著者

吉川 洋子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, no.75, pp.130-149,L13, 1983

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Japanese-Philippine negotiations on war reparations lasted from 1951 through 1956, often interrupted by disagreements on the terms of payment. Significantly, the diplomatic deadlocks were often broken by informal channels of communications and secret talks. A host of political and business leaders who had varying degrees of interests in each other's country participated.<br>A most important breakthrough in deadlocked talks was made in New York and Washington in November 1954 by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose secret meetings were arranged by the Premier's confidants on Philippine affairs, Nagano Mamoru and Shiohara Tamotsu. Nagano, a leading steel industrialist, had business interests in the Philippine iron mines and other resources, and had his own proposal on a variety of development projects to be financed by reparation funds. Shiohara, Executive Director of the Philippine Society of Japan, had been a personal friend of Senator Laurel since the Japanese occupation period when Laurel was President of the Republic and Shiohara served his government as an advisor on internal affairs.<br>Nagano played several other roles during the whole process, including one as a member of the Japanese delegation for reparations talks. So did many other leaders such as former Ambassador Murata Shozo, Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and businessmen like Furukawa Yoshizo who had lived in the Philippines before the war and claimed to be experts about the country.<br>Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in May 1955 by Ferino Neri, chief Philippine reparations negotiator, who ran a series of secret meetings in Tokyo with political and business influentials regarding the terms of payment. He finally obtained Prime Minister Hatoyama's confidential endorsement of his proposed terms. This success was made with the skillful help of Hatoyama's Deputy Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto Takizo, who apparently had many Philippine acquaintances primarily through the Free Masonry whose members pointedly included Hatoyama, Senator Camilo Osias, and most probably Senator Laurel.<br>The long negotiations demonstrated the significant roles played by informal contact-makers on both sides. Many of them were those with official capacity seeking secret contacts, but some without official capacity also volunteered secretly to help the talks. Both Japanese and Philippine political cultures weigh personal ties, particularly, ties based on clientelism, in political dealings. The interaction of the two cultures over such difficult negotiations multiplied the effectiveness of informal contact-makers.

著者

鹿 錫俊

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_140-176_151, 2014-03-31 (Released:2015-10-20)

参考文献数

17

著者

臼井 陽一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.179, pp.179_163-179_166, 2015-02-15 (Released:2016-01-23)

著者

大嶋 えり子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_103-184_116, 2016-03-30 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

66

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Recognising memories of past perpetrations or not is often an issue connected with responsibility and reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This has been for a long time an issue vexing French authorities.In the 1990’s, French government and parliament began to recognise memories related to the colonisation and the independence war of Algeria. Although French authorities had kept silent on those dark events to which many fell victim on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, they started to recognise memories related to Algeria by erecting memorials, opening museums and making laws.This article aims at elucidating why the French parliament made laws recognising memories related to Algeria. Making memory-related laws, called “memory laws (lois mémorielles)”, is a particular way to France to recognise certain perceptions of the past, and is different from other memory recognitions as it has a binding force.I thus considered two laws, made in respectively 1999 and 2005. The law passed in 1999, that I will call the “Algerian war law”, replaces the term “the operations in North Africa” with “the Algerian war or the battles in Tunisia and Morocco” in the French legislative lexicon. It officially recognises that the conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 was a war, whereas it has been long reckoned to be a domestic operation aiming at maintaining order. The law enacted in 2005, that I will call the “repatriate law”, pays homage to former French settlers in Algeria for their achievements and emphasises the “positive role of the French presence abroad”.This study shows that those two laws were made in order to reinforce national cohesion among French people, instead of fostering dialogue between Algerians and French. By examining the wording and the law making processes of the two acts in question, especially the debates conducted at the National Assembly, it sheds light on how French elected representatives tried not to acknowledge France’s responsibility for the damages caused during the colonisation and the independence war and how they attached little importance to reconciliation with Algeria. Both laws indeed do not contain memories of Algerian people harmed under French rule, except some parts of the memory of Harkis, who fought with the French army during the war.The recognition of memories by official authorities of former perpetrators has significant repercussions and can encourage reconciliation between antagonists. It however tends to avert eyes from victims’memories in France when the past related to Algeria is in question. Issues connected with memory do not only concern relations between France and Algeria, but also involve the larger question of how to remember perpetrations caused by discriminatory policies and how to overcome them to accede to reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.

著者

今井 真士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_44-172_57, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

28

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It is often assumed that, even if opposition parties can participate in electoral politics, they are fragmented, insufficient and insignificant under authoritarian regimes in which the ruling elites have maintained their political power for the long term. Recently, however, there have been not a few pre-electoral coalitions in various countries in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Post-Communist World and the Middle East that opposition parties have formed with each other during the parliamentary elections. Under what conditions do opposition parties form pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty authoritarian regimes? There are still a few studies on pre-electoral coalitions under authoritarian regimes, though even such arguments have not consider a possibility that opposition parties could form them not only in competitive context but also in hegemonic one: In other words, these studies have treated a degree of party competitiveness as a given condition and dismissed a question of how it affects coalition formation among opposition parties. Therefore, this article focuses on party competition and electoral institutions, and attempts to testify their effects on the pre-electoral coalitions formed by the leading opposition parties by using an original data of the parliamentary elections from 1961 to 2008 in multiparty authoritarian regimes in which ruling elites have maintained their political power for more than a decade. The first section outlines it as a background of pre-electoral coalition formation of opposition parties that the number of authoritarian regimes which adopted a multiparty system has dramatically increased since the 1990s. Although compelling to adopt a multiparty system as a part of political liberalization, ruling parties have still tended to maintain their economic, social and political dominance and the opposition parties have tended to be in a disadvantageous position: It is authoritarian single-party dominance. The second section provides four hypotheses of pre-electoral coalitions focused on the party competition and the electoral institutions on the basis of two contrasting logics derived from the analyses of authoritarian regimes:One is that multiparty elections can facilitate their political liberalization, and another is that they can foster their political stability. The third section testifies several models with a large-N logistic regression with a sample of 248 parliamentary elections in 54 countries in the period 1961-2008. These models show that the leading opposition party is more likely to form pre-electoral coalitions with other parties when (1) the opposition parties as a whole have more seat share and when (2) the Effective Number of Opposition Parties (ENOP) increase, but that it is less likely to do it when (3) the numbers of the interaction term of seat share and ENOP increase and when (4) the plurality voting system is adopted. Finally, this article concludes by emphasizing that political institutions matter in authoritarian regimes.

著者

大山 貴稔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_1-180_16, 2015

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"International contribution", diffused in the wake of Gulf War, is a peculiar idea in Japan. Western International Relations Theory (IRT) talks about "international coordination" and/or "international cooperation", but never deals with "international contribution". I'm going to focus on the idea of "international contribution", which enables me to discuss Japanese perception of international relations and encourages me to reconsider so-called IRT.How does the idea of "international contribution" rise up to the surface? The historical overview of this question is presented in the first section. Through the rapid economic growth, the prime ministers of Japan such as Eisaku Sato, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Noboru Takeshita came to feel the enhanced international status as one of big powers, which was unaccompanied by Japan's actual performance. This gap between the expectation from "international society" and the reality in "international society" provided the setting for the idea of "international contribution". The emergence of this idea was nothing more than contingent use initially. Notwithstanding this genesis, "international contribution" precisely captured something like the flavor of the time and got into circulation.Then, how was "international contribution" mentioned? The structural outline, which is visible in the use of "international contribution", is inductively extracted in the second section. The perception that Japan had taken "free ride" on "public goods" arousing international criticism keenly made Japanese realize the necessity of "international contribution". Furthermore, "international society" is hypostatized in the background of "international contribution", dredged through the comparison with "international coordination" and "international cooperation". These understanding denote that at least for most of the Japanese the realm of international relations is not "anarchy".Besides, how was "international contribution" as practice put into? Alongside of this question, transition of subject positions, especially pertaining to the Self Defense Force (SDF) and the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), is reviewed in the third section. Although dispatching SDF which evokes the shade of military forces had long been regarded as taboo in the postwar period, the SDF brought about recognition as an actor of "international contribution" together with growing necessity of "international contribution". NGO, on the other hand, came to accumulate fund and human material due to escalating interest in "international contribution". Then the governmental awareness of NGO has gradually changed and the government has got to utilize NGOs.Various aspects of "international contribution" are sketched through the analysis of these chapters. Based on these aspects, I wonder if "international contribution" is a certain type of IRT. It functioned historically as a "lens" which gave us some "answers" at that time. If that's the case, we ought to consider what the "academic" theory is and what it should be.

著者

野口 和彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_157-184_165, 2016-03-30 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

21

著者

植木(川勝) 千可子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_1-203_16, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

47

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This special issue explores the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations. This problem is particularly important because several changes are underway that may alter our understanding of nuclear weapons and how they might shape and be shaped by international relations. What is the situation surrounding nuclear weapons today and have the changes increased or decreased the likelihood of war?The changes we observe are threefold. First is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are now in what some call the “second nuclear age.” There has been an emergence of new and potential nuclear powers, such as India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. Second, we see the development of lower yield nuclear weapons. Third, there is a growing and strong support in the world community for the ban on nuclear weapons.Then, what are the impact of these changes? And how will we be able to reach the answers? I offer several hypotheses about nuclear weapons and war. How does the acquisition of nuclear weapons change the behavior of the state that has acquired them? Secondly, will smaller nuclear weapons decrease or increase the chances of war? What are the arguments in favor of and against lower yield nuclear weapons? And thirdly, how do norms help deter the first use of nuclear weapons?The articles in this issue share this understanding of these changes and seek to offer insights into overcoming the problems. They analyze the current situation and seek to find answers from past cases of success and failure. Several articles focus on the future of nuclear disarmament and arms control. They seek to identify causes for success from past agreements and analyze possible problems in the future. One article tests competing hypotheses on nuclear stability and bipolar stability and finds that nuclear hypothesis offers a stronger explanation. Still another looks at the strength of norms on nuclear weapons. Others explore the policies of Russia, Japan and the United States.

著者

上村 威

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_174-187_177, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

大島 美穂

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_1-189_16, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

22

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The purpose of this volume is to review the relationship between International Politics and Regional Studies from the perspectives of each field, and to re-examine Regional Studies contribution to International Politics. It has been quite some time since Stanley Hoffmann, among others, indicated that International Relations (IR) was an American social science, and it has become commonplace to affirm that IR is not “international” at all, but is rather characterized by a pervasive Anglo-American mode of thought and resulting conceptual and spatial boundaries. Since then a limited number of studies have emerged to enhance our understanding of how IR is perceived in distinct places around the globe, and one of the most important of these is a series on “geocultural epistemologies in IR” by Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver. The configuration of the JAIR membership shows that in Japanese academic circles IR has developed in a dual format with one branch focusing on theoretical research and global studies and the other on regional studies and historical research, and, moreover, that those tendencies are different from American IR. As another distinct feature, these two areas of research do not exist in an isolated manner, and more than a few members not only carry out regional studies but also incorporate a profound knowledge of theoretical research into their work, which has led to the development of significant resources and achievements. However, it is difficult to sustain this linkage as a steady process, and it seems that the majority of members, throughout their careers, study in a very narrow range of specialization with limited crossover into alternates branches of the field.It can be said that regional histories, as well as their political, economic, and social structures, have been formed in the context of international politics and that we cannot discuss regional issues without regard to international politics and vice versa. In this volume, by presenting the relationships between international politics and regional issues in the Middle East, Latin America, East Asia, South-East Asia, Russia and Europe, and by engaging in analysis of regional alliances in international conflict, we would like to try relativizing IR and the interaction of regional and international politics in evidence based research.

著者

高橋 良輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_146-184_156, 2016-03-30 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

65

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_75-195_91, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

70

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This article re-examines the historical process of framing Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which is called Renunciation of War Clause, and focuses on its function as reassurance by the loser. Dealing with the function, this research explains the reason why postwar Japan-U. S. relationship could dramatically progress conflict resolution from the total war to the restoration of peace from both theoretical and historical standpoints.To answer the question mentioned above, this article argues that, in terms of a theory of reassurance by the loser, Postwar Japan intended to treat the victor’s anxiety on its challenge by relying on the normative self-restraint of Article 9 of the Constitution. The argument regards the provision of the Article as a signal justified by an appropriate norm. While the U. S. was concerned about Japan’s challenge and intended to make it impossible by prohibiting armament, Japan dealt with the fear of the U. S. by reassuring its own intention. Japan sent a normative signal of reassurance, which bound itself by denying war and armament. Therefore, it is appropriate to understand that, in essence, Article 9 of the Constitution had practical meaning as a signal of reassurance in order to let the U.S. and other countries know Japan’s peaceful intention, rather than an abstract norm derived from the idea of pacifism, which came from regret for the war.Tracing the historical process of framing Article 9 of the constitution reveals that it worked as the loser’s reassurance. The process was the opposite direction of the order of the completed text. The U. S. home government decided to disarm Japan at first, and the local commander MacArthur followed the policy. On the other hand, as Japanese leader, Prime Minister Shidehara proposed renunciation of war to MacArthur. However, it was just an ideal promise regarding peaceful intention, and lacked reassurance in terms of the capability. The Japanese government hoped to maintain the provision of armament in the constitution. It was unacceptable for the U.S., so it prepared a draft of the constitution which included renunciation of war proposed by Shidehara as well as the prohibition of arms. The U.S. presented the draft to Japan in order to confirm its peaceful intention. The draft imposed the cost of the prohibition of arms, while it mitigated the impression of burden by referring to the normative legitimacy of renunciation of war. The draft as the U.S. screening set up a hurdle that Japan should clear. Japan reassured the U.S. and other members of the international society by sending a signal which became costly due to the democratic institutional constraint of diet deliberations. It made Renunciation of War Clause a national pledge.

著者

湯川 勇人

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.190, pp.190_130-190_144, 2018-01-25 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

67

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This article investigates that how Japan pursued inconsistent diplomatic conceptions, establishing a New Order in East Asia and avoiding the deterioration of the U.S.-Japan relationship, by focusing on Foreign Minister Arita’s diplomatic strategy toward the United States from the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War to 1940. It argues that Arita tried to maintain the U.S.-Japan relationship within the framework of the Nine Power Treaty by rectifying the open door policy for establishing a New Order in East Asia.During the initial stage of the Second Sino-Japanese war, Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita devoted his primary attention to the creation of so called Toa Shin Chitsujo (New Order in East Asia) by establishing an economic block with China and a puppet state “Manchukuo.” The United States had been opposing this policy as it infringed upon the Nine Power Treaty which reaffirmed the open door policy and guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. At the same time, Japan was economically dependent upon the US especially for raw materials that were of vital importance for Japan’s war against China.The preset study reveals in what way Arita pursued two inconsistent diplomatic goals: avoiding the deterioration of US-Japan relations while attempting to establish a New Order in violation of the Nine Power Treaty. Previous researches interpreted Arita’s Statement of 18 November 1938 as abandonment of the Nine Power Treaty and alteration of the status quo. However, this article shows that Arita made efforts to keep Japanese engagement consistent with the Nine Power Treaty by asking the Department of State, through the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, to rectify the interpretation of the open door policy in exchange for the protection and respect of the US rights in China. In that sense, the Nine Power Treaty served to Arita as a valuable asset in achieving inconsistent diplomatic objectives.In order to alleviate the Depart of State skepticism about Arita’s approach and gain the US trust, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to engage in protection of the US interests in China. Then policy makers of the Foreign Ministry decided to settle the problem of the blockade of the Yangtzu River. However, this policy had never been implemented because of the strong opposition from young diplomatic officers. As a result, the Department of State made their perception of Japan worse, and it bankrupted the Arita’s foreign policy.

著者

佐伯 喜一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.5, pp.40-59, 1958-06-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

18

著者

大串 和雄

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.207, pp.207_49-207_64, 2022-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

40

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This article identifies the characteristics of transitional justice (TJ) in Latin America compared to other world regions and explores the causes of such characteristics. The author highlights seven discernible aspects in TJ as practiced in Latin America. First, Latin America pioneered the current wave of TJ in the mid-1980s. Consequently, the Latin American experience inspired and contributed to the development of the TJ “field” at the global level. Truth commissions and “the right to the truth” may be counted among such contributions. Further, numerous perpetrators were successfully prosecuted in Latin America, perhaps on par with the Western Balkans. Second, the “post-authoritarian type” predominates in Latin America’s TJ, as opposed to the “post-conflict type.” Only four countries, i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, had “post-conflict TJ.” Third, the punishments of the perpetrators were almost exclusively assumed by the national courts rather than international or hybrid courts. Nevertheless, prosecutions in the national courts of foreign countries had some significance. Fourth, regional human rights institutions, i.e., the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, were instrumental in advancing victims’ rights. Fifth, domestic factors were far more important than international factors in Latin America’s TJ. The limited international involvement may be explained by the pioneering character of Latin America’s TJ (as the international community only began to involve itself in TJ in the 1990s). More importantly, it may be attributable to the predominance of the “post-authoritarian type” (because the international community often serves as a mediator in internal armed conflict, but not in democratization settings). Sixth, the driving force of TJ in Latin America has been victims and their supporters, especially domestic human rights NGOs, which were far more instrumental than international and foreign NGOs in advancing TJ in their countries. Seventh, in Latin America, the principal demands of victims were the punishment of the perpetrators and the truth, although this conclusion should be qualified by several important caveats provided in the article. The truth can be divided between the “micro truth” (what happened to the particular victims) and the “macro truth” (the overall pattern of human rights violations and war crimes in the country). The victims were eager to discover the micro truth and, although most knew the macro truth, they demanded that it be recognized by the state and society. The article advocates for considering the Latin American experience to obtain a less skewed and more diversified representation of TJ around the world.

著者

小泉 直美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_81-189_97, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

58

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The question why the Soviet Union radically changed its foreign policy course which led to the end of the Cold War has been the subject of controversy in various academic journals on international relations. Realists argue that the economic downturn brought Gorbachev and other conservative leaders including the military to rethink its antagonistic policy toward the United States seeking for some respite. Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that the radical change in foreign policy was caused by the new idea and identification which Gorbachev had acquired through learning of the Common Security concept from Western peace researches. While these debates have shed light on how the end of Cold War began, they have been indifferent to how the U.S.-Soviet Cold War really ended. This paper focused on this missing point of these controversies.From the perspective of Russian regional studies, the Gorbachev initiative including bold unilateral concessions were extremely rare in the history of a country with deep concerns on its national security like the Soviet Union. Those unilateral concessions were their tactics to make the Western nations believe in the Soviet sincerity to overcome mutual distrust and make Europe more safer place for their conducting economic reform. Even Gorbachev noticed mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the West would not disappear overnight. Therefore what the Gorbachev’s team really aimed at was the lower -leveled parity of strategic forces between the West and the East. Since this simple fact was forgotten in the euphoria of Russian renouncement of communism and the alleged U.S. victory over the Soviet Union, the ‘ending’ of the end of the Cold War became quite ambiguous. START II was hastily signed in January 1993 by Boris El’tsin and George H. W. Bush. This treaty was to sum up a series of arms control negotiations which was to create the strategic stability between the two sides, but in reality it was much disadvantageous to weakened and confused Russia and only left a sense of unfairness to Russians.

著者

大内 勇也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.192, pp.192_33-192_49, 2018-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

59

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The adoption of international human rights treaties has been a subject of great interest in International Relations. As human rights protection has been regarded as a domestic matter, it is understandable that many states were reluctant to restrict their sovereignty by treaties in this field.Existing studies therefore focus on treaties with implementation mechanisms like human rights courts or individual petitions. At the same time, these studies assume that agreements on human rights treaties depend on governments’ acceptance of principled norms of human rights. And based on discourse theory, they claim that states agree on the treaties because they are “persuaded” by arguments referring to principled norms.Yet such norms do not always imply specific means to realize human rights. Therefore, treaty implementation mechanisms are often contentious issues in negotiations, and the results of negotiations vary. Existing studies cannot explain the differences in these results. What explains the incorporation of implementation mechanisms?To answer this question, this article focuses on legal experts as political actors in “epistemic communities” and explains how they incorporate implementation mechanisms into human rights treaties. I argue that legal experts are able to define agendas and specific policy for governments in two ways. First, when human rights problems are internationally recognized, these experts create a legal framework for international policy and take the initiative in drafting. Second, they prepare the draft of their policy preferences and direct the course of governmental negotiations.In the two steps above, three conditions affect the extent of legal experts’ influence on governments’ positions. First, the higher the level of agreement between legal experts on treaty provisions, more influential the experts become. Second, the more uncertain governments are about the nature of human rights problems and the prospect for policies, more dependent they are on legal experts. Third, the greater the level of disagreement between governments on treaty provisions, the more influential legal experts become. When these conditions are favorable for legal experts (i.e., agreement between experts, high government uncertainty, and disagreement between governments), they can realize a treaty that matches their preferences.To test my argument, I analyze the drafting process of the European Convention on Human Rights adopted at the Council of Europe in 1950. This convention is a significant case of providing both the human rights court and individual petitions. Yet most states were unwilling to provide these implementation mechanisms in the beginning. My analysis shows that legal experts of the European Movement succeeded in incorporating these provisions into the convention, because the three conditions were favorable for legal experts. These conditions made it possible to realize their human rights project despite the major power, Britain, strongly opposing both of the implementation mechanisms.

著者

金 栄鎬

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.177, pp.177_42-177_56, 2014-10-30 (Released:2015-11-13)

参考文献数

47

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This paper examines South Korea’s change of foreign policy toward Japan due to its changes of government since democratic transition in 1987 by taking into account the three points of view: First, I focus on the policy makers’ ideal inclination, conservative or progressive, as well as on power relations among ruling party, opposition party and public opinion; Second, South Korea’s policy toward Japan have to be analyzed in connection with ones toward North Korea and US; Third, I take the 1965 regime, under which diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan was established with containing not merely communism but also post-colonial issues, as an indicator to classify continuity and change of the policy. The two conservative governments after the 1987 transition, Roh Tae-Woo and KIM Young-Sam administration, showed continuity of foreign policy toward Japan as seen from the perspective of the 1965 regime. The two administrations cooperated with Japan when Japan kept adopting hard-liner policy toward North Korea. The two also continued containing post-colonial issues although South Korea instead confronted Japan when Japan tried soft-liner policy toward North Korea. The change of power on election in 1997, unprecedented in the South Korean political history, brought about a significant change. Kim Dae-Jung’s “National Government” developed reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and simultaneously maintained cooperation with Japan. Roh Moo-Hyun’s “Participatory Government” forged ahead with such a change. It pursued peace and prosperity with North Korea despite confronting US because a fear of entrapment was mounted among South Korean public opinion. Roh, moreover, promoted policy toward Japan to overcome the colonial past, which have had been contained under the 1965 regime. Lee Myung-Bak’s “Practical Government”, inaugurated in return of power to conservatives after 10 years’ progressives. Lee administration adopted again hard-liner policy toward North Korea and reintensified the alliance with US while adhered to the 1965 regime with Japan. Lee, however, confused coherence of policy and strategy toward Japan by sudden landing on Takeshima/Dokdo in just before his term expired. The present Park Geun-Hye administration, irrespective of her conservative ideal inclination, couldn’t but tackle with the post-colonial issues from the beginning of the term, as well as is trying a kind of soft-liner policy toward North Korea.

著者

山崎 望

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_14-194_28, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

28

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The liberal democratic regime, which survived confrontation with the fascist and communist regimes, has spread throughout the world, but with the loss of its enemies, it has acquired the problem of creation of legitimacy and effectiveness by oneself. The crisis of the liberal democratic regime, which is unable cope with this, has been pointed out.In this paper, noting the various countries where the liberal democratic regime has been consolidated, we discuss the transition of legitimacy and the concomitant repositioning of violence through the reconsideration of the various discourses of political theory that point out the transition of legitimacy, an element of the political regime.First, we examine the discourses that have noted the transition of legitimacy in the liberal democratic regime. Specifically, we focus on the articulation of the legitimacy of liberalism and democracy; examine the discourses of 1) the undoing of democracy by neo-liberalism (W. Brown), 2) the crisis of liberalism due to populism, also referred to as the shadow of democracy (J.-W. Müller), and 3) the suspension of liberal democracy due to rules in the state of exception (G. Agamben); and discuss the transition from liberal democracy to another type of legitimacy.Next, we examine discourses that point out the transition of the legitimacy of the sovereign or national state system (international political system), which is a prerequisite of liberal democratic regime. Specifically, focusing on the articulation of the legitimacy of sovereignty and nationalism, we examine the 1) disruption of sovereignty due to racism (M. Wieviorka), 2) ruin of nationalism due to cosmopolitanism (U. Beck), and 3) transformation of legitimacy due to the formation of a new form of polity, ‘Empire’ (M. Hart & A. Negri), and discuss the transition from sovereignty and nationalism to another type of legitimacy.In addition, we discuss the transition of legitimacy based on the articulation of various discourses by dividing them into the three levels of national political regime, international political system, and the level of the intersection of international politics and national politics. Finally, we sketch the repositioning of violence associated with the “triple transition” of legitimacy and discuss the challenges that confront it.

著者

大山 貴稔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_1-180_16, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

99

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“International contribution”, diffused in the wake of Gulf War, is a peculiar idea in Japan. Western International Relations Theory (IRT) talks about “international coordination” and/or “international cooperation”, but never deals with “international contribution”. I’m going to focus on the idea of “international contribution”, which enables me to discuss Japanese perception of international relations and encourages me to reconsider so-called IRT. How does the idea of “international contribution” rise up to the surface? The historical overview of this question is presented in the first section. Through the rapid economic growth, the prime ministers of Japan such as Eisaku Sato, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Noboru Takeshita came to feel the enhanced international status as one of big powers, which was unaccompanied by Japan’s actual performance. This gap between the expectation from “international society” and the reality in “international society” provided the setting for the idea of “international contribution”. The emergence of this idea was nothing more than contingent use initially. Notwithstanding this genesis, “international contribution” precisely captured something like the flavor of the time and got into circulation. Then, how was “international contribution” mentioned? The structural outline, which is visible in the use of “international contribution”, is inductively extracted in the second section. The perception that Japan had taken “free ride” on “public goods” arousing international criticism keenly made Japanese realize the necessity of “international contribution”. Furthermore, “international society” is hypostatized in the background of “international contribution”, dredged through the comparison with “international coordination” and “international cooperation”. These understanding denote that at least for most of the Japanese the realm of international relations is not “anarchy”. Besides, how was “international contribution” as practice put into? Alongside of this question, transition of subject positions, especially pertaining to the Self Defense Force (SDF) and the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), is reviewed in the third section. Although dispatching SDF which evokes the shade of military forces had long been regarded as taboo in the postwar period, the SDF brought about recognition as an actor of “international contribution” together with growing necessity of “international contribution”. NGO, on the other hand, came to accumulate fund and human material due to escalating interest in “international contribution”. Then the governmental awareness of NGO has gradually changed and the government has got to utilize NGOs. Various aspects of “international contribution” are sketched through the analysis of these chapters. Based on these aspects, I wonder if “international contribution” is a certain type of IRT. It functioned historically as a “lens” which gave us some “answers” at that time. If that’s the case, we ought to consider what the “academic” theory is and what it should be.