender could be a political driver. In opposite, it may harden the reaction of the target since it may unite the country to resist to the external pressure. As for the positive economic incentive, the domestic audience of the target may not induce by the reward given, thus may blur the mechanism of causal relationships.In many cases, economic statecraft is imposed without setting the specific goal or lifted without tangible result and fulfilling the concrete demand of the target. It is a symbolic policy tools to persuade domestic audience of the sender by showing that their government is executing tangible policy measures to exercise power on the target over contested political agenda. At the same token, a defensive economic measure, most notably export controls, may frame economic interaction corresponding to the strategic relationship. The aim of this measure is to shape the political relationship rather than punish or deter specific action.The assessment of utility of the economic statecraft differs when considering short term and long-term effect of the measures. Additionally, the economic statecraft has positive record when an instant reaction to the developing events is necessary to spare time for further consideration of policy appropriate.

著者

五十嵐 隆幸

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.197, pp.197_42-197_57, 2019-09-25 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

104

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Was the Sino-American Rapprochement a turning point that changed everything? In 1969, the ROC changed the military strategy from “Offensive Posture” to “Unity of Offensive and Defensive”. Certainly, the advent of Nixon gave a big impact to the ROC’s national security, which heavily relied on the US. However, the ROC Government might decide to change its military strategy from “Retaking the Mainland,” which had been attempted for over a decade, to building up the consolidation of Taiwan’s defense when encountering the escalation of the PRC’s military threat even at the peak of the chaotic Great Leap Forward and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.The chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s provided a chance for the ROC to retake the mainland. The ROC would have been able to initiate military operations if received support from the US Nevertheless, US Government after the Kennedy administration was seeking coexistence with the PRC and therefore rejected all ROC’s requests.At that time the PRC was strengthening its nuclear capability and conventional forces despite being in a state of political chaos. In response to the growing military threat of the PRC, improvement of the ROC government’s defense capability to secure “Taiwan” became its top priority. Moreover, when the US abolition of Military Assistance Program was announced, the ROC Government was forced to improve military advancement at the expense of its own economy and spend the limited budget on defense in priority. Therefore, the ROC Government had begun to reform the “Offensive Posture” strategy that it adopted since 1949, and decided to change to the “Unity of Offensive and Defensive” strategy that focused on defense more than before. This was before Nixon put forth the “Guam Doctrine” and started to approach the PRC.Division of “China” was incorporated into the Cold War and immobilized. Although the chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s was likely to develop into “hot war” if ROC took military action. The US suppressed the ROC’s action for changing the status quo and avoided military conflict with the PRC. There is no doubt that the current US-China-Taiwan relations was formed in the 1970s, beginning with Nixon’s rapprochement to the PRC. However, the structure of maintaining the status quo of the ROC’s endeavor to acquire the US military commitment to resist the PRC’s continuous military expansion was gradually formed through the 1960s.

著者

小野坂 元

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_123-195_136, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

61

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The Shanghai Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) that conducted social work in Chinese society was accused of anti-imperialist, radical actions by the Chinese labor movement after the Shanghai riot on May 30, 1925. While Chinese trade unions endorsed the newly established International Labour Organization (ILO), this international legislation for labor standards could not ensure cooperation between the ILO and the Chinese Government and society; the reason being that any labor condition regulations, both domestic and international, did not exist in the International Settlement as extraterritoriality.This paper clarifies the coordination between the ILO and Shanghai YWCA to remedy the lack of legislative protection that Chinese workers faced in the International Settlement of Shanghai. Although, the Factory Act was enacted in 1929, its enforcement was postponed because of Chinese industrial conditions’ conflict with extraterritoriality.Traditional literature has focused on the conflict between national interests and international standards. This approach notes that international organizations’ activities were disrupted by power politics that sought unilateral interests. However, international organizations established after World War I were dysfunctional. I think that international organizations acquired innovative thinking during the Chinese National Revolution in 1920s. The fact is that the ILO and the YWCA aimed to create a Chinese Labour Inspection System as well as transform themselves from euro-centrism to international socialism.Moreover, we need to consider the connection between Chinese nation building and introduction of ILO standards on both Chinese proper land and extraterritorial areas, particularly Shanghai’s International Settlement. The Chinese government aimed to demonstrate their legitimacy as a nation state by enforcing their labor regulations and inspecting foreign factories.Historical examining the Chinese labor problem regarding extraterritoriality, this article explains that the Shanghai YWCA and the ILO’s activities indirectly influenced the improvement of the International Settlement’s social administration and attained the endorsement of enforcing Chinese factory inspection there.Thus, a condition for reshaping multilateral cooperation with the newly established Chinese Government of Nanking in 1928 was created by this international coordination to enforce international labor standards in Shanghai.

著者

藤井 篤

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_28-173_42, 2015-06-25 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

58

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This paper aims to analyze Anglo-French relations during the first half of the Algerian War (1954–1957) focusing on the perceptions and attitude of the British Foreign Office (BFO) toward the French Algerian problem. What did the British think of this colonial conflict? How did their attitude toward France change? What differences can be observed between BFO bureaucrats in London and the British Ambassador in Paris? France made efforts to ask her NATO allies to support her in order to defend her position in Algeria and fight against the Afro-Asian bloc, which demanded the independence of Algeria in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The British supported the French position formally but were careful not to go too far fearing that it would damage the dignity and interests of Britain in Africa and the Middle East. The African Department at the BFO thought that supporting the French position in Algeria was different from supporting the day-to-day French policy there another. The Western Organizations Department feared that deploying French troops under NATO to North Africa would make defense forces in the central sector of Europe vulnerable. On the other hand, Gladwyn Jebb, the British Ambassador in Paris then, tried to ardently express and promote British support to France by making good use of Cold War rhetoric, insisting that the triumph of Algerian nationalist movements and the retreat of France would bring about a vacuum of power and put not only Algeria but also the whole of North Africa in the orbit of Soviet communism. The British continued to formally support France hoping for a liberal solution to the Algerian conflict, which was regarded as a French internal problem by the British. As terrorism in Algeria worsened and the French Army continued to be unable to defeat the nationalist forces, the British began to discreetly shift their attitude. The African Department thought that it was essential to provide a political solution to the conflict, for which the autonomy or independence of Algeria was considered. Jebb’s Cold War rhetoric became less effective in the BFO. The British intended to cooperate with the Americans to realize a cease-fire in Algeria and keep North Africa on the Western side. They tried to exercise their prudent and informal influence on France to make more efforts to attain a liberal solution, while continuing to provide France their formal support in the United Nations. When the British and Americans were forced to comply with Tunisian requests of arms supply, which the Tunisians would otherwise order from Egypt or Soviet Union, Anglo-French relations became tense and entered a critical phase.

著者

中谷 直司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_111-180_125, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

50

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What was it that eventually put a period to the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the beginning of the interwar years, a treaty that had been the most successful treaty in East Asia to that moment, through two victories in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the First World War of 1914–1918? As many previous works have claimed, was the strong pressure from the United States decisive in terminating the alliance? Or else,as some British works in relatively recent years have argued, was the opposition of the United States no more than the last push to bring down the curtain on the arrangement, if discarding the alliance had already become all but a foregone course in London by the time Washington made clear its opposition? This study will challenge both accounts. First, it will show that the American opposition alone was not and could have not been enough to put an end to the alliance, even though this opposition did indeed create the international dispute itself over whether or not the alliance should be continued. At the same time, the study will deny that London was almost independently decided on the matter. The British government did need something external to help it with its decision; however, that was not the increase of American pressure but the restoration of the credibility of America’s commitment to a new international order-building program, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. To this point, American diplomacy had had trouble displaying this commitment, due to the country’s failure to join the League of Nations that the US itself had conceived. Therefore, secondly, this work will emphasize the serious dilemma that the British alone confronted in the international politics that led to the lapse of the alliance. That dilemma can be well understood as a variety of the “security dilemma in alliance politics” very well known to IR students. Major previous works,especially in British research, believe that Japan consistently held the alliance to be more significant than Britain did until the last day of the treaty, because the former gained greater advantages through an alliance with the leading power in world politics. However, this study will largely revise this view by describing both Britain’s international political dilemma and Japan’s diplomatic changeover in the aftermath of the Great War.

著者

高橋 力也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.188, pp.188_15-188_29, 2017-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

66

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This article examines the Japanese government’s attitude toward the issue of “nationality of married women” in the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law in 1930, the first diplomatic conference hosted by the League of Nations for the purpose of codification of international law. Through investigating the decision-making process on the Conference within the government, it aims at revealing the Japan’s constructive engagement in the codification project conducted by the League of Nations, which set in motion the advancement of international law during the inter-war period.It is well known that the Hague Conference marked a watershed in the history of international law. Though the achievements in the Conference were meager, it surely paved the way of setting up the current codification system in the United Nations, particularly the establishment of the International Law Commission. Seldom discussed and little known is how Japan responded to this major development in the field of international law. While some preceding literatures have elucidated the passive, or sometimes hostile, stance of Japan toward enhancement of laws of war, they have yet to show a complete picture of the Japanese view on international law at that time since they do not sufficiently address the issues of laws of peace with which the Hague Conference was mainly concerned.Probably, no issues discussed in The Hague attracted attention and received publicity more than nationality of married women. One of the reasons was that it touched the heart of the tension between the concept of family unity and gender equality. At the time of 1930, while most countries still adhered to the old principle that wife follows the nationality of husband in case of international marriage, some national legislations had discarded it and allowed an alien woman who married their national to retain her original nationality if she wished so. It was against this background that the Hague Conference attempted to reconcile the difference between legislations in nationality of married women by means of multilateral convention.While Japan still maintained the old principle in its nationality law based on the traditional family values, it took a somewhat flexible stance in The Hague. Interestingly enough, Tokyo instructed its delegation to the Conference that if a consensus emerged among states, they could go along with the proposed article, which granted a married woman the right to choose not to acquire husband’s nationality. These findings suggest that at that time Japan sought to project its image as an important contributor to the development of international law through its active participation to the codification project by the League.

著者

石田 淳

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_152-165, 2012

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As Stanley Hoffmann has convinced us in his 1977 article, it was in the United States in the wake of the Second World War that the study of international relations, IR as is now called, was established as an independent academic discipline. This article explains in what sense it has been an <i>American</i> social science and explores whether it still offers a useful analytical tool with which to better understand the multifaceted political reality of today's international relations.<br>This article first goes back to the origins of IR and reviews its main features in the foundational work of Hans Morgenthau. His work stressed that perception matters in power politics among nations in that the outcome of diplomacy depends upon the perceived persuasiveness of threats and promises. In addition, it devoted attention to the relations between politics and law to explain how the status quo in international order had been maintained and challenged.<br>And then this article examines the way in which IR has been Americanized since his time. In a nutshell, first, the influence of Thomas Schelling's work in the 1960s was profound and far-reaching in the entire field of IR. The intellectual hegemony of rationalism (or the analytical methods of rational choice) in the 1980s meant that the mainstream IR came to pay less and less attention to actors' perception and law. And second, it was totally ironical that the discipline of IR has recently retrieved the sociological discussion on perception, law, and norm, which it intentionally deleted in the process of importing rationalism from economics.<br>This article concludes by emphasizing that the discipline of Americanized IR should expand its horizons: the study of diplomacy should be broadened to cover not only <i>coercion</i> for the purpose of either deterring a challenger from altering the status quo or compelling it to restore the status quo, but also <i>reassurance</i> for the purpose of achieving peaceful change; and the study of international order should highlight the way in which international and domestic orders have co-evolved in history.

著者

池内 恵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_115-175_129, 2014

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Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This "avoidance theorists" conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its "subservient" style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the "defensive" nature of Islam but expanded the concept of "defense" beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the "defense" to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as "defense" in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.

著者

本多 美樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_161-175_164, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)

著者

千知岩 正継

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_167-178_170, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

著者

渡邉 昭夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_159-181_169, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

1

著者

清水 謙

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_87-172_99, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

55

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The impact of 9/11 was strong enough to change the Swedish security doctrine of neutrality that had existed since the Cold War. The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson and Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated that the security policy of 1992, that is “Military non-alliance making it possible to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in the vicinity”, had served well. This means that Sweden has practically abandoned its neutrality, confronting international terrorism. Swedish society, generally known as ‘an open society’, has many internal “security holes” and the terrorist incident in central Stockholm on December 11th 2010 exposed such kind of vulnerability. That incident was “home-grown” and the generous migration policy was challenged again. This article investigates ‘the securitization of migration’ in Sweden using the analytical framework of ‘securitization’ the Copenhagen School provided. The Copenhagen School insists that ‘speech act’ by securitizing actor(s) and ‘acceptance of the audience’ are required in the process of securitization and that ‘extraordinary measures’ beyond the state’s standard political procedure will be legitimated. The first two steps mentioned above are well discussed in Sweden in earlier research (e.g. by Abiri), while the third one is still controversial. Therefore, my aim in this article is to present a crucial example of an extraordinary measure. Indeed, the securitization of migration started to occur already in the 1990s or earlier, but a conclusive extraordinary measure was not implemented until December 2001, namely the case of repatriation of two Egyptians (Egyptenavvisningarna). In 2005 the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Justitieombudsmännen) and the Committee on the Constitution (Konstitutionsutskottet) investigated this deviant case and declared that the governmental action was too optimistic and that the method of the repatriation was inappropriate. The repatriation itself has been treated as an accomplished fact in the Parliament even though the decision was adopted in irregular procedure. Therefore, this result leads us to the conclusion that the process of the securitization of migration has been fulfilled. The Securitization of migration in Sweden is still idling and there are no signs of ‘desecuritization’ after the terrorist incident in Stockholm. Furthermore, the sequential terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011 are thought-provoking and indicate that the Nordic societies have to cope with migrational issues.

著者

西野 照太郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.4, pp.85-96, 1958-02-05 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

28

著者

芝崎 厚士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.191, pp.191_143-191_156, 2018-03-28 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

15

著者

井関 正久

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.169-184,L19, 2001

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East and West Germany were in a turbulent period in the 1960s. On the one hand the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 determined the division of both German states and symbolized East-West tensions. On the other hand the first postwar generation that criticized the Nazi generation began protest actions against the establishment. &ldquo;1968&rdquo; was a symbolic date for the protest movements of the 1960s in both German states.<br>Today, &ldquo;1968&rdquo; is the focus of public attention again because the parties of the &ldquo;sixty-eighters&rdquo;, the &ldquo;Greens&rdquo;, have become the ruling parties as partners of the Social Democrats. The protagonists of &ldquo;1968&rdquo; seized the authority and are now on the side of the establishment. But some young people of the post cold war generation tend to look for an alternative to the &ldquo;sixty-eighters&rdquo; and call themselves the &ldquo;eighty-niners&rdquo;.<br>In the 1960s the generation conflict became a social phenomena and caused the student revolt in West Germany. Students pursued not only the reform of the universities but also the democratization of society as a whole. They were the main actors in the extra parliamentary opposition and sought out political coalitions with labor unions and pacifists to oppose the passing of the Emergency Law. The antiauthoritarian movement formed a new political public space in which everyday life was politicized. The sixty-eighters in West Germany were the main actors of the &ldquo;new social movements&rdquo; in the 1970s and initiators of the &ldquo;Greens&rdquo;. They brought the idea of grass-roots democracy, feminism and ecology to parliaments and constantly changed the political culture.<br>In East Germany there were also protest activities in the 1960s, in spite of suppression by the state. Under the influence of western subculture and student movements in West Germany the postwar generation opposed the cultural policies of the SED. During the &lsquo;Prague Spring&rsquo; in 1968, hopes of democratization of socialism rose in East Germany also. The Soviet repression of the Prague Spring brought about different protest activities, which were immediately put down by the police. The sixty-eighters in East Germany organized political alternative movements through the 1980s and formed several civic groups like New Forum in the autumn of 1989. They were also the initiators of Round Table as a dialogue forum, which symbolized the &ldquo;peaceful revolution&rdquo;.<br>The German protest movements in the 1960s contributed to forming the current democratic political culture. Since then public space has been made the place of political participation and social learning. Therefore, &ldquo;1968&rdquo; can be regarded as the beginning of the long democratization and emancipation process of German society.

著者

藤山 一樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_30-180_42, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

70

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This article explores how the British government agreed in the summer of 1922 to fund their debts owed to the American government during the First World War. Since the U.S. entered the war on the Allied side in April 1917 until June 1919, British debts to the U.S. subsequently swelled to approximately $4.3 billion. After the war, the American government firmly insisted on swift repayment by the Allies of their war debts; and they suggested that U.S. economic assistance for European reconstruction was not to come until the debtor countries settled their debt questions with the U.S. Nevertheless, the British government continued to avoid funding their debts since 1920. Claiming on a general cancellation of all the inter-Allied debts, the Lloyd George government declined even to acknowledge their financial obligations. Chief Cabinet members such as the Prime Minister David Lloyd George and the War Secretary Winston Churchill were concerned with the impact on the domestic economy (and public opinion) of expending a vast sum of money; they also wished the Americans to take a more lenient position over the war debts. A sea change in the British policy of the war debt question came in 1922, when European relations reached its nadir in regard to German reparations. The French sought to enforce on Germany the strict execution of the reparations obligations of the Treaty of Versailles; meanwhile, the Germans, undergoing hyperinflation, persistently demanded a moratorium due to its chaotic economic condition at home. Then, from May to June 1922, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Robert Horne and the British Ambassador at Washington Sir Auckland Geddes convinced the Cabinet that such deadlock in the Continent did require some external assistance from the U.S., the largest creditor nation, and they pressed for an early Anglo-American war debt settlement in anticipation of some U.S. commitment to the European problem. Around the same time, the U.S. Ambassador at London George Harvey assured Lloyd George and Churchill that a debt settlement would lead to Anglo-American cooperation to tackle problems in Europe. In July 1922, the Lloyd George government finally consented to dispatch a British delegation to Washington for starting negotiations on conditions of repaying their debt to the U.S. After the British determined to fund their debts to the Americans, Anglo-American relations again stood on a sound footing, which could be a stimulus to their joint effort over German reparations toward the subsequent Dawes Plan of 1924.

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.38-53,L7, 1995

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Among wartime leaders in Japan, no one was more aware that the issue of World War II centered on decolonization than Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (April 1943-April 1945). As Ambassador to China (January 1942-April 1943), Shigemitsu had become the strong supporter of Japan's &ldquo;New Deal for China&rdquo; to approve the Wang Ching-wei regime's voluntary self-independence and freedom. When he became Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu continued to promote &ldquo;independence, freedom, and mutual equality&rdquo; towards Asian occupied area as the main principles of Japan's &ldquo;New Deal for Greater East Asia&rdquo;. This set of &ldquo;New Deal&rdquo; policy could provide a &ldquo;basic maneuver&rdquo; for peace proposals towards the Allied Powers. In othe words, if Japan changed its war aims in accordance with those of Great Britain and the United States, there would be no more reason for Japan to keep fighting with China, the United States and Great Britain. At the opening of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943, Shigemitsu and the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry used the Greater East Asian Declaration as an opportunity to redefine Japan's war aims and to appeal to the Allied Powers with their basic peace maneuver. From the viewpoint of Shigemitsu, however, &ldquo;New Deal&rdquo; policy including the Greater East Asian Declaration was as much for domestic as for foreign use, to give the Japanese people a clearer conception of war aims, and to reform the militarism which had caused Japan to fall into military colonialism towards Asia. When he was aware that it was impossible to use the &ldquo;New Deal&rdquo; policy for domestic reform to exclude military colonialism from Japan, he insisted that the Japanese Government should accept &ldquo;unconditional surrender&rdquo; on their own initiative for the attainment of the same purpose.

著者

国分 良成

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.145, pp.1-16,L5, 2006

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In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War, China essentially changed the nature of its policy of reform and opening. This was an individual decision taken by a single leader, Deng Xiaoping, and it was taken to secure China's stability by means of active participation in the international community as opposed to shying away from it. China conspicuously embarked on a path to economic growth, aiming to achieve a shift to a market economy through the bold introduction of foreign capital, and its subsequent readiness to join the WTO in 2001, implying submission to the international system, indicates the compromises that the establishment was willing to make in order to survive. In this respect, the impact of the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War can be seen as having determined China's consequent course.<br>However, the plan to promote economic growth, through marketizing the economy amidst expansive globalization, is bound to give rise to grave difficulties in the near future. Disparity between regions, between urban and rural areas and between income groups, social unrest, energy shortages, environmental damage, corruption in government and rampant materialism are only some of the countless contradictions that have been recently exposed, and which may undermine the government. China needs to change in more substantial ways than mere privatization and political reform if it intends to overcome these predicaments.<br>In terms of foreign relations, the US-China relationship has been a stepping-stone for China's flourishing omnidirectional and multilateral diplomacy, coinciding with a fanfare of Chinese government pronouncements about &ldquo;peaceful development&rdquo; and the country's &ldquo;peaceful rise.&rdquo; Nevertheless, it remains a closed political system, and the lack of transparency in its political decision-making and military affairs is a constant source for concern. Furthermore, Chinese policies abroad are firmly linked with the balance of political power within the top leadership circle at home. Feuding over the transition of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao had palpable effects even in foreign affairs.<br>The issues shaping China's domestic policies and foreign relations are increasingly ramified and complicated. What shook the regime during Tiananmen may have been caused by a fraction of the elite and an international &ldquo;third wave&rdquo;, but today the elite is beginning to erode at its very own core. When reading Chinese intentions, it is imperative to bear in mind the following facts: that the Chinese Communist Party's ultimate aim is to sustain its political authority; that economic growth is necessary for it to achieve this; and that it finds itself compelled to pursue cooperative relations in today's interdependent, globalized world. This political, economic and diplomatic reciprocity constitutes the terms by which the future of China should be assessed; that is, failure in any one of these areas will compromise China's hold on its structural stability.

著者

政所 大輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_131-187_146, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

参考文献数

68

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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an emerging norm regarding the national and international protection of populations from genocide and mass atrocities. After the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty proposed the principle of R2P in 2001, the idea was unanimously adopted by member states of the United Nations (UN) at the General Assembly in 2005 and 2009, and also used by the Security Council as a rationale for international action in Libya in 2011. The fact of this normative development is a puzzle, because the R2P potentially represents a challenge to state sovereignty for both developing and developed countries, and also because existing literature argues that norms are less likely to be created in the issue area of sovereignty and security. Nevertheless, it is important to ask why the R2P norm has been increasingly accepted by UN member states.Researchers who have attempted to answer this question tend to describe its chronological and historical process, but do not clarify or identify actors, factors and mechanisms which have promoted the norm diffusion of R2P. In addition, constructivist scholars who have been engaged in explaining norm diffusion processes pay attention to the role of norm entrepreneurs who persuade actors to accept their newly advocated norms by changing actors’ preferences. However, based on such explanations, it is difficult to understand the case of R2P norm diffusion, since the agreement of R2P in 2005 was achieved while there was a group of member states who were suspicious of or strongly opposed to the norm, including the United States. The purpose of this article is thus to elucidate the political process in which the R2P norm has diffused by analyzing why and how UN member states unanimously agreed upon R2P in 2005 and 2009.The article concludes that mechanisms of persuasion and negotiation among UN member states functioned successfully in gaining a consensus and promoting norm diffusion of R2P. In the early stage of norm diffusion, agreement is likely to be achieved through negotiation in order to accommodate various preferences of member states and seek mutual concessions. The agreement on R2P in 2005 through such negotiation was then a reference point by which norm entrepreneurs successfully persuaded member states to accept the R2P norm. Through persuasion by such entrepreneurs as the UN Secretary-General, his special adviser and NGOs, many states which were skeptical of R2P in 2005 changed their discourse in its favor. As a result, member states by consensus adopted the General Assembly resolution on R2P in 2009. This shows that norm entrepreneurs succeeded in stimulating the norm diffusion by persuading member states to change their preferences on R2P.