著者

小阪 裕城

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_92-193_107, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

62

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This article examines the politics involved in the right to petition the United Nations (U.N.) in the drafting process of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Experiences of war and ideas such as “the Atlantic Charter” published by the allied countries inspired people around the world to become politically active. They started to seek not only a victory over the Axis countries but also a victory over injustices they face in their respective countries. When the U.N. Human Rights Commission began drafting the International Bill of Rights in 1947, it had already received many petitions from those people. This paper tries to answer the question of how nations responded to this situation, and how and why the article on the right to petition the U.N. was finally deleted from the drafting process of the declaration.As major African American civil rights groups were trying to send their petition to the U.N., internationalizing racial problems in the United States, the issue concerning the right to petition became an important issue for the U.S. government. The Interdepartmental Committee on International Social Policy, which was established by the Truman administration in 1946, discussed the issue of whether the international bill of human rights should be a legally binding “convention” or “declaration,” which was not supposed to be legally binding. While some countries such as Australia and India proposed mechanisms to implement a human rights charter, the U.S. State Department was reluctant to draft a binding convention at that moment, fearing that it was so provocative for the conservatives that they would disagree with the U.S. commitment to the United Nations.Separate from the American concern, the U.N. Human Rights Commission decided to draft both a convention and a declaration and started to make a series of drafts of the declaration that included the article on the right to petition the U.N. U.S. policymakers discussed these and were concerned about the article of the right to petition. What worried the U.S. is that recognizing the right to petition would stimulate “unwarranted hopes” around the world. The U.S. tried to revise the draft articles by replacing the “right to petition the U.N.” with the “right to communicate with the U.N.” From the U.S. viewpoint, the right to petition the U.N. was misleading because people might think that the U.N. would consider petitions and would take action for redressal of grievances in their respective countries.Eventually, in 1948 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without an article on the right to petition. Most of the earlier studies on the drafting process of the declaration have not examined international and domestic politics over the right to petition. Thus historians have usually described the Declaration as a part of the history of the formation of U.S. hegemony or as the beginning of the history of the successful development of the international human rights regime. Keeping in mind individuals as a subject of international law and politics, politics concerning the article on the right of petition allows us to analyze history from a different angle.

著者

浜 由樹子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_114-189_129, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

44

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As is frequently argued by scholars of international politics, particularly in the school of constructivism, identities and national interests are cognitive phenomena and are socially constructed. A state’s collective, regional identity constitutes recognition of threats, opportunities, enemies, and allies. However, theoretically, there remains ambiguity about endogenizing identity change or transformation. Case studies concerning Russia’s new identity formation after the collapse of the Soviet Union can contribute to strengthen this point.Under the Putin administration, Russia has vigorously attempted to get involved in the regional cooperation in Asia. Especially in the past three years after the Ukraine crisis, perhaps in response to the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the “West”, not a few specialists have observed its “pivot to the East.” Russia’s Eurasian identity plays an essential role in this attempt. The study examines how Russia’s Eurasian identity was formed, how it developed, and how the concept of “Eurasia,” referring to the region bridging Europe and Asia, has been argued in the discourse of diplomacy.In the author’s view, there are several groups of “Neo-Eurasianists” currently. Some scholars speculated the influence on Russian politics of ideologues who claimed Russia to be an anti-Western, Eurasian power; however, most of them focused too much on some extremists, such as Alexandr Dugin. To explain the association between the Eurasian idea and diplomacy, more attention should be paid to the specialists of or working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Leading Russian scholars and specialists in East Asian studies took considerable time to conceptualize Russia’s new regional identity. Some of them rediscovered the old idea of “Eurasianism” which originated in the 1920s–30s among the émigré intellectuals. To consolidate the ties of the Russian nation with states in the post-Soviet space and its regional integration with Asia, those who were searching for a new regional identity found it and modified it into “Neo-Eurasianism.” In several respects, the updated version of Eurasianism is relevant to the present situation of Russia.In their recent discourses, “Eurasia” has the following two features. (1) It represents a “mega region” in the ongoing project to connect several regional architectures such as EAEU, SCO, Chinese SREB project, and ASEAN. In the project, Russia characterizes itself as a hub of Eurasian regional powers, and (2) as an intermediary concept to legitimize cooperation with China, it subsequently appeals its orientation to multipolarity in the world, which has been the vision as well as the goal of Russia’s diplomacy since the mid-1990s. In brief, Eurasian identity motivates Russia’s policies and behaviors during the “Pivot to the East”.

著者

小木曾 照行 桜井 敏照 藤村 道生 義井 博

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.151-169, 1962

著者

中井 愛子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_65-189_80, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

65

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This paper clarifies the decisive role played by Latin-American “legal” regionalism in the 19th century in relativizing European international law and dismantling the European monopoly of the power to set international principles.Simon Bolivar’s pan-Americanism in 1820’s is widely known as unsuccessful project for a political union of Latin American states. Actually, however, his project had two main pillars, the creation of a political union and that of “American public law,” and what was more important to the future world was the later. When Americas achieved their independence in 1810–20’s, the governing international principles were that of Vienna, agreed among European Powers and whose basic features were dynastic legitimacy and balance of power between monarchs. These principles were not compatible with the sovereign statehood of most of newly independent American states born in decolonial revolution and declared independence without recognition by ex-monarch. Nevertheless, those rules were considered as “European public law” or “European international law,” which was at that time mere synonym of “international law” governs the general relations between civilized nations. In this situation, Bolivar begun to pursue not only a union of Latin American states but also “American public law” which should be constituted by rules and principles that are different from that of Europe and suitable for America. Bolivar’s ideal American public law contains, e. g., popular legitimacy principle, denial of forcible intervention, obligatory peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereign equality, etc.The efforts of Latin American states to realize these ideal new norms continued throughout centuries. Certain of these norms have acquired universal approval, taking the place of old European originated norms. In the late 19th century, some Latin American scholars started to argue that the assumption of identity between “European international law” and “international law” was not appropriate any more asserting the existence of American international law and possible existence of other regional international laws. In the beginning of the 20th century, the existence of American international law was accepted in Europe with rise of social or objectivist legal thoughts and European regionalism. The modern academic assumption of the identity of “European international law” and “international law as the law of civilized nations” had disappeared in 30 years from 1880’s to 1910’s. Latin American legal pan-Americanism triggered this fundamental change of the conception of international law.

著者

栗原 健

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.6, pp.52-65, 1958-07-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

35

著者

石田 淳

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_56-175_69, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)

参考文献数

32

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The essence of realism is its attention to the exercise of power through which political actors pursue their goals of realizing desirable consequences. From the realist point of view, political actors aim at either maintaining or altering the status quo by getting others either to do what they otherwise would not do, or to refrain from doing what they otherwise would do. In other words, power relations and prudent actions are at the core of realism. The primary purpose of this article is to examine why this realist school of international relations went through changes of its analytical foci from the Interwar Era to the Nuclear Era in the twentieth century. The realism of the Interwar Era found its target of criticism in liberalism, which totally ignored the conflict of interests among major powers over the status quo. E. H. Carr in particular severely criticized the liberal defense of the status quo. Then, the ideological confrontation between the two crusading superpowers during the Cold War directed the realist research to the misperception of intentions. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, fully understood the seriousness of the security dilemma in the Cold War context, in which the intention of the liberal United States was naturally misperceived by the Soviet Union as demanding for change of the status quo in her favor and this misperception exacerbated the prospect for negotiated settlement of conflicts. Finally, the nuclear arms race during the Cold War generated awareness among realists that the avoidance of total nuclear war was in common interests between the Cold War rivals. In this context, realists came to be aware of not only the risks of misperceived threats but also those of misperceived promises among states. This article stresses that Yoshikazu Sakamoto, placed in a proper historical context, should be re-read as one of the few Japanese scholars of international politics, who chose to theoretically tackle contemporary American realist questions, often associated with Hans Morgenthau and Thomas Schelling.

著者

米 多

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.188, pp.188_62-188_76, 2017-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

70

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The purpose of this research is to examine the process of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan implementing its anti-communist alliance policy in the middle of the 1960s with the Vietnam War intensified as the background. After evacuating to Taiwan, the ROC government lead by Chiang Kai-shek continued to declare its intention to recapture the mainland China and build up a collective security treaty organization like SEATO with other anti-communist countries in East Asia.It is generally considered that Chiang Kai-shek eventually gave up trying to add or join any Asia military alliance in the early 1960s around 1963, but recent research in Korea has shown that the ROC still had an interest in it after that. This paper presents the truth by using the newly opened archives in Taiwan, Korea, and the U.S. Moreover, special attention is paid to the decision-makers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC as another major factor influencing the promotion of the alliance concept and their response to national and Cold War regional politics at the same time. Because whatever the outcome, the bilateral talks and negotiations for the treaty of military alliance, with the end goal being the improvement of mutual understanding between ROC and other Asian anti-communist countries, which would have a substantial effect on ROC’s foreign policy making later.At the beginning of 1964 when the French government was about to establish the diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chiang Kai-shek decided to commence military action as a countermeasure, and propose the concept of ‘Asian Anti-communist Alliance’ for setting up a new anti-communist alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of Vietnam (ROV) in advance in which the aim is to get the military support from ROK instead of U.S. and invading the mainland China through the North Vietnam, while the U.S. was starting to put great pressure on all the East Asian allies to follow the U.S. military strategy in Vietnam.The failure of the Sea battle of August 6 in 1965 made the ROC leaders recognized that the ROC’s military power was not strong enough. In the late 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek postponed the military action and let the POK take the initiative in APACL after losing interest in joining or adding a new alliance. On the other hand, the ROC’s diplomats started to coordinate their Asian foreign policy after the Concept of ‘Asian Anti-communist Alliance’ failed, in response to the regional political transformation in East Asia that most of the free countries had been seeking to improve the domestic economy rather than the ideological confrontation.

著者

野口 和彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_80-203_93, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

43

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Although the United States and the Soviet Union seriously competed with each other through nuclear arms racing, they never fought each other directly. This is a puzzle because the more severe the conflict is, the higher the incentives become for the conflicting parties to fight. To tackle this issue, I pick up two classical hypotheses explaining the surprising stability of the international system. H1 is the theory of nuclear revolution developed by Robert Jervis. H2 is the stability of bipolar world constructed by Kenneth N. Waltz. The Cuban Missile Crisis is used here to test these hypotheses. This case study is timely because we now know the details of this important political event. As a result of testing these two hypotheses, H1 passed and H2 failed: U.S. decisionmakers, especially John F. Kennedy, first got angry about the Soviet’s sudden installation of nuclear missiles’ sites on Cuba, but he gradually come to favor a quarantine because he was afraid of nuclear retaliation if the U.S. military attacked Cuba. This evidence confirms that H1 is valid. As for H2, this assumes that superpowers do not have to care about alliance politics in the bipolar world because their security is ultimately threated only by the other power, so it should only balance against the other superpower internally. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union both did worry about how their allies reacted, the US even endangered the missile deal with the Soviets for the sake of its relatively minor ally, Turkey. This evidence of superpower behavior is inconsistent with H2. In sum, the stability of the international system was maintained by the nuclear revolution, at least during the Cold War.

著者

張 帆

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_52-200_66, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

80

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As an independent discipline, International Relations (IR) has gone through 100th years. In recent years, “non-Western IR theories” and “Global IR” have become hot topics, and IR in Japan has been receiving more attention. Especially, many researchers focus on Realism in postwar Japan.In existing research, scholars always compare Japanese Realism and the Realist theory. However, this research approach does not realize the differences among “non-Western” IR. Therefore, it does not fully reveal the characteristics of Japanese Realism.This article makes a comparative study between Japanese Realism and Chinese Realism, especially focusing on Masataka Kousaka and Xuetong Yan, the most famous realists in Japan and China.In 1950s, Japanese intellectuals debated on foreign policy, and the Idealists who advocated unarmed neutral policy were the mainstream. Labelling the Conservatives who supported the US-Japan Security Treaty as “realists,” the Idealists criticized “realists” for ignoring the value issue, but only recognizing the de facto. Enlightened by Classical Realism, Kousaka proposed a new “realism” in which the power politics and value coexisted in 1960s. He also advocated a diverse view of power, with particular emphasis on the role of non-military forces. Based on these views, Kousaka suggested Japan center its foreign policy on non-military forces, play the role of middle power and peace state, and amend the Yoshida Doctrine.In China, IR did not really start until 1980s. Influenced by Scientism, Yan debated with the Marxists on the view of national interests and became a realist in 1990s. After then, Yan combined the Classical Realism with ancient Chinese political thought and proposed “Moral Realism” in 2010s. “Moral Realism” believes that the key of the power shift in international system lies in political leadership. A rising state could not become a dominate state unless it practices “morality”. China should amend the Deng Xiaoping Doctrine and promote a foreign policy based on the values of Confucianism.Through comparative analysis, we can find that Japanese Realism and Chinese Realism both (1) face the problems of “import” and “creation” of IR; (2) advocate the adjustment of foreign policy; and (3) stress the importance of value and non-material power. On the other hand, compared with Chinese Realism, Japanese Realism (1) takes the reality of “middle power” as starting point; (2) regards Pacifism as the value of Japan; and (3) is lacking sufficient concern for the construction of the theory.Japanese Realism takes a traditionalist approach and try to end the diplomatic debates in Japan and to amend the Yoshida Doctrine. From the perspective of the Scientism, Japanese Realism is not a theory, but a thought. Nevertheless, as a pioneer in the exploration of “non-Western” IR, it has brought us rich enlightenment.

著者

宮地 隆廣

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.174, pp.174_174-174_177, 2015-09-15 (Released:2015-07-28)

著者

山口 優人

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_83-204_98, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

61

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Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has led the global war on terrorism, which primarily targeted terrorists motivated by radical Islam, also known as Global Jihadists. This international military campaign caused many serious problems, such as heavy civilian casualties by the U.S.-led military actions, the expansion of Jihadist militant groups by the power vacuum in Iraq, and the overwhelming refugee influx in Europe. Many experts on international law or human rights have criticized preventive attacks, torture, and drone strikes targeting those suspected of being involved in terrorism activities as illegitimate.Critical terrorism studies have regarded the methodological vulnerability of mainstream terrorism studies as one of the causes of this problematic counterterrorism. This article reflects on the omissions of conceptual analyses in terrorism studies as an American social science by focusing on fanaticism, which is one of the key concepts in the New Terrorism theory. The assertion is that the concept of fanaticism has distorted the recognition of the Global Jihad in academic and political contexts. Thus, this article deconstructs the binary system of reason/fanaticism, exposing the arbitrariness of the system by hidden political power.The first section describes the process of constructing binary systems in terrorism studies: secular/religious motives and reason/fanaticism. This process is revealed by shedding light on significant works by Bruce Hoffman and Walter Laqueur. Hoffman has claimed the possibility of unprecedented attacks by religious terrorists because of the radical difference between secular motives and religious ones. He concluded that religion inspires terrorists to more destructive violence, for example, the use of weapons of mass destruction. Laqueur developed the binary system of secular/religious motives, using the term fanaticism, which means a mental illness caused by a loss of reason. He constructed the structure of reason/fanaticism in the core of his New Terrorism theory.However, this structure is invalid because our minds cannot be transcendentally divided between reason and fanaticism. The second section of the article thus points out that the structure’s boundary has been drawn arbitrarily from the perspective of the Enlightenment and Western modernization. By reviewing the Foucault/Derrida debate about madness, the author clarifies that our minds are the mixture of truth and falsehood. This means that terrorists who seem to be absolute fanatics follow truth to some extent. As long as scholars persist in using this term, terrorism studies will naturalize the distorted understanding of Global Jihad.Finally, the article presents some concepts in psychoanalysis or social psychology as an alternative approach to the New Terrorism theory. These studies have explained our irrational behaviors by focusing on our minds’ unconsciousness. We should reflect on the conceptual problems of existing studies from a critical perspective, paying attention to micro approaches more positively for the development of multidisciplinary terrorism studies.

著者

黒崎 輝

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_125-182_139, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

参考文献数

63

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In the late 1960s, the Japanese government’s Cabinet Research Office secretly investigated Japan’s nuclear weapons capability and then produced a report in 1968. From a technological and financial standpoint, the report concluded that Japan could build a small number of nuclear bombs without difficulty. Meanwhile Prime Minister Eisaku Sato had announced the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” in December 1967, but the Japanese government policy did not explicitly prohibit Japan from possessing a nuclear weapons capability. Relying on the 1968 report and other materials, some published works insisted that the Sato government sought to maintain Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. This article questions the validity of this argument by reexamining the 1968 report and Japan’s atomic energy development in comparison with a U.S. government study from the mid-1960s on nuclear non-proliferation policy toward Japan.Comparison of the analyses of the 1968 report and the U.S. study on Japan’s fissile material production capability reveals that the latter was based on a more realistic scenario of Japan’s nuclear armament than the former. The 1968 report assessed that Japan could build nuclear bombs by using the plutonium produced by a modified Calder Hall reactor purchased from the U.K. because Japan would obtain reprocessing capability in the early 1970s. To do so, however, required Japan to refuse the safeguards stipulated in the 1958 Japan—U.K. atomic energy agreement. The 1968 report found that it would be damaging and unlikely for Japan to consider such a course of action. In contrast, the U.S. study, which also concluded that Japan had the ability to manufacture plutonium bombs, assumed that Japan would construct a heavy-water moderated reactor using safeguards-free natural uranium to evade international safeguards. Unlike the U.S. study, the 1968 report did not explore feasible measures for Japan to build nuclear bombs.This article also argues that the Sato government lacked political determination to develop and maintain Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. In the late 1960s, Japan was acquiring a nuclear weapons capability as a result of its atomic energy development, which did not follow the scenario in the aforementioned U.S. study. The delay in the construction of a reprocessing plant in Tokai Mura illustrated that the Japanese government did not prioritize the development of Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, it became more difficult for Japan to go nuclear against the will of the U.S. because in the late 1960s the former deepened its dependence on the latter for atomic energy development. Nevertheless, Japan’s atomic energy complex and national security circles had a common interest in promoting Japan’s atomic energy development as a national policy, and consequently Japan retained its nuclear weapons capability.

著者

中島 琢磨

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_101-206_116, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

72

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify empirically the political and diplomatic processes centering on nuclear submarines’ visits to Japan in 1964. When the Security Treaty with the United States was revised in 1960, Japan legally stipulated that bringing nuclear weapons into its territory should be a matter for prior consultation. However, during the negotiations to revise the treaty, it did not place explicitly on the agenda the issue of port calls by nuclear-armed ships.On the other hand, the U.S. was rapidly advancing the development of nuclear weapons to be mounted on submarines. After the revision of the treaty, it successfully launched a Polaris missile from an underwater nuclear submarine, and proceeded with the development of Subrocs to be mounted on submarines. Under these circumstances, in June 1961 and January 1963, it requested Japan to accept visits by its nuclear submarines.The development of nuclear weapons technology and the existence of public information on it are factors that are essentially outside of alliance politics. And the former was originally intended by the U.S. to maintain its superiority over the Soviet Union and increase its credibility in the eyes of the allies. The development of Polaris missiles and Subrocs, however, put the Japanese government in a difficult position in domestic politics. Opposition legislators were able to grasp the development status of new nuclear weapons from information released by the U.S. and to take up the issue in the Diet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus had to consider how to handle, under the prior consultation system, cases of visits by submarines equipped with Polaris missiles and Subrocs.At the time MOFA, on the basis of pre-existing official documents and government statements that had been made in the Diet, offered legal and policy interpretations of such cases. However, there were various limitations in applying to sea-based nuclear weapons past policies that presupposed those that were land-based.In the end, while the government could not officially allow visits by nuclear-armed ships to Japanese ports, it also fell into a situation where it could not come to an explicit agreement with the United States on how to handle such visits under the Security Treaty. In this way, the development of new nuclear weapons to increase America’s credibility in the eyes of its allies had rather the political consequence of creating, for Japan, an alliance management dilemma. In 1964, in the absence of any resolution of the dilemma, Japan made a highly political decision to allow nuclear submarines to visit its ports.

著者

山本 章子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_111-182_124, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

参考文献数

56

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This article aims at reconsidering the decision making process of the Eisenhower administration on the revisions to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 as part of the policy for the U.S. oversea bases. The previous studies have argued the treaty revisions as part of American policy toward Japan with a motive to prevent her from neutralization. But so-called “New Look”, the cold war strategy of the Eisenhower’s administration which depended on nuclear weapon capability, built in the presence of oversea bases all over the world. Therefore, the U.S. government addressed lessening the complaint of the host nations to maintain the oversea bases. This article discusses the treaty revisions from the point of its relations with the Nash Report, the survey and recommendation on the situation and issues surrounding U.S. oversea bases, to point out how the treaty revisions have a close link with the comprehensive U.S. oversea-bases policy. Furthermore, my analysis focuses on the attitude of the U.S. military including the Pentagon. The previous studies have ignored the role of the U.S. military in terms of the treaty revisions, but they are a key actor as well as the Department of State and the American embassy in Japan because the U.S. military has a veto of security policies.During the period of the Eisenhower’s administration, the USSR’s success in hydrogen-bomb test and appeal for change for peace after death of Stalin escalated fear of entrapment and demand of reducing U.S.-Soviet tension among the U.S. allies. In addition, the success of the USSR in development of ICBM missiles and Sputnik I launching in 1957, persuaded the host nations to limit their alliance commitment to the United States. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. military forces for a long time and criminal jurisdiction procedures involving U.S. military personnel unfair to the host nations also led to public protest against the security policy of their government. As for Japan in 1950s, the presence of U.S. military bases was considered as an ongoing symbol of the “U.S. occupation”. What is more, the strong anti-nuclear sentiment everywhere in Japan strengthened the public’s fear of entrapment. The neutralists in Japan succeeded in propagating the idea that the U.S. military presence would increase the risk of entrapping Japan into unwanted nuclear wars after so-called “Sputnik shock”.Reflecting such a situation, the Nash Report recommended that the U.S. should examine alternatives to their base system in Far East. This recommendation became discussed seriously by the Operation Coordinating Board in spite of the opposition by the U.S. military. These altered the negative attitude of the U.S. military toward the treaty revisions.

著者

信夫 隆司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_146-178_155, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

27

著者

中村 覚

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_176-193_179, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

著者

庄司 潤一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_125-170_140, 2012-10-25 (Released:2014-10-26)

参考文献数

73

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It is often the case that when economic ties expand through trade, and the exchange of people expands, diplomacy will also take a favorable turn. However, in terms of the Japan-China relationship, which is symbolized by “cold political relations but hot economical relations,” such progress is not occurring. Because of incidents such as the collision of fishing boats off the coast of the Senkaku Islands, political tensions do not seem to be withering. Both Japan and China admit that the reason for this is the existence of the historical perception issue. However, until the 1970s, the historical perception issue was a domestic Japanese issue rather than a pending problem between Japan and China; but in 1982, with the textbook incident, it became an international issue. During this process, both the Japanese and Chinese governments have made certain political “compromises,” but this has instead stimulated domestic radical claims and both nations strengthening their nationalism, and this has created the structure of a vicious cycle. Furthermore, in the background, a composition was made involving the “politicization” of the historical perceptions of both countries and the “asymmetry” of respecting Chinese claims. Moreover, in recent years, the downturn of Japan and the rise of China have been making the historical perception issue more complex. In other words, the historical situation that Japan and China have never experienced coexistence as great powers, has been promoting a sense of mutual rivalry,which has undeniably led to the historical perception issue becoming more complicated. The historical perception issue has become a complex phenomenon as a result of its expansion in both countries after the textbook incident, such that the issue spans several dimensions of political diplomacy, academic research,and national sentiment; and it is becoming difficult to discuss it only within the framework of each government’s diplomacy. Therefore, it is necessary to work on the historical perception issue not only by considering diplomacy,but also by keeping watch on the achievements of academic research and on public opinion in both countries.

著者

松本 佐保

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_112-173_126, 2013-06-25 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

62

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Cultural diplomacy and cultural propaganda have been discussed by some scholars of British diplomatic history, but it is not clear what degree of influence these activities had upon the mainstream of diplomacy. This article attempts to explore the importance of cultural diplomacy for Britain in the first half of the twentieth century, including the world wars, by looking at the cases of British policy towards Italy and the United States. It begins by looking at Sir James Rennell Rodd, the British ambassador to Italy between 1908 and1919, who used his cultural diplomacy in order to persuade Italy to join the Allied side during the First World War. He helped to create the British Institute in Florence, which in 1917 came under the Ministry of Information (MOI) as part of the British propaganda effort. Once the war ended the MOI was dissolved, partly because the Foreign Office disliked its aggressive propaganda activities towards foreign countries. However, when it became apparent that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which were more advanced in the field of political and cultural propaganda, were using cultural diplomacy to increase their influence in the world, the Foreign Office reluctantly had to organize some form of propaganda to counter their activities. This led to the establishment of the British Council in 1934, which was, in part, loosely modeled upon the British Institute in Florence. It attempted to concentrate upon purely cultural activities, but with another war approaching this line was breached and the Director, Lord Lloyd, increasingly used the Council for political propaganda and intelligence-gathering. The greatest challenge came in the United States where British propaganda had to avoid the excesses of the First World War and yet still promote Britain`s cause. In this environment the Council`s cultural propaganda became useful by emphasizing the common ethnic and cultural roots of the two countries. In addition, the Council proved useful in the post-war period as its activities could be used to promote democratic values and thus encourage other countries, such as Italy and Greece, to move away from both fascism and communism. This article therefore demonstrates the importance of cultural diplomacy and how it contributed to the mainstream of British diplomacy.

著者

籠谷 公司 木村 幹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_103-181_114, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

33

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Since the end of World War II, historical legacy has caused a series of disputes between Japan and South Korea. Scholars attribute these repeated disputes to Japan’s failure to settle the compensation problem, American foreign policy toward Japan in the early period of the Cold War, the unequal distribution of national capabilities between Japan and South Korea during the Cold War, and the particularities of nationalism in both countries. The literature emphasizes the peculiarities in the Japan-South Korea disputes. However, this does not mean that we are not able to explain the Japan-South Korea disputes in a systematic manner. For example, Kagotani, Kimura, and Weber (2014) argue that South Korean leaders are more likely to initiate a political dispute with Japan in order to divert public attention from economic turmoil to Japan-South Korea disputes. What else drives South Korean leaders to start a political dispute with Japan? In this article, we focus on South Korean leaders’ motives and policy alternatives to explain how a trade dispute evolves into a political dispute between Japan and South Korea. We assume that a South Korean president is a policy-oriented actor and prefers to take a soft line toward Japan to manage Japan-South Korea relationships. The president also needs political support from the legislature in order to implement public policy. As the presidential approval rate declines, a candidate for the next president tends to behave as a hard-liner to attract public attention, and the legislature follows the candidate, not the president. To implement good public policy, the president is required to maintain his/her popularity and take a hard line. Given such political constraints, we examine the president’s choice. When the president faces a large trade deficit, he prefers to start a trade negotiation with Japan, not to initiate a political dispute to divert public attention. Only if the negotiation fails, the president initiates a political dispute by addressing historical legacy because issue-linkage can induce mutual concessions, and because even a concession in the political dispute, not the trade dispute, can help the president maintain his/her popularity in order to move back to a soft-line in the subsequent periods. Thus, the president often engages in this diversionary tactic and a trade dispute often evolves into a political dispute. We test whether a trade deficit is more likely to induce more South Korean hostile actions toward Japan. The statistical analysis using the event data confirms that trade imbalance favoring Japan often causes a political dispute regarding historical legacy. The case studies of Presidents Rho Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam reveal political decisions behind the escalation of Japan-South Korean disputes.

著者

深串 徹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_46-187_61, 2017

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<p>How to commemorate the Sino-Japanese war is a controversial issue in contemporary Taiwan. The government of the Republic of China (R. O. C.) often commemorates the war from legitimate Chinese government's point of view, whereas some Taiwanese scholars criticize it as ignoring the memories of the majority of Taiwanese people. As a result, scholarly attention in Taiwan has gradually been shifting to explore the memories of "ordinary" Taiwanese people during the war. At the same time, not enough attention is being paid to the concrete contents of the official memory of the war and how it was created. In particular, scholars are holding different images as to whether the official historical narrative of the war during Chiang Kai-shek period (1950–1975) could be recognized as containing "anti-Japanese" sentiment or not. The major factor for these divisions is lack of clear definition and indicators of what constitutes "anti-Japanese" sentiment.</p><p>This article defines the historical narrative that contains "anti-Japanese" sentiment as follows: If, in a certain period of time, a government claims that the reason why she is being cautious of Japan comes from its past adversarial relationship with her, that narrative could be characterized as containing "anti-Japanese" sentiment. As for the indicators, this paper establishes four criteria: 1) Was the war against Japan described as the most important fight in the R. O. C.'s history? 2) How strongly did the R. O. C. government stress its victimhood in the war? 3) Was reconciliation with Japan described as being done sufficiently? 4) When the R.O.C. had diplomatic conflict with Japan, did the government provoke Taiwanese people to remember the memory of war?</p><p>Using these definitions and indicators, this paper examines the R. O. C. government's official historical narrative of Sino-Japanese war during Chiang Kai-shek administration. The author argues that when there was diplomatic relations with Japan, the R. O. C.'s official narrative of war had a conciliatory tone toward Japan. While provoking hostile feeling against the Chinese Communist party in mainland to fight a civil war, the R. O. C. formed and used the memory of the Sino- Japanese war to promote its relations with Japan in order to consolidate anti-communist camp in East Asia. Therefore, during that period, the official historical narrative was hard to estimate as "anti-Japanese".</p><p>However, after the R. O. C. broke off its diplomatic relations with Japan, in response to latter's normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, the reconciliation with Japan was described as null and void because of destruction of peace treaty between the R. O. C. and Japan. Shortly afterwards, the narrative of victimization in the war grew stronger in the official discourse of the R. O. C., the historical narrative started to contain "anti-Japanese" sentiment.</p>